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# Globalization Revisited: Challenges & Opportunities

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# Globalization And Development *

**Keynote Address**
**Professor Deepak Nayyar**
**Vice Chancellor**
**University of Delhi**

**Abstract**

*This lecture endeavours to situate the process of globalization in the wider context of development. In doing so, it explores the implications of globalization for development in retrospect and prospect. The structure of the lecture is as follows. The first part sets out the essential meaning of development, in the light of the very uneven development experience and the fundamental change in thinking about development strategies over the past fifty years. The second part outlines the dimensions and characteristics of globalization in our times. The third part examines the economic factors, the political conjuncture and the intellectual rationale underlying globalization. The fourth part explores the historical origins of globalization through a comparison with the late nineteenth century, to highlight the similarities and the differences. The fifth part discusses how globalization led to uneven development then. The sixth part considers the development experience of the world economy during the last quarter of the twentieth century, which suggests that the exclusion of countries and of people, attributable partly to the logic of markets, is a fact of life. It suggests that, without correctives, it would lead to uneven development now. The concluding part argues that sensible strategies of development in a world of globalization should create economic space for the pursuit of national interests and development objectives. In this task there is a strategic role for the nation state, both in the national and in the international context.* ■

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## Global Identity: Nationality and Citizenship

**Dr. Ernest Wolf-Gazo, English & Comparative Literature Department**

In the 1990s a concept went about the world: globalization. The symptoms of the globalization process could be observed in the area of communications, economics and politics. Any sort of formal rationality could easily be put into forms and shapes of globalizations. However, as we enter the 21st century it became obvious that a mix between cultural habits and traditions, psychologies, ideologies and religions badly mixed with globalization. This, of course, is no surprise to those who deal with human affairs and not simply technical-formal rational forms of communications between human beings. Mathematical propositions can easily be globalized. Thus, the specific problems emerging in the new world of Internet, electronic mail and websites run analogically to the old problem of objectivity between the humanities and the natural sciences. It is easier to analyze a piece of moon rock whereby at the end of the analysis everyone agrees, than to decide what sort of food is most nutritious for everyone. Nutrition in terms of vitamins, minerals and calories are clear, but the cooking techniques and presentation of the food intake is an entirely different matter. Human being have a tendency even to fight and kills each other as to food intake. We happen to know, as a matter of fact, that developmental psychology tells us that human beings are very slow and arduous culture learners; yet, once they have taken in "their" form of acculturation in the early teenage years, nothing will change their habits and ways of doing and thinking. Any effort to force a change will be rebuffed and aggressive war-like behaviour emerges immediately. At the onset of the 21st century we witnessing this phenomenon daily on satellite television and, perhaps, immediate locality, be that in Europe, The United States, The Middle East, or the Far East.

The fact is that, whether I accept, or not accept, a mathematical equation as being valid, functional and truth, does not threaten my identity of any sort. I don't become depressed because I may think, with a sense of humour, of course, that one plus one makes three (of course everyone knows that the sum is equal to two, formally speaking). However, whether I am exiled, and the ancients understood this very well how to use as an equivalent to a death sentence, does threaten my wellbeing and identity. Socrates is the most famous example of a person who refuses to be exiled, because who could not live without his people and, of course, as his pupil Plato recounts, the truth is a supreme value for human beings.

We want to focus on a very narrow piece of phenomenon that accounts for an interesting contradiction in the globalization process and has already emerged as a serious source of friction between States and individuals, namely, the contradic-

tion between nationality and citizenship in terms of a global identity. Most people have not yet two or even three passports, but all have one mother and father and, usually, one country of birth. A century ago it was normal that a person died at the place where he or she was born. Communications and travel was limited, but only a few was able to travel trans-national. No matter where a person travelled the allegiance was clear: to once family and country, because both where identically enmeshed with a persons psychological well being. The emergence of the modern passport still did not cause a problem as long as the bearer of the passport identified himself or herself with its origin of issue. Formal identity of the passport holder and the real identity in terms of country and culture did not contradict themselves. We are talking about the respective elite of any country. Europe's aristocracy never had a "passport" problem or even a nationality problem. Elite status was sufficient compensation for any inconvenience in terms of country allegiance and emotional ties to once language and eating habits and music preference. Yet, with jet travel, international tourism and speedy communications as well as audio-visual access at any time to any place, the problem between nationality, or ethnic allegiance, and formal citizenship does become a problem, if not a major one in the long run.

Formal identity, such as a national ID or passport, and cultural identification can no longer be handled as though we are dealing with the same pair of shoes. In fact, we are dealing with apples and oranges. There have always been individuals who, due to their mixed national parentage and international education, in terms of bilingualism or even trilingualism, or simple outsider states, known today as minorities, where forced to take on a chameleon-like identity. Yet, the great majority of persons do not feel that contradiction between nationality and citizenship. No doubt, however, we are convinced, considering the phenomenon of globalization that this problem will, sooner or later, become an essential one, as we slowly acquire a global identity. This may take another century and several generations. As soon as the first humans will land on Mars and, perhaps, even cultivate habitats on Mars, human beings will have achieved, with great costs in blood, anxiety and fear, a sort of global identity everyone can identify. Yet, this is music for the future.

A short illustration from European history will help the matter: one of the basic problem that was during the process of the French Revolution was the status (politically and otherwise) of foreigners on French soil. Are foreigners given French citizenship on the basis that they enculturated or adaped themselves to the local cultural environment, or, are they still, despite the knowledge of the French language and acting out French eating habits, treated as foreigners? We only note language and eating habits, not to mention religious affiliations, or social status, or class adherence, ultimately gender identity. Will foreign homosexuals and lesbians be treated differently from locals? Will foreigners with syphilis (an old fash-

ioned illness) be treated differently from local? Of course, the usual claims are, even in the olden days, that locals are not perverse and don't have these illness, since, after all, they are more moral than foreigner. This is a very old belief, like cleanliness, whereby ethnic centrism is defended on grounds of morality, not to mention religion. Of course, citizenship gives a former foreigner the legal right not to be expelled from the country of his choice. On the formal level, the foreigner is equal to the local and the simple chance of birth doesn't turn out to be and advantage or disadvantage to the foreigner and native, deranged or healthy.

The acute observation by the French patrician Alexis de Tocquille on the momentous importance of the French Revolution is worth noting, even two-hundred years after the event:

> " The French Revolution aspired to be world-wide and its effect was to erase all the old national frontiers from the map ... it would be truer to say that it (the French Revolution) created a common intellectual fatherland whose citizenship was open to men of every nationality and in which racial distinctions were obliterated ".

These words sound like a dream in the first decade of the 21st century. Interestingly, he didn't mention women of different nationality. This, of course, would be expecting too much, considering that most countries and states today treat the nationality and citizenship issue, pertaining to women, differently than to men. Nationality, in terms of ethnic ties, or blood relations, are mixed with citizenship, often indiscriminately. An Iranian male national, even though he may have non-Iranian citizenship, is treated legally like an Iranian citizen in Iran, should he visit his "former" country. If he marries a non-Iranian, the non-Iranian wife, not to mention their children are treated legally as Iranian citizens (in terms of Islamic law) whether they protest or not. This is not the case for an Iranian female who may marry a non-Iranian man: she basically loses her rights, maybe even to return to her "native country", if she did not marry according to Islamic law, but "only" by international law. Their children will automatically be considered "foreigners", while in case of the Iranian man, "his" children with any non-Iranian woman will be considered "natives". These cases, not to mention military service, could be applied to most Middle Eastern countries and Far Eastern states. However, in the name of fairness, we must mention Switzerland, whereby a Swiss male's marriage to a non-Swiss results in immediate Swiss citizenship for the non-Swiss lady in question, not to mention a Swiss passport for her, while the same rule doesn't apply to Swiss females marrying non-Swiss males, in fact, their respective husband will always be without a Swiss passport. Needless, to say, this contradiction between ethnic identity and belonging to one's own kind usually overrides citizenship, even in our days.

The French revolutionaries had a hard time, as the revolution became more

violent and ecstatic, as to differentiate between the rights of native-born Frenchmen (not to mention women) and foreigners living in revolutionary France. Although in the 20th century the importance of citizenship, in the form of human rights for anyone, regardless of colour, creed and nationality, has made some progress, yet, as we have seen, since the French Revolution, the psychological habits and enculturation of respective native countries and communities makes it extremely difficult to override local law and rules with global laws and rules that would confer global identity to everyone, despite nurturing local habits and cultures.

**Conclusion**

We are still a long way from establishing an intellectual globe where citizenship, spelling out the rights and obligations of mankind, override ethnic, religious and local laws and rules, establishing freedom of the individual so necessary for a productive life worth living. ■

## Shadowlands: Globalization, Technology, and Spiritual Crisis

**Robert Switzer, ECLT-PHIL Department**

In his *Discourse on Thinking*, Martin Heidegger (1966) distinguishes calculative thinking from meditative. It is a distinction we all know, though perhaps one we think about too seldom. We plan, we take stock, we map out our course of action. organize – all of us, and sometimes more than others. The military mind, like the academic trying to organize a conference, works out the detailed logistics involved and tries to anticipate contingencies. But the aim of a conference is, or should be, meditative thinking, while the aim of the military planner is something else indeed: more plans, more maps and networks and structures, more calculations. As many of you know, there was to have been a Heidegger conference in Oriental Hall on March 23 of this year; it was postponed due to the US-led war on Iraq, and due to the calculation of some of the participants concerning the pluses and minuses involved in attending a conference at the *American* University during such a period. Given this, it certainly would appear that "thought" is one of the first casualties of war. And yet, when is thought more needed? We all know that smarter bombs are not the answer. What has befallen us, in this globalized world, mesmerized by the power of our technology? Heidegger insisted, quoting the poet Hölderlin, that "where danger is, grows the saving power also" (1977, 28f.). In the little space I have here, and in the shadow of war, let me attempt at least an outline of a thought or two, following Heidegger and a more contemporary writer, Paul Virilio, on the spiritual crisis of our globalized age.

The essence of technology, Heidegger tells us in his famous lectures from the 1950s, published as "The Question Concerning Technology" (1977), is nothing technological. If technology were, as it appears, merely a means or an instrument, then we could come to master and dominate it just as we master and dominate the earth through technology. But in fact, technology comes more and more to master us.

Technology masters nature through knowledge of the mechanistic causes that bring specific states of affairs into being. But this mechanistic aspect of causality was, under the name *causa efficiens*, but one of the four causes identified by Aristotle and maintained for two millennia after him – the others being the material cause, the formal cause, and the final cause, the "why" or purpose. It is this last, in particular, that we have lost track of in our age.

In isolating efficient cause, and understanding it not in terms of the work of the craftsman but mechanistically, we Moderns have turned the being of what is into mere show, into a virtuality, the result of a play of forces that lie behind and shape it – forces which, since Descartes and Galileo, we have understood as inherently subject to mathematical description without remainder, and so to our explicit

codification and control.

Although this goes against the grain of our common understanding, or misunderstanding, of these terms, technology then is through and through "metaphysical." For technology is a "revealing" that brings forth the real – though, characteristically, it does so through what Heidegger calls "a setting-upon, in the sense of a challenging-forth." This challenging, Heidegger tells us, happens in and as an inter-locking process, in which "the energy concealed in nature is unlocked, what is unlocked is transformed, what is transformed is stored up, what is stored up is, in turn, distributed, and what is distributed is switched about ever anew" (1977, 16).

Technology, as "enframing" [*Gestell*], brings things to a stand, regulating and securing them; it takes stock of things, reduces them to a matrix of energy and informational flows and equivalencies. This Heidegger names the "standing reserve." The name "standing-reserve," Heidegger writes, "designates nothing less than the way in which everything presences that is wrought upon by the challenging revealing," for "whatever stands by in the sense of standing-reserve no longer stands over against us as object" (1977, 17). That is, we have lost the thing as such – and with it, the world as well. And what of human being? We have become transformed also, into "human resources." The phrase says it all. But more than just cogs in the corporate wheel, we have become wired, plugged in and turned: off. We have become mere nodes in an informational array, like the US soldiers with their kilos of electronic gear, satellite uplinks, global positioning equipment, instantaneous computer interfaces, and so on; indeed, like almost all of us, during this war, sitting on the coach at home, watching.

Everything, it seems, has been brought near—and yet, precisely as so present, so within reach, everything has become somehow emptied out of meaning.

Heidegger saw this coming, it seems to me, already in the 1950s. In his essay "The Thing," he writes that distances have now been abolished by the new transportation and communications technologies – but, "the frantic abolition of all distances brings no nearness." Indeed, nearness is "even repelled by the restless abolition of distances" while with it "remoteness also remains absent" (1971, 165-66). Everywhere there is a levelling – as Heidegger puts it: "Everything gets lumped together into uniform distanceless-ness," and he considers "this merging of everything into the distanceless more unearthly than everything bursting apart." It is a silent and barely noticed loss, in other words, and hence more horrible—as also more fundamental—than the ravages of war. It is unearthly – a loss of the earth itself, and of the earthly in *things*. And it is just this disappearing earth and world which I want to speak of here, in terms of the loss of *mattering*.

Today, and in the near future, technology is in the process of transforming us more radically than even Heidegger could have foreseen. We are fast becoming disembodied denizens of cyber spaceless-ness, awash in information without sense, and indeed ourselves mere intersection-points in the matrix of information,

domination and control.

A wonderful recent guide to this Brave New World is Paul Virilio's 1995 book *Open Sky*. One of the technologies which he highlights, and which Heidegger could not of course have imagined, is telepresence. It functions in his work—and will also here for me—both as example and as metaphor. On the literal level, this is a technological system of projecting a virtual presence to another part of the physical world, by means of the instantaneous relay of input/output information and control. The effect is achieved using the by-now familiar virtual reality gear: twin, three dimensional high-resolution optical displays in a visor, along with ultra-precise 3D headphones, and some sort of force and tactile actuators in a date glove or data suit – along with sensors to accurately note and report every movement of the head, torso and limbs. But telepresence itself is not virtual reality, since the world one inhabits through this gear is not synthetic but "re-presentational;" not computer-generated, but an electronically mediated encounter with the "real." In telepresence, your "eyes" are cameras operating in a distant environment, your "ears" far-off microphones, your "hands" robotic arms, now flexing with hugely amplified power in a distant terrain. The original scenario behind much of the development of this technology was, I understand, a proposed mission to Mars, in which the astronauts would remain safely on earth, but experience the alien world through telepresence hook-ups to robots on the Martian surface. But the more likely scenario will be some not-so-distant battlefield, since here, as so often elsewhere, war will be the most likely "killer ap" (establishing application) for this new technology.

Aside from the crucial aspect of "action at a distance" – hinted at already in the ready array of remote controls that spill across our coffee-tables – there is something uncomfortably familiar about telepresence. In essence, we're already there. Of course, in its full incarnation, we will be suited up. And yes, this equipment – the data glove and data suit, the characteristically Darth Vader-esque VR helmet – were designed to bring the user into a virtual world. But generating a realistic VR environment has proved to be beyond the present reach of computer technology, and will likely remain so for some time. That is, a purely synthetic reality manufactured "whole cloth" by the deployment of massive computer resources, such as the one Keenu Reeves inhabits in the *Matrix* films, remains a fantasy. And indeed, such fantasies, by taking center-stage in the popular imagination, have helped obscure the real issue of our contemporary crisis of "virtuality." Certainly a fully "made up" reality was never Plato's point, in his parable of the cave. No, what we see is "real," or at least it "passes for real," like shadows passing back and forth before our eyes on the wall of our cave. A shadow is "cast" by a real thing, and so is certainly tied to reality in some sense—but it is thinned out, levelled down, lacking in depth. And so in our media-saturated world today: everything is within reach, but nothing "matters;" and so things slip through our fingers, as mere shadows of the real.

And this is the point of my title: The shadowlands, I want to suggest, are not some alternative reality of computer games and Hollywood entertainments that we come to inhabit instead of reality itself. Rather, it *is* reality itself, as transformed or virtualized by our technological grasp on it into nothing much different than computer games or Hollywood films. It is the real-life battlefields of Iraq, for example, that have become our shadowlands.

It is not necessary then, that we "suit up" Telepresence is already with us in the media omni-surveillance of instantaneous telecommunications. We are every-where, and so nowhere. This war, more than any other, has been a media event. Whatever happens, we are right there, with "imbedded" reporters, right on the front lines. And if our view is sometimes blocked, for reasons of "security," we trust that someone, somewhere - Tommy Franks, let us say, or the Dr. Strangeloves in the War Room under the White House – has the total, totalizing, grasp on things. For the operative principle *is* totalizing – and hence, inescapably, totalitarian: every-thing is drawn into the matrix of knowledge/power, lit-up the way a terrain on a moonless night is penetrated by night-vision goggles, and brought not just under surveillance, but under control.

Telepresence. Its essence is *being there.* Our Dasein has become inflated, we have become wholly worldly – indeed, we are the world. Armchair travellers, we go nowhere, but we are instantaneously *there*. And coming soon, as I suggested, is action at a distance. In this bona fide telepresence, the obvious application, again, will be warfare: Actual human flesh replaced by robo-soldiers, remote controlled killing machines, drone grunts – directed by armchair infantry, who will get the sights, the sounds, even the feel of the battlefield—in total virtual surround–sound realism – without putting themselves at risk. And what exactly will warfare have become, one wonders, when one side, at least, can pursue it at will, and *without risk*.

Paul Virilio, in *Open Sky*, makes repeated use of a military metaphor to describe our present predicament: mobilization. We are being deployed, in a new matrix of domination and control over not just what is, but over ourselves, over the human body; over the very stuff of flesh, over the mattering of what matters. Virilio quotes with approval the words of Paul Klee, who had written, "To define the present in isolation is to kill it." In Virilio's view, this is exactly what the tele-technologies of "real time" are doing: "they are killing 'present' time by isolating it from its here and now, in favour of a commutative elsewhere that no longer has anything to do with our 'concrete presence' in the world" (1997, p. 10). The result he terms the "sudden mobilization of the illusion of the world, of a *whole* world, telepresent at each moment." And at the same time, the "witness's own body" or as he also calls it, the "body terminal," becomes "the last urban frontier." The effect is this: The body's natural "sphere" of perception, and of influence, becomes grossly distended – seemingly, now, without limit; nothing any longer remains at a distance, nothing is any longer out of reach. The condition of the possibility of this is the fact that we

humans have the *power* of reach – but this natural endowment will soon become as atrophied as the muscles of a data-entry clerk. Virilio writes,

> Doomed to inertia, the interactive being transfers his natural capacities for movement and displacement to probes and scanners which instantaneously inform him about a remote reality, to the detriment of his own faculties of apprehension of the real, after the example of the para- or quadriplegic who can guide by remote control — *teleguide* — his environment, his abode, which is a model of that home automation, of those "Smart Houses" that respond to our every whim. Having been first *mobile,* then *motorized,* man will thus become *motile,* deliberately limiting his body's area of influence to a few gestures, a few impulses.... (1997, 16-17)

Already, our computers respond to voice commands; soon, it will take just a flick of the eye to surf the net. And, as Virilio points out, the body itself has become the new frontier of power/knowledge. It was not enough to know—to "crack" the genetic code, for example—nor were the gross interventions of organ transplants and myriad chemical potions enough. Now, in addition, we will willingly open our very "selves" up to invading armies of micro-machines, nanno-technology sensors and actuators, micro-robotic hordes colonizing the human body and, as need arises, rebuilding it "brick by brick." We will not only be "wired," but (Virilio predicts) we will willingly ingest "more or less biodegradable 'stimulant' implants, microbe-machines, cellular automata" which will monitor and repair the functionalities of the body itself (1997, p. 53). This loss of an "inside," of the inner space of the body, applies equally to the mind, it seems to me, to the human imagination and the human spirit. Everything now has been exposed, lit up, made public, brought under control. Is nothing sacred?

This issue is at the heart of our concerns here. It is also, I believe, at the core for Paul Virilio. Indeed, he provides an answer to Nietzsche's famous question regarding nihilism: "who has wiped the horizon from the sky?" (1974, sec. 125, p. 181). The "death of God" is in some sense nothing else than this loss of horizon—a perceptual metaphor that bids us attend to what is becoming of perceptual world. Virilio writes,

> Gradually reduced to nothing by the various tools of transport and instantaneous communication, the geophysical environment is undergoing an alarming diminishing of its 'depth of field' and this is degrading man's relationship with his environment. *The optical density of the landscape* is rapidly evaporating, producing confusion between the *apparent* horizon, which is the backdrop of all action, and the *deep* horizon of our collective imagination...
> (1997, p. 22)

One might expect a tremendous sense of freedom to result from this incredible, open terrain of images and information – but this is not our experience. This flat, limitless expanse of "data" is not making us happy or fulfilled. Instead, as Virilio notes, there is "a catastrophic sense of incarceration now that humanity is literally deprived of horizon." And he asks, "how can we ignore the risk mankind runs of losing our own world?" (1997, p. 41).

The shift to placeless-ness and the eternal now of "present time" affects not only our lived bodies and the perceptual world, but also politics. Virilio writes,

> The question is then no longer one of the **global** versus the **local,** or of the **transnational** versus the **national.** It is, first and foremost, a question of the sudden temporal switch in which not only inside and outside disappear, the expanse of the political territory, but also the before and after of its duration, of its history; all that remains is a **real instant** over which, in the end, no one has any control. "For proof of this," Virilio adds, presciently, "one need look no further than the inextricable mess geostrategy is in thanks to the impossibility of clearly distinguishing now between offensive and defensive — instantaneous, multipolar strategy now being deployed in 'preemptive' strikes..." (1997, p. 18).

And indeed, many of the familiar problems of globalization have their roots in the impact of communication and information technologies. These include mass unemployment, the migration of workers and other displaced peoples, and the emergence of the new totalizing power structures that Hardt and Negri so effectively describe in their recent (2001) book, *Empire.*

The forging of the global village, in short, certainly has its dark side. Perhaps what we need is a return to distance; a moving apart – preserving the necessary tension of otherness, and moving towards a rediscovery of difference. Perhaps, too, the "coalition of the willing"—and in truth, there are many such coalitions operating, in and as a web of implication and complicity—needs to become less *willfull.* For it is the will — to domination and control – that, more than anything else, lies at the heart of the metaphysical impulse which is reshaping our world into a horizon-less conflux of information "bits" without depth, context or sense.

It is as he came more and more to prescribe a movement away from the metaphysics of the will that much of Heidegger's lasting importance lies. This is the way forward, after technology, in his view –for there is no going back. In his essay "The Turning," he writes, "Through thinking, we first learn to dwell in the realm in which there comes to pass the restorative surmounting of the destining of Being, the surmounting of En-framing" (1977, p. 41). This means, it is only through an open and responsive dwelling as thinking letting-be that we can even begin to come close to the overcoming of the metaphysical impulse that lies at the heart of

technology and its levelling "grasp" on the real, which reduces it to the sort of framework and standing reserve of energy and information quanta that I have tried to depict throughout this paper. But, Heidegger suggests, it will most likely happen that "the turning of the oblivion of Being into the safekeeping belonging to the coming to presence of Being" will "finally come to pass only when the danger, which is in its concealed essence ever susceptible of turning, first comes expressly to light as the danger that it is." This is Heidegger's way of saying that we need first to *wake up*—in my terms, to the loss in our world today of "mattering." Here again, but in a new sense, we encounter the shadowlands. Heidegger writes,

> Perhaps we stand already in the shadow cast ahead by the advent of this turning. When and how it will come to pass .... no one knows. Nor is it necessary that we know. A knowledge of this kind would even be most ruinous for man, because his essence is to be the one who waits, the one who attends upon the coming to presence of Being in that in thinking he guards it. Only when man, as the shepherd of Being, attends upon the truth of Being can he expect an arrival of a destining of Being and not sink to the level of a mere wanting to know. (1977, p. 42)

This last phrase is important since, from Plato to Heidegger, idle curiosity has been seen as one of the most problematic, even dangerous, aspects of human nature. This Nietzsche had already seen, in the midst of an attack on the "breathless haste" with which we live in the Modern world, which he sees "spreading a lack of spirituality like a blanket." He continues,

> Even now one is ashamed of resting, and prolonged reflection almost gives people a bad conscience. One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news... ; one lives as if one always might "miss out on something." (1974, sec. 329, p. 259)

In truth, it is not more and more information that we crave. We have enough; indeed, as the war in Iraq has brought home to us, more than enough. Instead, it is the simple, honest nearness of things and people that we seek, that we care about, and so, as we say, that "matter" for us. Let me close with the following, thoughtful questions from Martin Heidegger:

> Will insight into that which is bring itself disclosingly to pass? Will we correspond to that insight, through a looking that looks into the essence of technology and becomes aware of Being itself within it? Will we see the lightning-flash of Being in the essence of technology? The flash that comes out of stillness, as stillness itself? Stillness stills. What does it still? It stills Being into the

coming to presence of world. (1977, p. 49)

These are, in the broadest sense of the world, religious questions, just as our present "global" crisis is a spiritual one, in the end. To rediscover the reality of the real, the light of the sacred in the humblest things, as we come to them with care and in humility—is this still possible today? We can only ask, and recall the words with which Heidegger concludes his essay on the "Question Concerning Technology," namely: "Questioning is the piety of thought."

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## Globalization: An Historical Perspective

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Living in the twenty-first century we tend to think of globalization as a modern phenomenon. Most people, by nature, are *not* historically minded – and few are professionally trained to take the long view. When, for example, I express optimism to my friends, students and colleagues about the future of Egypt, and suggest that the tensions we are witnessing between East and West will one day resolve themselves, they always want to know how long the project will take and, to my amazement, they become disheartened when I tell predict that the Arab world will be where it wants to be in another fifty to one hundred years. To them this seems intolerable; to an historian, encouraging. In order to cope with the stresses of modernity, westernization and globalization, we *must* take the long view, for these are technical, cultural and economic processes that required centuries to transform the world.

In any discussion of globalization, one will often hear the name of Immanueal Wallerstein, the leading proponent of world-systems theory, and one of the most prolific contributors to the globalization debate. For Wallerstein, "globalization", by which he means the "spread of the capitalist world system" across what he calls the "actual globe",[1] began in the late fifteenth century with the European discovery of the sea route to India. Already this is a much longer temporal framework than most analysts have in mind when writing, for example, about information technology, the digital economy, foreign direct investment, or the role of the media. For my part, I would like to lengthen our understanding of globalization even further. In my estimation it matters little whether market systems, technologies, and ideologies fan out across the "actual globe" or what people*perceive* to be the globe, because th eend result is the same: the world becomes a single place in thought and action: it is compressed: and there is an intensification of the consciousness of the world as a whole.[2]

Consider the career of Alexander the Great. He conquered what for all intents and purposes was for the Greeks the known world – and thereby ushered in what historians call the "hellenistic period", an era when Greek culture spread eastwards to form a new, hybrid civilization characterized by the emigration of large numbers of Greeks into Egypt, Mesopotamia and Persia; the growth of large, cosmopolitan cities; the spread of Greek laws and business practices; the establishment of vast trade networks that linked India with Africa and sub-Saharan Africa; and the introduction of eastern religious traditions, especially the Egyptian cults of Serapis and Isis, to what in modern terms might well be called the "western imperialists."

Even earlier, in the late sixth and early fifth century BC, Cyrus, Cambyses,

Darius and Xerxes created for themselves what is often called a "Persian world empire." "The main highway, known as the Royal Road, spanned some 2700 kilometers from the city of Ephesus on the coast of Asia Minor to Susa in western Iran."[3] It was Cyrus the Great who freed the Jews from their captivity by the Babylonians, who allowed them to return to Palestine, and who rebuilt their temple in Jerusalem. More significantly, it was during this period that the Hebrews, whose belief system was still in the process of taking shape, came into contact with the Iranian religion of Zoroastrianism. It was from the Zoroastrians that Judaism borrowed the concepts of good and evil, Satan, free will and the Judgment Day, ideas central to the world's great monotheistic traditions. It would be difficult to find a more profound example of the world becoming a "single place in thought and action."

Five years ago at this conference it was asked whether globalization was a "blessing" or a "curse." In the ancient and medieval worlds people wondered the same thing. "In every era of human history globalization, or modernity, or some equivalent term has meant the ways, norms and standards of the dominant and expanding civilization. . . . The Hellenistic kingdoms, the Roman Empire, medieval Christendom and Islam, even the ancient civilizations of India and China: all imposed their norms over a wide area and radiated their influence over a much broader one, far beyond their imperial frontiers."[4]

At the height of the Empire, when it stretched from the Straits of Gibraltar to the cataracts on the Upper Nile, and from the Irish Sea to the Tigris and the Euphrates, anti-Roman sentiment sounded chillingly familiar to anti-American sentiment today. Unlike Americans, however, the Romans had no illusions about how the peoples they conquered felt about their political, military, cultural and economic dominance:

*Rome can no longer hold out against the world,* Cicero warned his countrymen. *I do not mean against its power and arms in war, but against its groans and tears and lamentations. . . . Words cannot express how bitterly we are hated among foreign nations owing to the wanton and outrageous conduct of the men whom of late years we have sent to govern them. . . . Do you imagine that when you send an army, it is to defend our allies and attack the enemy – or to use the enemy as an excuse for attacking your allies and friends? What state in Asia is sufficient to contain the arrogance and insolence of a single military tribune, let alone a general or his legate?*[5]

Jewish, Christian and even pagan apocalyptic literature is filled with the same sort of complaint, and again, it sounds very much like the anti-modern and anti-western rhetoric we hear from Islamist groups today.

The Roman historian Cassius Dio (d. c. 235 AD) put the following anti-Roman (and anti-globalization) speech into the mouth of Boadicea, Queen of East Anglia, as she was rallying her people: *You have learned from actual experience how*

*different freedom is from slavery. Hence, even if you had previously, through ignorance of which was better, been deceived by the alluring promises of the Romans, yet now that you have tried both, you have learned how great a mistake you made in preferring an imported despotism to your ancestral mode of life; you have come to realize how much better is poverty with no master than wealth with slavery.*[6]

Similar sentiments can be found in the Babylonian Talmud: *All that [the Romans] have instituted they have instituted only for their own needs. They have instituted market places to place harlots in them; baths, for their own pleasures; bridges, to collect tolls.*[7]

And in the Sibylline Oracles: *They waste the poor, that they themselves more land/ Procuring may enslave them by deceit. . . . On thee some day shall come, O haughty Rome/ A fitting stroke from heaven . . . And no more under slavish yoke to thee/ Will either Greek or Syrian put his neck,/ Barbarian or any other nation,/ Thou shalt be plundered and shalt be destroyed/ For what thou didst, and wailing aloud in fear/ Thou shalt give until thou shalt repay.*[8]

And in the Book of Revelations: *Fallen is Babylon the great [i.e. Rome] . . . An the kings of the earth, who committed fornication and lived wantonly with her, shall weep and wail over her . . . And the merchants of the earth weep and mourn over her, for no man buyeth their cargoes anymore – cargoes of gold, and silver, and precious stone, and pearls, and fine linen, and purple, and silk, and scarlet, and all thine wood, and every vessel of ivory, and every vessel made of most precious wood, and of bronze and iron and marble, and cinnamon, and spice, and incense, and ointment, and frankincense, and wine, and oil, and fine flour, and wheat, and cattle, and sheep, and horses, and carriages, and slaves, and souls of men.*[9]

What else is this if not a capitalist than at least a proto-capitalist world system?

When the Muslims had their turn, they more than any of the civilizations that preceded them conceived of their mission in universal terms, and they, more than any other, managed o spread their system of belief to the farthest corners of the globe, from Andalucia to Indonesia, and from Siberia to Nigeria. Not surprisingly, there was resistance to this new and completely unprecedented form of cultural imperialism. In the ninth century, Paul Alverus, a native of Cordoba, complained of the loss of local traditions: *The Christians love to read the poems and romances of the Arabs; they study the Arab theologians and philosophers, not to refute them, but to form a correct and elegant Arabic. Where is the layman who now reads the Latin commentaries on the Holy Scriptures, or who studies the Gospels, prophets or apostles? Alas! All talented young Christians read and study with enthusiasm the Arab books; they gather immense libraries at great expense; they despise the Christian literature as unworthy of attention. They have forgotten their language. For every one who can write a letter in Latin to a friend, there are a thousand who can express themselves in Arabic with elegance.*[10]

For five hundred years the 'Abbasid caliphs claimed universal authority from their main capital in Baghdad, but Baghdad was eventually sacked and taken when the Mongols burst out of east Asia in the mid-thirteenth century to establish an empire that ran from China to Europe. (Even now some are calling the Americans the "new Mongols" and comparing George W. Bush to the grandson of Genghis Khan).[11] As with earlier globalizations, the Mongol conquest opened the Silk Routes to merchants like Marco Polo, and products and ideas and technologies spread from East to West, including, most significantly, printing, paper money and gunpowder: items that are essential to, and emblematic of, the processes of globalization and modernization today.

Nad let's not forget the Ottomans, who succeeded the Mongols, and who called themselves "Lords of the Horizons." For westerners, they represented not only a "challenge" but also an "opportunity" in that like all global superpowers the Ottomans exerted a tremendous cultural attraction. Turban parties were all the rage in European courts as were the growing of tulips and the opening of the first coffee shops. Turkish characters appeared in the novels of Cervantes and the plays of Shakespeare. Christian renegades flocked to the Mediterranean and converted to Islam in droves. In a seventeenth-century play by Robert Daborne called "A Christian Turned Turk," a wealthy Jewish merchant wonders why, if Islam is as evil as people make it out to be, God had not destroyed it long ago instead of making it into a world power. In *Tamburlane*, the English dramatist Marlowe raised the question: "Whose side is God on?". And an English diplomat, Sir Henry Blount, narrated his travels to the Ottoman court in terms reminiscent of the globalization debate today: *He who would behold these times in their greatest glory could not find a better scene than Turkey . . . [The Turks] are the only* modern *people, great in action . . . whose empire hath so suddenly invaded the world, and fixed itself such firm foundations as no other ever did.*[12]

Westerners were not at all sure they were going to win. In a book written in 1639 by Thomas Fuller called *The Historie of the Holy War*, the "shock" and "awe" is palpable: *[The Turkish Empire] is the greatest and best-compacted that the sun ever saw. Take sea and land together and from Buda[pest] in the West to Tauris in the East, it stretcheth about three thousand miles . . . It lieth in the heart of the world, like a bold champion bidding defiance to all his borderers, commanding the most fruitful countries of Europe, Asia, and Africa: Only America lieth free from the reach thereof.*[13] My how times have changed.

Or maybe not. One of Immanuel Wallerstein's theses is that globalization, which he sees as beginning only around 1500, has now reached its limits, that the capitalist world system phase is coming to an end, and that we are now entering into a period of chaos from which will emerge some new sort of world order, something different from everything that has come before. It seems to me, however, that the world will keep on turning as it always has; that centers of world

hegemony will continue to shift from region to region; that new technologies and ideologies will continue to displace old ones; that changes in climate, the discovery of new resources, and the appearance of new, unanticipated human and animal epidemics will unanticipated results of global proportions; that markets will continue to expand in exponential fashion as populations grow; that global culture – if such a hobgoblin truly exists[14] – will continue to twist and turn and surprise us: and that we need not fear this, because we cannot do anything about it.

Globalization is *not* a modern, western phenomenon. Beginning with the earliest civilizations, the drift of people, languages, products and ideas has always been an integral feature of the human experience. It has brought miseries, to be sure – epidemics, war, revolution, poverty and oppression –, but it has also brought health, peace and prosperity. My sense is that the best way to gain a measure of control – both as individuals and societies – over the irresistible forces of uncertain events is to learn how to ask questions and make decisions that run with the flow of history instead of against it.

## Notes

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2 Roland Robertson, *Globalization (Theory, Culture and Society)* (London: Sage Publications, 1992), p. 8.
3 John P. McKay, Bennett D. Hill and John Buckler, *A History of Western Society*, 6th edition, Vol. 1 (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1999), p. 58.
4 Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response* (London: Phoenux, 2002), p. 167.
5 Naphtali Lewis and Meyer Reinhold, eds., *Roman Civilization*, 3rd edition, Vol. 1 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), pp. 404-405.
6 Lewis and Reinhold, *Roman Civilization*, p. 334.
7 Lewis and Reinhold, *Roman Civilization*, p. 333-334.
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12 Daniel J. Vitkus, ed., *Three Turk Plays from Early Modern England* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), p. 11.
13 Nabil I. Matar, *Islam in Britain, 1558-1685* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 14.
14 Immanuel Wallerstein, "Global Culture(s)- Salvation, Menace, or Myth?" Paper delivered at conference on "New Cultural Formations in an Era of Transnational Globalization," Academia Sinica, Taiwan, Oct. 6-7, 2001.■

## Accountability and Transparency of Information Technology in Global Society

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### Abstract

*Computing and information technology are ongoing sources of change in the way we conduct our lives. For the most part we judge these changes to be beneficial, but we also recognize that imperfections in the technology can, in significant measure, expose us to unexpected outcomes as well as to harms and risks. Because the use of computing technology is so widespread these impacts are worrisome not only because harms can be severe, but because they pervade and threaten almost every sphere of public and private life. Lives and well-being are increasingly dependent on computerized life-critical systems that control aircraft, spacecraft, motor cars, military equipment, communications devices and more. Moreover, in global society, quality of life is at stake in the enormous array of information systems, communications networks, bureaucratic infrastructures of governments, corporations, and complex finance, as well as everyday conveniences such as personal computers, telephones, microwaves, and toys that are controlled and supported by computers.*

*The extensive presence of computing in these many spheres of life suggests two related concerns. The one is a concern with achieving suitable degree of reliability and safety for these systems so as to minimize risks and harms; the other is a concern with entrenching and maintaining in those sectors of society that produce and purvey computing technologies a robust culture of accountability, or answerability, for their impacts. The first of these two has, in recent years, achieved increasing recognition among prominent members of the computer community. They question whether many of the systems in use are sufficiently sound for the uses to which they are put. Citing cases of failure and poor programming practices, they appeal to the computer community, corporate producers, and government regulators, to pay more heed to system safety and reliability in order to reduce harms and risks. Lives, well-being, and quality of life, are vulnerable to poor system design and the all too likely occurrence of failure.*

*In the same way that experts within the computer community have exposed the critical need to improve standards of reliability for computer systems, this paper urges attention to the neglected status of accountability for the impacts of computing, specifically for the harms and risks of faulty and malfunctioning systems. Thus, while our vulnerability to system failure and risk argues for greater*

*attention to system safety, reliability, and sound design, and calls for the development of technical strategies to achieve them, it also underscores the need for a robust tradition of accountability for failures, risks, and harm that do occur. A culture of accountability is particularly important for a technology still struggling with standards of reliability because it means that even in cases where things go awry, we are assured of answerability. However, just the opposite is occurring. This paper argues that conditions under which computer systems are commonly developed and delimitations of computing, contribute in significant measure to an obscuring of lines of accountability. Unless we address these conditions and conceptions, we will see a disturbing correlation – increased computerization, on the one hand, with a decline in accountability, on the other.*

*A strong culture of accountability is worth pursuing for a number of reasons. For some, a developed sense of responsibility is a good in its own right, a virtue to be encouraged. The social policies should reflect this value appropriately by expecting people to be accountable for their actions. For others, accountability is valued because of its consequences for social welfare. Firstly, holding people accountable for the harms or risks they bring about provides strong motivation for trying to prevent or minimize them. Accountability can therefore be a powerful tool for motivating better practices, and consequently more reliable and trustworthy systems. A general culture of accountability should encourage answerability not only for the life-critical systems that cause or risk grave injuries, damage infrastructure, and cause large monetary losses, but even for the malfunction that cause individual losses of time, convenience, and contentment. Secondly, maintaining clear lines of accountability means that in the event of harm through failure, we have a reasonable starting point for assigning just punishment as well as, where necessary compensation for victims.*

*The paper explains more fully the conditions in which computer systems are commonly produced and describe common assumptions about the capabilities and limitations of computing, showing how both contribute toward an erosion and obscuring of accountability. Four of these are called the four barriers of accountability: (1) the problem of many hands, (2) the problem of bugs, (3) blaming the computer, and (4) software ownership without liability. The main objective in identifying the barriers is to come out to a conviction that as long as we fail to recognize and do something about these barriers to accountability, assigning responsibility for the impacts of computing will continue to be problematic in the many spheres of life that fall under its control. And unless we pursue means for reversing this erosion of accountability, there will be significant numbers of harms and risks for which no one is answerable and about which nothing is done. This will mean that computers may be "out of control" in an important and disturbing way. The paper is concluded with suggestions on how we might overcome the barriers and restore accountability.*

## 1- Framework

The central thesis of this paper, that increasing computerization in global society may come at the cost of accountability, rests on an intuitive understanding of accountability closely akin to "answerability." For a deeper understanding of the barriers to accountability in computerized global society and the conditions that foster them, it is necessary to move beyond an intuitive grasp and to draw on ideas from philosophical and legal inquiry into moral responsibility and the cluster of interrelated concepts of liability, blame and accountability. Over the many years that these concepts have been discussed and analyzed, both by those whose interest is theoretical in nature and those interest is more practical, many analyses have been put forth, and many shadings of meaning have been discovered and described.

Emerging from this tradition, contemporary work by Joel Feinberg on moral blame provides a framework for this inquiry (Feinberg, 1985). Feinberg proposes a set of conditions under which an individual is morally blameworthy for a given harm. Fault and causation are key conditions. Accordingly, a person is morally blameworthy for a harm if: (1) his or her actions caused the harm, or constituted a significant causal factor in bringing the harm; and (2) his or her actions were "faulty." Feinberg develops the idea of faulty actions to cover actions that are guided by faulty decisions or intentions. This includes actions performed with an intention to hurt someone and actions for which someone fails to reckon adequately with harmful consequences. Included in the second group are reckless and negligent actions. We judge an action reckless if a person engages in it even though he foresees harm as its likely consequence but does nothing to prevent it. We judge it negligent, if he carelessly does not consider probable harmful consequences.

Applying Feinberg's framework to some examples, consider the case of a person who has intentionally installed a virus on someone's computer which causes extensive damage to files. This person is blameworthy because his intentional actions were causally responsible for the damage. In another case, one that actually occurred, Robert Morris, then a graduate student in computer science at Cornell University, whose Internet Worm caused major upheaval on the Internet and infiltrated thousands of connected computers, was the consequence of a bug in his code and not directly intended. Critics judged him reckless because they contended that someone with Morris's degree of expertise ought to have foreseen this possibility.

Although moral blame is not identical to accountability, an important correspondence between the two makes the analysis of the former relevant to the study of the latter. An important set of cases in which one may reasonably expect accountability for a harm is that in which an analysis points to an individual (or group of individuals) who are morally blameworthy for it. In these cases at least, moral blameworthiness provides a reasonable standard for answerability and accordingly, Feinberg's conditions can be used to identify cases in which one would reasonably expect, or judge, that there ought to be accountability. The four barri-

ers, explained earlier, are systematic features of situations in which accountability is obscured.

### 2- The Problem of Many Hands

Most systems in use today are the products not of single developers working in isolation but of groups or organizations, typically corporations. These groups, which frequently bring together teams of individuals with a diverse range of skills and varying degrees of expertise, might include designers, engineers, programmers, writers, psychologists, graphic artists, managers, and sales people. Consequently, when a system malfunctions and gives rise to harm, the task of assigning responsibility – the problem of identifying who is accountable – is exacerbated and obscured. Responsibility, characteristically understood and traditionally analyzed in terms of a single individual, does not easily generalize to collective action. Computing in particularly vulnerable to the obstacles of many hands. First, most software systems in use are produced in institutional settings, including small and middle-sized software development companies, large corporations, government agencies and contractors, and educational institutions. Second, computer systems themselves, usually not monolithic, are constructed out of segments, components or modules. Each module itself may be the work of a team of individuals. Some systems may also include code from earlier versions, while others borrow code from different systems entirely, even some that were created by other producers. When systems grow in this way, sometimes reaching huge and complex proportions, there may be no single individual contributed to its various components. Third, many systems being developed and already in use operate on top of other systems (such as intermediate level and special function programs and operating systems). Not only may these systems be unreliable but also there may merely be unforeseen incompatibilities between them. Fourth, performance in a wide array of mundane and specialized computer-controlled machines – from rocket ships to refrigerators – depends on the symbiotic relationship of machine with computer system. When things go wrong, it may be unclear whether the fault lies with the machine or with the computer system.

### 3- The Problem of Bugs

The source of a second barrier to accountability in computing is omnipresent bugs and the way many in the field routinely have come to view them. To say that bugs in software make software unreliable and cause system to fail is to state the obvious. The inevitability of bugs escapes very few computer users and programmers and their pervasiveness is stressed by most software, and especially safety, engineers. The dictum, "There is always another software bug," (Leveson & Turnet, 1993) especially in the long and complex systems controlling life-critical and quality-of-life-critical technologies, captures the way in which many individuals in

the business of designing, building and analyzing computer systems perceive this fact of programming life. Errors in complex functional computer systems are an evitable presence in ambitious systems (Corbato, 1991). Errors are more common, more pervasive, and more troublesome, in software than in other technologies (Parnas et al., 1990). Even when we factor out sheer incompetence, bugs in significant number are endemic to programming. They are the natural hazards of any substantial system.

Although this way of thinking about bugs is helpful because it underscores the vulnerability of computer systems, it also creates a problematic mind-set for accountability. On the one hand, the standard conception of responsibility directs us to the person who either intentionally or by not taking reasonable care causes harm. On the other, the view of bugs as inevitable hazards of programming implies that while harms and inconveniences caused by bugs are regrettable, they cannot -- except in cases of obvious sloppiness – be helped. In turn, this suggests that it is unreasonable to hold programmers, systems engineers, and designers, to blame for imperfections in their systems.

## 4- The Computer as Scapegoat

Although the practice of blaming a computer, on the face of it, appears reasonable and even felicitous, it is a barrier to accountability because, having found one explanation for an error or injury, the further role and responsibility of human agents tend to be underestimated – even sometimes ignored. As a result, no one is called upon to answer for an error or injury.

Computers present a curious challenge and temptation. As distinct from many other inanimate objects, computers perform tasks previously performed by humans in positions of responsibility. They calculate, decide, control, and remember. For this reason, people attribute to computers and not to other inanimate objects the array of mental properties, such as intentions, desires, thoughts, preferences, that lead us to judge human action faulty and make humans responsible for their actions.

Not all cases in which people blame computers rest on this tendency to attribute to computers the special characteristics that mark humans as responsible agents. In at least some cases, by blaming a computer, a person is simply shirking responsibility. In others, typically cases of collective action, a person cites a computer because she is genuinely baffled about who is responsible.

There are also the perplexing cases where computers perform functions previously performed by humans in positions of responsibility leading to the illusion of computers as moral agents capable of assuming responsibility. In the case of an expert system, working out new lines of accountability may point to designers of the system, the human experts who served as sources, or the organization that choose to put the system to use. B. Friedman and P. Kahn (1997) argue that system

designers play an important role in preventing the illusion of the computer as a moral agent. The argue that certain prevalent design features, such as anthropromorphizing a system, delegating decision making to it, and delegating instruction to it diminish a user's sense of agency and responsibility.

**5- Ownership without Liability**

This issue of property rights over computer software has sparked active and vociferous public debate. Should program code, algorithms, user-interface, or any other aspects of software be privately ownable? If yes, what is the appropriate form and degree of ownership – trade secrets, patents, copyright, or a new form of ownership devised specifically for software? Should software be held in private ownership at all?

While ownership implies a bundle of rights, it also implies responsibilities. In other domains, it is recognized that along with the privileges and profits of ownership comes responsibility. Holding owners responsible makes sense from a perspective of social welfare because owners are typically in the best position to control their property directly. Likewise in the case of software, its owners (usually the producers) are in the best position to affect the quality of the software they release to the public. Yet the trend in the software industry is to demand maximal property protection while denying, to the extend possible, accountability. This trend creates a vacuum in accountability as compared with other contexts in which a comparable vacuum would be filled by property owners.

The result is that software is released in society, for which users bear the risks, while those who are in the best position to take responsibility for potential harms and risks appear unwilling to do so.

Although several decades ago software developers might reasonably have argued that their industry was not sufficiently well developed to be able to absorb the potentially high cost of the risks of malfunction, the evidence of present conditions suggests that a reevaluation is well warranted. The industry has matured, is well entrenched, reaches virtually all sectors of the economy, and quite clearly offers the possibility of stable and sizable profit. It is therefore appropriate that the industry be argued to acknowledge accountability for the burden of its impacts.

**6- Enforcing Accountability**

The systematic erosion of accountability is neither a necessary nor inevitable consequence of globalization; rather it is a consequence of co-existing factors: many hands, bugs, computers-as-scapegoat, and ownership without liability, which act together to obscure accountability. Barriers to accountability are not unique to computing. Many hands create barriers to responsible action in a wide range of settings, including technologies other than computing failures can beset other technologies even if not to the degree, and in quite the same way, as bugs in computer

systems. The question of who should bear the risks production – owners or users – is not unique to computing. Among the four, citing the computer as scapegoat may be one that is more characteristic of computing than of other technologies. The coincidence of the four barriers, perhaps unique to computing, makes accountability in a computerized global society a problem of significant proportion. I conclude with the suggestion of three strategies for restoring accountability.

### 6-1 An Explicit Standard of Care

A growing literature discusses guidelines for safer and more reliable computer systems. Among these guidelines is a call for a simpler design, a modular approach to system building, meaningful quality assurance, independent auditing, built-in redundancy, and excellent documentation. Some authors argue that better and safer systems would result if these guidelines were expressed as an explicit standard of care taken seriously by the computing profession, adopted by educational institutions, urged by professional organizations, and even enforced through licensing and accreditation.

By providing an explicit measure of excellence of functions independently of pressures imposed by an organizational hierarchy within which some computer systems engineers in corporations and other large organizations are employed, a standard of care could also function to back up professional judgment. A standard of care may also be a useful vehicle for assessing the integrity of the field of computing more broadly.

### 6-2 Distinguishing Accountability from Liability

For many situations in which issues of responsibility arise, accountability and liability are strongly linked. In spite of their frequent connection, however, their conceptual underpinnings are sufficiently distinct so as to make a difference in a number of important contexts.

One key difference is that appraisals of liability are grounded in the plight of a victim, whereas appraisals of accountability are grounded in the relationship of an agent to an outcome. Although those people who are accountable for harm are very frequently the same as those who are liable, merging the notions of liability with accountability, or accepting the former as a substitute for the latter, can obscure accountability in many cases. Although a good system of liability offers a partial solution because at least the needs of victims are addressed, it can deflect attention away from accountability

### 6-3 Strict Liability and Producer Responsibility

Establishing adequate policies governing liability for impacts of computerization is a powerful means of expressing societal expectations and at least par-

tially explicates lines of accountability. Well-articulated policies on liability would serve the practical purpose of protecting public interests against some of the risks of computer system failure which are further amplified by reluctance on the part of producers and owners of systems-in-use to be accountable for them.

Serious consideration should be given to a policy of strict liability for computer system failure, in particular for those sold as consumer products in mass markets. To be strictly liable for harm is to be liable to compensate for it even though one did not bring it about through faulty action.

By shifting the burden-of-accountability to the producers of defective software, strict liability would also address a peculiar anomaly. One of the virtues of strict liability is that it offers a means of protecting the public against the potential harms of risky artifacts and property.

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# The Ethics of Globalization and Plagiarism: The More Things Change, the More things Stay the Same.

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## Abstract

*Technology with globalization has changed the way writing is taught and learned at the American University in Cairo. As a blessing, students now have access to multiple databases and online texts that a decade ago would have only been considered an educator's fantasy. The administration in the University's Writing Program has acknowledged this phenomenon and has created a new program that takes advantage of the latest technological resource.*

*Unfortunately, the curse of technology has transformed the way students plagiarize as well. University professors are now becoming familiar with internet paper mill sites that offer students a chance to download free essays and to cut and paste them into their own work under their own name. Also, these "cheater" sites offer students a chance to order custom essays with one-of-a-kind papers produced by emailing a scanned assignment page and a credit card number.*

*What AUC professors might not be aware of is the local paper writing underworld in Cairo, where "tutors" write essays for students for a minimal charge. Students have informally claimed that up to 50% of AUC undergraduates use these "paper writers" at one time or another during their college career. The following research to be presented looks in-depth at both these issues.*

*First of all, an assignment was written and presented to English 101 students in Fall of 2002 dealing with internet paper mill sites. Students were asked to analyze one of the more famous cheater sites "Schoolsucks.com" and determine whether or not the site is a threat to the integrity of the American University in Cairo. In other words, would AUC undergraduates find this website a source for plagiarism? Students uncovered the audience and purpose of the site and came up with some surprising results that would be of interest to AUC faculty.*

*Secondly, a freshman 102 student in cooperation with Writing Program faculty established a secret relationship in fall of 2002 with a local "tutor" (paper writer) and had a custom paper (multiple drafts) written for the paltry sum of 100 Egyptian pounds. The technology of email and attachments has made the relationship all too easy. This presentation will offer a glimpse into Cairo's term paper writing network and reveal ways to detect these types of essays. In conclusion, what individual faculty members can proactively do in response to trend and what AUC as an institution might want to do concerning prevention is considered.*

**Background**

In the fall of 2000 I began teaching in the Freshman Writing Program at the AUC. At that time, I was working mostly independent of other instructors in the program concerning curriculum and day to day lesson planning. Instructors were required to meet with students five days a week. Material selections were based on what instructors had done in the past or with what they had shared with one another. Class packets were assembled and students purchased these readings and responded to them through writing assignments which were partially completed in the classroom in the early drafting process insuring that at least the early invention stages of writing were original to the student

In fall of 2001, the Writing Program recreated itself to incorporate the advantages of uniformity and technology. Although the process of writing is still highly valued in the new Writing Program, things work much differently now. Students meet with an instructor only fifty minutes three times a week. WebCT has been incorporated and is used extensively as a resource for the writing courses. Instructors are expected to create three original writing assignments per semester which can be viewed and uploaded electronically on a departmental server and shared within the department. Most of these assignments use electronic texts as background and required readings. Students download assignments from WebCT and click on the hyperlinked readings they are to respond to. Teacher packet making and student pick up is becoming a thing of the past. One of the Writing Program's goals is to make students more independent and responsible. In many ways the new program has done this.

**Problem**

The new Writing Program assigns grades to student portfolios whereas in the past writing courses have been pass/fail. Students feel pressured to secure high GPA's in order to have a wide array of options when choosing majors. Also, because of the fewer contact hours with my students in the new program (three 50 minute sessions each week) very little student writing is done in class that is assessed. The department does requires an initial diagnostic exam and some short in-class writing tasks, the four assignments that make up the student's portfolio are almost entirely written outside of class. For the minority of dishonest students, this opens an opportunity to pass the course by submitting written work that is not of their origin. Several instructors have come across suspect compositions of late but are having little success in confirming their suspicions.

**Part One**

**Digital Term Paper Mills**

At last year's conference Jayme Spencer looked in depth at Internet paper mill

sites. To recap, scores of these sites seem to be thriving on the net. With less student writing in the English classroom and seemingly less student/instructor intimacy, I was interested in whether these papers offered online where a threat to the integrity of the Writing Program and/or to other departments at AUC. Who better to ask than the students themselves?

An assignment was created for fall 2002 which asked seventeen 101 students to analyze the website schoolsucks.com and determine whether it is a threat to the integrity of AUC. Schoolsucks.com began in 1997 is considered one of the original "cheater" sites on the net offering a database of free papers that can be downloaded or cut and pasted into student texts. According to the New York Times, Schoolsucks.com was getting over 10,000 hits a day in 2001 (Flynn). Many online articles have been written about its creator Kenny Sahr and his stance on the issue of plagiarism and the internet. The 101 students spent a couple of class periods in the lab examining this website and reading background articles on paper mills and Mr. Sahr's philosophy and motivation.

**Assignment Prompt (Purpose and Audience)**

"An American university evaluation board of investigators will arrive this fall to look into whether AUC will be able to continue its certification and be on par academically with universities in the United States. One of the areas they are interested in the issue of plagiarism and its prevalence at AUC. In preparation of the board's arrival, the Provost has asked several students to investigate different types of possible plagiarism going on at AUC. One group of students has volunteered and been assigned to look into Internet term paper mills and to see whether or not they are a threat to the integrity of AUC. Your responsibility on this team of student investigators is to analyze the web site schoolsucks.com and determine whether this site should be included on a high alert list sent out to professors and administrators. If put on the list, professors could sweep the web site to see if they match any of their student essays. The board might think well of this. ***In sum, you are to examine the web site thoroughly, determine the purpose and the audience of the web site and make a recommendation in an academic essay to the Provost of AUC as to whether it is a threat to the integrity of the American University in Cairo."***

To view the entire assignment, see Appendix A.

**Results:**

13 of the 17 students felt that Schoolsucks.com is **not** a threat to the integrity of AUC.

Some reasons why:

- The topics of the free essays are too general and would be difficult to fit

into an AUC professor's demands particularly in the Writing Program where assignments are specific and sources are sometimes provided.

- The costs are exuberant for AUC Students. Custom papers, that are written to a specific assignment range from 15 to 50 dollars per page depending on the required topic, length of essay, and the speed of delivery. A five page paper could easily cost 100 US dollars.
- It is risky to pay money using credit cards over the internet. One student said that many students don't have credit cards anyway and would not want to justify the use of a credit card to their parents.
- Free essays offered on the site are of poor quality and general in nature.
- It is not easy to search the database at this site.
- The images, games, and messages on this site all point to an audience younger that that of university students.
- The custom paper writer lives abroad and would not be able to write in an Egyptian style.
- A lot of the free papers are outdated. Under biology, genetics, cloning for example.
- There is nothing preventing professors to check the site to see if the essay is plagiarized.
- The chatting, free email, games and shopping at Schoolsucks.com are not services AUC students would be interested in.
- The free essays are garbage and it is up to the student to determine what is of quality. This is not easy to do for one to do who needs to plagiarize.
- You have to have good searching skills to find a paper that matches your needs. Students who cheat might not have these skills.

One student put it this way:

"In my opinion, as an AUCian, almost all AUC students would not attempt to try the service even if the trial was cheaper. They would rather resort to another source such as teachers in their families or their friends instead of taking the risk."

(Certainly, many of these paper mill sites may be useful to AUC students. Schoolsucks.com doesn't really match the audience of AUC students very well, but other sites may.)

**Part Two**

**Collusion and the Local Paper Writing Underworld**

Local paper mills where "tutors" write essays for students may pose a much bigger threat to the integrity of AUC than that of the internet paper mill sites. More and more Writing Program instructors are uncovering locally custom made essays in portfolio assessment committees. According to one writing program student, as many as 50% of his friends are having essays written under their own names in this

fashion. He stressed that it might be easier to get the plagiarized work through an upper-level course in one's major requiring a more traditional "term paper" rather than a lower-level writing course where assignments are specific and sources are often provided. However, it is known among students that agencies have specialists for writing program courses even to the extent that they have in-class assignments prewritten by agencies and committed to memory. Also, papers with recycled topics are copied off from a cache held at local internet cafes in Heliopolis and Dokki. As a response to this, in fall 2002 an English 102 student volunteered to pursue one of her assignments in this dishonest fashion while simultaneously writing the essay on her own. Acting on a telephone number from a fellow student (there are seemingly several agencies around Cairo), she followed the below process to have the essay written for her. (The names below have been changed.)

- Contacted a woman on her mobile phone named Dr. Smith and asked her if she could get some help with one of her English assignments. Her "paper writing" agency is considered one of the bigger ones in Cairo.
- Dr. Smith bluntly asked if she wanted an essay written for her. After answering "yes" the 102 student was told that they have written several essays on the same topic in the past.
- After saying she wanted the essay written for her, the 102 student was asked to take the assignment and sources to the 10th floor of the Cairo Center a block from AUC's Main Building and give it to a woman there who would transfer the material to Dr. Smith. The woman at the advertising agency was said to be the niece of Dr. Smith.
- Two days later the 102 student was notified was asked to pick up the essay on floppy disk at the same bank office and present the niece 100 Egyptian pounds.
- After printing and looking over the essay, the 102 student determined that it was not in a suitable counter-argument form as required by the instructor and in all likelihood would not be accepted.
- The 102 student called Dr. Smith and explained the problem. Here Dr. Smith admitted that she did not write the essay. She gave the 102 student the email address of a man named Mohamed and was told that he was the one who wrote the essay.
- Mohamed responded quickly to the email of the 102 student and rewrote the essay to the form that the 102 student suggested. The completed essay was sent as an attachment by email to the 102 student.
- The business relationship was established between 102 student and paper writer, Mohamed.

See Appendix B for actual email exchange (with the names changed).

**Institutional Options in Response**
**Turnitin.com**

Through the suggestion of the Academic Integrity Committee, AUC has agreed to subscribe to turnitin.com, a plagiarism detection service. A professor (or student) submits an essay electronically to this site and the site returns plagiarized areas highlighted within a couple of days. This type of action is beneficial in detecting students plagiarizing from the net but might do little to deter or detect papers written in collusion. Aside from checking a submitted paper for plagiarism, Turnitin.com automatically uploads the essay onto its database for future reference. This may put local paper writing agencies under extreme pressure because they would have to create an original work each time rather than cut and paste from past assignments.

**Code of Honor**

Donald McCabe who is a professor at Rutgers University and has done extensive research in the area of internet plagiarism at the secondary and post-secondary levels puts it this way, "I subscribe to the theory that suggests we'd be much better off promoting integrity among our students rather than trying to police their dishonesty"(qtd. in Slobogin).

Many US universities have made an effort to combat the above mentioned types of plagiarism by instituting an honor code among students. These, like the one at Duke University, typically take the form of the students taking of a pledge, enforcing violations through student-run honor systems and requirements to turn in suspected cheating incidents. Other universities have Codes of Academic Integrity such as the one at the University of Pennsylvania. Among other things they spell out expectations and consequences of violations concerning student plagiarism during an "Academic Integrity Week" on campus (Clark-Pearson).

**Individual Professor Options in Response**
**Electronic Properties**

The Writing Program is encouraging its instructors to uncover an essay that has been written by a local paper writer by looking through the properties area from the right mouse button. Have the students submit the essay uploaded on WebCt or on a floppy disk and save the essays to the hard drive of your computer. Once here, click on the right mouse button and scroll to the bottom to click on "Properties." There you will find three choices: General, Custom and Summary. Click on "Summary" and you will be able to view the origin of the document by seeing who the original author is and who last saved the document. If the names here do not match the name of your student, you may have yourself a plagiarized essay.

**In Class Honor Code**

It may be helpful for individual instructors to compose a letter concerning

academic integrity and attach it to the course syllabus as Professor Bill Taylor does in his political science classes at Oakton Community College. (See Appendix B) His five page open letter lists what academic integrity requires of him as an instructor and of the students in his courses in six areas: preparation for class, in class, with regards to exams, with regards to written assignments, and with regards to your final grade. In the last section of the letter, he writes of the consequences of not living up to our responsibilities.

"In all of the areas listed above, I will do my best to live up to my responsibilities. If you feel I've failed to do so, you have every right to call me on it. If you do, I have a responsibility to give you respectful consideration. If you feel that I do not do these things, you have the right (and I would say the responsibility) to bring this to the attention of my dean. At the same time, I have a right to expect that you will live up to your responsibilities. If I get the sense that you're not doing so, I consider it a matter of my academic integrity that I call you on it"(Taylor).

For my code of honor presented to students see Appendix C

**Conclusion**

It is clear that technology plays a major role in the ways and means of plagiarism at AUC. I urge the newly formed Task Force on Academic Integrity to focus on awareness and call upon the integrity of the individual student for a healthier, honest university academic environment.

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## Appendix A

## ECLT 101 ESSAY TWO
## Analyzing the Message
## Analysis of an Internet Paper Mill Site

**Requirements:**

- Length will be a minimum of 750 words (at least three sides of A4 when typed).
- You will work on three drafts. These will all be typed.
- Use 12 point New Roman font and double-space your essay.
- Leave 1" (2.5cm) margins top, bottom, left and right and staple your work in the top left hand corner. Supply a plastic folder (side-opening).
- Type your personal details in the top left corner of the front page (full name, ID number, course, section, essay number, essay draft and date of submission).
- Provide a suitable title for your essay and centre it on the first page after your details.
- Provide an outline and a Works Cited page.
- Your essay should be carefully proofread and checked for typing and other errors before submission.
- Remember to consider comments made on and about your previous work as you work on this essay.

**Schedule:**

- Class discussion of possible advertisements for essay focus:
- First draft due:
- Second draft due:
- Third draft due:

**Focus:**

- Formulating an original thesis
- Describing a message to make analysis meaningful to one's audience.
- Using analysis of a primary source to produce thoughtful and interesting content.
- Interpreting and explaining the persuasive power of a message.
- Supporting controlling ideas with sufficient detail from a primary source.
- Using a secondary source as a tool for analysis.
- Demonstrating an ability to analyze.
- Addressing an audience.
- Expressing ideas clearly and coherently.
- Revising based on teacher comment and self-evaluation.

**Assignment:**

An American university evaluation board of investigators will arrive this fall to look into whether AUC will be able to continue its certification and be on par academically with universities in the United States. One of the areas they are interested in the issue of plagiarism and its prevalence at AUC. In preparation of the board's arrival, the Provost has asked several students to investigate different types of possible plagiarism going on at AUC. One group of students has volunteered and been assigned to look into Internet term paper mills and to see whether or not they are a threat to the integrity of AUC. Your responsibility on this team of student investigators is to analyze the web site schoolsucks.com and determine whether this site should be included on a high alert list sent out to professors and administrators. If put on the list, professors could sweep the web site to see if they match any of their student submitted essays. The board might think well of this. In sum, you are to examine the web site thoroughly, determine the purpose and the audience of the web site and make a recommendation in an academic essay to the Provost of AUC as to whether it is a threat to the integrity of the American University in Cairo.

**Points to Consider:**

- How is the Internet surfer welcomed to the site schoolsucks.com? What is the purpose for such a message? What kind of tone does this set for the audience? Does it appeal to emotion or the intellect?
- After clicking into the home page, look to what different services are provided.
- Explore the term paper, custom paper and free homework hyperlinks. Are these services AUC students could use? Are they affordable? Is it possible to pay from Egypt?
- What are the results of the survey on the home page? Are these credible statistics? Who do you think most visits the site, teachers or students?
- Are teachers able to check what essays are on the site? How can they do so?
- Who is likely to try and win the $250 scholarship offered?
- Click on the hyperlink "About school sucks." Read the message and attempt to interpret it. Paraphrase the webmaster's words. Next click on the "For Students" and "For Educators" messages. What is he trying to say here?
- Click on the "message boards" hyperlink and read through what members are saying about the web site. Is there any discussion on cheating? Who are these people? Infer as to where they are from and how old they are.
- Is the particular language used on the web site attractive to AUC students?
- Is there any other way this web site tries to make money? Are these ways dishonest?

- What is the overall message the web site is trying to send the audience through this web site?
- What is the overall purpose of this web site?
- What is your recommendation? Should this site be put on the high alert list for AUC professors?

**Steps in the Process:**

1. Using the checklist for evaluating a business/marketing web page, surf to some of the 250 Internet sites that provide pre-written research papers. Apply the checklist to a few of them and determine if the sites vary in quality.
2. Having read and discussed the readings in class, click into www.schoolsucks.com and follow the points to consider above.
3. Discuss the web site with a peer in class and brainstorm ideas about the webmaster's intentions. Read this assignment sheet again and make sure that you understand the task, purpose and audience.
4. Prepare a short oral presentation about the features of this web site and your response to it. Share your analysis with your group in class.
5. Plan your essay, having first shown me your thesis statement.
6. Write the first draft as an in-class essay.
7. Redraft carefully, taking into account the advice given and comments made. Proofread carefully before resubmitting.

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## Appendix B

### Email exchange between the 102 student and her local paper-writer-for-hire.

Dear 102 student,

I got your two e-mails, and I'm now working on the paper the way your professor wants it to be (counterargument to Locke's article using the other sources) but I still have a question for you. What do you mean by the «MLA» style. At least what is it an abbreviation for? Do you want to state the web address in the body itself? (I mean after every paragraph the web address from which the ideas are taken should be mentioned?)
good luck..
Mohamed

---

Subject: RE: paper
Date: Mon, 11 Nov 2002 20:06:44 +0200

Dear Mr. Mohamed,

The copy of my paper I sent you was MLA style. I have no idea what it states for. I don't know what else to tell you about it. Actually my works cited page was not that bad in my paper, the teacher said I shouldn't of changed it
hehe...
What should I tell my friends who need your help?
102 Student

---

Dear 102 student,

Thanks for the e-mail. I'm now working on your paper. As for your friends, I won't be able to finish any papers or assignments before next saturday since I already have a lot of work to do. So, I can't accept any assignments that have to be delivered before that date, although I welcome any assignments whose due dates start from saturday on, after I know about the requirements of these assignments.
Thanks and good luck...
Mohammed

---

Subject: RE: paper
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2002 09:35:14 +0200

Dear Mr. Mohamed,

Thank you very much for your hard work. I really apreciate it. How can you manage writing so much! Is this your full time job? I bet it is, that is why you are so good at it. Where did you go to school? When I talked to you, your English was so perfect! I have to confess I was a bit jelaous... =)

When you send me my paper I will check it before I give it to my professor and it make style changes if necesary. The main goal now is to have the paper ready for her.

Thanks again,
102 Student

---

Dear 102 student,

I'm attaching to this e-mail your paper after making the changes and adjustments your professor wanted. I changed the style and format of the paper to be a counter argument to Locke's views, using the other sources.

I hope it will be ok, and I recommend you read and check it before you you hand it in to your professor. Please, let me know as soon as you get the peper from the e-mail.

By the way, thanks a lot for the nice words in your previous e-mail, and I'm really happy to be there for you not only as an assisstant in writing papers, but also as a friend. As for my English, I think I should tell you that I studied in an English language school since my early childhood, in addition to the fact that I got my master degree from State University of New York (SUNY), USA.

Thank you and good luck
Mohamed

---

Subject: RE: paper
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2002 08:21:55 +0200

Dear Mr. Mohamed,

I have not heard from you yet. PLEAAAAAASEEEEEEEEEE HELPPPP!!!

My friends are driving me crazy! They really need help with their papers. If you can't help them, it's okay, but if you know someone else who can help them let me know, please, please, please.
Maria

---

Hi 102 student,

Thanks for your e-mail. I'm ready to help your friends if I have time. So, just please send me the assigments they want and the due date, and I'll send an e-mail back to let you know my response....

Thanks again and have a nice time.
Mohammed

## Appendix C
## Letter of Integrity to Writing Program Students

*The following is a slightly altered letter to students written by Bill Taylor, a professor of political science at Oakton Community College. The following has been re-written by Ken Schindler with his permission.*

*Here at the beginning of the semester I want to say something to you about academic integrity.*

*I'm deeply convinced that integrity is an essential part of any true educational experience, integrity on my part as a faculty member and integrity on your part as a student.*

*To take an easy example, would you want to be operated on by a doctor who cheated his way through medical school? Or would you feel comfortable on a bridge designed by an engineer who cheated her way through engineering school? Would you trust your tax return to an accountant who copied his exam answers from his neighbor?*

*Those are easy examples, but what difference does it make if you as a student or I as a faculty member violate the principles of academic integrity in a writing course, especially if English is not in your major?*

*For me, the answer is that integrity is important in this course precisely because integrity is important in all areas of life. If we don't have integrity in the small things, if we find it possible to justify plagiarism or cheating or shoddy work in things that don't seem important, how will we resist doing the same in areas that really do matter, in areas where money might be at stake, or the possibility of advancement, or our esteem in the eyes, of others?*

*Personal integrity is not a quality we're born to naturally. It's a quality of character we need to nurture, and this requires practice in both meanings of that word (as in practice the piano and practice a profession). We can only be a person of integrity if we practice it every day.*

*What does that involve for each of us in this course? With regard to written assignments, the principles of academic integrity require that I:*

- *Devise meaningful an updated assignments on current topics that target you as an audience.*
- *Provide you with a clear description of that assignment so that you know what is expected of you and what the committee will be looking for when it is graded.*
- *Give explicit written and verbal feedback in the drafting process that will help you improve your writing.*
- *Give due and careful consideration to your paper when evaluating it and assigning a grade and support student effort within the committee assessment meeting..*
- *Confront you if I suspect that you have plagiarized or in other ways not handed in work that is entirely your own.*

*With regard to written assignments, the principles of academic integrity require you to:*

- *Start your research and writing early enough to ensure that you have the time you need to do your best work,*
- *Hand in a paper which you yourself have done and not one that a for hire paper writer has done for you;*
- *Seek only appropriate help from others (such as proofreading, or discussing your ideas with someone else to gain clarity is your thinking),*
- *Not be satisfied with a paper that is less than your best work, and*
- *Give full and proper credit to your sources.*

*Let me expand on this last point, since it applies to both you and me. By its very nature, education and the accumulation of knowledge is a shared enterprise. None of us has the time, let alone the background knowledge required, to learn everything on our own. Virtually everything we know has come to us because someone else has taken the time to think about something, research it, and then share what s/he's learned with us in a class lecture or, more likely, in an article or book. This is every bit as much true for me as a teacher as it is for you as students. I'd have very little to teach if all I could talk about is what I've learned solely on my own. In a class lecture it would be too disruptive if I stopped to cite all of my sources, but I know, and you need to know, that I am sharing with you the things I've learned from hundreds of different authors.*

*What I contribute is the way I bring their ideas together into a coherent whole so that it makes sense to you. If this is true for me, how much more so for you. I have many more years of education and reading behind me than you do. I don't expect you to do original research. Instead, I expect you to read about the research of others, and to bring together their ideas in such a way that makes sense to you and will make sense to me.*

*Therefore, it's essential for you to cite your sources in any research paper you write. The academic reason for doing so is to give credit to those who have done the original research and written the article or book. It's also so that I could look at them if I needed to in order to find out if you have properly understood what the author was trying to say. But at a practical level, citing your sources is a way to show that you've done the assignment. If your paper contains no citations, the implication is that you have done a piece of original research, but that wasn't the assignment. Citations (along with a works cited page) show that you have consulted a variety of resources as the assignment required. They're also an acknowledgment of your indebtedness to those authors. So don't feel you need to hide the fact that you're drawing from one of your sources. That's what it's all about.*■

# Globalization and Sub-Saharan Africa: Will the Promise of Shared Prosperity Ever be Realized?

**Dr. Donald L. Sparks**

## Introduction

Globalization looks quite different depending on where on the globe one stands. Standing in Washington or London, the benefits appear evident. Standing in Lusaka or Lagos, however, and the costs loom even more evident. Globalization, the accelerated economic integration among nations, clearly has brought benefits in terms of worldwide economic growth[1]. However, these benefits have not been evenly distributed, and income disparities between rich and poor countries, and even within countries, have increased. This is most pronounced in sub-Saharan Africa. Globalization was supposed to provide gains for all, or at least the gains were supposed to outweigh the losses.

Since the late 1980s, sub-Saharan Africa has generally followed the Washington Consensus, i.e., lowering government spending, privatizing the public sector, liberalizing foreign exchange, embracing democracy and transparency and generally starting to provide what some have called an enabling environment for the market to work its wonders. This liberalization has come at great expense to Africa's poor: declines in health and education spending, for example, were usually part of the package. The trade off was supposed to be prosperity, or at least sustained growth, as a result of partaking in the global economy.

Nonetheless, despite this adherence to market liberalization and the rapid pace of globalization, during the past three decades sub-Saharan Africa has continued to be marginalized in the world economic system. At the same time, however, many other parts of the world have continued an extraordinary economic growth rate. This raises the serious question, then: will the promise of shared prosperity ever be realized? Note the question asks "will" rather than "when will"; as it is not clear at this juncture that the region can ever catch up. As Naomi Klein suggests, "It hasn't taken long for the excitement inspired by these manic renditions of globalization to wear thin, revealing the cracks and fissures beneath its high gloss façade. More and more over the past four years, we in the West have been catching glimpses of another kind of global village, where the economic divide is widening.... This is a village where some multinationals, far from leveling the global playing field with jobs and technology for all, are in the process of mining the planet's poorest back country for unimaginable profits." (Klein) It is this notion of the neglected "back country" that this paper addresses.

During the past two years a number of distinguished, accomplished and

influential observers have examined the issue of globalization's winners vs losers.[2] These studies are not the result of fringe elements: they include a former World Bank chief economist and 2001 Nobel Prize Winner in economics among others. More important, perhaps, is that "ordinary" people around the globe are now learning more about these issues, and many taking to the streets, to the press and to international gatherings. What has caused all of this interest?

**Background: the region's dismal economies**

Before we explore that aspect, perhaps it is necessary to better set the stage by providing some background about Africa's dismal economic performance during the past two decades; a dismal performance during a period of unprecedented wealth creation in many rich nations.[3]

Today Africa accounts for less than 2% of world trade, inward investment and global economic output. Most of Africa's economies are small and fragile. More importantly, the region is poor: according to the World Bank, its combined gross domestic product (GDP) is US$371.4 billion, almost equal to that of the Netherlands. If South Africa and Nigeria are excluded, the combined GDP is US $168.7 billion, only slightly more than Denmark's. An estimated 40% of the Africa's 600 million people live on less than $1 per day, the internationally recognized poverty line. Indeed, nearly 75% of all Africans live on less than US$2 per day. Africa's GDP per capita was estimated at $490 in 2000, and ranged from Ethiopia's $100 to Seychelles' $7,310. The region has the world's second most unequal distribution of income, after Latin America. Africa's share of the world's poorest people increased from 25% to 30% during the 1990s. Moreover, unlike that of all the other developing areas, sub-Saharan Africa's output per head was lower in 2002 than it was 30 years earlier, having declined by 50% in some countries.

Taking inflation and population growth into account, the region's GDP per capita actually fell by 42.5% between 1980 and 1990. Given a population increase projected at 2.6% annually, an estimated GDP growth rate of 3.1% would provide a growth rate per head hardly exceeding 0.5%, compared with the annual rate of 7% viewed by the 1995 World Summit on Social Development as necessary to reduce poverty levels by one-half by 2015.

The supply of food available per capita, measured in daily caloric intake, fell from 2,140 calories in 1971 to 2,100 in the mid-1990s, increasing the number of malnourished people from 94m. to 210m. About a third of the region's children suffer from malnutrition, and each day an estimated 14,000 people are infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV); by the end of 2000 sub-Saharan Africa accounted for about 80% of AIDS-infected children world-wide. Only about one-half of the region's population has access to safe water and adequate sanitation. The constant threat of war and civil conflict poses grave questions about the possibility of economic gain; indeed, one in five Africans currently live in a country seriously

affected by war or strife.

Of the 49 countries classified by the UN as 'least developed' in 2001, 34 were in sub-Saharan Africa. Of the world's developing areas, Africa has the worst record in the most important social and economic indicators (see Table 1 below). From 1900-2000 the region had the lowest GDP per capita growth (actually negative), the highest level of its population living in extreme poverty, lowest life expectancy rates, the highest HIV rates, the highest number of children not living past five years, and the lowest primary school enrollment rates.

Table 1. Social & Economic Development Indicators in the Developing World

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| East Asia/Pacific | 1,110 | 5.9 | 27.6 | 14.2 | 0.22 | 69 | 44.7 | 97 |
| Latin America/ Caribbean | 3,879 | 1.7 | 16.8 | 15.1 | 0.58 | 70 | 36.7 | 94 |
| Mid East/ North Africa | 2,235 | 0.9 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 0.03 | 68 | 53.9 | 86 |
| South Asia | 440 | 3.6 | 44.0 | 36.9 | 0.56 | 63 | 96.5 | 73 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 490 | -0.1 | 47.7 | 46.7 | 8.38 | 47 | 161.6 | 60 |

(1) = GDP Per Capita (current US$)
(2) = GDP Per Capita annual change (1990-2000)
(3) = % of population in extreme poverty (1990)
(4) = % of population in extreme poverty (1999)
(5) = HIV prevalence (% adults aged 15-49)
(6) = Life expectancy at birth (years)
(7) = Under 5 mortality rates per 1,000 live births
(8) = Primary School Enrollment (%) 1998

Source: Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, 2002; World Development Indicators 2001.

## Background: trade, aid, investment, debt and agriculture

To fully understand Africa's position in the global economic system, one must examine international trade, investment, aid and the agricultural sector. Take trade first: more than half of sub-Saharan Africa's exports generally go to the Western industrialized countries, from which the region traditionally purchases about 80% of its imports. African countries typically produce one or two major agricultural or mineral commodities for export to the industrialized countries in the West. Primary products account for approximately 80% of the region's export revenues, about the same level as during the 1960s.

Between 1970 and 1985 Africa's share of the world market for primary (non-petroleum) exports fell from 7% to 4% of the total. The maintenance of Africa's 7% market share would have added US $10 billion to its overall export income. According to the Global Coalition for Africa, revenues from Uganda's coffee exports declined by about 50% between 1985 and 1990, despite a rise in volume terms.

Notwithstanding the benefits of the Lomé Conventions, protectionism and restrictive agricultural practices, particularly in the EU and (to a somewhat lesser extent) the US, have resulted in an over-supply of some agricultural commodities, and have thus inhibited world-wide demand and weakened world prices. Agricultural subsidies in the US, Japan and the EU amount to some US $300 billion annually, about equal to Africa's total GDP. Eliminating these supports would benefit sub-Saharan Africa greatly: a recent study suggested that incomes per head would increase by $6. Tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade erected by the Western industrialized countries have discouraged value-added or semi-processed agricultural imports from African states. The World Bank has estimated that high tariff rates, anti-'dumping' regulations and other trade barriers cost sub-Saharan Africa $20 billion annually in lost exports.

Most African states produce similar products for export,. generally primary agricultural or mineral commodities, and, as most of the value added is carried out in Western industrialized countries, there is little African demand for these products. African states themselves often discourage trade by their strongly inward-orientated, import-substitution development strategies, including overvalued exchange rates and protectionist trade policies. Their transport infrastructure is geared for export to the EU, Japan and North America, rather than to nearby countries. Tariffs have been higher than elsewhere in the world because of the limited avenues available for taxation. Because of the small size of these economies, these barriers to trade are significantly more damaging Finally, since the landlocked countries' trade is principally with Europe, neighbouring countries are often viewed as competitive obstacles rather than potential markets. In southern Africa, for example, only 4% of the export trade of the 14-member Southern African Development Community (SADC) are transacted among SADC members.

Many in the West who see gains from globalization call for "free trade" (ie, no

tariffs or non-tariff barriers) in goods and services. However, the free movement of people, ideas and financial flows are not so widely favored. The Washington consensus stress free trade of goods, but not people. Why? Could it be that the citizens in the rich countries would not tolerate "unfair competition" from lower wage earners, thus threatening their jobs? However, they see no problem with subsidizing agriculture and textiles (and engage in other protectionist activities) while demanding no barriers to their exports. As Naomi Klein observes, "...Wal-Marts and Exxon, trading cargo across borders, demand 'fair and equal treatment' and 'non-discrimination clauses'. Meanwhile, humans are increasingly treated like cargo, with no rights at all."(Klein, p. 75)

With regard to other trade elements, "...international trade law must be understood not only as taking down selective barriers to trade but more accurately as a process that systematically puts up new barriers – around knowledge, technology and newly privatized resources. These Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights are what prevent farmers from replanting their Monsanto patented seeds and make it illegal for poor countries to manufacture cheaper generic drugs to get to their needy populations." Klein, ppxxi George Soros suggests that, "The WTO opened up a Pandora's box when it became involved in intellectual property rights. If intellectual property rights are a fit subject for the WTO, why not labor rights, or human rights?" (Soros, p.48.) Why not indeed. Another important related issue is international financial flows. The WTOs' Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) was supposed to provide a level playing field between foreign vs domestic firms. However, TRIMs reinforces the asymmetric relationship between international capital and MNCs on one hand, and poor countries on the other. (Soros, p 49.)

Three of the most obvious manifestations of external difficulties Africa faces are foreign debt, declining levels of international aid and the difficulty of attracting outside investment. The region's aggregate ratio of debt to exports was estimated at 239% in 1996. However, if South Africa's exports are excluded, the ratio rises to 327%. The region's ratio of external debt to GDP was 78% in 1999. The majority of the 'most debt-distressed countries' (33 of 41) are in sub-Saharan Africa. During the past two decades there has been a continuing debate on how best to reduce poor countries' debt burdens and how to fund such reductions.

The region has yet to broaden its investment base beyond energy and mining, which remain its prime attractions. It should be noted that several economists have examined the relationship between natural resource bases and poverty. Two major studies strongly suggest that dependence on mineral extraction correlated highly with high levels of poverty and social unrest (government corruption, lack of transparency, high military spending and authoritarian style government). (Ross p97 and Sachs p62.) Furthermore, while the region's vast raw materials and low-wage economies attract foreign investors, they are fearful of internal political

volatility and the uncertainty of securing the enforcement of commercial contracts.

Finally, Africa suffers from inelastic price and income demand for its agricultural primary products. This means that as its customers in rich countries incomes increase, their demand for food products does not generally increase as fast. And, as prices come down, demand is not stimulated, since rich consumers basically have and can afford all of the food they want. In fact, in most rich countries the problem is too much food. Furthermore, the region faces significant dangers in monoculture agriculture, as was pushed during the 1960's Green Revolution. Farmers, who could before plant a variety of crops to feed themselves, were pushed into industrial, export-oriented agriculture. This has had severe impacts in many parts of Africa. Now genetically modified foods (so called Frankenfoods) are being introduced from the north. There has been little unbiased science to see the long-term effects; witness Zimbabwe and Zambia, whose people are starving, refusing GM food aid from the US.

**The future?**

Having painted a bleak picture, how does this relate to the questions concerning globalization's effects on Africa's development (or lack thereof) during the past three decades? Perhaps that again depends on where one is standing. As Naomi Klein suggests, "In the case of Africa, essentially an entire continent can find itself exiled to the global shadow world, off the map and off then news, appearing only during wartime when its citizens are looked on with suspicion as potential militia members, would-be terrorists or anti-American fanatics." (Klein, p.xxi.) Indeed, when I taught in Cairo, my students rarely considered themselves to be African. They, I believe, shared the stereotypes generated by the Western press. This lack of interest has resulted in a lack of knowledge that has resulted in increased economic and commercial isolation.

To get to the heart of the issue, Peter Singer puts the key questions in their most basic form: "Has inequality increased during the period of global economic liberalization? Have the poor become worse off?" (Singer, p89.) He correctly suggests that the two questions are separate, and go toward the question of relative vs absolute poverty. An auxiliary question is has increased trade benefited all? While there is not universal agreement either way, the preponderance of evidence presented above suggests an answer. World Bank researchers Mattes Lundberg and Lyn Squire whose recent study argues, "At least in the short run, globalization appears to increase poverty and inequality." (Lundberg, p. 27.) The former chief economist at the World Bank also agrees, arguing that globalization has indeed enriched many, even in developing nations, "But for millions of people globalization has not worked. Many have actually been made worse off, as they have seen their jobs destroyed and there lives become more insecure. They have felt increasingly powerless against forces beyond their control. They have seen their

democracies undermined, their cultures eroded."(Stiglitz, p.248.) Finally, a study done by the WTO states plainly that, "It is an empirical fact that the income gap between poor and rich countries has increased in recent decades". (Ben-David, p3.)

Peter Singer asks another excellent question about whether we can do better: "Even those who accept the general argument for the economic benefits of a global free market should ask themselves how well a global free market can work in the absence of any global authority to set minimum standards on issues such as child labor, worker safety, the rights to form a union, and environmental and animal welfare protection." (Singer, p.92.)

It is interesting to note that after decades of virtual stagnation and at times decline, sub-Saharan African economies at least are growing again. However, on average that growth is not high enough, or sustained enough, to reduce the number of poor people. A 4% rate of economic growth projected through to 2006 represents about double the growth rates of the preceding decade; however, real income per head (ie, adjusted for inflation), which is forecast to rise at about 1% annually, would be no higher in 2006 than in 1982, and about 4% below the level of 1974.

What, then of the future? Does Africa have a choice in the matter? Is there any way for the region to share the prosperity? First, even if Africa wanted to decline globalization, it could not (or if it did, the result would be an Albania of the 1970s and 1980s). No, globalization is here to stay. What are some possible solutions? A number of ideas have been offered, ranging from the Tobin Tax[4] (where gains from foreign exchange transactions would be heavily taxed and the proceeds distributed to poor nations), to a carbon emission tax (where the rich nations who are responsible for the majority of greenhouse gases would provide compensation for damages to poor nations). These options are not politically viable today, especially under the current US regime.

A more realistic approach –but perhaps as pessimistic— would be to view the relationships now under globalization as one where the rich nations enjoy monopoly and monopsony exploitation. Monopoly exploitation exists where a single producer has price setting ability, enabling economic profits over the long term. The rich countries produce industrial consumer and producer goods with considerable value added. Monopsony exploitation exists where there is a single buyer who can engage in price setting. Here the rich countries have considerable influence over the prices of mineral and agricultural commodities.

Of course the way to counter monopoly exploitation is to start producing competitive products. On the other hand, the way to counter monopsony exploitation is to promote more "south-south" trade (ie, commerce between developing nations). In the short term both approaches are unlikely. Over the longer term, however, there are rays of hope. The new African Union may be a start. Such an integrated market would produce a countervailing power to the rich north. Further, in 2002 the presidents of Nigeria, South Africa and Senegal put forward perhaps the

continent's most ambitious plan for reform: the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). Its aim is to develop a "holistic, comprehensive, integrated, strategic framework for the socio-economic development of Africa". Specifically, the priorities include: (1) creating peace, security and stability; (2) investing in people; (3) promoting industrialization; (4) increasing information and communications technology; and, (5) developing basic infrastructure. It is too early to see if this program will actually take off, much less if it to be successful. At the very least, however, it provides a "road map" of sorts.

**Conclusion**

Africa's path ahead is indeed difficult and uncertain. There are important questions still to be addressed: Will sub-Saharan Africa continue to be marginalized, or can it find ways to integrate more successfully into the global economy? How can the negative effects of globalization be minimized? Will the industrialized countries open their markets to competition from the region? Will the region find ways better to co-operate and integrate their economies? Will the countries begin to invest in an often-overlooked resource: its own people, particularly its women?

Finally, a point not discussed until now needs admitting: do the rich countries really care? At the FAO summit in Rome in June 2002 where the participants agreed on a goal of halving the number of hungry people in half (from some 800 to 400 million), only two rich countries sent their head of state (and one was Italy, whose was already in the country). (Klein, p89.) Perhaps this question must be posed in addition to the ones listed above. And until it is, the answer to the question this paper tries to answer, will Africa partake of global prosperity, remains doubtful.

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# Public Administration and The Challenge of Globalization

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**Abstract**

Globalization has taken diverse routes since AUC's fifth Research Conference discussed the subject in 1998. Developments in the field of technology and communications have produced several challenges to public administration in all societies. Since technology travels both ways, influence of globalization has become mutual between developed and developing countries. Whereas many good ideas like universalism, brotherhood of all peoples, international travel and transactions became part of globalization, soon destructive utilization of the advantages of globalizations also emerged.

September 11, 2001 reflected the terrible consequences of globalization of evil and destruction throwing challenges to public administration in all nations. The role of government, which was seen as diminishing in the face of emergence of concepts like liberalization suddenly became more significant.

Hobbesian warnings of the evil in human beings called for greater role for the state in keeping law and order and for guaranteeing security to its population. The United States of America, which never had a Department of Interior or Home Secretary was prompted to have a cabinet department for homeland security employing 170,000 personnel. Many other countries also increased their security machinery against the threat of globalized terrorism posed by groups of non-governmental or anti-governmental organizations.

The proposed paper tries to look into the changes taking place because of the positive and negative challenges posed by globalization to good governance■

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* Abstract only is published here

# The Implications of the Digital Economy on a Growing Digital Divide in Developing Nations

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## Abstract

*The growing evolution of information networks has brought with it many opportunities to countries and organizations around the globe. However, it has also created a number of challenges that need to be handled. With the need to access information virtually for the development of all sectors and industries, it is becoming increasingly vital to formulate the infrastructure required to link different stakeholders to different information venues such as the Internet and the World Wide Web. Though important, such an objective seems to be difficult to realize especially with the still relatively poor infrastructure in all developing nations around the world. In that respect, it is important to assess the role of information networks in business and socioeconomic development and the attempt to quantify and qualify the realization of such role otherwise information networks risk creating a growing digital gap that could have negative implications on the development process at large. This paper covers the implications of the digital economy on a growing digital divide with a focus on developing nations and the steps they need to make to optimize the benefits of the infrastructure of the new economy.*

## Background

Information technology is the combination of information, computing and communication technologies (Schware and Choudhury 1988, Munasinghe 1987, Lind 1986). Nowadays, more researchers are using the term of information and communication technology (ICT) as opposed to information technology (IT). The literature shows that most of the information technology applications introduced to developing nations were focusing on specific sectors in the economy such as education, health, energy and agriculture; only a few cases recognized information technology, as an emerging industry/sector by itself due to the large human, financial and infrastructure resources needed. However, over the last few decades, the importance of information technology has been greatly emphasized in most developing nations in a deliberate effort to ensure that they do not lag behind (Goodman 1991, Lind 1991). In most of these nations, the government has played the most important role in the diffusion of information technology and it has been the largest if not the single user of computers and it greatly influenced the diffusion of information technology within organizations (Moussa and Schware 1992,

Nidumolu and Goodman 1993).

It is important to note that the government-private sector partnership has been a deciding factor in diffusing information technology in Egypt. During the last decade, a large number of these nations have been embarking on medium and large-scale information technology and computerization projects that were mostly funded by the government and international agencies to introduce socioeconomic development and change (Daly 1992, Berman, 1992).

In the case of Egypt, as part of its structural adjustment program, a large number of informatics projects were formulated targeting the use of information technology to leverage managerial and administrative performance in the government and focusing on key sectors such as education, health, employment, trade and local administration. It is widely noted in the literature that frequently such projects implemented in developing nations were inappropriate to the needs of the local context having its focus more on large-scale capital expenditures rather than on human capital investment such as training and human resource development (UNESCO 1989). The focus was more on large urban areas rather than on rural settings and therefore, failed to achieve their goals (Kamel, 1993). Such a large number of failed projects resulted in a generally negative conventional wisdom that defined information technology as inappropriate to developing nations. However, research studies show that the implementation of informatics projects is an area of growing interest in developing nations and where effective and growing use is taking place (El Sherif and El Sawy 1988, Schware and Trembour 1987, Moussa and Schware 1992).

In that respect, developing nations capitalizing on the experiences of the past, have been extensively investing in training, human resource development, consultation and the establishment of an efficient technological infrastructure that is capable to sustain, grow and compete in global markets. Following is a comprehensive overview of Egypt's information and communication technology infrastructure through its different development phases, its building blocks and the potentials it possesses to contribute to the nation's business and socioeconomic development. For Egypt, the building-up of an informatics industry using information and communication technology for business and socioeconomic development will help provide a booster for the economy if the proper information technology is transferred, adopted, diffused and adapted. Within the context of a developing nation like Egypt; establishing an information-base focusing on priority issues and sectors in the digital economy is an invaluable element for development; information that could be used for development, as a tool for business, as a base for a market economy, and as the bridge between Egypt and the global information and knowledge-based societies (Kamel and Wahba, 2002).

**Using ICT for Development**

It is important to note that the use of information and communication technology can be a platform for business and socioeconomic development. Technology can be used as a means to an end and not an end in itself and by doing so it could leverage and improve the developmental process of a nation, let alone a developing nation, if the infrastructure is enabled and effectively used (Kamel, 1998).

However, between the north and the south, alternatively labelled developed and developing nations, there is a gap between those who have access to the Internet "information" and those who do not also known as haves and have nots (Kamel, 2001). There are a number of factors that are contributing to this situation such as the fact that the Internet accessibility is segmented heavily along social class and educational capabilities. In that respect, there are a number of elements that need to be provided for the community to have access to the Internet and that includes; education, language proficiency, a phone line, a computer and the ability to pay the subscription or the phone bill. These are elements that can not be covered by so many people in low income economies such as Egypt. Statistics document the fact that high-income economies' households are more likely to be using the Internet five times more than those in lowest income economies' households. Moreover, minorities, low-income persons, less educated citizens and children especially in rural areas are among the groups that lack access to information resources. Additionally, there are also a digital divide within developing nations between urban and rural areas where most of the information and communication technology infrastructure is only available in capitals and big cities. Table 1 shows the status of Internet users worldwide which reflects the digital divide figures. It is important to note that while the per capita Internet in Canada is 491 that are the highest worldwide, it is 5 in India being the lowest (Computer Industry Almanac, 2001).

| **World Total** | **605.60 Million** |
|---|---|
| USA and Canada | 182.67 million (Growth rate 14%) |
| Europe | 190.91 million (Growth rate 32%) |
| Asia Pacific | 187.24 million (Growth rate 39%) |
| Latin America | 33.35 million (Growth rate 48%) |
| Africa | 6.31 million (Growth rate 48%) |
| Middle East | 5.12 million (Growth rate 61%) |

Table 1 – Number of People Online Worldwide – www.nua.ie [March 2003]

Statistics show that almost 10% of the world's population now has access to the Internet. However, the majority are concentrated in the north i.e. in the developed world. There are, though, some changes in the global Internet where for the first

time, Europe has the highest number of Internet users and followed by the Asia Pacific region. But the digital divide between developed and developing nations is as wide as it ever was where Europeans account for 32% of global Internet users and only 6% of the world's net users are based in Latin America and finally the Middle East and Africa combined account for just 2% of global Internet users. While the Middle East and Africa have seen a slight increase in the numbers of people who can access the Internet, the lack of telecommunications infrastructures in these regions means that most citizens remain unconnected. Forecasts indicate that the number of worldwide Internet users will reach one billion by 2005 (Computer Industry Almanac, 2001).

The digital divide is faced by a number of challenges such as awareness of the use and importance of information and communication technology. Additionally, the rate of penetration of computers is small because education in that sector is not well diffused. Moreover, the local content in the Arabic language is insignificant to the extent that it can create an impact and help diffuse the use of the Internet and the World Wide Web. Finally, it is vital to mention that the completed infrastructure will help provide well-integrated and comprehensive services delivery mechanisms.

ITU reports that the digital divide between developed and developing countries is growing. This refers to the availability and quantity and quality of Internet access in various countries. Statistics show that in developing nations standard telephony has improved to 1 telephone to 100 inhabitants as compared to 74 to 100 inhabitants in developed nations (www.nua.ie). Moreover, reports also indicate that non-English speakers outnumber native English speakers when it comes to using the Internet leading to global reach aspects where 59.8% [338.5 million] of the total world online population are from non-English speaking zones compared to 40.2% [228 million] from English speaking zones. Additionally, Chinese is the number one language in the Asian-speaking zone and perceived to be the number one language on the net by the year 2020 (www.nua.ie). There is a need to move from two-D to three-A and that is from the digital divide to awareness, access and affordability. An important transformation with many stakeholders within the formula and that includes the society; different businesses, the government where the Internet should reach all schools [private and public], public access to public libraries should prevail and the need to establish community access program where free Internet should be provided in public places for public access; and finally, educators and their important role in knowledge dissemination.

In the case of India, the government established labs in rural areas to narrow the digital divide. However, they had challenges in electricity, telephony, net connectivity and other basic infrastructure elements. It is important to note that the population is over 1 billion people and 70% of which live in villages. Among the important statistics the fact that literacy rate is 52% (65.5% males and 39% females) and finally there are 18 recognized languages and only 50 million speak English. Among the

important challenges is the low IT penetration which is relatively poor; PC penetration is 0.58% (Asia at 3.31% and world average is 8.42%) and the projected growth of Internet connections is from 4.5 million (2002) to 10 million (2003).

India has developed a number of projects to help minimize the problems of the digital divide. This included 50+ innovative projects that are using modern information and communication technologies for the benefit of urban and rural citizen consumers by providing (a) enhanced access to information and communication technology, (b) better access to information services, (c) improved education through computers or about computers and (d) opportunities to earn a better living by learning a new skill in the knowledge based economy. The government in India believes that success of a rural networking initiative depends on how progress is achieved in information technology initiation and diffusion. Example of the projects implemented are the information village project that helps empowering people through public access to timely and accurate information; providing information content that caters for local needs such as agriculture and tourism and the information sharing project that helps develop a partnership between individuals and the government which also encourages small and medium-sized enterprises to grow and benefit.

**ICT in Egypt**

Egypt is the cradle of an ancient civilization dating back to 3000 BC. Since the Pharaohs, information acquisition and knowledge dissemination were key elements in the nation's development that is now home to more than 70 million people and growing at an estimated rate of 1.7% (www.mcit.gov.eg). More than 30% of the population are engaged in one of the education stages either in degree paths or part of lifelong learning processes. Egypt has the second largest economy in the Middle East and over the last three decades, it has implemented a comprehensive economic reform program that has enabled its current economic growth rate to stand at 5.7% annually with an inflation of 6% (www.economic.idsc.gov.eg). Egypt has four basic sources of foreign exchange earnings. They are equally divided between tourism, oil, Suez Canal earnings and remittances of Egyptian working abroad, mainly in the Arab Gulf countries. Cairo, the capital of Egypt, is a large metropolis where buildings of French and English architecture stand next to modern skyscrapers. Cairo's 19 million inhabitants constitute nearly 27% of the total population. Egypt, like many other developing countries, is trying to expand its industrial base and modernize itself technologically across its 26 different provinces. Egypt is perceived by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a middle-income country. It has a large service sector mainly built around tourism and transportation. Its major exports are human resource capacities, petroleum products, cotton and leather products; its major imports are food, machinery and vehicles. Agriculture accounts for nearly 17% of the gross domestic product,

industry 32% and services 51%. Estimates show that unemployment is standing at 8% and the labour force is growing at around 2.7% annually (ITU, 2001).

Information technology has been identified by the government of Egypt since the mid 1980s as a potential player and a platform for growth. The performance of the information technology industries, in that respect, has been remarkable in the decade of the 1990s (Kamel, 1999). In 2000, the IT market accounted for 730 million US dollars (American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt, 2002). This represented an increase of around 17.1% from 1999 and 33% from 1998. Additionally, the number of IT registered IT companies has been continuously on the rise reaching in early 2002 over 500 companies and reflecting over 55% growth than 2 years earlier (American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt, 2002). In 2001, the IT market was valued at 849 million US dollars with an annual growth rate of 16.3% and by 2004, the value of the IT market is expected to reach 1,315 million US dollars with a compounded average growth rate (CAGR) of 16.1% from 1998 (American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt, 2002). One of the key areas the government focuses on is human resources development; Egypt ranks 119$^{th}$ out of 174 in the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI) placing the nation in the medium human development category and it is one of the nations that have made the fastest progress in human development starting with a low HDI of 0.432 in 1975 to a medium HDI of 0.616 in 1997 and comes 4$^{th}$ among Arab nations (ITU, 2001).

**Egypt and the Use of ICT for Development**

Egypt's history, location, civilization, potentials and capabilities amongst other vital elements have always represented a setting unmatched by many other nations around the global let alone in the Middle East where so many economic factors reflect implications on the global economies at large. In that respect, Egypt has always possessed a competitive advantage and represented a destination for so many investors interested to develop and grow their business in an ideally located nation at the crossroads of three continents and also at the center of global communications networks (American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt, 2002). From that perspective, Egypt has always been ranked the highest in the region in terms of many aspects and one of which has been the macroeconomic environment and policies shaped and directed towards the encouragement of foreign investments and favourable labour market conditions.

In that respect, the collaboration of the government, the public and private sector was essential to realize the planned and projected benefits from the deployment of information and communication technology. Recently, the private sector share of the gross domestic product has risen to 76% (American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt, 2002). The economy is geared towards a more export-oriented mechanism with the European Union as the largest trading partner accounting for 50% of

Egypt's imports and exports followed by the United States with 23.5%. Moreover, Egypt was among the first signatories of the WTO agreements. In September 1999, the government of Egypt took a major step towards the deployment of information and communication technology for socioeconomic development following the earlier steps and projects that had started since the mid 1980s. In that respect, the ministry of communications and information technology was established.

Moreover, a three-year national ICT plan was formulated that addressed the following issues: upgrading the current telecommunications infrastructure to build an effective and accountable infrastructure that can provide Egypt and the Middle East and North Africa region with reliable, effective and affordable telecommunications services; creating a legislative environment conducive to encouraging local and foreign investors to operate in the ICT field; creating local demand for the ICT industry to motivate local and foreign investors; targeting international markets by creating an ICT industry capable of competing globally and transforming the sector into an export-led industry in order to capture a greater share of the global market; developing qualified human resources to develop and employ cutting-edge information and communication technologies and attracting foreign investment through global alliances (www.mcit.gov.eg).

It is important to note that since 1999 and until the end of the second quarter of 2003 a number of achievements in the quest of building the nation's technological infrastructure were realized. This includes the liberalization of the telecommunications sector by providing private-sector companies with new licenses for mobile telephones, payphones, Internet, data networks and portal services; the establishment of the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA) for licensing telecommunications services and for the drafting of a unified telecommunications act; continuous collaboration between the government and the private sector for the development and policy setting of the sector; partially modernizing the core backbone of the network; restructuring the tariffs of the sector; increasing the number of available land lines; the establishment of the new science park initiative "Smart Village"; the formulation of technology incubators such as "Ideavelopers"; training a large number of new graduates exceeding 8000 as well as enhancing the skills and capacities of over 60000 government and private sector workers (American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt, 2002).

The information and communication technology sector in Egypt is one of the largest in the Arab region (ITU, 2001). The volume accounts for around 20% of the total market value of the information and communication sector in the region (Kamel, 1997). This includes computing services, equipment and software where the latter is growing at more than 20% a year making Egypt the regional hub with 80% of software exports are destined to other Arab countries. The information technology market in Egypt has been witnessing rapid growth over the last three years with more companies coming into the market place every year. The majority

of these IT start-up companies are relatively small in size with capital ranging between 1 and 10 million Egyptian pounds (Business Monthly, 2001). There are over 700 high-tech companies (this includes companies involved in software development and sales, hardware manufacturing and sales and networking products and services) in Egypt as well as a growing number of information and communication technology specialists. Moreover, over the last decade Egypt has hosted a large number of regional and international information and communication technology meetings, conferences and exhibitions including Comdex, Gitex, CaiNet, ICANN, IFIP, and BITWorld among others.

## Conclusion

It is important to conclude that information and communication technology could help support business and socioeconomic development plans. However, there are a number of requirements that need to be made available for such technology to be effective. This includes creating information-rich societies as a key element of poverty reduction and sustainable development; using information and communication technology as an effective tools to tackle socioeconomic issues and not using it as an end by itself; providing an enabling environment to facilitate the enabling of information and communication services and the promotion of innovation and entrepreneurship; enabling information acquisition and knowledge dissemination and establishing community network centers that can play a significant role in socioeconomic development and growth.

Finally, there are a number of lessons to be learnt from the experience of introducing information technology into Egypt for business and socioeconomic development purposes. This includes (a) information and communication technology breaks down traditional barriers such as location which is no longer important due to the removal of time and distance barriers; (b) information and communication technology leads to empowerment; (c) help increase capacity; (d) supporting the leveraging of economic opportunity and (e) promotes independence.

The information technology sector in Egypt is still under development, though booming with success. The sector has been witnessing changes since 1985 and has witnessed a major transformation in 1999 that is reflected in the use and diffusion of information technology in most private and public sector organizations in addition to increasing investment in the region by local and international companies. This is coupled with a build-up of an information culture nationwide that is carried out by a joint collaboration between the government and the private sector. However, more is expected from the government to entice citizens to use information technology in different aspects of their lives. It is believed that information and communication technology could be the platform that Egypt can use to make a major transformation in its quest to make a substantial move towards development

and growth and that could help close down the digital divide prevailing within Egypt's different provinces as well as between Egypt as a developing nation and other developed nations of the north.

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# Digital Divide in Egypt: Between Theory and Practice

**Radwa Mobarak and Amira El-Messeiry**

**Outline:**

I- The Digital divide as a source of exclusion in today's information society.
- Description of the information gap.
- Figures representing the information gap between the developing world and the developed world.

II- Literature Review
- Tichenor, Donhue, and Olien (1970) On Education and socioeconomic status as determinants of knowledge gaps.
- Childers and Post (1975) On Information poor.
- Viswanath, and Kahn, and Emily ((1993) On Motivation as a factor in crossing knowledge gap.

III- Digital Divide in Egypt
- The situation in Egypt

1. The Macro Level (Egypt as an underdeveloped country versus developed countries and includes the following)
   a. Low rates of connectivity.
   b. Low number of Arab or Egyptian web cites.
2. The Micro Level (Knowledge gaps among Egyptians)
   a. Weak Infrastructure
      - Lack of trained work force in the IT industry.
   b. Technology Barriers
      - Unequal or lack of computer skills.
      - Unequal access opportunities.
   c. Education
      - Lack of Language skills
   d. Motivational factors
      - Lack of awareness about the digital divide problem
      - Lack of interest and motivation

Status of Telecommunication in Egypt
- Growth in the telecommunication sector.
- Telephone lines and Teledensity.

Status of IT in Egypt.
- Number of operating companies and employees.
- The increase of the countries online capacity to 400 megabits

IV- Egypt attempts to solve the solution

Infrastructure

1- Increase of Telephone lines
2- Investing in training infrastructure
    a. Free Internet project.
    b. Computer literacy programs.
    c. Constructing Internet Cafes in rural and disadvantaged areas.

Education

1- Foreign language acquisition programs
2- Global Education

**Introduction**

The Information Revolution is defined by an ongoing access process of economic, social and political globalization (Cogburn). In the last few years, globalization has become one of the most important issues that provoke debate, because resources, including knowledge, are not distributed equally among countries or even among individuals. This fact has generated an enormous interest in the concept of the Digital Divide that now occupies a prominent place in the agendas of almost every country on the globe.

According to Harrington (2001), the digital divide is the gap between countries that have extensive Internet access and those that do not. The UNDP Report (2002) broadens the definition referring to the digital divide as "the differences between those who have digital access to knowledge and those who lack it (pp.73). But, this divide is not only about access rather education and awareness play an important role in the growth of the divide (El-Nawawy, 2000). "To some this divide is a symptom of deeper forces threatening to tear the world apart in the twenty first century" (Ulfelder 2002, pp.63).

The information gap between the developed and the developing countries is apparent regarding many aspects. For example, in the year 2000, 98 percent of Latin America, 99.5 percent of Africans, and about 98 percent of Asians were not connected to the Internet. Also in terms of IT use: "rich countries are increasing their use of IT by a healthy 23% annually. Developing nations grew, too- but only by 18%. This five-point gap is substantial. It's widening, leaving worrisome implications for international trade and further global expansion" (Wilson, 2000).

Technology and information revolution bypasses billions of human beings in the world, because of the digital divide (Kennedy, 2001). Egypt, as part of the developing world, shares similar reasons for the digital divide, among which are poor quality of education and lack of awareness as a direct outcome of illiteracy (El-Nawawy, 2000). However, Egypt has recently realized the importance of the Information and Communication sector and therefore, in 1999, the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MCIT) was introduced in the

governmental body (Kamel, 2001).

This research paper addresses two main research questions: How is Egypt's progress in information technology, compared to other parts of the world? And what are the main reasons for the digital divide in Egypt?

This study is an attempt to examine where Egypt stands in the New World order, looking at Egypt's problem from a theoretical point. Furthermore, it shifts from its theoretical view to a more practical one to recommend and support efforts to bring Egypt into the Information Technology realm.

The theoretical part of the paper is based on the Knowledge Gap Hypothesis.

**The Knowledge Gap Hypothesis and Literature Review**

The knowledge gap theory by Tichenor, Donohue & Olien (1970) hypothesized that knowledge acquisition does not occur equally among all segments of society. Instead, there is a difference in the level and speed of knowledge acquisition among people with high education and high socioeconomic status and those with lower educational and socioeconomic status (Tichenor, Donohue & Olien, 1970). Severin and Tankard (2001) considered knowledge a resource or a kind of wealth that is not distributed equally through a society. Childers and Post (1975) described people struggling with poverty as "information-poor".

Tichenor, Donohue & Olien (1970) explained knowledge gap in terms of two dimensions. The first is that knowledge acquisition of a heavily publicized topic will proceed at a faster rate among better-educated people than it will occur with less educated. The second is that there is a correlation between acquisition of knowledge and education for topics highly publicized in media than for topics less publicized.

A basic element of the knowledge gap hypothesis is the role of education. "As the infusion of mass media information into a social system increases, segments of the population with higher socioeconomic status tend to acquire this information at a faster rate than the lower status segments, so that the gap in knowledge between these segments tends to increase rather than decrease (Tichenor, Donohue & Olien, 1970, pp.159 - 160).

Scholars have suggested that education plays a critical role in knowledge gaps, this is that formal education predicts a variety of activities related to knowledge acquisition. Formal education results in a person having a greater number of reference groups, more interest in and awareness about science and public issues, more accumulated knowledge of these topics and more extensive exposure to mass media contents in relevant areas (Tichenor, Donohue & Olien 1970).

Robinson in 1967 proposed that those who are informed remain the same unless "acted upon by an outside force," while the other hand those who are educated and informed stay in motion. The implications of this view is that people according to different levels of education or illiteracy may or may not develop "trained capacities" or "incapacitis" to acquire additional information from their surround-

ings (Tichenor, Donohue & Olien, 1970).

Another direction in the study of the knowledge gap hypothesis proposes the role of motivation as a determinant in knowledge acquisition and accordingly in limiting gaps between better and less educated people. Ettma & Kleine (1977) proposed the Motivation Contingency Model. This model envisioned the interplay between education and motivation, concluding that a combination of a high level of motivation and low education could lead to a lesser degree of education based knowledge gaps unlike those who are of a low motivation level and low education.

Viswanath et al. (1993) examined whether knowledge gaps decrease when motivation to acquire information or the functionality of information is similar among people of different education. The study found that the differences because of education were more evident within the motivated group. The study thus suggested that group membership, information functionality, motivation and education all combined serve as factors that affect knowledge, rather than motivation alone as a determinant in overcoming the effect of low education.

**Related Studies of Media Use**

Kwak (1999) examined a three-way relationship between education, motivation and media use in causing and lessening knowledge gaps. The study supported the importance of motivation, and media use in modifying the relationship between education and knowledge acquisition. Viswanath et al. (1991) did another study addressing the element of the functionality of topics in media and found that educational based gaps are less likely to occur on topics of interest to a community or a group and that knowledge gaps are more likely to occur if the topics are of no appeal or interest.

As communication technology changes very rapidly, many scholars speak of a "communication revolution" or an "information explosion" (Severin and Tankard, 2001). This communication revolution has the dramatic effect of giving the user much more control over the communication process and the information received. According to Lepper (1985) because of the high cost of the new technology, it may be more available to the well-to-do people within a society than to the less well off on a micro level and more available to developed countries than to developing countries on a macro level. This effect could further widen the digital divide between different socioeconomic classes within a society and between countries.

**Laying Out the Case of Egypt:**
**History of the Internet in Egypt**

As in many parts of the world, the Internet in Egypt has developed outside the formal telecommunication sector. According to ITU (2001), the first use of the Internet can be traced to a link that the Egyptian Universities Network started in October 1993, via an initial 9.6 kbit/s link to the European Academic and Research

Network. However, according to Kamel (1997), co-founder and Secretary of the Internet Society of Egypt (ISE), awareness of Information technology in the country predates the Internet by about 10 years.

According to ITU (2001) a landmark event that raised awareness within government circles of the potential of the Internet was the International Conference on Population and Development held in Cairo, from 5-13 September 1994 and attended by some 15,000 people. One of the conditions for hosting the meeting was that the Egyptian government had to provide a 64 kbit/s connection to the Internet for the duration of the conference. This link, established via a leased line to Montpellier, France, cost the Egyptian government US $ 450,000 for the nine-day period.

After the conference, the government decided to allow Egypt's Information and Decision Support Center (IDSC) and the Regional Information Technology and Software Engineering Center (RITSEC) to offer free Internet accounts to government agencies, NGOs and private companies as part of a long-term government funded campaign (Kamel, 1997).

According to El-Nawawy and Ismail (1999) another landmark event was in 1995, when Telecom Egypt established an open-door policy for commercial Internet services. Telecom Egypt stated that it would establish Internet gateways and allow 12 ISPs to begin operating.

"In October 1996 Internet diffusion suffered a setback when the Egyptian press ran a series of negative articles, claiming that the Internet was being used for the spread if subversive literature. This led to demands from government circles that an official body be nominated to regulate the Internet in Egypt" (ITU, 2001). The best candidate was decided to be a local chapter of the Internet Society of Egypt, which was formed with the understanding that it would act as the regulatory body of Internet matters (ITU, 2001).

**Current Status of Telecommunications in Egypt:**

Concerning public telecommunication operators Telecom Egypt is the biggest company in the Egyptian and the Arabian telecom market. It has 5.7 million subscribers and a teledensity of just under seven lines per 100 inhabitants (ITU, 2001).

Orascom Telecom is the second major player in the Egyptian telecom field. It is part of a consortium that owns MobiNil, one of the country's leading cellular phone operators (ITU, 2001). It has bought Telecom Egypt's GSM network in May 1998 and now has stakes in 18 GSM licenses (ITU, 2001). Orascom is also a shareholder in Menatel, with France Telecom, which has a franchise for the installation of 20,000 public payphones over a ten-year-period (ITU, 2001).

As for the mobile operators in Egypt, the two leading operators are MobiNil and Vodafone. MobiNil has a share of 55 percent of the mobile market with 1.2 million subscribers (ITU, 2001). Vodafone comes second after MobiNil, concerning market share (ITU, 2001).

In addition to Telecom Egypt and the two mobile operators, there are other industry players that received licenses from Telecom Egypt and from the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology. Among those licensed players are "two payphone operators, Menatel and NilePhone; two operators of Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSAT) networks; Nile Online, an Internet infrastructure company and EGYNet, a data communications company" (ITU, 2001).

**Status of Information Technology in Egypt**

As for the information technology sector Egypt's Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector is one of the largest in the Arab region. According to an official source, the value of the ICT market in Egypt in 1998 was about US $2.4 billion, with IT (computer services, equipment and software) accounting for around 20 percent. Software is considered a hopeful spot, estimated to be growing by 20 percent a year (ITU, 2001).

Concerning the computer market, ITU (2001) estimated some 1.4 million personal computers for a penetration of 2.1 per 100 inhabitants. Practically all computers and parts are imported and reassembled locally.

The structure of the Internet market in 1998 showed that there were 37 ISPs in Egypt (Table 1 - PC Week Egypt, 2001), and 60 ISPs in the year 2001 (ITU, 2001). The largest ISPs are LINKdotNET, GegaNet and Internet Egypt (ITU, 2001). In the year 2002, more ISPs emerged, however there are no statistics for the new number.

**The Problem on the Macro Level**

According to the United Nations Arab Human Development Report (2002), "many studies have examined the digital divide between various parts of the world, measuring it through a barrage of statistical indices." These indices include the number of stationary telephone lines, personal computers (PCs), web sites and Internet users and their ratio to the total population. The Arab world ranks low on some of these indicators. For example, Arabs represent five percent of the world population, but only compile to 0.5 percent of Internet users (UNDP Human Development Report, 2000).

Compared to the advanced world, the Arab region does not score badly with respect to telephone lines and personal computers per thousand people, but it ranks last with respect to web sites and Internet users (UNDP Human Development report, 2002). Even compared to the developing world regions like Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, the Arab region ranks last concerning number of Internet users and before last concerning number of web sites.

Despite the enormous growth and development of the ICT sector in Egypt (Table 2 and 3), as a part of the Arab world, it still suffers from the same problems that face the region. Among those problems is ranking low concerning the number of Internet users. There are 60 Internet Service providers (ISPs) in Egypt, catering to roughly

55,000 subscribers (ITU, 2001). Statistics provided by the London-based ElSharq ElAwsat newspaper show that there are about four users for each commercial account, which makes the number of Internet users 400,000, in the year 2000 (As cited in ITU, 2001). For the year 2002, the estimation was 1,000,000 million Internet users (Ministry of Communication and Information Technology, 2002), ranking Egypt as ninth among the Arab countries. If the last estimation is considered an accurate one, Internet penetration would account for about than 0.7 percent of Egypt's population that is around 66 million in the year 2002 (CAPMAS, 2002).

According to the ITU report (2001), in the year 2000, Egypt was the fourth largest number of Internet users in the Arab region, behind the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon. However, the statistics for the year 2002 provided by the UNDP report (2002) show that Egypt had fallen into the tenth place, behind Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Oman, Jordan and Tunisia. Hence, Egypt is falling behind annually at a large rate on this aspect.

Concerning infrastructure needed for ICT, Egypt had a teledensity exceeding the Arab states' average by eight percent (El-Nawawy, 2000). Egypt's public policy supports the Internet growth. With a growing annual consumption of 177,000 PCs for the year 1999- 2000 and 1,200 IT companies, Egypt has a comparatively similar IT infrastructure and an even more thriving private sector at the Internet services level than the rest of the Arab states. However, according to the UNDP report (2002), Egypt ranks twelfth among Arab countries in number of telephone lines and eleventh in number of PCs, although Egypt has a larger population than any other Arab country. Thus, Egypt is not progressing in developing infrastructure as it should be.

As for the number of web sites, Egypt ranks seventh among the Arab countries. Although most Arab countries rank very low on this indicator, still Egypt's ranking is not considered a strong one, since the difference between the number of web sites that Egypt developed and that of the United Arab Emirates, the first in rank, is vast.

The UNDP report (2002) suggests several reasons for a growing digital divide between Arab countries, including economic factors. Comparing Egypt to other Arab countries on the economic scale, the per capita income in Egypt is less than the Arab States' average by 40 percent (El-Nawawy, 2000) (Table 4). This is somehow balanced because Egypt provides Internet services with a lesser cost that nears half as that in the rest of the Arab States. However, the disparity still exists between the economy of Egypt and of other Arab countries.

Other reasons the UNDP report (2002) suggests are "absence of national information policies, weakness of the role of Arab League agencies and other regional organizations, lack of interest of Arab financial institutions in information projects and the increase in education budgets."

Taking into account that Egypt is falling behind some other Arab countries like

UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Lebanon on some indicators of technology. And comparing the Arab World to other world regions, advanced and developing, the picture shows that the digital divide very large and widening between Egypt and G8 countries.

Theoretically, the case provided is evident of Lepper's (1985) hypothesis. Egypt is not a well-to-do country, since its natural resource base is extremely limited. Egypt, once self-sufficient in food, now imports nearly one half of its foodstuff and receives annual US Aid (Egyptian Center for Economic Studies, 1998). Hence, with the high cost and rapid changes of new technology, Egypt's efforts to catch up with the "technology revolution" are not effective and advanced countries benefit more from it, widening the divide.

**The Problem on the Micro Level**

According to the UNDP report (2002), socioeconomic factors, such as education levels and age composition of the population are central reasons to the digital divide within individual countries. The digital divide in the ICT sector within Egypt is manifested in technology barriers and unequal access opportunities, education, awareness and motivation (El-Nawawy, 2000).

One of the main reasons for unequal access and technological barriers resulting the digital divide within Egypt is the rural-urban gap (UNDP, 2000). Despite the marked fall in poverty levels in Egypt's rural areas as opposed to its urban centers, the report reveals that rural households still live in traditional village housing lacking running water and modern toilets, besides being overcrowded by large-sized families (UNDP, 2000). The Internet is also making that imbalance bigger, mostly because of telephone tariffs and Egypt Telecom's monopoly (Elamrani, 2000). The rural-urban disparity in Internet access is the result of these new technologies being based on older ones, such as the telephone, which have a traditionally lower penetration in the countryside. But it is also because phone companies do not facilitate providing Internet for locals (Elamrani, 2000).

The economic factor also plays a role in the digital divide within Egypt. According to the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (2002), the new technology is aimed at the middle class Egyptian. This average middle class Egyptian may not have access from home, but can easily log on at university, work or at any cyber café. "However, there are vast differences in the length of access between Internet users of different means. Many on that poorer end must restrict themselves to purely functional uses of the Internet—email, research, news" (Elamrani, 2000). On the other hand, those who can afford to have the technology at home are privileged with more access time and variety of information not limited to specific purposes.

Another factor affecting the internal digital divide is the uneven geographical dispersion of ISPs in Egypt (ITU, 2001). Geographic dispersion means the

concentration of the Internet within a country from a single city to nationwide availability (Ibrahim, 2002). In the year 2000, there were 60 ISPs in Egypt (ITU, 2001), however 35 of which are in Cairo and Alexandria (Table 5 - Internet Arab World Magazine, 2000). In the year 2002, eighteen out of 26 governorates have ISPs and the number of ISPs is growing, but still the dispersion between governorates is uneven (Ibrahim, 2002).

**Education as a contributor in the Digital Divide:**

The problems of educational systems in Egypt are represented at different levels: high levels of illiteracy, gender and rural gaps in education, poor quality, insufficient computer equipment and connectivity and lack of adult learning and training (UNDP Human Development Report, 2002). All these factors are the manifestations of the status of the educational system in Egypt: on the individual level, the importance of education lies in the fact that it provides the person with the basic skills that allows him to function in the information society. On the developmental level, education is "prerequisite" in the process of human development. According to the UNDP index of human development, education was defined as one of four attributes of human development. In other words, education is the supplier of qualified human resources. Thus, the "mismatch" between the supply of education and the demands of development and information society are the real factors of the digital, economic and developmental gaps that Egypt is experiencing (UNDP Human Development Report, 2002).

**The Problem on the Macro Level**

Egypt and the Arab states are experiencing an educational gap that separates them from developed countries and even developing countries. According to the UNESCO statistical yearbook (1998) illiteracy in the Arab states in 1995, is estimated towards 65,000,000 compared to 13,000,000 in developed countries and 872, 000,000 in developing countries. Although the number of illiterates in developing countries may exceed that of the Arab states, the ratio of total illiterates in Arab states is 43.3 percent of its population compared to 29.6 percent in developing world, and 3.4 percent in the developed world (UNESCO, 1998).

**The Problem on the Micro Level**

**Illiteracy in Egypt**

On the micro level, Egypt is experiencing an educational gap within the country itself. Although Illiteracy eradication in Egypt is a continued effort, the outcome is not very clear due to the large ratio of illiteracy in the population. According to the UNESCO's statistical yearbook (1995), the adult literacy rate in Egypt was 49 percent (Cochran, 1997) compared to 50 percent at 2002.

According to CAPMAS 2002, the educational status of students 10 year olds

and older in 1998 is: 39.36 percent illiterates, 18.74 percent could read and write, 9.27 had primary education, 26.92 less than university certificates 5.68 percent university graduates, 0.03 not identified (CAPMAS, 1998).

Also, the disparity in the distribution of education in urban and rural Egypt indicates a gap in education efforts within the country. For example the number of urban illiterate males is 2,024,237 compared with 4,616,042 men in rural areas. Even within the same area the gender gaps in education are high. For example, illiterate males in urban Egypt are 2,024,334 compared to illiterate females who are 3,284,721. In rural Egypt the gap is more obvious between illiterate males who represent 4,616,042 compared to 7,721,025 for females. Over all ratio of gender literacy gap in Egypt is 66 percent for Egyptian men compared to 43 percent for women (USAID, 2002).

**Spending on Education:**

According to CAPMAS the public expenditure in Egypt on Education has increased from L.E.12, 427.5 million in 1997/1998 to L.E.13, 527.4 millions in 1998/1999 to 14,747.3 millions in 1999/2000. Expenditure on education constitutes 14.75 percent of the whole governmental public expenditure estimated to 100,302.9 millions and is distributed as follows: Expenditure on primary, preparatory and secondary education is 10,489.7 millions and 4,257.6 millions on high education is (CAPMAS, 2002).

Another problem in education in Egypt is that it is divided in two different segments: the very expensive private, education, which is affordable to a minority and the poor quality government education for the majority of the population. As a result, rather than narrowing knowledge gaps, education is expanding the gap among different socioeconomic classes "Education has begun to loose its significant role as a means of achieving social advancement in Arab countries, turning instead into a means of perpetuating social stratification and poverty" (UNDP, 2002).

Poor quality of education in Egypt is another angle of the educational problem in Egypt. Poor quality overshadows all the efforts to spread education by increasing the number of schools. Basic skills that education should provide are reading, writing, Mathematics, foreign Languages, and computer skills (ITU, 2001). The problems with the educational system in Egypt are that it does not serve some of the previous criterion. Education in Egypt is based on memorization of single textbooks and does not encourage the development of independent thinking. (ITU, 2001) Thus, it results in low level of knowledge attainment and the lack of analytical skills and innovative capacities. The poor quality of education is reflected in the high failure rates as well as repetition of school years. Repeaters of school years at 1997are estimated to 334,254 students (UNESCO, 2002).

Also, most schools lack scientific laboratory and computer equipment. This results in a generation who are not in touch with the requirement of the new age of

technology. "You can finish high school without seeing a computer. You could very well finish college without seeing a computer: that is the education problem. The students are not going to be citizens of the world if they do not know how to use New World order machines." Mohamed El Nawawy, Founder of Egypt's first commercial ISP. Computer connectivity rates at the Egyptian schools is as follows: Out of the 32,000 schools in Egypt, 23,000 are equipped with computers of which 6,000 are equipped with telephone lines and Internet connectivity. In 90 percent of these Internet connected schools, there is only a single computer installed. The remaining ten percent have at most 20 computers per school (ITU, 2001).

Despite the ministry's continued effort to increase the number of computer at school each year, student's benefit is still limited due the low computer to student ratio. Also, limited numbers of hours are given to computer classes. (ITU, 2001) A comparison between Egypt and the United States in the ratio of computer to student represents the gap. In the United States, as Statistics indicate there is slightly more than one computer for every five students. The ratio of student's access to Internet is eight students to one (Koss, 2001).

High education is Egypt is also divided into private and public education. The 14 public universities are connected to the Internet through the Egyptian Network (ENU). Computer courses were introduced in all university faculties, however large number of students (1.7 million) and lack of finances allows only for computer basics (ITU, 2001).

**Low Levels of Language Acquisition:**

Low level of foreign Language acquisition is another obstacle in popularizing the Internet in Egypt even among the educated segments. The importance of the English language is that it is the operating language of the Internet. The World Economic Forum 2002 recognized the fact that 93% of all the Internet web pages is in English. (Kasim, 2002) Also, English is the most familiar language to the Egyptians. Moreover, according to San Francisco based market research, after English, the most common languages on the net in order are: Japanese, Spanish, and German and finally French and Chinese are the fifth. (Wendy, 2000, pp.62) This poses a problem to Monolingual Arab speakers who will be blocked out from the majority of web content the mater, which will contribute to strengthening the digital divide. As a result, the Egyptians are left with no choice but to try to excel in English. In Egypt, English language is the second language in most of the Egyptian schools. However, low levels of language proficiency could be attributed to the fact that it is introduced at later stage of education (preparatory stage). However English language courses is now a mandatory part of the University curriculum. (ITU, 2001)

**Lack of Awareness, Motivation and Involvement:**

Awareness, consciousness and involvement in the problems of one's society are

all direct outcomes of education. Illiteracy on the other hand could result in the opposite. Thus, illiteracy in Egypt could be held responsible for the lack of awareness among a high percentage of the Egyptian population. According to El-Nawawy (2000) lack of awareness and motivation are among the main problems that result in the digital divide within a society. Tichenor, Donohue & Olien (1970) provided evidences of how education serves to distinguish those who are educated from those who are not. According to Tichenor et. al., the base of the differences between the literate and illiterate is not only in the quantity of accumulated and stored knowledge generated from education, but also awareness. In addition to acquired skills, education increases awareness. Thus, the educated person is more likely to be aware of a topic when it appears in the mass media and is also better prepared to understand it.

Also, a better educated person is more likely to enjoy a broader sphere of every day activity and belong to greater number of reference groups whom are likely to discuss topics of shared interest together (Tichenor et al., 1970). Such relevance reinforces, and facilitates knowledge acquisition. Moreover, education is likely to influence selective exposure, acceptance and retention of information. Thus the values and norms presented in mass media are more relevant to more educated people as the delivery system of mass media and technology is geared towards the elite.

Applying Tichenor's logic on Internet access in Egypt, we could see that those who make use of the Internet are the educated segment of the society. The educated were more able to learn about the Internet from the media as the information disseminated in the media was relevant to them. Next, because of their possession of computer and basic language skills they were motivated to make use of the Internet. However, as mentioned previously, this segment in Egypt is limited compared to the whole population. As statistics indicates, university graduates in Egypt only constitutes 5.68 percent of the population while those with less than university education represent 26.92 percent of the population. These high levels of illiteracy deprive a 68 percent of the population from accessing the Internet because simply they do not posses the basic tool. As a result, they will be less involved or motivated to approach it (CAPMAS, 2002).

**Attempts to bridge the digital divide in Egypt:**

The community is taking steps to establish a strong Internet society in the country in a partnership between the government, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations as well as individual users (Hashem, 1998). Egypt's case is unique, however, in the sense that the government is the entity that carries on the efforts the efforts to bridge the digital divide (Kamel, 2001).

**Computer Literacy and Training Programs**

The Egyptian government is consulting major International IT corporations in order to develop a strong basis for a skilled workforce in the IT domain. For example, it designed a program for training university graduates to become IT professionals through a period of six months. This is done in cooperation with IBM, ICL, Cisco, Microsoft and Qualcomm. The program trained 55,000 graduates (Meed Weekly Special Report, 2002).

Also, the government carried on a computer literacy program providing basic computer skills to young Egyptians. These programs were offered at poorer neighborhoods where people could not afford training (Meed Weekly Special Report, 2002). Besides the government had set up 300 IT clubs in less advantaged areas with a LE 1- access cost per hour (Meed Weekly Special Report, 2002).

**Free Net Introduction**

In its efforts to spread Internet usage across the country and transform Egypt into an information society, the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology publicized the free Internet access in the country (MCIT, 2002). In partnership with licensed ISP's, MCIT affiliate Telecom Egypt set-up an estimated 15,000 ports, capable of serving 2 million Internet users, with users having to pay only for the local dial-up phone tariff (MCIT, 2002).

On January 2002, MCIT and Telecom Egypt, the state owned fixed line monopoly launched the project. This project aims at increasing the number of Internet users in Egypt (Africa News, 2002). Such a project allows everyone with a computer and a modem access the web by simply dialing specific local telephone numbers like 0777-5000 or 777-7777, which are easy numbers to remember. ISPs buy some of these telephone numbers from Telecom Egypt and users of this service only pay the cost of the local calls. Seventy percent of the revenue of these calls goes to the Internet service provider and the other 30 percent is paid to the government through Telecom Egypt (Africa News, 2002).

**Egypt Cyber Center**

The first Internet data center in the Middle East – Egypt Cyber Center (ECC)– was inaugurated by MCIT in an event, which marked the coming together of the country's information society. Partnering with technology-based holding company NTC, Egypt's leading private equity house Commercial International Investment Company (CIIC), and data carrier EgyNet, ECC provides e-commerce platforms, e-business applications, server hosting, internet connectivity, and disaster recovery options to IT-oriented businesses. ECC is part of the $25 million project conceived

to help enterprises optimize Internet operations using the latest technological advancements. The project's value is expected to soar to $150 million within the next three years (MCIT, 2002).

**Technology Incubator**

Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MCIT) and CIIC (Commercial International Investment Company) formed the region's first technology incubator firm, to help entrepreneurs develop their ideas into successful businesses quickly. The new company, IDEAVELOPERS, is to-be headquartered in the Pyramids Smart Village, Egypt's first technology park, in Giza. This project sets out to develop Egypt's emerging IT market, encourage inward investment and help Egyptian businesses be International successes (MCIT, 2002).

**eGovernment**

The IDSC has played a major role in providing government information online. Its "Information Highway" project was first launched in 1995 (ITU, 2001). Web sites were established for various sectors such as tourism, health, culture, environment and local government (ITU, 2001). Today all of the governorates have an online presence through GovernoratesNet (ITU, 2001). A global e-government survey conducted by Brown University in the US rates Egypt as being at the higher end of the e-government readiness (Africa News, 2002).

**Educational Efforts:**

The ministry of education allocates a substantial amount of its expenditure to increase of the number of schools to spread education among the nation. In 2001, the ministry added 2,000 new schools at cost of LE 3 Billion. Also, among its long-term plans, it aims at building 17,000 schools by the year 2010 with initial costs reaching LE.25 Billion. (Business Today, 2002).

In addition, the Ministry of Education, together with the USAID, is working to compensate for gender enrollment gaps in Egypt. The "New schools Program" is an effort to target girls whose age six to 14 who have never enrolled in education or dropped out of school. The program will help at least 28,000 girls in areas where girl's enrollment in education is low. Such efforts proved effective as Statistics show that the number of girls in rural Upper Egypt currently enrolled in primary school continues to rise with a 15 percent increase in the past 5 years (US Aid, 2002).

Also among the ministry's efforts is the implementation of "Education Reform Pilot" in Alexandria that was initiated 2001. The planned pilot effort is aimed at improving the quality of education through decentralized school management, and increased community involvement and extensive training of teachers. This program will run for four years and will include 60 schools (US Aid, 2002). Also the government is investing on the seven- ten year age group with a number of 400, 000

PCs to Local schools (Meed Weekly Special Report, 2002).

In the field of teacher training, the ministry of education in cooperation with the USAID has designed "The Integrated English Language Program", which is aimed at raising the levels of teachers in English language (US Aid, 2002).

**Limitations of the study:**

Since the study is dependent on secondary data, the researchers have faced considerable obstacles when trying to find reliable cross-national data and country specific information. There was not enough research, nor enough accurate statistics about Egypt: ISPs do not provide any accurate information about their activities and the very limited available statistics are controversial due to governmental bias. The researchers tried to overcome this problem through using different sources, however those sources are not that consistent, since some of them provide percentages, some provide rankings, while other provide just rough estimates.

**Conclusion and Recommendations**

It is clear to the newly established information society in Egypt that there is still a long way for the information and telecommunication revolution. There is a growing need for innovative solutions for speeding up the ongoing development, expanding public awareness, and enhancing public access to information and communication services. In addition, there is a lot to be gained from cooperation and exchange of experiences and expertise across boarders with the rest of the world, especially with the existence of regional organizations and that can support such cooperation and cross-fertilization.

**Continuous enhancement of Information and Communication Technology:**

In spite of the significant growth in the use of information technology in Egypt, there are still several challenges that the information society should face.

Preserving the culture and traditions of local communities, while empowering them to interact effectively with other communities around the world is one of those challenges (Hashem, 1998). Providing adequate Arabic information content on the Internet in key sectors including education, business, and trade services. This will increase the societal Internet penetration drastically. Also, providing adequate training and technical assistance to enable users, especially professionals, to make best use of the Information and Internet technologies in their line of work.

Wide-scale up-to-date infrastructure deployment is another challenge. The priorities of the government are mainly focusing on the deployment of basic telephone service all over the country (MCIT, 2002). High-speed integrated networks are on the agenda but not yet implemented. Private-sector participation the establishment of infrastructure will also be a new opportunity as Egypt will have large bandwidth requirements for newly evolving multimedia applications (MCIT, 2002).

The buildup of the Egyptian Internet with its "infostructure" and servers in different disciplines is one of the major challenges that Egypt faces. The content buildup has always been considered a role of governmental organizations exclusively. The evolving private sector ISP participation in Web development and hosting introduces new challenges and new responsibilities for the validation and security of the contents (MCIT, 2002).

**Educational reforms:**

Egypt should work to improve the quality of Education. As proposed by the UNDP, "The objectives of the education process should be derived from the global vision of the 21st Century education. Education should integrate Arab people into the age in which they live." (UNDP, 2002). Kirkwood (2001), defined the global citizens of the 21st century as "Those who posses high technological skills, broad interdisciplinary knowledge about the contemporary world and adaptability flexibility, and world mindedness to participate effectively in the globalized world." As singled out by Kirkwood (2001), students who entered kindergarten in 1999 will graduate from high school in 2012. These graduates will confront a more open world more global in nature and more demanding. The globalization, openness, and development brought by communications technology will force them to deal with individuals and ideas from a diverse ethnic, social, and cultural background. Also the standards of competence will rise. In order to be able to cope, all children have a right to be educated and equipped with right attitudes, needed knowledge, and skills to become competent and responsible. "They should acquire the sensitivities and tolerance and respect for all human beings to live harmoniously in an independent world" (Kirkwood, 2001).

**Directing towards Adult and Continuous Education and Motivation:**

The core of adult education is the "continued investment in people, overcoming the fragmentation of life into education, work and retirement; forging new routes to equal opportunities, diversifying education and training opportunities, reconciling cultural, social, economic goals, building on past achievements and devising a new systemic logic." (Oduran, 2000) Continued education could ensure the spread of the required technological skills that would enable an elder segment of the society to participate rather than to seclude and become disadvantaged. Towards the realization of this goal, Egypt could borrow from Singapore's efforts in the domain of adult and continued education.

Examples of adult education programs that were carried out are: the Training Initiative for mature employer (TIMC), The Adult Co-operative Training Scheme (ACTS), The Certified on the Job Training Center (COJTC). Such efforts proved effective in supplementing formal education gaps that appear by time and provided a solid basis for competitiveness. (Oduran, 2000). Egypt could make use of similar

programs to raise the skills of government, and public sector employees who are generally low in language and computer skills. Such programs would lead to more efficiency and competence and would increase the employee's level of interest and motivation.

**Increasing levels of Awareness:**

Creating awareness should be a shared interest between education and the mass media. Both should utilize their ability in affecting people's lives to educate people. In an underdeveloped country where the half the population is illiterate, concepts like the "digital divide" and " globalization" are abstracts. Both education and the media should work to increase the salience and the functionality of these issues and work to integrate them into the lives of their people. If such concepts are "meaningless to the illiterate, hungry, unemployed, hopeless and sick masses of the people, it can be make meaning to them if directed against the cause of their frustration" (Oduaran, 2000).

Continued education could ensure the spread of the required technological skills that would enable an elder segment of the society to participate rather than to seclude and become disadvantaged. Towards the realization of this goal, Egypt could borrow from Singapore's efforts in the domain of adult and continued education.

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## Appendix

### Tables

Table 1. Egyptian Internet Service Providers 2001 - Source PC Week Egypt

| ISP | Web Page | City |
|---|---|---|
| ALEXCOMM (MADENTEX) | www.alexcomm.net | Alexandria |
| ALEXNET | www.alexnet.com.eg | Alexandria |
| DATA EXPRESS | www.dataxprs.com.eg | Alexandria |
| TECHNOMINA | www.tecmina.com | Alexandria |
| INTERNET ALEXANDRIA | www.inetalex.ie-eg.com | Alexandria |
| GLOBALNET | www.globalnet.com.eg | Alexandria |
| CNS | www.cns-egypt.com | Alexandria |
| ACCESS | www.access.com.eg | Cairo |
| COMMNET GROUP | www.comment.com.eg | Cairo |
| DATUM | www.datum.com.eg | Cairo |
| EGYPT ONLINE | www.egyptonline.com | Cairo |
| EIS | www.eis.com.eg | Cairo |
| GEGANET | www.gega.net | Cairo |
| IEC | www.iec.egnet.net | Cairo |
| INFINITY | www.inifinity.com.eg | Cairo |
| LINK.dotNET | www.link.net | Cairo |
| MIST | www.mist-net.com | Cairo |
| PAN ARAB COMPUTER CENTER | www.pacc.com.eg | Cairo |
| RITE | www.rite.com | Cairo |
| CLICK | www.click.com.eg | Cairo |
| S.C.C. | www.scc.com.eg | Cairo |
| ETSNET | www.etsnet.com.eg | Cairo |
| STARNET | www.starnet.com.eg | Cairo |
| THE WAY OUT | www.wayout.net | Cairo |
| WORLDNET | www.worldnet.com.eg | Cairo |
| INTERNET EGYPT | www.ie-eg.com | Cairo |
| SHAHD | www.shahd.com | Cairo |
| ONLINE | www.online.com.eg | Cairo |
| PURENET | www.purenet.com.eg | Cairo |
| NIEREC | www.nierec.com.eg | Cairo |
| MENA NET | www.menanet.net | Cairo |
| SOFICOM | www.soficom.com.eg | Cairo/Alex |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| BEC | www.bec.com.eg | Port Said |
| SINAINET | www.sinainet.com.eg | Sinai |
| CONSULTANT INFORMATION CENTER | www.cic.com.eg | Tanta |
| INTERNET ISMAILIA | www.ie-eg.com | Ismailia |
| INTERNET SIXTH OF OCTOBER | www.ie-eg.com | 6th of October |
| INTERNET HURGHADA | www.ie-eg.com | Hurghada |

Table 2. Development of Information Technology in Egypt - Source MCIT

| Indicator | 1/10/1999 | 31/12/2000 | 30/6/2001 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Number of Service Providers (ISPs) | 45 | 60 | 65 |
| Percentage of Service Providers for 10,000 persons | 0.007 | 0.009 | 0.01 |
| Number of Internet Subscribers | 300,000 | 650,000 | 750,000 |
| Percentage of Internet Subscribers for 10,000 persons | 47 | 101 | 115 |
| Companies working in IT field | 234 | 363 | 565 |

Table 3. Information and Communications Technology in Egypt 2002 - Source MCIT

| Indicator | October 1999 | January 2002 | Proportion |
|---|---|---|---|
| Number of Internet Users | 300,000 | 1,000,000 | 233% |
| International Internet Band Width | 20 Megabits/sec | 400 Megabits/sec | 1900% |
| Monthly Internet Subscription | LE 100 | Free with the price of a local telephone call | |
| Number of ICT companies in Egypt | 266 | 677 | 155% |
| Number of ICT | No statistics | 4954 | 100% |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| employees in Egypt | available | | |
| Number of ICT skills Development Trainees | 1200 | 44,400 | 3600% |
| Number of IT clubs | 30 | 325 | 983% |

Table 4. Income Per Capita for Arab States — Source ElNawawy 2000.

| Arab States | Population (1000s) | Income per capita (USD) | GDP (USD 1000s) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Algeria | 30,774 | 1,097.00 | 337,590,780.00 |
| Bahrain | 607 | 9,522.00 | 57,798,540.00 |
| Comaros | 676 | 334.00 | 2,257,840.00 |
| Djibouti | 629 | 979.00 | 6,157,910.00 |
| Egypt | 67,226 | 1,168.00 | 785,199,680.00 |
| Iraq | 22,450 | 7,037.00 | 1,579,806,500.00 |
| Jordan | 6,483 | 1,306.00 | 84,667,980.00 |
| Kuwait | 1,897 | 17,533.00 | 332,601,010.00 |
| Lebanon | 3,236 | 4,546.00 | 147,108,560.00 |
| Libya | 5,470 | 5,621.00 | 307,468,700.00 |
| Mauritania | 2,598 | 388.00 | 10,080,240.00 |
| Morocco | 27,866 | 1,246.00 | 347,210,360.00 |
| Palestinian Territory | 1,077 | Not Available | Not Available |
| Oman | 2,460 | 675.00 | 16,605,000.00 |
| Qatar | 589 | 16,166.00 | 95,217,740.00 |
| Saudi Arabia | 20,899 | 6,921.00 | 1,446,419,790.00 |
| Somalia | 9,672 | 169.00 | 16,345,680.00 |
| Sudan | 28,882 | 59.00 | 17,040,380.00 |
| Syria | 15,725 | 4,242.00 | 667,054,500.00 |
| Tunisia | 9,460 | 2,063.00 | 195,159,800.00 |
| U.A.E. | 2,397 | 20,203.00 | 484,265,910.00 |
| Western | 2,840 | Not Available | Not Available |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sahara | | | |
| Yemen | 174,880 | 318.00 | 55,611,840.00 |
| Total | 2,788,450 | 2,507.37 | 6,991,668,740.00 |

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# Counteracting Negative Images in the Media: Close-up on the Middle East

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**Abstract**

*By and large, there is no tool more powerful than the media in transmitting information. In a time where information is power, this is definitely the rest of the world should invest in. The idea is that the technological boom has managed to alter the distance dilemma and in many ways has enabled us to have access cultures all over the world. Meaning that one can simply turn on the news, browse the net, or listen to the radio to receive information on places and people's uncountable miles away. This is impressive and dangerous at the same time. The listener or viewers ability to access such information has several effects that vary enormously. I want to explore the effects of the media in creating stereotypes; I want to briefly examine the attention span of the viewer or listener in contemporary times. Finally I would like to end on an optimistic note, one that seeks to make the best use of the media; through encouraging groups that have been marginalized or mal-presented to get involved in the making of their identity; to participate in their own representation. Also, at the end I would like to make the argument that while the media is very powerful, it is only a medium; there is still a grave difference in learning about a people and a place directly than from being given the information; the former is more active and tends to work against stereotypes. I would also like to bring up the idea of the 'marketization' of culture by reinforcing stereotypes in and how that affects the subjects Perception of his/her own identity.*

This paper attempts to deconstruct and examine the portrayal of the Middle East and people of Middle Eastern origin in the media in order to present new ways of counteracting such images. Counteracting in this sense refers to a method where a dialogue is created not only between 'Eastern' and 'Western'; as such categories are totalizing and do not represent the diverse composition of either, a dialogue is needed between audiences between peoples of different places of different and similar origins. The idea is to move away from a position that conceives of media images as fixed visions maintained by homogeneous dominant groups. The paper is divided into three parts, the first counteracts the view that conceives of the United

States as a homogenous culture with a fixed identity that is not susceptible to change, on the contrary the United States has a unique political structure that provides spaces for upward mobility. This part of the presentation draws on James Zoghbi's thought and several other articles examining Arab economic power in the United States. The second part of the paper examines the role played by Arab networks in terms of incorporating their voices and acting as representatives of their community in the international media-making arena. The third and last part of the paper is a synthesis of the ideas explored in the first two parts. This part looks at several efforts, some that are productive and some that are not. The paper concludes with recommendations and pays specific attention to the benefits of employing a cultural studies approach to media.

**Part One:**
**Breaking down Totalizing Conceptions of American Society**

In his book entitled, The Media and Modernity, John B. Thompson offers a social theory of the media that is very much involved emergence of modernity. For, Thompson the growth of mass communication in the nineteenth century is very much related to the growth of capitalism as well as the growth of nationalism. (Thompson 76-80). The growth of the media thus created the category of 'mediated interaction' that in many ways dictated the norms of society. (Thompson 81-85). Media as an industry grew to privilege certain groups while marginalizing others, thus offering us a sense of the power dynamics involved (Thompson 82-86). Yet while the media as an industry is linked to certain group dynamics, this by no means is reflective of a stagnant society. In a speech made to nominate Jesse Jackson, James Zoghbi began with the phrase, "I am the son of an illegal immigrant nominating the son of a slave" (Zoghbi – Interview). Zogbhi uses to this to demonstrate that only in an American society can this type of political process take place. For Zoghbi, Arab-Americans need to incorporate themselves into American society by making use of their political power (Zoghbi --Interview). In interview with Zoghbi in the American University in Cairo, he revealed that "We [Arab-Americans] stronger today than we were in the 1980's". Zoghbi supports this claim by giving several examples of Arab-Americans holding key political positions in the United States (Zoghbi- Interview). Zoghbi argues that despite the events of September 11, Arab-Americans are supported by significant factions in the United States demonstrating to a large extent that in many ways Arab-Americans are incorporated into American society (Zoghbi- Interview). For Zoghbi, the main solution to counteracting negative images in the media is through direct engagement in the debates, in creating a dialogue (Zoghbi-Interview). Zoghbi argues that at this point in time Arab-Americans are in a position to exert political pressure in their favor through collective action; the idea is to have an efficient organizational structure that has a coherent political vision with clear cut

objectives in mind (Zoghbi-Interview).

It is important to keep in mind that Arab-American political power has a strong economic base. In an article entitled "Untapped Markets: Ethnics in the US", the author makes the argument that at this point in time, Arab-Americans as an ethnicity are in position create an economic block. The growth of the role played by Arab-Americans in terms of the American economy when tied with political action will ultimately change the way that Arab-Americans are represented, resulting in the situation where over time, Americans begin to see Arab-Americans are no longer an 'alien' group that is distanced from the mainstream.

Even though Arab-Americans are in position to alter the portrayal of people with Arab or Middle Eastern background in the United States, they should not be burdened with that responsibility on their own. Zoghbi points out, that while Arab-American action is important; it needs to be complemented by political action from the Middle East itself, "We need Arabs to be telling the story" (Zoghbi – Interview)

**Part Two:**
**The Role of Middle Eastern Networks in Creating a Dialogue**

The main problem that James Zoghbi identified with regards to portrayal of Arab in the Media in the interview in the American University in Cairo was the passive stance that Arabs and people of Middle Eastern origin take towards making themselves understood to other nations (Zoghbi-Interview).

When questioned about what she felt the main problems with Arab media networks were, Schams El Wazeer, an Arab producer in CNN stated, "My main problem with Arab media is that oftentimes they try too hard to come across as being pro-Palestinian but with less calculated subtlety", "with state-controlled Arab media there is a tendency to throw in too many adjectives when a simple straight forward approach is much more effective" (El Wazir- interview). An anonymous source revealed when asked the same question that "recently, Arab media has improved with the growth of independent private media such as Jazeera, ANN, and Al-Arabiya. They have generally over the past 2.5 years given the *Intifada* the kind of coverage that the conflict warrants. But they have also allowed the Iraq crisis affect their coverage by marginalizing this conflict in favor of an American-style play-by-play coverage of the Bush administration's" tactics, "By trying too hard to imitate western-style coverage, modern private Arab news channels have unwittingly allowed the US to determine their news agenda as well" (Anonymous source – online interview). Arab media thus has to break away somehow from the international news-making agenda by creating their own news, or by focusing on issues that are more relevant and important to them. The same interviewee revealed that due to global attention being centered on the situation in Iraq, very little attention is given to the Palestinian situation and this is precisely where Arab media should fulfill its role. When asked about the types of problems with the Middle

East's portrayal in non-Arab networks, the interviewee stated, "I think the greatest problem regarding western portrayal of the Middle East is that the story is almost always de-contextualized. Background or historical info is almost always left out". (Anonymous source – online interview)

While this effort is still lacking, it is important to note significant advances in this area: channels such MBC2, Arabia, ANN, Al Jazeera 2 have become a lot more active in presenting news of the Middle East to other nations across the globe. Their contribution is important because it not only speaks to non-Arab and non-Middle Eastern audiences, but to Arabs and Middle Easterners across the globe, thus creating an international dialogue. MBC 2 is another important channel that speaks to the non-Arab audience. On the whole, Arab media networks have managed to incorporate themselves to a large extent in the international news making arena, yet the ability to break loose from the international media trend remains. A prime example of this integration is SAWA radio, a music station sponsored by the United States government that plays Arab that has become increasingly popular not in the United States, but in other nations in the Arab world. SAWA radio is important because it is an attempt taken by Americans and Arabs alike to actively create a dialogue with younger generations of Americans and Arabs in general. However SAWA Radio has been criticized for being a long winded approach, a project representing an empty effort at bridging gaps between cultures, SAWA radio has been criticized for being a shallow channel that does nothing by play music without any form of programs that in any way attempt to educate the listener or serve as introduction to the different types of music that is played.

**A synthesis and recommendations**

The crux of the matter that was identified by both interviewees and James Zoghbi is the need for Arab participation in the political sphere and specifically in the media industry.

The Al-Hewar center held a panel discussion entitled, "Media and Image-Building" in which solutions were provided on how to counteract negative images in the media. With regards to the question of counteracting negative images of Arabs in the media, one of the panelists, Dr. Dan Rainey revealed, "Ethnic communities in America are not simply tied to media images. Although images may be formed by what is seen on television, day-to-day interactions between people also help develop perceptions, and mediates, to a great extent, what is seen on TV. It is somewhat different for Arab-Americans, however, because people in this country don't have a lot of opportunities to interact face-to-face with Arabs. Therefore, a lot of what many people know of Arab Americans and the Middle East comes from the media, especially in smaller communities. It is different in some of the larger cities, such as Washington, D.C., which tend to be multi-cultural, and in which more Arabs live, but the opportunity in much of the country

to interact with people who are different is relatively limited". (http://www.alhewar.com/rainey.html)

The idea is to create an empathetic subject, in an article entitled "The Power of Feeling: Locating emotions in culture", E. Diedre Pribam emphasizes "the need for a cultural studies approach to emotions that focuses in detail on: how emotions are constituted, experienced, and managed, what is culturally permissible for specific categories of subjects to express as part of their constitution within contemporary power relations, and the techniques and contexts in and through which the emotional subject is produced" (Pribram 407). This is precisely the type of approach that Arab media networks should take towards making themselves identifiable subjects to non-Arab viewers. Such efforts will put Arabs and other marginalized groups in a position to tell their parts of the story. These types of efforts coupled with political and economic power will put Arabs in the type of position they want to be in.

At this point I want to look at the work of several NGOs that aim at enforcing dialogue and understanding through various media. The organizations that are briefly introduced are the Arab-American Network and the Common Ground NGO. What is characteristic of both organizations is that they embrace a cultural studies approach to media, meaning that they seek to bring about positive changes through understanding the historical and social dynamics of the societies they operate in and accordingly choose what type of media would be most suited to their project objectives.

The Arab American Action Network (AAAN) is a not-for-profit organization based in Chicago. The objective of this organization is the creation of a more tolerant environment through advocacy, "We are committed to empowerment through advocacy, action and education, while expanding the resources and services available to our community. For its success and growth, AAAN relies on the dedication and hard work of its staff, and network board members, volunteers, friends and contributors that spans the city of Chicago and the world" (p://aaan.org/ " http://aaan.org/.)

Founded in 1982,Common Ground is an NGO founded by governments, foundations, multilateral organizations and individuals with the aim of widening the scope of media with an ethical foundation (ghof-center.org/handbook/melone/final.pdf" www.berghof-center.org/handbook/melone/final.pdf) The Common Ground team pointed out that tension usually takes place where this scarcity of information, offering information based on a large scale of facts would already be a de-escalating measure(www.berghof-center.org/handbook/melone/final.pdf). Common Ground employs four different mechanisms in order to bring about more constructive media, such mechanisms include: "targeting journalist, addressing media content", targeting "those aiming at changing the political context, providing local networks with technical assistance (www.berghof-center.org/handbook/

melone/final.pdf.)

The point of this paper is to examine some of the venues through which counteracting negative images in the media can take place. While the focus of this paper are Arabs and Arab Americans, it is important to keep in mind that mechanism suggested are applicable to any group seeking to incorporate itself into the media-making discourse. The paper examined the problematic nature of international media-making discourse, demonstrating that the process of incorporating alternative voices is one that demands a structural change with regards to how media images are constructed. The paper also examined the importance of creating an empathetic subject in order to generate positive feedback from viewers and listeners. Overall the purpose of the paper was to locate the responsibility of counteracting negative images to those who are unhappy with their representation. The paper argues against the passive stance that Arab networks play in the international media-making arena, and urges them to locates venues to articulate their voices in a rapidly changing, technologically advancing communicational environment.

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# Identity Politics in Central Asia

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**Abstract:**

*The paper is discussing how the newly independent states in Central Asia face the issue of developing their distinct national identity. Some scholars argue that a strong national ideology helps to build a strong nation-state. Many post-colonial states in Asia and Africa had gone through the stage of rediscovering and reshaping their identity. Five "stans" of Central Asia emerged just 12 years ago after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Although these new nations had formed as separate ethnicities many centuries ago, they never encountered a situation where a statehood was identified with only one particular ethnicity. Historically, the states (Turk Khanaty, Karakhan Khanaty, Maverannahr, Golden and Chaghatay Hordes, Bukhara Emirate, Khiua Khanaty, Turkistan) that existed in the area had always been multinational. Now, these five nations are facing the challenge of being a titular nation in their states. Thus the issue of developing a new national ideology is being addressed. How these states are coping with these issues? How are they identifying themselves vis-à-vis their neighbors? What is their attitude to the common heritage they share with their neighbors? How are they utilizing the symbols of their common heritage? How are they dealing with an overarching Central Asian, Muslim and Turkic identity, and the common legacy of the Soviet Past. How convincing is the accentuation of national symbols in the era of globalization and regional integration? These are the questions that have many ethical as well as political dimension.*

The emergence of new independent states in Central Asia with the collapse of the last multinational Empire of the Soviet Union unleashed a debate about the identity of these new nations. In the wake of the 'constructivism' theory of nationalism, the dominant perception has been that these new nations are 'constructed' or 'invented' by Soviets. This is a leitmotiv in Oliver Roy's new book—"The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations," in which he argues that Soviet decrees determined not only "the frontiers of the new nations, but also their names, their reinvented pasts, the definition of the ethnic groups that they were reckoned to embody, and even their language" (Roy vii).

I think that although the Russian colonialism and the Soviets undoubtedly

played a great role in the emergence of Tajiks, Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Kazakh and Turkmen as new nations into modernity, these new nations are not completely artificial, as Roy and others argue; they emerged in the place of primordial *ethnies*, some of which can be traced many centuries back; and not 'unnaturally' separated from the 'unified' Turkestan SSR (1920-1924). Iranian versus Turanian, nomadic versus sedentary, other ethnic, linguistic, and territorial divisions existed before the creation of Turkestan, before the advent of Russians, and even before the Mongol invasion as documented in the Mahmud Kashghari's "Diwan al-Lughat-at-Turk" (11th century), where he distinguished several Turkic dialects that existed at the time. The Soviets did not invent these divisions; they simply built on and institutionalized them. Of course, the irony of history is that, today, through the Soviet institutionalization, particularly, delimitation into 'union' and 'autonomous' republics, 'print capitalism,' mass education and literacy and recent nation-state status, some of these primordial divisions/identities made their way into the modern world, while some disappeared, and some are still struggling for a place in modernity (Karakalpak, Uighur).

The emergence of 'five stans' on the territory of Soviet Central Asia has been mainly explained by the Russian fear of the pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic sentiments on its southern frontiers, i.e. 'divide and rule' strategy. Oliver Roy describes the delimitation as an 'imposed territorial realignment, the eminently artificial, manipulatory, and strategic nature of which has been well documented."(Roy 3)

However, recently, studies emerged which argued that Soviet motivation in building new nations in Central Asia was far more complex than 'divide and rule' interpretation ascribes to it. As Edgar Lynn writes in *Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*:

> In articles and dissertations that began to appear in the mid-1990s, historians have called into question many of the elements of this older narrative and created a more complex picture of Soviet nationality policy in the 1920s. Rather than seeing the creation of national republics as a cynical and manipulative ploy to retain control over non-Russians, these historians have shown that nation-making had a strong ideological rationale and was an essential part of the Soviet project - not just in Central Asia but throughout the Soviet Union. Soviet leaders were convinced that nationhood was an essential stage of development for all "backward" peoples seeking to become modern and Soviet. They also believed that the creation of national republics and regions would win the support of the non-Russian populations who had long been oppressed by Russian colonialism and "great-power chauvinism." The Soviet leaders were correct in their assumption that this "na-

> tionality policy" would be popular in many parts of the Soviet periphery; in fact, indigenous elites often welcomed the creation of national territories. In Central Asia, nomadic and tribal groups such as the Turkmen and Kazakhs resented "Uzbek" efforts to define and dominate Turkestan and were therefore receptive to the Soviet proposal to create separate national republics and languages [in 1924 Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan were created on the territory of Turkestan]. (Lynn 187-188)

**'Nationality Policy' in the Soviet Union and Soviet Historiography**

One cannot explain the current identity politics in Central Asia without taking into account the nationality policies of the Soviet Union. Although now all these nations put forward theories about the authenticity of their nations and statehoods since the time immemorial, there is a little doubt that these nation-states are as much the product of the Soviet nation-making, as they are the result of the national aspirations of the respective nations.

Although a continuation of the Tsarist Russia in some sense, the Soviet Union was a unique imperial system of its own creation. Theoretically, all the nations of the Soviet Union were declared to be equal, while, in reality, of course, Russians played the role of a "big brother" with about 25 millions Russians living outside of the Russian Federation with the objective to "guide other nationalities on the way to communism." As Robert Strayer writes, in the Soviet case, nationalist movements confronted "an official ideology that had long and strenuously denied its imperial status, casting itself instead as multi-national state in the process of creating a new "Soviet" identity." Despite the fact that under Soviet regime nationalists gained much more autonomy rights that they would ever dream of under the Tsarist Russia, the Soviet state had managed to nurture vibrant ethnic nationalisms "by policies that recognized and encouraged national cultures on the one hand, while sharply restricting their prerogatives and offending their sensibilities on the other"(Strayer 377).

One of such offenses to nationalists' sensibilities was the fact that historiographies of the 'union republics' were subordinated to the interests of the Russian nation's meta-narrative, which made impossible commemoration of national heroes who fought against Russians or symbols that were seen as anti-Russian or anti-communist. In the construction of national histories for the Soviet Republics, state policy was to promote cultural achievements over military ones. In the context of Central Asia, this meant a stronger emphasis on the Iranian part of the Central Asian culture, with the names of Iranian poets and philosophers taking a prominent place from the school curricula while the Turkic part of the culture (mainly military achievements) was at best ignored. In addition to the Russian denying any

prominent place in the history to the Turkic tribes that dominated the south of Russia before the Mongol invasion, or to the Golden Horde and its successor states, nomads also held an inglorious place in the Marxist scheme of development because of their inferior means of production. (Manz 16)

Already in the early 1980s, some representatives of the nationalist elite attempted to defy the Russian historiography's dominance over national history making. For instance, in the book called "Az -I-Ya"Olzhas Suleimenov (today the Ambassador of Kazakhstan to Italy) effectively challenged the established Soviet historiography view of the inferiority of the Turkic nomadic tribes and their negative impact on the Russian nation's formation by making linguistic analysis of the 13th century Russian classical poem "Slovo o Polku Igoreve." In the book, Suleymenov just listed all the words of Turkic origin that he found in the Russian poem. The words stood as a solid evidence of the strong cultural ties between the nomads inhabiting vast steppes of Eurasia and Russian feudal states of the time.

Although, today the new historiography and identity politics of the new Central Asia states seems to free itself from the constrains of the Soviet master narrative, on a deeper level, this historiography remains shaped by the Soviet vision, as much of today's cultural politics is either further development of the Soviet leitmotivs (as in the case with the Tajik historiography) or/and rewriting of history in response to the unfair treatment in the Soviet historiography (Kazakh historiography).

As Adeeb Khaled writes in his "Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform",

> Social and institutional terrain on which struggle over culture takes place in colonial settings is very much the product of colonial rule. To look for 'responses' to colonialism in a domain located entirely outside of it is futile, since the very formulation of the response is inextricably intertwined in patterns of colonial knowledge. Although this obviously applies to modernist revisions of identity, even visions of the authenticity of native tradition are articulated through means of cultural production often introduced by colonizer. (Khaleed 13-14)

## Post-Soviet Historiography and Identity Politics in Central Asia

### Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan was fashioned out of the heart of Turkestan and took along huge chunks of Tajik, Kazakh and Karakalpak populations. Most of the ancient Central Asian cities— Bukahara, Samarkand, Ferghana, Kokand, Andijan, Khorezm, Khiva —are located on the territory of Uzbekistan. Despite **'the history of land'** paradigm promoted by the Uzbek government (initially invented by the Soviet historiography) that emphasizes the connection of the current Uzbek state with all the states and civilizations that existed on its territory, many historians argue that 'Uzbek' is the most 'constructed' and artificial identification given to this diverse

region. There is much evidence pointing out that most of the people who are called Uzbeks today were not 'Uzbeks' prior to delimitation of 1924 and creation of the Uzbek SSR.

As Azim Malikov of the Samarkand State University writes:

> Prior to the Russian conquest there existed three multi-ethnic states in Central Asia (the Emirate of Bukhara, the Khanate of Kokand and the Khanate of Khiva). The state language of the Emirate of Bukhara was Persian, in the Khanate of Kokand state documents were written in Uzbek and Persian and it was only in the Khanate of Khiva that Uzbek was used. Furthermore, we have to mention that the language of the court in Bukhara was also Uzbek (Turki). Alth ough all these states were ruled by Uzbek khans and theirs capitals were located on Uzbek territory, no feeling of a common Uzbek unity had developed among the population of the Khanates. On the contrary, internal divisions, continuous wars as well as internal conflicts have strengthened the dissociation of the Uzbeks and prevented their further ethnic development and national consolidation. (Malikov 3)

According to the British anthropologist Czaplicka, who studied ethnography of Central Asia in the beginning of the 20th century, Uzbeks then were still in the process of sedentarization:

> Since the Uzbegs are in process of exchanging their nomad life for a sedentary one, the customary law ('adat) is being replaced by the written law (sheriat). Father-right is very strong, but the women are freer then among the Tajiks or Sarts. Though they now live in clay and wood houses (*sakla*), their old felt tents (*yurt*) are still to be seen, especially in summer. There is much ethnological evidence that the Uzbegs belong to the same ethnic group as that people who are called by the Russians Kaizak-Kyrgyz. (1918, 37)

Writing about the complexities of identification in the beginning of the 20th century Turkestan, Adeeb Khaleed says that after the last wave of Turkic migration into Transoxania, the newcomers were called 'Uzbek' while the older Turkic population of the region was called 'Turk' and/or 'Sart.' Moreover, the ethnic sense of 'Uzbek', 'Sart', 'and Tajik' did not coincide with the language use. As he writes, "it was quite possible for groups to identify themselves as Ozbek speaking only Persian, as was the case with many Ozbeks in Bukhara" (Khaleed 188-189).

Despite the continuing existence of regional divisions (Khorezmian, the Bukharian-Samarkandian, the Ferghanian and the Surkhandarian) most of the Uzbeks today identify with the Uzbekistan as their nation-state. Azim Malikov

writes that Uzbek identification is now dominant even in Samarkand, which has always been known for its strong regionalism and Tajik/Farsi influence. At the same time, the above evidence suggests that the term 'Uzbek' has undergone a considerable change: from identifying Uzbek tribes that kept their nomadic distinction as late as the beginning of the 20th century to identifying the people who speak Uzbek, as a mother tongue. If in the beginning of the 20th century, among 'Sarts' or/and sedentary 'Turks' (then these two terms could be used interchangeably, but they are no longer in use) Uzbeks were known for their nomadic traditions, today, the tribal links are quite weak and endogamy (nomadic tradition of not intermarrying within seven generation) is not observed (Malikov 10). Thus, it can be concluded that consolidation of the nation under the identity of 'Uzbek,' which, of course, meant different things in the beginning of the 20th and the end of the 20th century, is more-less completed.

As it was noted above, the Republic of Uzbekistan, at its creation incorporated large portions of the Tajik population in Bukhara, Samarkand and Ferghana Valey. When the delimitation into the 'union republics' took place many inhabitants of the region in fear of being forcibly relocated to ensure that a given nationality would be entirely contained within its 'own' republic chose identification that didn't necessarily reflect their ethnic consciousness but rather estimate of which answer would enable them to remain in their home (Atkin 49). At the same time, being an Uzbek or a Tajik didn't make much difference in the bilingual milieu of the Turkic-Persian sedentary civilization where people, languages, tradition and symbols were to the great extent intermixed. Even today, although speaking different languages (the Uzbek language, being Turkic in its grammatical structure, contains a great number of the Farsi lexicon, as well as has a strong Farsi phonetic influence), Uzbeks and Tajiks' life styles and traditions are closer to each other than to that of Kazakh, Kyrgyz, or Turkmen. The Uzbek and Tajik affinity is especially evident in northern Afghanistan when they often form one confederation vis-à-vis other ethnic groups.

Historically, according to Adeeb Khaleedi, the destinies of the Turkic and Iranian people of Central Asia were so intertwined that there was no paradox involved in the fact that Firdousi composed his masterpiece of the Iranian literature Shahname under the aegis of the Turkish ruler Mahmud Ghaznawi. But today, unfortunately, divergent Uzbek and Tajik historiographies, which try to divide undividable past, present a potential source of conflict in already volatile situation in Central Asia.

Although the Uzbek state claims to be a heir of the civilizations that existed on the Uzbek territory, the Uzbekistan historiography is not consistent with its **'history of land'** paradigm, when it conveniently omits the periods of the Samanids and earlier pre-Islamic Iran and starts the genesis of the Uzbek state with **Tamerlane, the principal hero of the Uzbek master narrative.** It is worth noting that the

alleviation of Timur to the role of the founding father of the Uzbek nation first started in the Soviet historiography, which favored Timur over the later Uzbek dynasty, who were descendents of Chingiz Khan, constantly reviled figure in the Soviet historiography. ('Uzbek' initially was the name of the Chingizid Khan who made Islam a state religion of the Golden Horde, later it became the name of the dynasty, then the name of the tribes affiliated with the dynasty, and today, it is the name of the people who at some point of history were ruled by the dynasty).

**Tajikistan**

For the variety of reasons, one of which was the dominance of the Turkic-speaking elite in the Turkestan Republic's government, the designers of the Soviet 'national delimitation' in Central Asia discriminated against the Tajiks, having deprived the newly formed republic of Tajikistan of the two most important centers of Tajik urban culture, Bukhara and Samarkand, which were awarded to Uzbekistan. Tajikistan began its existence in 1924, as an autonomous republic within the larger Uzbekistan SSR, fashioned out of the easternmost province of Bukhara. In 1929, it was enlarged by the addition of territory further north, a portion of the agriculturally important Ferghana Valley, and was promoted to a 'union republic,' the highest ranking administrative division of the Soviet Union.

As noted above, the Soviet historiography was more favorable of the Iranian culture and history than the Turkic one. Thus, already in the Soviet times, Tajiks were considered full heirs of the two millennia pre-Islamic Iranian civilization, as well as Farsi literary tradition. As Muriel Atkin writes, many Tajik villagers who went to the Tajik-Soviet school know some poetry of Firdousi, Rudaki and Omar Khayam. (Atkin 59)

Atkin notes, that the Soviets sought to capitalize on emphasizing the links of Tajiks with the wider Persian-speaking world, particularly with Afghanistan. He writes that Soviet-sponsored publications in Tajikistan, Iran, and Afghanistan have used official interpretations of Tajikistan's history and its transformation under Communist rule to impress kindred peoples outside the Soviet Union. The Soviets used the cultural similarities among people living north and south of the Soviet-Afghan border in an attempt to bolster the foundering communist regime in Afghanistan. "This has included such measures as bringing young people from Afghanistan to study in Tajikistan, sending Tajik academics to Afghanistan... and arranging cooperative projects" (Atkin 58).

The current Tajik historiography, which views the history of Tajiks as history of living ethnos with fluctuating borders, was shaped by the Tajik communist party leader and later director of the Moscow-based Institute of Oriental Studies Babadjan Ghafurov (1908-1977). According to Ghafurov, the geography of Tajik history by no means corresponded with the geographical borders of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic. Modern Uzbeks, according to Ghafurov were Turkicized

Iranians, indebted profoundly to their Iranian cultural and genetic heritage. Racially, they were different from the Kyrgyz and Kazakh showing far less Mongol features in their anthropology (Atkin 52).

Following in Babjan Ghafurov's footsteps, Tajikistan historiography today continues to emphasize Tajik links with the Islamic Iranian Sunni tradition and starts the genesis of the Tajik nation-state with the Samanid dynasty (874-999), 1,100 anniversary of which was celebrated in 1999. The map of the Samanid state with its capital in Bukhara (now in Uzbekistan) is displayed in many public places in the country. Later in the history of the region, according to the Tajik narrative, the Samanid cultural realm was replaced by the rule of primitive Turkic nomadic tribesmen (Ghaznawids and Karakhanids dynasties).

The Tajik historiography with its **history of ethnos with fluctuating borders narrative,** breeds the sense of victimization when one realizes that the nation, which at some point controlled the whole of Central Asia and made the greatest contribution to the Central Asian civilization, is now is reduced to the small 93 percent mountainous Tajik state, with no major cities from where Persian civilization spread. This sense of victimization of Tajikistan by its Turkic neighbors, especially militarily strong Uzbekistan, is felt on the political level, as Tajikistan tries to escape the Turkic encirclement by strengthening relations with Russia and Iran. In Central Asia, Tajikistan remains the only country hosting Russian military bases, with 12,000 Russian garrison guarding Tajikistan's border with Afghanistan.

The attitudes discussed above about the Tajik vision of their past can be attributed with reasonable certainty only to the representatives of the Tajik elite, which comprises just a small minority in this generally impoverished state. The common Iranian roots of the Tajiks notwithstanding, Tajikistan remains the least consolidated nation in the former Soviet Central Asia, with strong regional differences between agricultural and industrialized North (Ferghana Valley) and underdeveloped mountainous South and Pamir regions, which remain isolated from the rest of the country. It is often argued that 1992-1995 civil war was not as much the government vis-à-vis Islamic opposition confrontation, as it was the confrontation between the North that was dominant during the Soviet times and the South Kulob region.

**Kazakhstan**

Kazakhs didn't receive a fair treatment in the Soviet historiography for two reasons, first, as nomadic 'hordes' with inferior means of production and subsequently (according to Marx's thesis that economic production relations define superstructure), without much social organization let alone state, and second as tribes in the confederation of the Golden Horde, under which Russia suffered for three centuries—the period known in the Soviet and Russian history as the 'Mongol-Tatar Yoke.'

Zhanara Nauruzbayeva, in her ""Post-Soviet Rewriting of History in Kazakhstan:

Transformation of National Identity Through Textbook," writes that in the post-Soviet Kazakhstan the major emphasis has been given to the rewriting the history and official textbooks as part of the new identity politics. If, in the Soviet times on the territory of Kazakhstan, the history of Kazakhstan has been a marginal subject taught once a month in the last two years of the secondary education. In the post-Soviet Kazakhstan, teaching national history became a higher priority with the subject being included in the list of required state examinations. At the same, time, quite expectedly, the narrative of the Kazakh history changed substantially. (Nauruzbayeva 5)

In the Soviet historiography, the origin of Kazakhs as a nation was connected to the downfall of the Mongol Empire (15th century), a major even in the Russian history, after which the lands of Russia and Central Asia were 'freed' from Mongols thus opening a space to the new nations formation. The post-independence historiography sets a new time-line for evolution of the Kazakh people, one that begins a lot earlier than Soviet historical accounts suggested. For instance, the author of the 8th grade textbook Babayev asserts that Kazakh nationality was formed in 11th-12th centuries, but the tribes that constituted the Kazakh nation lived on the territory of Kazakhstan as early as 7th –4th centuries BC (Nauruzbayeva 7).

In their narrative of the nation, the Kazakh historiography adopts **history of land and history of tribes** paradigm, as some tribes such as Kypchak and Dulat and many others, that were later incorporated in the Kazakh nation have a history of their own, which is more ancient and better known then the history of Kazakhs. The perception of continuity and belonging to the territory is thus established through these well-known in the history Turkic tribes. At the same time, the historical figures of these tribes that lived and worked outside of the territory of Kazakhstan, for instance Sultan Beybars or Al-Farabi, are also incorporated in the historical narrative as Kazak national heroes. In the beginning of the 1990s, the Kazakhfilm produced a patriotic movie about the career of Sultan Beybars in Mamluk Egypt. Although, the plot was based on historical events that led to the rise of Beybars and previous Mamluks, the movie especially emphasizes the nostalgia that Mamluks supposedly felt for Desht-i-Kypchak and their instituting some steppe traditions such as drinking brewed horse milk at the Mamluks' court.

If the Russian historiography didn't attribute any statehood tradition to Kazakhs, dismissing their nomadic state as poorly organized, in the new Kazakh historiography the emergence of the Kazakh Khanate was interpreted as the final stage or the triumph of the Kazakh nation formation. Kazakh khanate was now seen as a qualitatively new step in the nomadic statehood, as, in contrast to Mongol *uluses*, it was, supposedly, based on the ethnic principle. Of course, one can argue against this interpretation that this state was created by yet another lineage of Chingizids through their agreement with the new confederation of tribes, out of the traditionally susceptive to fragmentation Mongol *ulus* (This time it was a White Horde, a

successor of the Golden Horde).

The nomadic state was essentially a confederation of the tribes who came together under the central leadership. Once the confederation was created, its continuation was dependent on the constant maintenance and renewal of the "relations of alliance, clientelship and subjugation on which it had been founded as well as on the creation of new ones." (Bastug 97) The fragility of the nomadic state and its frequent fragmentation is often explained by the power that tribal leaders exerted over the leaders who had to constantly renew the relations of their alliance with the confederation. As Adeeb Khaleed writes, "the authority of the khan for all its aura of Chinggisid descent, remained tenuous, since a number of potential Chinggisid rulers existed at any given time" (Khaleed 34).

Most of the Kazakh historians admit this downside of the nomadic state system, at the same time, today, in the wake of the political democratization and liberalization imperative, they emphasize the positive side of such fragmentation and decentralization, the phenomenon which is in the national historiography called "steppe democracy," whereby the khan was elected by the tribal leaders (*aksakaldar alkasy*) and his authority depended on their willingness or unwillingness to accept his leadership.

If in the Soviet times, the nomadic past of the Kazakh/Kyrgyz was regarded as the stage of underdevelopment and cultural inferiority to Russians or Central Asian sedentary populations, today, the state ideology makes pride of the nomadic traditions which are interpreted as the traditions of democracy, mobility and openness to other cultures. Part of this 'openness to interaction with other cultures' tradition is grounded in the nomadic way of life, as nomads' livelihood always has depended on their ability to trade the surplus of their livestock with neighboring sedentary populations.

Although, no longer nomadic state, Kazakhstan's ideologists extensively use nomadic symbols and myths in representing the identity of the new nation-state. For instance, the flag of Kazakhstan has the flying horse beneath the interior dome of the *yurt* (nomadic tent) on a field of a blue sky.

**Conclusion**

Since the new states of Central Asia acquired their independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, the national elite made an attempt to write a new history and develop distinct national identities, which would facilitate the process of the national consolidation, state-building, as well as outside recognition.

To justify the right of Uzbeks, Tajiks and Kazakhs to be a titular nation in their respective independent states, the national elites tried to link the new acquired statehoods with the primordial imperial statehood traditions of Tamerlane Empire, Samanid Dynasty and Golden Horde (at the same time, the fact that all these empires were multi-national was conveniently omitted).

As the identity politics of the new nation states developed vis-à-vis the widely spread understanding of these nations as 'constructed' by Soviets, the common tendency was to stretch modern national identifications as far back into history as possible. I think, this approach is flawed, as it does not help to explain the transformation of the primordial identities into national ones. The incorporation of the most recent past of their history –Soviet era, which so far all of the national historiographies in question failed to make, and assessment of the Soviet 'nationality policies' contribution to the development of nationhood of Tajiks, Uzbeks and Kazakhs might help to shed the light on this transformation and provide the missing link.

Despite the revision of the Soviet historiography by the national elite, I would argue that the new historiographies use the same old Soviet narrative of national ethnogenesis and national evolution in explaining the descent of the new nations on the historical scene.

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# Children's Cultural Education Project

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**Abstract**

*In the previous Sasakawa Symposium I presented a project I started called the "Children's Cultural Education Project" targeting children in the range of 12-16. In this year's symposium I will present the concept of the project, and then I want to present and evaluate the progress and the achievement of the project during the last two years and also the future plans and goals of the project.*

*The following is a briefing about the concept of the project.*

*The children of today are the youth of tomorrow and the future of the country. It is therefore of high importance to empower them to build and discover their own character and identity and accordingly their society and country. Many children nowadays get their knowledge mainly through the school's syllabi and maybe the internet and are usually loaded with material to study which provides them with little time for other extracurricular activities. In their free time, many play computer games or watch TV.*

*Taking into consideration the importance of the value of knowledge, the project uses the free time of the children in activities that are educational and also entertaining taking them to site visits and trips to areas such as historical places, the country side, etc. as well as cultural events such as exhibitions, theatre plays, etc. The knowledge and the information children get by visiting a certain area or attending a cultural event provides them with deeper understanding and greater impressions than what they get only by reading a book or watching a CD Rom representation. It is a practical experience that provides the children with a new dimension to their information as well as to the methods they use to learn and conceive their knowledge.*

*The broader goal of this project, after being implemented in numerous schools and organizations, is to form an NGO that deals with cultural issues and provides such services to more children.*

## Introduction

Knowledge, the love for knowledge, and the seeking for knowledge are among the main important reasons behind the development of the human being.

Taking into consideration the increasing value of knowledge, children, the future youth and the future of the country, need special attention and education to

empower them to build and develop their own character and accordingly their society and country. Most of the children nowadays get their knowledge mainly through academic learning and their entertainment mostly through the computer and the television. Cultural education is as essential as the theoretical academic education and the knowledge of information technology. Children need to get their experience and knowledge practically by visiting, seeing and participating. The knowledge and the information children get by visiting a certain area or attending a cultural event provides them with deeper understanding and greater impressions than what they get only by reading a book or watching a CD Rom representation.

The paper is presenting a practical cultural education and knowledge project for children within the range of 12-14 years[1] .

**The situation and the problems:**

**The school educational system:**

The school educational system offers curricula that aim at increasing the scientific, historic and linguistic knowledge of the children. Some curricula offer valuable theoretical information concerning the children's own culture as well as general knowledge about other areas of the world, nevertheless problems lie in the following:

- The children are often loaded with studying material that provides them with little free time to participate in any extracurricular activities.
- School trips are a very important element of the school education, but a small number of schools offers such trips. Also in schools where trips take place, the children are often taken to well known areas that they can easily visit with their families or to areas where they can spend a nice day. What lacks is the addition of knowledge and experience to children through such trips.
- Attention is often given to the grades the children get and not to their interests and hobbies.
- A small number of schools drive the children's attention to cultural events and teaches them how to appreciate culture.

Therefore one of the aims of this project is to drive the attention of many schools and parents to the importance of cultural activities and give them basic guidelines how they can incorporate that in their programs.

**Entertainment:**

Entertainment is a very important element in building the child's character and behavior.

Means of entertainment are numerous. The most common means by which children entertain themselves nowadays is by watching TV, playing computer games or using the internet.

A constant decrease in drawing, playing music, reading, going to the theatre, practicing sports and physical games can be noticed in all social levels. Few children participate in cultural events and activities.

**Learning and entertainment techniques:**

One of the problems that leads to the lack of cultural knowledge is the means of education and entertainment. The theoretical means of education do not help the children in clearly understanding the subject matter. The constant use of computer and games, whether for learning or entertainment, make the children lose the interest in primitive basic games and research methods. As mentioned earlier, children need to get their knowledge and experience by practical learning. Children's knowledge and experience is widened when they go on site visits to historic areas, the country side, etc. as well as cultural events such as concerts, exhibitions, theatre plays. This practical experience provides the children with a new dimension to their information as well as to the methods they use to learn and conceive their knowledge.

**I hear and I forget**
**I see and I remember**
**I do and I understand**

***Chinese proverb***

**The project**

**The aim:**

To summarize the basic problems that this project aims at reducing:

- The lack of interest in cultural activities.
- The theoretical and technological means of learning.

So, the project aims at increasing the awareness of the importance of the **practical** cultural education.

**The plan:**

In Egypt there are numerous organizations that work with children. These organizations have different interests, goals as well as working techniques. The aim of these organizations is nevertheless almost the same: Providing the children with more awareness and experience. So, no matter what the interest of the organization is, the children widen their knowledge in one or more fields.

Appreciating the effort of these organizations and with the understanding that one has to continue on what exists, this project started by contacting these institutions and organizations and providing them with a practical experience for their children. This gives them an example and more ideas on how to increase the

practical cultural awareness of the children.

**Practical experience of the project:**

**Walking tours to the AUC community**

Two "Walking Tours" were provided to interested individuals in the AUC community. One was to al-Mu'izz street in Islamic Cairo and one was to Coptic Cairo and Fustat. The individuals that participated in those tours came from different backgrounds and nationalities. But what is interesting to note is that some of the Egyptian participants who have been living in Egypt for all their lives have never visited those areas and some of the foreigners who have been living here for months didn't as well; this is not meant as criticism but on the contrary; those young people and adults did not deny the fact that they haven't been to those areas and they planned their time to be able to participate in such an activity. Others who participated in those tours have been to those areas but wanted to learn more information about those areas as well as sharing with the group the information they have as well as participating in the discussions that take place during those tours that turn out to be beneficial to all participants.

**Walking tour to boy-scouts group**

A direct practical experience to the project was a walking tour to a group of boy-scouts in Islamic Cairo. They were provided by their leader with questions that they were expected to solve during their tour.

What was noted from this tour is that:

- All the boys were for the first time visiting this area[2].
- The degree of interest in acquiring the knowledge was different from one boy to the other.
- The children's understanding for the importance of such a tour is not a direct one but an indirect one that might have an effect on decisions they take after a couple of years in their future lives.
- Providing the children with questions or something to solve is a challenge that makes them more attentive and ask questions.
- Preparing such tours for children is more challenging than when prepared for young people and adults because it requires more creative techniques to get their attention and to get them interested in what they see and visit.

Such practical cultural walking tours for children are one aspect of the project that is offered to other institutions and organizations.

**Walking tour to girls from the German school**

A group of girls (Age 14) were taken by the school to a Walking Tour on al-Mu'izz street. Joining the girls in the first part of the tour, they were given some historical background about the area, and through the walk some of the monuments were explained, drawing their attention to the history of the building, the builder,

and also the architecture and decoration of the building.

What was very important during the tour was to make the girls interact with the community members. Those girls are somehow isolated from the community and do not have direct contact to different class members of the society. During such a tour it is not only important that the girls increase their knowledge about the history of their country, but it is very important that they interact with people from different social standards, get to talk to them and know them and deal with them. This is also a very important and real knowledge of one's own culture and country.

**Culture group in the German school**

Last year after the walking tour that was given to the German School, it was suggested to the school to form a group called "Culture Group" as an extracurricular activity. A proposal was presented to the German school and was approved. Starting the academic year 2002-2003, the group started. The activity is organized in a way that the students meet twice per week in the after-school class hours and once during the weekend for tours to Egypt.

During the class meetings the students are introduced to questions about their hobbies and interests, their ways of spending their free time as well as their means of acquiring knowledge. In every meeting the latest information concerning culture and knowledge are discussed, games that help them build their character are played. They are also required to research cultural topics and present them during the meetings.

In the tours, the students are required also to research the area before visiting it; during the tour they are asked questions and requested to present what they researched.

After a couple of months working with this group of students very interesting development was observed not only by me but also by their teachers: The students started to understand the meaning and the importance of culture and of knowledge. Some of them started reading the newspapers every day and realized that despite of getting a lot of information and knowledge in the school, they have to acquire their own knowledge and information by reading or visiting areas.

They were visiting areas for the first time and they realized that it is a disgrace that they live here all their lives and never visited these areas. But what was interesting is their growing interest for culture and history; not only that but also their interest in different fields. For example, during a tour to Coptic Cairo, the group was also taken to the ruins of al-Fustat; none of them visited this area before; but what was interesting is the discussion that took place after the visit; they were discussing: Why people don't go there? Why no care is taken for this area? Where the finds are exhibited and why there is no museum in the area to show those finds?

This group continues to work and learn, but it is worth noting that what those students benefited and continue to benefit are not just some more information added to their knowledge but they developed the interest and the understanding of the

importance of knowledge and culture; they learned an APPROACH.

**Tour to the teachers of the German school:**

The teachers of the German school, who noted the development and the interest of the students who participated in the "Culture Group" required also to be taken on a walking tour. This day was part of the formation day offered to the teachers of the school.

**Tours to groups affiliated to NGOs:**

Groups which are part of NGOs were also taken to various walking informative tours. The participants affiliated to those groups were mainly from relatively poor families who do not have the chance to participate in such visits. Usually those groups were taken to trips where they could enjoy the day and play, etc. which is of course very important. Taking them to an informative tour was different, yet very beneficial and interesting to them.

During the tour they were asked questions and the mentioned information was re-questioned many times to make sure they understood what they saw and that they will remember it.

In these tours, every group was taken once in order to be able to provide many students with those tours; so one the one hand many were able to participate in those tours and benefit from the information they got during the tour, but on the other hand it was not possible to note the development of participants because of those tours. Nevertheless, their leaders note the difference and they realized that it is important to include in the trips they do an informative knowledge part.

**Plans of the project:**

**The Service Learning Program at AUC**

The AUC is starting a Service Learning Program. This project is incorporated as part of the Service Learning Program. It will be expanded to become part of a course. The idea is to contact professors teaching Islamic Art and Architecture and ask them to add for the studnets an additional (non requirement) activity to the course which is related to the "Children's Cultural Education Project"[3]. This activity requires from the students to take children (for example on two trips) to the areas and monuments they are studying. This will on the one hand enhance the student's understanding of what they are studying and also with a service learning activity and on the other hand provide the children with well educated knowledgeable leaders to explain them the places they are visiting.

**Organizations and institutions**

As mentioned earlier, there are numerous organizations and institutions working with children. Some of these institutions were already contacted and they incorporate in their program one of the walking tours provided by the project

as part of their program.

**Conclusion:**

From the examples shown it is clear that the project acts in two ways: The first way is applicable to the group from the German School; here a continuous developed way of working was done. The tours were also accompanied by meetings to discuss the tours as well as other topics. This way, it was possible to note and observe the development of the participants, which came to be very successful.

The other way was letting institutions and organizations incorporate the walking informative tours in their programs. Here it was not possible for me to observe the development of the participants; nevertheless it provided their leaders with methods and means that they could follow.

Believing in the importance of culture and the increase of the value of knowledge and of practical experience, both ways are important and essential, and the project will continue hoping to increase the number of children as well as leaders benefiting from the project.

## Endnotes

[1] During my school and university education I participated in numerous cultural and social extracurricular activities, which made me realize the importance of such activities. Believing in the importance of knowledge and observing the level of knowledge and experience young people have, I decided to start this project, also as an extracurricular activity, to provide children with practical, interesting and beneficial ways and experience of obtaining knowledge and culture.

[2] The leaders of the group were taken before the walking tour to the same area. It was the first time for them there as well.

[3] Some professors were already contacted and they agreed; students were presented the idea and many showed interest in the project. ■

## Partnership in Development Research

**Dr. Hoda Rashad & Ms. Soheir Mehanna**

The Egyptian Program "Partnership in Development Research" is part of an International Program initiated by the Netherlands Ministry of Development Cooperation in 1994 called MMRP (Multidisciplinary, Multiyear Research Program).

This program is under implementation in nine countries: four in Africa: Egypt, Mali, Tanzania and Uganda, three in Asia: Bangladesh, Kerala in India and Vietnam and two in Latin America:

Bolivia and Nicaragua.

**The general objectives of MMRP are:**

- To promote research for sustainable development targeting poverty alleviation, environment protection and gender equality.
- To build up research capacity.
- To stimulate the dissemination and use of the research findings for policy formulation and implementation.

Despite the freedom and autonomy given to each country to formulate, conceptualize and implement its own research agenda, all MMRP's share a number of unifying links that are significant to the understanding of the knowledge produced and its utilization.

**These unifying links are:**

- Demand Orientation
- Location Specificity
- Multidisciplinarity
- Involvement of non-researchers and capacity building

The Egyptian program: "Partnership in Development Research" started in 1999. Overall, the objective of the program is "To inform development policies and strategies through linkages between those who conduct research and those who utilize findings."

To this end, the program promotes a research agenda that is responsive to the needs and priorities of local communities and the marginalized sectors of population.

The program has been conceptualized and is supervised and coordinated by an independent body of distinguished Egyptian experts and researchers. This group constitutes the Advisory Board and the Steering Committee. The Social Research Center serves as the secretariat of the program.

**The Components of the Program:**

The Program consists of 4 components:

1. Open Research Competition
2. Capacity Building and Training
3. Commissioned Research
4. Thematic Research

***1- Open Research Competition:***

**From Research to Application**

Until the present time we had 6 rounds of open competition which resulted in 42 research projects and 19 MA's and 11 PhD students.

Research projects have been conducted in 22 governorates. Topics investigated are: Women, Children, Health, Environment, Poverty, Agriculture, International Trade, Rural Development, Economic Development and Scientific research.

***2- Capacity Building:***

For the capacity building component, the Program runs several types of training:

- On hands training
- Technical training
- Networking
- Training and Scholarships

***3- Commissioned Research:***

From Application to Research, Research for this component is of micro level concern.

Topics investigated include:

- Street Children
- Micro-Credit for Women
- Female Literacy

***4- Thematic Research:***

This type of research is undertaken on the macro level. It deals with development topics of national concern. The two themes investigated are:

- Middle Class
- Poverty

Examples of the research topics investigated are:

- Female Headed Households and the Role of Development Programs.
- The Economic Role of Rural Women in Agriculture.
- The Effect of Privatization Programs on the Social Status of Egyptian

Working Women.
- Development of Simple Technologies Used in Women's Projects.
- A Study of the Conditions of Female Farmers after the Law of 1996.
- Three Major Aspects of Underdevelopment:
- Poverty, Poor Environmental Conditions an Childhood Deprivation.
- The Social Presence of Child Agricultural Workers in Egypt and their Care and Needs: a Field Study.
- The Phenomenon of Violence in Schools Injury Patterns Among Children, and a Preventive Strategy for Ismailia Governorate.
- An Evaluation of the Health Status of Street Children.
- Health Education Program to Control Viral Hepatitis Diseases Transmitted by Hairdressers in Assiut City.
- Incorporating the Handicapped in Development.
- Trachoma Rapid Assessment and Planning for Control Interventions: A Pilot Study in Fayoum Governorate, 2002.
- Applying Social Group's Programs with Schizophrenics Patients' Families for Rehabilitating Schizophrenics Socially.
- Fishing and Water Resource Development in Egypt.
- An Ecological Analysis of the Rural Egyptian Home Socio-Economic and Health Impacts of Water Degradation in Rural Egypt.
- A Comparative Study of the Legislative and Administrative Environmental Protection.
- Environmental Pollution in South Upper Egypt.
- Integration of Marginalized People Rural People in Development Program.
- Poverty and Development in Rural Egypt.
- Domestic Poultry Production and Poverty Alleviation: Determinants and Obstacles.
- The Role of Rural Organizations in Meeting Information Needs for Exporting Crops.
- The Effects of Pesticides and Fertilizers on Agricultural Development in Sharkia Governorate.
- A Study of the Problems and Obstacles Facing New Graduates and its Effect on Development in Newly Reclaimed Areas.
- Encouraging Small Farmers in a Reclaimed Area to Produce More Marketable Export Crops.
- Developing Silkworm Production in Agriculture Reform Associations in Sharkia Governorate.
- Evaluation of the Role of Free Duty Zones in Developing Exports.
- The Transformations of the Power Structure and its Relationship to Rural Development in the Contemporary Egyptian Village.

- The Small Craft Industry Project Using Palm Branches in a Village in Gharbia.
- Measuring the Macroeconomic Effects of the Hidden Economy in Egypt.
- The State and Scientific Research in the Egyptian Context.
- Academic Approaches to the Study of Sociology in Egypt.
- The Social Effects of Information Revolution on the Egyptian Family.
- A Sociological Analysis of Volunteer Work in Egypt.
- Social Values Among the Residents of Squatter Settlements. ■

# Hacking for Jihad: a Controversial Issue

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## Abstract

*Cyber-wars may be less bloody but they are potentially highly destructive with far-reaching effects. Hacking for jihad is a new controversial topic that can be classified as a cyber-war. Jihad means striving. In its primary sense, it is an inner thing within self to rid it from debased actions or inclinations, and exercise constancy and perseverance in achieving a higher moral standard.*

*Hacking is the breaking into computer systems (PCs, servers, networks, or websites). It is done mainly to break the security of computer networks, or to create malicious programs like viruses. Hacking for jihad is one of the running wars. It is a different type of war, a technological war. Now we have a fact, which is that hacking for jihad is on the stage with the rest of the wars but "Is Hacking for jihad ethical or not?"*

## Introduction

Setting rules and regulations to restrict the use of destructive weapons is the world's main concern nowadays. It is very difficult to reach a clear-cut decision on what is justifiable during war, especially after the emergence of new "non-military" weapons. These weapons, which depend more on intelligence and power of mind, have created a new type of war, it is what we call cyber war. Cyber war may be less bloody but it is potentially highly destructive with far-reaching effects.

## What are Cyber wars?

Cyber wars come under what military theorists increasingly refer to as asymmetric warfare, whereby unconventional tactics are used by smaller players to offset their military weaknesses. Like a classic guerrilla struggle, which is a conflict of the weak against the strong, cyber war can enable an individual to damage the computer system of a government or 'down'the website of a multinational corporation. The weapon of choice can be nothing more than a laptop computer wired to the Internet. Cyber war activists have their opinion, "As information technology comes to rule every part of our life, it is no longer necessary to have rockets to destroy an electrical facility," explained Faris Muhammad Al-Masri, founder of UNITY (www.ummah.net/unity), a website with an Islamic

ideology. "Instead, penetrating the enemy's networks and planting your code will get a better result." In cyber war, an individual can target the chink in the armor of modern technology: that no computer system is totally invulnerable to attack from a talented and determined 'black-hat' hacker (or cracker). It is a form of warfare that can be conducted remotely and anonymously.

**What is Jihad?**

Nature rules say that if you face an enemy, or suffer from injustice, you must fight back, but never says how to do this. It depends on humans and how they react to situations. This, in its abstract sense, is what we call jihad. This word has been in frequent use in the Western press over the past several years, explained directly or subtlety, to mean holy war. As a matter of fact the term "holy war" was coined in Europe during the Crusades, meaning the war against Muslims. It does not have a counterpart in Islamic glossary, and Jihad is certainly not its translation. Jihad means striving. In its primary sense, it is an inner thing within self to rid it from debased actions or inclinations, and exercise constancy and perseverance in achieving a higher moral standard.

Since Islam is not confined to the boundaries of the individual but extends to the welfare of society and humanity in general, an individual cannot keep improving himself/herself in isolation from what happens in their community or in the world at large. It is a duty which is not exclusive to Muslims but applies to the human race who is, according to the Quran, God's vicegerent on earth. Muslims, however, cannot shirk it even if others do. The means to fulfill it are varied, and in our modern world encompass all legal, diplomatic, arbitrative, economic, and political instruments. But Islam does not exclude the use of force to curb evil, if there is no other workable alternative. A forerunner of the collective security principle and collective intervention to stop aggression, at least in theory, as manifested in the United Nations Charter, is the Quranic reference "..make peace between them (the two fighting groups), but if one of the two persists in aggression against the other, fight the aggressors until they revert to God's commandment." (49:9) Therefore, it is not a Muslim war; it is a human race battle to fight injustice.

**What is e-Jihad?**

Jihad has many forms and can be used in different contexts. One of the conventional forms of jihad is the military jihad, which is a means to demonstrate justice. But nowadays there is a less costly and more intelligent way to fight the enemy without wasting human lives. This is done through e-jihad. E-jihad is another form of jihad that is marking its steps towards the future. Some forms of e-jihad include disseminating information via websites, sending e-mails to raise awareness, and creating global networks. It also entails infiltrating and disrupting an enemy's computer networks and databases, often with the use of weapons such

as viruses, worms and Trojan horses.

**What is hacking?**

Hacking is the breaking into computer systems (PCs, servers, networks, or websites). It is done mainly to break the security of computer networks, or to create malicious programs like viruses. Like any other profession, hackers have their code of ethics which argues that computers can change hacker's life to the better. It is technology that masters our world, and so every one should have access to this technology without any boundaries.

**Hacking for Jihad**

Hacking for jihad is one of the running wars. It is a different type of war, a technological war. In this war, hacking is not for testing the system's performance or security, but rather for fighting the enemy using the technology weapon: computers and intelligence. Hackers for Jihad may break the computer security of the target system, hack into e-commerce sites and break into governmental sites on the Internet.

Today, hacking for jihad is on the stage among the world's other controversial issues. It is raising a lot of debate about whether it is ethical or not. Supporters of hacking for jihad argue that it is a legitimate weapon. They think that injustice should be faced by all available weapons except those which destroy humanity (like nuclear and biological weapons). Hackers for jihad believe that their way of fighting is the most civilized one as it doesn't take any human life. Their victims could be people's accounts or money, but no blood is shed. They think they achieve their goals without violating human rights.

On the other hand, a lot of people disapprove of this type of jihad. They believe that man should not use technology against humanity and human benefits as technology was created for the good of humans and not for their destruction. In their point of view, such a weapon could lead to unlimited struggle between nations that no one can stop. It can exhaust people's money and effort without achieving any concrete benefits. But in more extreme cases, it can lead to actual war.

**Examples of Cyber wars**

***The Arab-Israeli cyber war***

One of the most popular e-jihad battles that are taking place nowadays is the Arab-Israeli cyber-war. The Arab-Israeli cyber war first erupted in 2000 when a group of Israeli hackers crippled the prime website of the Hezballah group in Lebanon by encouraging Israeli supporters to 'bomb' the site with automated floods of e-mail. Hezballah retaliated by rallying Arab supporters for a counter-attack which soon downed the main Israeli government website and the Israeli Foreign Ministry site. These attacks include: denial of service attacks, attempts to

gain root access, system penetrations, defacements and a variety of other attacks [3]. The high-profile hits include websites for the Israeli Foreign Ministry, the Bank of Israel, the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, the Israel Defense Force (IDF) and others.

***Kashmir Conflict***

The conflict over Kashmir between India and Pakistan has also lead to the uprising of what can be considered a cyber-war. A group of Pakistani hackers started hacking into Indian sites in the year 2000 in order to bring attention to a social cause and slow down India's economy [4].

***Iraqi suicide cyber attack***

The hacking of American sites by Iraqi citizens during or after the bombing of Iraq is one of the latest cyber battles. An Iraqi hacker, interviewed by email, warned that Western governments and businesses should brace themselves for 'suicide cyber attacks'. He defined a 'suicide cyber attack' as an attack where the hacker sets out to cause maximum damage unhindered by any regard for being detected and caught [5].

**Conclusion**

So, "Is hacking for jihad ethical or not?" There is no certain answer that settles the debate. It depends on people's perception of what is right and what is wrong. You could be seen as a terrorist if you break into someone's property and sabotage it. However, if you are doing this to fight back or to protect your own property, the picture would look different. Whether the hacktivists on either side are labeled as terrorists or freedom fighters, their online warfare looks set to become a key part of today's era of connectivity and globalization.

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# The Internet and the Construction of Arab and Islamic Identity

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## Abstract

*Since the Internet was launched in the sixth decade of the twentieth century, it introduced a new interactive channel of mass communication. Moreover, it has been affected by the content people post on it. Unlike Macluhan's statement the medium did not turn only to be the message, but also used to construct identities. Due to its peculiar inter-connectedness, and many-to-many unique nature, the Internet offers the possibility of the development of what is referred to as the "global village." Thus, marking this decade to be the "age of access" as it brings the whole world to one screen and a set of buttons to access the "Other".*

*Stereotyped as terrorists and violent, the Arabs need to correct their image and offer the right picture of their culture. Therefore, they have put a lot of content on the Internet in different disciplines to portray their culture and construct an "identity."*

*In addition, Islamic websites found their way on the internet. They play now a crucial role in introducing islam in its different disciplines, including the explanation of Qur'an, hadith, fiqh, sharia, sunna, seerah, islamic history and /or defining Islam and Muslims. These websites also promote Islamic Law and can create a beneficial dialogue between the West and Muslims around the world.*

*Muslims after the 11th of September 2001 need to focus on correcting the distorted image that was created to stereotype them as terrorists. Muslims need to show the world that terrorism is not related to Islam which is a religion of peace and dignity.*

*This paper will introduce an analytical assessment of both Arabic and Islamic sites on the World Wide Web (in both Arabic and other languages). On one hand, this research will investigate how far the Arabs attempted to use the medium as a means of globalizing and at the same time Arab zing their Websites content.*

*On the other hand, the researchers will assess the content of islamic directories on the Internet and classify them accordingly to the content they publish and the fullfilment of their missions. Finally, this paper will evaluate the internet as a crucial means of mass communication in promoting Islam to both Muslims and non-Muslimsin in their own languages, including audio and video facilities.*

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Mcluhan was right in stating that the medium is the message as individuals are restricted by their expectations and the limitations of what they interiorized (Doherty, 1995, pp.3-4). Vikan (2000) argues that in the case of the Internet, every computer that is a member of the net plays the role of "a message (content) and a medium (active information channel), both a transmitter and a receiver" (p.27). The social relationships of those who practice computer-mediated communication is affected by the nature of such communication; which proves that the "medium is the message" (Foster, 1997, p.35).

In the history of humanity, the Internet is now perceived as the fastest growing channel of communication in human history. The following indicators are proof:

- It took 38 years for the radio to reach 50 million users.
- It took 13 years for the television to reach 50 million users.
- It took 10 years for cable TV to reach 50 million users.
- It took the Internet 5 years to reach 50 million users and in less than one decade the number of users stood at 500 million users (Mahmoud, 2002, p.3).

Computer-mediated communication has proven to be the manifestation of the omnipresent nature of the electronic communication revolution, which leads to the revival of the prophecy of direct relation to computers and computing. Virtual reality technology, which guarantees to provide all pleasures of reality on demand, is the main portion of that prophecy. Computer-mediated communication has

produced new types of communities and new social structures known as "cybersociety." The latter relies on Computer-mediated communication, such as electronic mail and newsgroups, as well as the ability to communicate thoughts and information immediately across huge distances. Cybersociety becomes at work when individuals detach themselves from the physical world and create their own virtual worlds, which is considered the heart of the new communication technologies. Of crucial importance to cybersociety is the concept of self, and how social relations, which are fixed in the physical world by acknowledgment of identity, can work in virtual worlds. The question that imposes now is: who are we when we are using the Internet? (Jones, 1995, pp.1-4). The term society or "community" corresponds to "we" or collective identity that is constructed around others who seem to be similar to the "me" or the self. As any type of communication, it is not totally conceptualized without a conception of the self (Foster, 1997, p.25).

Erickson (1996) argues that the Internet is not only used to publish information, but in fact to form identities, and publishing useful information is just a consequence. He states that the Internet is one of the first means through which individuals form portrayals of themselves by utilizing information instead of "consumer goods as their palette." In other words, website, whether academic, professional, or personal, reflect their authors' social, political, or even personal identities.

Ryder (1998) points out that unlike other forms of mass media, the Internet is a mass medium that is characterized by being available to "mass producers as well as mass consumers." Websites are a type of asynchronous communication, which does not require "real-time interaction" (Rubio, 1996). Websites are different from both face-to-face communication and printed media in two aspects. First, websites do not feature text only, but also is considered audio-visual media. In other words, websites are unique in terms of content and form. Second, they are more dynamic than any form of print media as they can be linked to other websites using hypertext (Chandler, 1992).

The Internet is an interactive medium, which guarantees against the monopolization of its content. In other words, if the funding is available, individuals can launch their websites as free space is offered through home page providers. Creative design, useful content, and marketing of the websites are the keys of the game. In fact, it is the only two-way communication medium as an individual can see and talk to another party using an application and at the same time send him a document by email. However, the Internet is the only medium in history that does not necessitate the instant presence of people in space-time to enable the process of transferring information. It is also peculiar in that it is not limited in its storage and allows the transmitter to interact with the receiver (Vakin, 2000, pp.27-30).

What makes the term cyberspace accepted by society is that it "follows a long line of neologisms that describe unfamiliar technologies in familiar term," such as horseless carriage and talking pictures. It is this acceptance that makes Marshall

McLuhan's global village concept accessible. In his book, *The Gutenberg Galaxy*, McLuhan predicts how cyberspace can be established and what it will be like. He thinks that internalizing the new culture resulting from new communication technologies will lead the society from mechanism culture to interactive culture. In the past, individuals have to invent news machines to save the effort and time. Nowadays, we have to learn to adjust, and locate the best environments that individuals can possibly live with our new inventions (Doherty, 1995, p.2). Accordingly, "cyberbeing" represents a new relation between individuals and equipment as both are involved in a mutual relation of using and being used (Mchoul, 1997, p.6).

Thus, it can be claimed that a website is a "self-publishing" medium as the ability to publish on servers is like owning their printing press, and at the same time in a way it advertises for itself (Chandler, 1998). Also, this medium allows "identity maintenance" as websites can be subject to continuous change. The revisions that authors do in their websites can be seen as dead parts from themselves that are detached from them (Chandler, 1992).

Levi-Strauss's bricolage concept does not only mean organizing the material, but involves the formation of the bricoleur's identity as what he/she includes or excludes in his/her website portrays and sometimes shapes his/her values. Also, the selection process in itself signifies the social and cultural beliefs and practices of the author, but may not be visible to the websites users. For example, Chandler (1998) states that one of his academic friends showed him his website, and drew his attention that to the pinkish-purple background of the website. The friend confessed for the first time that he was gay and the colors he used signifies his gay identity, which was never mentioned in his website (p.7). The style and structure of the websites as well as the content reflect the identity of their authors. The construction of the authors' feelings, thoughts and how to present them convey and shape their identity. Websites construction make their authors think about their identities, which can influence the way individuals think of themselves, and may cause the authors to change themselves to become what they really want to be (pp.8-14).

Miller (1995) argues saying, "show me what your links are, and I'll tell you what kind of person you are." In other words, the individual's identity emerges from all his connections and associations. In cyberspace, all the links in website usually share the same interest, which can be thought of as constructing a sort of community or in fact "virtual community" consisting of websites (Rheingold, 1995).

This technological advancement is claimed to initiate an important social revolution as connecting via computers will just be as necessary as connecting via the telephone; in other words, it will become part of our daily routine. Communication via computers is claimed to be of a more democratic nature as "contextual cues, such as gender, voice, age, class, and race are usually hidden through the plain ASCII interface of most text based system" (Kroker and Weinstein, 1997, p.2)

The Internet revolutionized the individuals' lives, and pushed the world towards being a "global village." As a global mass medium, it includes various forms of mass and interpersonal communication means. Most of the famous and credible newspapers, magazines, radio and television stations are accessible through the Internet, which support the Internet's existence as a global mass medium. It also provides free e-mail and chat rooms sites (Cebular, 1997, pp.1-3).

Accordingly, some Arabs and Muslims have figured out the significant role that the Internet can play in portraying the true image of Arabs and Islam, and enhancing Islamic da'wa among both Muslims and non-Muslims. Moreover, they realized the importance of using the same new weapon used to distort their true image by building Arab and Islamic websites. Therefore, with just a click on the mouse both Muslims, non-Muslims, Arabs and non-Arabs around the world can access the true principles and teachings of Islam, and unprejudiced information about Arabs. Thus, they won't pay the attention to all the misleading information that is portrayed to them, especially through Western media (Madcour, 1988, pp.5-6).

Western media have contributed to the negative image and stereotyping of Arabs and Muslims. Mousa (1999) argues that there are several reasons that contributed to the enhancement of these negative stereotypes. First, the West has not always welcomed Islam. Second, the Arab-Israeli conflict, which has affected the stability in the Middle East, has its influence on Western culture. Last but most important is that Arabs and Muslims have not excreted an effort in defending their portrayal and Islam in the West (p.4).

For decades, news wires services have been and are dominated by Americans, and share it partially with Europe. Accordingly, they scarcely report news about the region's economic and business prospects, and nearly ignore analytical and contextual reporting. Even with the information technological revolution and the spread of the Internet usage, still production and dissemination of the content is done by Western media services, such as Reuters, AFP, AP, BBC, CNN and UPI. Websites and news services of Middle East origins contain a lot of content from Western media (Chahine, 2001, pp.1-2).

Several studies were conducted to examine the stereotypes of Arabs in Western media, an example of which is Ibrahim Marashi's study of a video game called "Israel Air Force." The game fosters enmity against Arabs. "The comments stated as the voice from headquarters makes as the player shoots down an Arab aircraft are particularly disturbing; and the instruction booklet is politically biased on its own" (Abdel Latif, 2001, p.2 ).

An example of media stereotype and distortion of Arabs' image is Walt Disney's productions, which contained Arab characters. The General Department of Information at the Arab League sent a warning letter to Walt Disney to give the company the opportunity to stop such productions, or else the department will boycott its productions in the Arab World (Arabicnews.com, Sept. 23, 1997,p.1).

Also, the Egyptian Artistic Professions Syndicate sent a warning statement after seeing its "Aladdin" production, which insults Arabs and shows them as barbarians and with no conscience. The Syndicate asked all Arab companies and Arab artists, who participate with their voices in Walt Disney's computer programs, to stop dealing with the company as a way to send a clear message to other media corporations (Arabicnews.com, Oct. 11,1997,p.1).

CBS new fall series, "The Agency," "opens with a CIA agent giving a briefing on terrorists sworn to wage holy war against the US. The rest of the story focuses on how the CIA strives to stop a bombing planned by Arabs, and controls even non-terrorists Arab diplomats. Another coming CBS series, "The President's Man: Ground Zero," focuses on White House secret agent who tries to stop "an Islamic terrorist" from controlling a major US city with a nuclear device. However, the executive director of the Muslim Public Affairs Council in Los Angeles meet with CBS officials and negotiated until the network agreed to drop "Holy War' from the original title, add an Arab American attorney, and drop all the references of "Allah" (Arabic word for God). (Rosenberg, 2001, pp.1-3).

Also, an American Paramount Pictures film entitled, Rules of Engagement, uses all the negative stereotypes about the Arabs Western countries. The film focuses on a US marine commander whose mission is to evacuate the American Ambassador and his family, and save them from the angry Yemenis surrounding the embassy in Sanaa. Arabs are depicted as" gun-toting, aggressive creatures were vermin, violent, irrational filled with motiveless hatred-nowhere does the film explain why they must kill Americans-and, like vermin, they should be killed" (Karmi, 2000, pp.1-2).

Matrix Reloaded, the newest film in the American movie theaters now, has gone to the extreme to make a mockery against Muslims. The writers and producers of the film named one of the characters( played by Stewart Wells) "Allah". This is offensive as Muslims turn to the worship of Allah five times a day, and calling a fictional character this shows disrespect to Islam and Muslims as a whole.

What recently enhanced the negative the portrayal of Arabs and Muslims in the West is the United States of America's declaration of war against terrorism. To achieve its objective, it uses the media to convey all the current events occurring in the Middle East as acts of terrorism against its interests. Americans in particular depend on their local media in acquiring international and domestic news reports. Most frequently such news reports select shots, which show Arab groups committing violent acts and bombing active places full of people, to reinforce their portrayal as terrorists. Also, in most cases, Western media reporters present scenes showing Arabs in different countries demonstrating and burning the American flag as an objection to the Israeli violent acts and policies in Palestine, or USA bombing of Afghani civilians in its war against terrorism or of Iraq cities. Furthermore, Western media interview Israeli victims, and neglect the reasons that pushed the Palestinians to commit such attacks. In addition, other events occurring in Arab

countries, such as Iraqi invasion of Kuwait enhanced the Arab's negative image (Wilson and Coulson, 1999, pp.2-11).

Arabs are always stereotyped in Western media as "troublemakers" because Israelis are always pictured as victims who can live peacefully. Israel is clever as it never get tired of discussing its case in the media, and using its lobbying campaigns, especially with its control over the media (Asmar, 2001, p.1).

Even Arab related websites did not survive Western stereotyping. In the aftermath of September 11, an anti-terrorism taskforce attacked InfoCom Corporation in Texas causing the crash of five hundred websites. InfoCom hosts websites for various clients in the Middle East, including al-Jazeera (the satellite TV station), al-Sharq (a daily newspaper in Qatar), and Birzeit (the Palestinian university on the West Bank). In addition, it hosts sites for several Muslim organizations based in the United States, such as the Islamic Society of North America, the Muslim Students Association, the Islamic Association for Palestine, and the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development. Moreover, InfoCom is the registered owner of ".iq" - the internet country code for Iraq (Whitaker, 2001, p.1).

American-based Internet hackers, The Dispatchers, attacked websites associated to anything perceived as Arab or Muslim. They succeeded in attacking the Arab News web page. The hackers described themselves as "a group of computer security enthusiasts who are outraged at the acts of terrorism... which are taking place in this day in age. It is our cause to fight back in every way we can." World Of Hell is an exclusive hacking group known for their ability to open top-level domains that succeeded in defacing several Muslim nations' websites. For example, they crashed the official website of the Presidential Palace of Afghanistan by sending so many requests for information (Ferguson, 2001, p.1).

Western media is not the only factor contributing to the negative image of Arabs and Muslims, but also Western educational textbooks contribute to this image. Although Arab and Islamic history constitutes 3 % of the Western history educational texts, this percentage portrayed Islam as a second-class religion, which was spread quickly and by the power of the sword. They portray Muslim as cruel and uncivilized who treated Christians in Jerusalem unfairly, and that was the main reason propagated for the European Crusades. They want to save Christians from the Muslim barbarian leaders. However, they never mentioned that the Crusaders killed a total of 70,000 Muslim women, children, and men. If this is what they teach their children, these children should know the true image of Islam. Thus, evolves the crucial role of Islamic websites in informing misled western societies about the true image of Islam (Al-Ashmawy, 2000, p.10).

Sweden is an example that shows the prejudiced stereotype of Islam and Arabs is based on the educational system. The Arab stereotype is based on the "biased selection of facts" mentioned about religion in the Swedish textbooks. Internal

politics in Italy and Sweden relating to the immigration of Arabs and Muslims is responsible of the recent Islmophobia perceptions. However, in the case of Sweden, the media still plays a vital role in contributing to the negative image of Arabs and Muslims. For example, Swedish news media always connect Islam to violent acts just the same as it portrays the "violent" third world in its news reports (Abdel Latif, 2001, p.2-3).

Some claim that just documenting the negative Arab and Muslim stereotypes is the beginning towards reducing it. Arabs and Muslims should seize any opportunity to communicate with the Western world and portray their real identity to the West, which is the vital role that Muslim organization should pay attention to in leading such communication. Arabs have to know that only protesting or denying the negative stereotype is not enough. However, what type of image do Arabs like to portray about them. Arabs have to work hard and present alternative images, which they have failed to do successfully until now. Arabs "have only one alternative image to that of a terrorist. That is the credit-card holder, the potential consumer with a craze for Western products" (Abdel Laif, 2001, p.4).

At this point there is a question that must be posed: Why should Arabs and Muslims be bothered with their negative stereotyped image that is portrayed by Western Media? Media experts state that in the history of media portrayals, the Arabs have been the most criticized group. The negative portrayal has intensified with the aftermath of September 11 events. The problem lies in that the relationship between the West and The Arabs is dependent on portrayals and stereotypes more than any time in recent history. Thus, any attempt to change such negative image is appreciated and desperately needed.

The Lebanese American University in Beirut hosted one of these attempts. The conference came following the war of words that followed the September 11 attacks on USA. More than 60 scholars from Western countries questioned the possibility of creating a new positive image of the Arabs in the West; and whether such attempt can be conducted individually or collectively. Moreover, conference panels tackled issues concerning how Arabs and Muslims view themselves and how others think of them.

Another step towards improving Arabs and Muslims' international image, which in turn will reshape the portrayal of their identity worldwide, is the Arabs League's consideration of hiring a Western Public Relations company. The Arab League Secretary General asserts the necessity of opening a constructive dialogue with Western countries to refute the Arabs distorted images. However, he points out the importance of criticizing themselves first and try to correct their mistakes (Gardner, 2001,pp.1-2). Accordingly, Arab information ministers meet in Cairo to launch a campaign in foreign media to counter the Arab stereotypes in Western countries (McGrath, 2002, p.1).

The Gulf Cooperation Council decided to initiate a media campaign to refute the anti-Arab publicity as Arabs identity in the West means suspected and wanted individuals surrounded by fears and suspicion. The council agreed to begin its media strategy with press outlets in the region whose aim is to correct the images connected with Arab identity. Second, a committee has been formed to formulate the strategy to be used in correcting the image of Arabs and Islam in Western countries. Third, the launch of three in English, Spanish, and French satellite television channels, to address the West in their languages and portray positive images about the true Arab identity, was proposed by the council information ministers (Janardhan, 2001, pp.1-2).

Also, Saudi Arabia is planning to launch from London an English language Arab satellite television channel, which will depend on sponsorships and advertisements for Arab and Islamic products. It will assist in clarifying the misconception propagated about the Arab identity and Islam, especially after September 11 attacks in the US. The channel will be used to portray the truth and facts about Arabs to bridge the gap between Arabs and Western countries. Later, the channel will broadcast in German, French, Spanish and Italian. (Hasan, 2002, p.1).

Nowadays, there is not one single Arab state that does not have web site representation, official or private. Most newspapers, magazines TV and Radio stations now have web sites on the Internet, irrespective of what may be the professional and technical standard of these web sites (Mahmoud, 2002, p.5).

Internet services and users vary incredibly from one Muslim or Arab country to another. For example, Bahrain has 3 Internet service providers, about 990 websites, and 35,000 users. Egypt has 33 Internet service providers, about 1,710 websites, and 70,000 users. Jordan has 7 Internet service providers, about 990 websites, and 35,000 users. Lebanon has 12 Internet service providers, about 2,520 websites, and 75,000 users. Oman has one Internet service provider, about 2,520 websites, and 28,000 users. Yemen has one Internet service provider, about 180 websites, and 3,500 users. Palestine has 8 Internet service providers and about 270 websites. Kuwait has 2 Internet service providers, about websites 900, and 55,000 users. Iraq has 90 about websites and 500 users. Iran has 2 Internet service providers, about 450 websites, and 100 users. Qatar has one Internet service provider, about 450 websites, and 285,000 users. Saudi Arabia has 37 Internet service providers, about 450 websites, and 190,000 users. Syria has one Internet service providers, about 270 websites, and 8,000 users. Turkey has 5 Internet service providers, about 1,260 websites, and 2 million users. United Arab Emirates has one Internet service provider, about 2,160 websites, and 220,000 users (Middle East Directory).

In 2001, Ajeeb, an Arabic magazine website, conducted a research study to know the number of Internet subscribers and users in the region.

| Rank | Country | Number of Subscribers | Number of Users per Account | Number of Users | % of Population |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | UAE | 220,000 | 3 | 660,000 | 24.44 |
| 2 | Bahrain | 35,000 | 3 | 105,000 | 16.67 |
| 3 | Qatar | 25,000 | 3 | 75,000 | 10.27 |
| 4 | Kuwait | 55,000 | 3 | 165,000 | 8.25 |
| 5 | Lebanon | 75,000 | 3.5 | 262,500 | 6.56 |
| 6 | Jordan | 35,000 | 6* | 210,000 | 4.57 |
| 7 | Palestine | 12,000 | 5 | 60,000 | 3.53 |
| 8 | Oman | 28,000 | 3 | 84,000 | 3.36 |
| 9 | Tunisia | 70,000 | 4 | 280,000 | 2.89 |
| 10 | Saudi Arabia | 190,000 | 3 | 570,000 | 2.59 |
| 11 | Egypt | 70,000 | 8** | 560,000 | 0.82 |
| 12 | Morocco | 55,000 | 4 | 220,000 | 0.73 |
| 13 | Algeria | 45,000 | 4 | 180,000 | 0.6 |
| 14 | Libya | 4,000 | 5 | 20,000 | 0.4 |
| 15 | Syria | 8,000 | 4 | 32,000 | 0.18 |
| 16 | Yemen | 3,500 | 4 | 14,000 | 0.08 |
| 17 | Sudan | 7,000 | 4 | 28,000 | 0.08 |
| 18 | Iraq | 500 | 25*** | 12,500 | 0.06 |
| | **Total** | **938,000** | | **3,538,000** | **1.29** |

Source: Ajeeb Research Unit (March 2001)

* Tens of thousands of users are accessing the Net through hundreds of accounts in 350 Internet cafés.

** Tens of thousands of university students are accessing the Net through hundreds of accounts in universities.

*** The majority of Internet users are accessing the Net through tens of accounts in four Internet centers. The remaining users are government agency employees.

Accordingly, Arabs and Muslims realized the importance of effectively using the Internet to promote a better understanding of the Islamic and Arab identities by bridging the gap between Arab and Western cultures. For instance, Arab governments have realized the importance of the Internet in portraying the Arab identity to other parts of the world and overcoming the cultural gap. Accordingly, the governments contribute to changing the picture by creating websites include a lot of information about Arab countries. Western countries' citizens have to know the real Arab identity by providing information about the Arabs' governmental systems, history, beliefs, religion, culture, geography, media and tourism.

For example, Hewadi (2000) cities an Internet project initiated by Qatari university student Mariem El Hagry and managed by Hamed El-Ansry, as an example of utilizing the Internet to portray the true image of Islam, which is the religion of most Arabs. Thus, it will be used to clear all the misconceptions propagated by Western media, such as those propagated about the jihad in Islam as acts of terrorism.

Most governments established their own websites, such as Lebanon's Websites about its presidency, ministries, parliament, and other national institutions as well as cultural and general overview about the country and its people are on the web. (http://www.gksoft.com/govt/en/ib.html). Another example is Egypt that has set e-government to offer the technological infrastructure necessary for better government services. Nearly all Egyptian ministries, universities, major national organizations, technology, and background information about the culture and the people is published on the Web. United Arab Emirates initiated a huge project to create a free trade set for E-commerce and technology-related industries. The city includes a variety of over 200 companies. Moreover, the UAE government switched to e-government facilitating residents and businesses because documents are processed immediately online. Residents will pay their telephone, water, electricity, traffic fines, monthly Internet charges from their homes via the Internet (Galabon, 2001, pp.2-4).
http://interoz.com/egypt/links/elsgov.htm; http://www.nilesat.com.eg/
http://www.sis.gov.eg/; http://www.ise.org.eg/wwws.htm; http://www.egypt.com/

Moreover, many Arab media sources too, such as newspapers, radio and television stations are available online. Media institutions have also realized the importance of providing news about the Arabs which are produced by Arabs from their own prospective; thus, implying their identity.

http://www.arabtime.com/; http://www.metimes.com/
http://www.daralhayat.com/; http://www.arabamerican.com/
http://www.arab-radio.com/; http://www.beirutnights.com/
http://www.aljazeera.net/; http://www.manartv.com/
http://www.art-tv.net/; http://www.entv.dz/; http://www.orbit.net/

Not only governments that have realized the importance of the Internet in reflecting a positive image about Arab identity, but also individuals ranging from

people in academia to college students have published their own sites. Some of them contained personal data, areas of interest, compilation of interesting links, and a briefing on their countries.

http://www.geocities.com/lotfy_eg/

http://www.medcom-egypt.com/Zewail.html

http://ghaithglobal.freeyellow.com/

There are various examples that point up the cultural quality the Internet has in store for the Arab world. Arabic Internet search engines such as www.cafearabica.com, " www.arabbay.com, and www.arabist.com offer links to websites covering issues like lifestyle, Arab women, people, Arab history and religion (Galabon, 2001, p.2).

Furthermore, some Islamic institutions and organizations dedicated Websites to portray the correct image of Islam. *Islamic-Awareness* website is an example of websites dedicated to portraying the true image of Islam. Its major purpose is dedicated to presenting the pure teachings of Islam, correcting misconceptions about Islam and refuting the lies, distortions and false accusations of Christian missionaries and Orientalists. (http://www.islamic-awareness.org/)

*Abusing the Word Islam* is another example of websites defending Islam. This site is dedicated to those who insist on abusing the names of "Islam" and "Muslim" either intentionally or in ignorance. In this page, we try to briefly show how many "religious" groups around the world who use the name of Islam are in fact clearly and absolutely in violation of certain *basic* principles contained in the Qur'an and Sunnah. There is also information available on common misconceptions held by Muslims and non-Muslims. (http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/notislam/)

**Research Methodology:**

For the purpose of this research, the researchers decided to compile two directories: one for Islamic directories on the Internet and another for the Arab related sites. Accordingly, the directories under study will exist in two lists to be analyzed separately. (Available at:

http://www.aucegypt.edu/faculty/dina/Islam/IslamDirectories.htm; http://www.aucegypt.edu/faculty/dina/Arabs/ArabsDirectory.htm).

Researchers used content analysis to assess the format and content of Islamic and Arab directories on the Internet. As for the sampling, a simple random sample was used. The reason for using such sample is that the chance for selection of each directory in the list is known. In addition, it does not demand comprehensive knowledge of the population. It is easy to achieve a representation from the sample. Furthermore, statistical validity can be known; and classification error can be avoided (Wimmer and Dominick, 1997, p.67).

The unit of analysis included the items on the front page of the websites of the simple randomly selected directories. For the categories of analysis of Islamic

directories, Qur'an, sunna, fiqh, hadith, aqeeda, Fatwah, Sharia, Sira, History of Islam and Muslims, Shi'ite, Islamic law, and misconceptions about Islam were used.

As for Arab related sites, the categories of analysis were news, arts, business, computer, countries, culture, education, entertainment, health, governments, media, miscellaneous, reference, science, and travel.

For format assessment, some elements that directly affect the usability of the Islamic and Arab websites under study were examined. These elements included text (fonts and size), images/ banners, sounds (warning sounds, music), the use of multimedia (moving images, audio, video, graphics), navigational aids (bars, content index, site map, consistency of link colors), animation with high tech sounds, colors, tables (to provide information as rows of data, construct columns as newspapers format, and construct index), Links to thematized issues, graphical icons {(Rajani and Rosenberg, 1999,p.6) and (Murphy, 1999, pp.3-4).

**Definition of terms:**

Qur'an: Citation if the Holy Qur'an whether a text or a sound.
Fiqh: any word mentions Fiqh.
Fatwa: the explanation of an ambiguous issue in Qur'an.
Aqeeda: any word mentions Aqeeda
Shar'ia: any word mentions Shar'ia including the explanation of Qur'an.
Sunnah: " " " Sunnah and deals with the Profit.
Hadith: " " " Hadith and deals with the Profit talks.
Sirah: " " " Sirah and deals with the Profit history.
History of Islam and Muslims: issues deals with history of Islam and Muslims.
Introducing Islam: introductory articles about Islam.
Misconcepts of Islam: any misconceptions of Islam.
Shi'ite: deals with Shi'ite Aqeeda and history.
Islamic Law: deals with laws of Islam.
Comparative Religion: deals with the explanation of other religions in relation to Islam.

**Content Analysis:**

***First: Islamic Directories***

This study included the analysis of eighteen Islamic websites out of thirty six whose directory is appended to this study. The analysis included the front pages only and odd numbers of the directory subject of this study. **The sites are:**

***Directory of Islam Directories Online***

1- http://www.academicinfo.net/Islam.html
2- http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Olympus/1458
3- http://www.islamset.com/
4- http://islamcity.com/

5- http://www.geocities.com/islamicsite2/islamic_links_center
6- http://www.talkislam.com
7- http://www.islam.com/
8- http://www.al-islami.com/
9- http://www.mdnet.co.uk/links/pages
10- http://www.geocities.com/zcdeen/
11- http://www.my-muslim.com/
12- http://www.allspiritual.com/IslamicResources.php3
13- http://i-cias.com/rel_isl_dir.htm
14- http://www.sunnahonline.com/links/web_index.htm
15- http://www.al-islami.org/
16- http://www.muslimtoday.net/
17- http://www.arches.uga.edu/~godlas
18- http://islamworld.net/cgi-bin/htmlscript?category.hts

**The Units of analysis included:**

Text (font and size).
Images/banners
Sound (music, warning)
Colors
Navigation aids (bars, content index, site map, and consistency of links).
Multimedia (moving images, audio, video, graphics).
Links to thematized issues
Graphical Icons
Animation with high tech sounds
Tables

**Categories of Analysis included:**

***1- Religious Categories:***

Qur'an, Fiqh, Fatwa, Aqeeda, Shar'ia, Sunnah, Hadith, Sirah, History of Islam and, Muslims, Introducing Islam, Misconcepts of Islam, Shi'ite, Islamic Law, Comparative, Religion, and Fundamentalism.

***2- General Categories:***

News, Entertainment, Philosophy, Politics, Heritage, Arts and Architecture, Business, Women Studies, Science and Technology, Learning Arabic, Health, and Others.

**Research Results**

***A- Units of Analysis:***

1- Site number 4 had an error was excluded.
2- Site number 10 was a copy of site number 2 but had a different address.

3- Site number 16 did not open at the time of the study.

4- So, the actual number of sites that offered content was 15 sites.

All sites offered good clear bold and plain text, images and banners, colors, and navigation aids, while only 5 offered sounds, and 8 offered multimedia.

***B- Categories of Analysis:***

1- Site number 4 had an error was excluded.

2- Site number 10 was a copy of site number 2 but had a different address.

3- Site number 16 did not open at the time of the study.

4- So, the actual number of sites that offered content was 15 sites.

As for the religious categories 8 sites dealt with Fiqh, 10 dealt with Aqeeda, 11 dealt with Sunnah, 11 with Hadith, 11 with Qura'an, 7 with Shar'ia, 8 with Sirah, 9 with Islamic History, 8 with Introducing Islam, 4 with Misconception of Islam, 8 with Fatwa, 5 with Shi'ite, 4 with Fundamentalism, 6 with Islamic Law, 12 with History of Islam and Muslims, 12 with History of Islam, and 9 with Comparative Religion.

*As for General Categories:*

11 dealt with News, 9 with Entertainment, 5 with Philosophy, 9 with Politics, 10 with Heritage, 10 with Arts and Architecture, 12 with Business, 10 with Women Studies, 8 with Science and Technology, 5 with Learning Arabic, 8 with Health, and 4 with Others including sports, shopping, family, education, e-cards, and travel.

**Research Findings**

***Purpose:***

All Muslim websites are basically created to establish channels to educate both Muslims whose mother tongue is foreign language other than Arabic language and non-Muslims of Islamic religion including all categories defined in this paper. As a matter of attraction, Islamic websites have the elements of entertainment, business, current news, and family information including health and kids. Also, they provided Sciences and Technology, Art and Architecture, music, and thematized links of interest.

***Sponsors:***

Non-profit organizations and universities support Islamic websites.

***Content:***

Islamic websites are organized and focused. They have relevant and appropriate links which are evaluated and updated.

On the other hand the text is neither well written nor well designed. In addition, they do not look attractive enough. They are not linked to popular websites such as Amazon.com or international media corporates or commercial sites.

***Bias:***

These sites are created by academic and religious corporates which show objectivity in writing style since they state their objectives clearly at the front page.

***Date of production/revision:***

All Islamic websites are recently established and most of them are established after 1995. They are also updated between 2000 and 2002. However, there are warnings that the site may have problems and how the visitor can deal with these problems.

***Usefulness:***

They are useful for surfing and researching since they are updated and focus on the relevant issues.

***Authority and Accuracy:***

The Islamic websites have the authority of recognized departments in well-established institutions such as Georgetown University, Geocities, Islam Today, Al Azhar, etc. This authority reflects accuracy, objectivity, and expertise. Also, these sites provide links and contact buttons to service providers and relevant links.

Also, these sites provide different kinds of information including articles, researches, and relevant sources dedicated to specific audience including non-Muslims and Muslims whose mother tongue is not Arabic.

***Coverage:***

All pages cover the topics well and offer links to relevant issues. Although the coverage includes graphics and professional looking it is not enough. They need to enhance the content more than it is.

***Security:***

So far security is provided and whenever possible a warning is provided.

**Conclusion**

The research reveals that although Islamic websites are newborn they are good in preaching Islam. In regard to its content they look solid with strong content that provide basic information about Islam in different disciplines including religion itself and relevant issues such as family, health and kids.

On the other hand the suit that these websites wear needs to be renewed with attractive covers including the design of the front pages, banners, sounds, text, fonts, colors, navigation aids and important links to attract more potential audience especially in this new era which is witnessing a fever of Arabic and Islamic studies

in the non-Arab and non-Muslim countries.

***Second: Arab Related Directories***

This study included the analysis of forty five Arab related websites out of 90 whose directory is appended to this study. The analysis included the front pages only and odd numbers of the directory subject of this study. **The sites are:**

**Directory of Arab Related Websites**

http://www.4arabs.com/
http://www.arabyellowpages.com/
http://www.arab.net/
http://www.al-bab.com/
http://www.amin.org/
http://www.angelfire.com/ri/Reem/
http://www.cal.org/projects/webtest/ArabicWebsites.html
http://www.egyptradio.tv
http://abuaseem.tripod.com/bestweb/
http://www.fayez.net/arab/
http://www.al-bab.com/arab/default.htm
http://www.alshindagah.com/Main_page.htm
http://www.arabia.com/
http://www.gulfbusiness.com/
http://www.middleeastdirectory.com/
http://www.alsaha.com/
http://www.ameinfo.com/
http://www.alhayat.com/
http://www.haneen.com.eg/
http://www.egypttoday.com/
http://www.al-khabar.com/
http://www.latribune-online.com/
am.org.eg/" http://www.ahram.org.eg/
http://www.elakhbar.org.eg/
http://www.horizons-dz.com/sites/
http://www.egypt.net/links.html
http://www.cairotimes.com/
http://www.sweetsites.8m.net/
http://www.alwaraq.com/
http://www.arab.de/arab/
http://www.travel-to-lebanon.com/?N=164
http://www.fajr.com/
http://www.arabwomenconnect.org

http://www.selectline.com/links.html
http://www.arabdatanet.com
http://www.t500.org/
http://www.albawaba.com/main/index.ie.php3?lang=e
http://www.twdg.com/cooking/home.html
http://www.alshamsi.net/eng/
http://www.adcci.gov.ae/pls/uaecontacts/contact_uae_list.act_selects
http://www.hejleh.com/countries/uae.html
http://www.qatar.net.qa/usefulsites.htm
http://www.uaebusinessdirectory.com/
http://www.dubai.com/
http://www.accessgcc.com/index.asp

**The Units of analysis included:**

Text (font and size).
Images/banners
Sound (music, warning)
Colors
Navigation aids ( bars, content index, site map, and consistency of links).
Multimedia ( moving images, audio, video, graphics).
Links to thematized issues
Graphical Icons
Animation with high tech sounds
Tables

**Categories of Analysis included:**

News, arts, business, computer, countries, culture, education, entertainment, health, governments, media, miscellaneous, reference, science, and travel.

**Research Results**

***I- Units of Analysis:***

All sites offered text and tables, 33 used images and banners, only 2 offered sounds (music and warning), 42 used colors, all had navigation bars, only 2 used multimedia, and all had links. Seven Arabic language sites showed scrambled text due to lack of a software to be installed to some computer machines such as Macintosh or service providers may adjust the versions of their Software. Also, only 5 sites had links to international trade marks including Amazon.com, Canon, Visa Card, Master Card, American Express Card., hp, BBC, CNN, Berlitz, and Budget. Front pages in 4 sites had the length between 5 and 10 pages which made it too long for the reader to scroll all of this number. The sitemap should include all the items with links instead of scrolling. 4 sites had pop ups with one of them offered

for sale.

***II- Categories of Analysis:***

42 sites dealt with news, 23 with arts, 25 with business, 20 with computer, 30, with countries, 37 with culture, 25 with education, 31 with entertainment, 26 with government, 15 with health, 29 with media, 25 with miscellaneous issues, 14 with reference 13 with science, 26 with travel. Among the sites, there was one personal site in English, two French sites representing two newspapers, one Tunisian and the other Algerian. Five sites were totally in Arabic language. Forty sites were for English and French languages speaking users. As for the updating date, eighteen sites either did not show the date or were not clear. Twenty six sites were updated between 2000-2003. Only one site was last updated on 1998. United Arab Emirates had four sites, one of which was about Islam. Lebanon had two sites: one about travel and the other about Christian religion. Egypt had three sites: Egyptian Radio and Television Union, Egyptian abroad services, and Egyptian links. Morocco had one site. Qatar had one site. One Arab Women site. One Middle Eastern cooking sites. Four sites for Arabic Information, Arab Media, Arab World Resources, and Media Links.

**Research Findings**

***Purpose:***

The basic purpose of the ninety three of Arab related websites, based on coded information, is to report news about Arabs and world wide current events. Moreover, eighty two percent of the sites introduce Arab culture to non-speaking Arabic readers. Sixty seven percent of the sites offered links to Arab countries. Sixty four percent of the sites deal with media related issues. Sixty nine percent offer entertainment. Fifty seven percent deal with travel and government related issues.

***Sponsors:***

The majority of the websites were supported by governments and media institutions.

***Content:***

Arab related websites are organized and focused. They have relevant and appropriate links which are in most cases evaluated and updated.

On the other hand, the Arabic text has some problems and looks scrambled and unreadable due to problems related to software. Most of the sites' designs are plain and unattractive. Moreover, they are not linked to popular websites, such as Amzon.Com or international media cooperates or commercial sites.

***Bias:***

These sites are created by media institutions and governments and they show objectivity in terms of their writing style from the Arab perspective.

***Date of production/revision:***

Most of the websites are updated between 2000 and 2003.

***Usefulness:***

They are useful for surfing and researching since they are updated and focus on the relevant issues.

***Authority and Accuracy:***

Arab related websites have the authority of the well known institutions that they represent, such Al-Ahram newspaper, Al-Akhbar newspaper, Cairo Times, Al Shark El Awsat newspaper, Arab newspaper, La Tribune, Al Khabar and Gulf Business. These sites reflects accuracy, objectivity, and expertise. Moreover, these sites provide links and contact buttons to service providers and relevant links.

Also, these sites provide different kinds of information including articles, researches, and relevant sources dedicated to specific audience including Arabs non-Arabs and whose mother tongue is not Arabic.

***Coverage:***

All pages cover the topics well and offer links to relevant issues.

***Security:***

To a great extent security is provided.

**Conclusion**

As for the format, they need to reexamine their shape on the Internet. For instance, their front pages need better site maps. Moreover, the websites need to viewed properly by various softwares as some of them was totally scrambled. They also need to be linked to popular websites to gain more weight. Furthermore, they need to offer more space for advertising.

However, the content available in most of them is current news about the Arab region and other parts of the world. They offer access to Arab culture which allow others to better understand Arabs. In other words, they tried to offer their identity in the way they perceive it.

**Recommendation:**

1. Arab states should upgrade their telecommunication infrastructure to meet the needs of information technology to make it available to average Arab

citizens. They should allow the private sector to compete in the Internet service market.

2. Create mailing lists and send e-mail circulars with supporting information to assist in changing Arabs stereotypes about Arabs to both Arab (to inform the about the problem tackled) and non-Arab users. Counter negative images by providing positive alternatives. The dissemination of information will be very effective for lobbying purposes.
3. Sending e-mail alerts to editors in chief of major western media outlets citing specific incidences indicating prejudice against Arabs and clarify misconceptions.
4. Launch chat groups devoted to open dialogues between individuals to refute all the negative perceptions and ideas about Arabs. Sensitize non-Arab users to negative portrayals. Most individuals don't consciously become aware of a negative message unless it concerns them or brought to their attention.
5. Feedback does matter to media people. Well written e-mails explaining that provoking and insulting media programming or websites' content has turned people off as an audience, and is wrong, will have an impact.
6. If Arabs show solidarity and imply it on their websites content, they will lobby very effectively and get paid attention to.
7. Get Arabs to produce the media. Make powerful and intellectual individuals publish their own websites reflecting their cultures, traditions, and characteristics; in other words, let these websites be a reflection of the true Arab identity. When creative and informational websites are identified as "Arab related websites", it would also be very helpful in letting the Internet users see a positive image and letting them know that Arabs are good people. "Name recognition carries a lot of power". Let the format be up-to-date, and content focused (Rainey; Morelli, and Hakki, 1999, p.3).
8. Design and maintain an informative website that serve as electronic activists' toolbox. The website should contain an archive of relevance to the history of the problem. It should state the qualities of activists and how to sharpen their skills. It includes an email group to coördinate an Arab electronic activism and Western Media Watch effort. This email group is a results-oriented email group to help Arab activists motivate each other in the use of their voices, pens and keyboards for the gloom pictures of Arabs in the Western world. It should have media watch list that includes all the national and regional newspapers with their Internet addresses and the emails of the editors to send letters to the editors.
9. Create a web ring of similar websites.
10. Launch online forums discussing Arabs' image in the West while offer alternatives, and encouraging feedback.
11. Encouraging the launch of online newsletters and newspapers to spread

positive ideas and updates about the current situation, which should be easy to find and browse.

12. Email short size videos or MS PowerPoint presentations about incidents clarifying the subject tackled.
13. Enhancing Arab related websites' content by adding more services, selecting high quality material, designing good menus and categorization and agreeing on the intellectual dimension of the content.

With all of these Internet related ideas to counter the Arabs' stereotypes in the West, the Arabs' message might set the West's agenda.

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# The Impact of Cultural Imperialism on Egyptian Life

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**Abstract**

*The imperialism era started with the emergence of empires in the 14th and 15th century, and came to an end after World War II when colonies won independence one by one. Imperialism has taken different forms through political, economic and recently cultural means. (Sawhney, 2002). Culture was described as having two aspects: traditional, which is concerned with ethnicity, and creative which refers to the arts and learning. (Williams, n.d.).*

*Egypt with a history of more than 7000 years was occupied for more than 2000 years. Egypt has experienced different forms of imperialism and colonialism, prior to the era of the Greeks (331-30 B.C.), through the Romans and the Copts (30 B.C.-A.D. 639). (McGrath, 1986). In 639 AD, Egypt was conquered by Arab armies, in 1798 was occupied by French and in 1882 by the British until 1954. (Marsot, 1985).*

*Today, in the era of the information age, global media have caused people to be more closely connected than in the past. The media provide primarily entertainment and secondarily information. This takes the form of a one-way communication flow, the expansion of which cannot be stopped.*

*This study investigates if there is an impact of cultural imperialism through global media on Egyptian culture and identity. Also, the study explores what steps if any Egyptians take to preserve their traditions, values and identity. A self-administered questionnaire based on a series of open- and closed-ended questions is the method used for gathering data from a population of 18 to over 36 year old Egyptians.*

## The Impact of Cultural Imperialism on Egyptian Life

***A civilized society that has never been influenced by another culture does not exist.***
***Ito Youichi***

Raymond Williams, an early pioneer in the field of cultural studies, describes culture as having two aspects: traditional, which is concerned with ethnicity, and creative which refers to the arts and learning. (Williams, n.d.). Also, he argued that imperialism was used to refer negatively to the practices of both the United States

and the Soviet Union. At that time, the term imperialism referred to both the political domination of Eastern bloc by the Soviet Union, and the economic denomination associated with the global reach of capitalism by the United States. (Tomlinson, 1991).

According to the dependency theory, former colonies or Third World countries remain economically, politically and culturally dependent on the West. (Tomlinson, 1991). Since the end of the Cold War, just a few former and present colonial nations such as Great Britain, France and the US have had control over global media. Western domination over media has been interpreted as a power to shape public opinion and to market Western values and lifestyle, and as a threat to the cultures and identities of other nations. (Nafie, 1999).

In addition, western domination over film industry such as Hollywood industry has taken a one-way communication flow. In this sense, people have become more concerned about the role of imported films in shaping their attitudes and perceptions in accordance with foreign ideas and values. These fears in the Third World countries are deeply rooted in the past when their colonial masters imposed their language and culture on them. (Sawhney, 2002). This might explain why some former colonial countries such as France express concerns about the impact of both foreign films and the Internet on their own culture and language.

However, cultural imperialism does not only emanate from the west. Egyptian colloquial Arabic is the most widely understood in the Arab world because of the more than half a century spread of Egyptian movies, radio broadcasts, and television serials combined with a flow of Egyptian schoolteachers throughout the region. (Alterman, 1999). This might explain why some Arab countries consider Egyptian media a one-way communication flow that has a sense of cultural imperialism on them.

This study investigates if there is an impact of cultural imperialism through global media on Egyptian life. Also, the study explores what steps if any Egyptians take to protect their traditions, values and identity. A self-administered questionnaire based on a series of open- and closed-ended questions is the method used for gathering data from a population of Egyptians aged 18 to over 36.

**Brief History on Colonialism and Imperialism in Egypt**

Egypt has experienced different forms of colonialism and imperialism. The era of the Greeks (331-30 B.C.) started when Alexander was "welcomed" to Egypt and founded a new city called Alexandria. Under the rule of his son, Potemy, a famous museum and a great library were established. In 54 B.C., Egypt was invaded by the Romans who left the great library destroyed. In 395 and during the Copts era, a late form of ancient Egyptian language known as "Coptic" was used. (McGrath, 1986).

In 639 A.D., Egyptians welcomed the Arab conquest of Egypt to replace the Byzantines who ruled the population and imposed a high tax on them. That time

showed immigration of Arabs to Egypt where they stayed and intermarried with Egyptians, a sign of starting *Arabization*. During the *Umayya dynasty* (685-705), administrative changes happened such as the language of the public registers was changed from the previous Coptic to Arabic. And later during the *Mamluks dynasty* (1250-1516), Egypt became a center of learning and inspiration for intellectuals and artistes from the other Muslim countries. (Marsot, 1985).

During the Ottoman Empire (1516-1805), Turks aimed to *Turkify* the populations of the states, the policy that faced opposed reactions and increased the feelings for Arab identity. In 1798, French army led by Napoleon Bonaparte landed in Egypt to establish a French colony, which lasted in 1801. (Rishmond, 1977).

Muhammad Ali, an obscure Turk, started the modern history of Egypt, and founded a dynasty lasted in 1952. (Marsot, 1985). For nearly twenty years, he sent educational missions to Europe including Italy, England and mainly France. He opened about 67 primary schools of a European type, and founded the printing press. (Richmond, 1977). During this dynasty, Egyptian nationalism was born. The army and the administration were *Egyptianized.* (Marsot, 1985).

Said, Ali's son, signed a concession to build a canal at Suez that united the Mediterranean and the Red sea, the project that put Egypt under financial troubles. In 1866, Ismail, Said's nephew, asked the European Powers to help him out of his financial problems, the step that let the Powers to intervene in Egyptian affairs. And finally, in order to restore his authority, he invited the British to occupy the country. In 1922, the British protectorate over Egypt was terminated and the country declared independence. But this did not mean the end of British intervention in Egypt until 1954. (Marsot, 1985).

Only for the last 50 years and for the first time since the days of the Pharaohs, Egypt has been ruled by Egyptians. (Marsot, 1985). Foreign words (mainly Turkish, French and English) appeared as a result of the long history of domination over the country. For decades, *The Assemblage of Arabic Language* has played a significant role to protect Arabic language and to think of alternative Arabic words to replace the foreign terms. (Timur, n.d.).

Former Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat (1970-1981), called for *infitah* or open-door policy that encouraged the growth of shops and restaurants featuring foreign goods and food, a sign of westernization or consumerism.

**Technology on Today**

The current era shows the revolution of information technology. Egypt has become the first African country to have two media satellites *Nilesat 101* and *Nilesat 102.* (Saad, 2000). In October 1993, full Internet services started in Egypt with only 2000 - 3000 users. ("Internet history," n.d.). In 2002, free Internet services (at the cost of the local call) started, the step that has encouraged computer literacy.

However, some Egyptian intellectuals believe that the computer is the main

reason for the dying of the Arabic language in general and Arabic calligraphy in particular. The computer has destroyed Arabic calligraphy by providing a limited number of poor Arabic letters to be used. (Salah, 2002).

## Literature Review

The cultural imperialism theory was developed in the 1970s in order to explain the media situation at that time, a situation which promoted a one-way flow dominated by one nation over another. This resulted in a passive audience and a powerful media. (White, 2001). According to Livingston A. White (2001), different terms have been coined in reference to cultural imperialism such as "media imperialism," and "electronic colonialism."

There is more literature on cultural imperialism from a theoretical perspective, and less from a scientific perspective. Three studies in particular have been done in an attempted to determine the impact of foreign television on local audiences to test cultural imperialism.

### Media Imperialism vs Cultural Imperialism

Some scholars claim that media have played a central role in creating culture. It is not all about delivering news, but also importing foreign customs, fashion, food, and etc merely from center nations. Since media products dilute identity and put culture under siege, "media imperialism is central to cultural imperialism." (El-Sherif, 2001). This thinking is based partly on the view that media products of periphery countries cannot compete with foreign media products. (White, 2001). This is why some authors such as Fred Fejes (1981) refer to media imperialism as cultural imperialism. (Tomlinson, 1991).

### Electronic Colonization vs Cultural Imperialism

Thomas L. McPhail refers to electronic colonization as cultural imperialism. (White, 2001). McPhail provides MTV as an example of the application of the electronic colonization theory. MTV has attempted to colonize a large number of viewers around the globe, particularly teenagers to influence their attitudes, preferences, and purchasing behaviors towards cultural products that are mainly from core nations. (McPhail, 2002).

### Americanization vs Cultural Imperialism

Other scholars refer to American products such as McDonald, Disney and Hollywood industry as cultural imperialism products. These scholars believe in the U.S. monopoly in global media expansion. (McPhail, 2002). However, there is a gap between "the perception of McDonald's as America and the plurality of cultural instances which make up 'real' America." (Tomlinson, 1991, p.75).

In addition, McPhail states that although there is a global media empire, there is no "monolithic" U.S. global media empire. He feels that this is because of the appearance of major foreign media corporations that has changed the global media landscape. These corporations are formed by a global mix of ownership among the current media stakeholders. Their main aim is to make greater profits by expanding their audience size of share. Therefore, when talking about cultural imperialism, scholars should think of "who owns what and for whom." (McPhail, 2002, p.72).

**English Language and Cultural Imperialism**

There is an assumption that writing in English "may be reproducing the practices of cultural imperialism." (Tomlinson, 1991, p.28). It is noteworthy that 80 percent of the stored information in the world is written in English, the primary language of the Internet. (Ogan, 2002).

**Criticism of Cultural Imperialism**

It has still been difficult to "denigrate" cultural imperialism sense it lacks precise definitions. It is apparent that cultural imperialism theory is applicable to a macro-level, rather than a micro-level. The theory focuses on broader issues such as culture, transnational media, and the flow of information between countries, and ignores the active media audience member. (White, 2001).

In an attempt to prove that cultural imperialism does not exist, Tamar Liebes conducted a study to determine how local audiences in Israel responded to *Dallas,* a popular Western TV program. Liebes found that the viewer actively produces meaning to the message imparted by *Dallas,* according to his values and experiences. (White, 2001).

It is recommended to replicate Liebes' study since the research was done in one of the core or center nations, and therefore demographically its audiences are different from those in peripheral or developing countries.

In addition, scholars such as Straubhaar (2000) highlight the concept of "cultural proximity." This concept refers to the audiences who actively select the programs that are closest to their own culture. Also, other scholars believe that it is the national media and not necessarily cultural imperialism that is responsible for the domination of market by media industries. (White, 2001).

## Methods

The objective of this research is to determine whether there is an impact of cultural imperialism on Egyptian life, and if so what steps Egyptians might take to preserve their traditions, values and identity.

***Description of the Sample.*** Due to time constrains, the sample size was limited

to 80 respondents, 33 males and 47 females, and was chosen from a population expected to have access to television, satellite and/or Internet. The 80 respondents were divided into four age groups: 30 aged 18-23, 16 aged 24-29, 5 aged 30-35, and 29 aged 36 and over. (See Appendix B for the profile of the respondents).

***Methodology.*** The data were gathered by conducting a survey using a self-administered questionnaire. The questionnaire was based on a series of close- and open- ended questions; the open-ended questions were included to allow for more in-depth information. It took the respondents 20 minutes or more to fill out each questionnaire.

***Description of the Questionnaire.*** The questionnaire consisted of six basic parts. Part One focused on uses of national television. Part Two concerned uses of satellite. Part Three was on movies. Part Four was about uses of the Internet. Part Five concerned the Arabic language. And finally, Part Six was miscellaneous and contained questions regarding the clothing style; the relationship between males and females, and parents and children; the concept of marriage, of the role of women, and of good education; the impact of foreign media on Egyptians; and Egyptian identity. (See Appendix A for a sample of the questionnaire).

## Results and Discussion

This study is to determine whether there is an impact of cultural imperialism on Egyptian life through global media, and if so what steps Egyptians might take to preserve their traditions, values and identity. Eighty people responded to the self-administered questionnaires, which consisted of six parts. The respondents were divided into four age groups: 30 respondents aged 18-23, 16 aged 24-29, five aged 30-35, and 29 aged 36 and over.

### Part One: National Television

Initially, **the respondents were asked whether they watch television, and if so, how frequently**. Of the 80 respondents, 78 were television viewers, while one each from 18-23 and 36-over age group did not watch. (See Figure 1 and Table 1). In terms of frequency, out of the 78 television viewers, the majority watched daily. (See Table 2).




Figure 1: The percentages of the TV viewers

Table 1: The number of TV viewers

| Age | Total Respondents | Yes | | No | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | No. | % | No. | % |
| 18-23 | 30 | 29 | 96.7 | 1 | 3.3 |
| 24-29 | 16 | 15 | 93.8 | 1 | 6.2 |
| 30-35 | 5 | 5 | 100 | 0 | 0 |
| 36 + | 29 | 29 | 100 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 80 | 78 | 97.5 | 2 | 2.5 |

Table 2: The frequency of watching television

| Age | Total Respondents | Every day | Every two or three days | Others | No response |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 18-23 | 29 | 24 | 3 | 0 | 2 |
| 24-29 | 15 | 11 | 3 | 0 | 1 |
| 30-35 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 36+ | 29 | 23 | 5 | 1 | 0 |
| Total | 78 | 63 | 11 | 1 | 3 |

**Next, the respondents were asked to name which local channels they watch regularly**. The 78 TV viewers did not restrict themselves to one channel only. Multiple channels were chosen. The data showed that channel one, two, and Nile TV were more popular among respondents than the other channels. In terms of the age in relation to the average number of channels watched, the data showed that viewers aged 30-35 and 36 and over watched more TV channels than the other age groups. (See Table 3 and Figure 2 and 3 below).

Table 3: The number of TV channels watched by respondents in each age group

| Age | Total Respondents | Ch-1 | Ch-2 | Ch-3 | Ch-4 | Ch-5 | Ch-6 | Ch-7 | Ch-8 | Nile TV | Total Ch. | Average |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 18-23 | 29 | 19 | 20 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 10 | 68 | 2.34 |
| 24-29 | 15 | 10 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 7 | 30 | 2 |
| 30-35 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 20 | 4 |
| 36+ | 29 | 23 | 24 | 10 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 19 | 109 | 3.8 |
| Total | 78 | 55 | 50 | 20 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 12 | 13 | 38 | 227 | 3 |

Figure 2: The number of viewers of the national channels



Figure 3: The relationship between age groups and the average number of channels chosen




**Then, the respondents were asked to name the programs they watch regularly**. Again, multiple programs were chosen by each respondent. The data showed that entertainment and critical discussion programs were the most popular among all age groups with news a poor third but still considered higher than the other programs. Out of all programs listed, only two, *Ra'es El Tahrir* (The editor-in-chief) and *El Zel El Ahmar* (the red shadow), appealed to a number of respondents in each group. (See Figure 4 below). (Table 4 in Appendix A lists all the programs that specifically mentioned by the respondents).

Figure 4: TV Programs the respondents watched regularly



Then, **the respondents were asked to name programs they think are openly critical of current situations**. Of the 78 viewers, 50 respondents mentioned multiple programs. *Ra'es El Tahrir* (The editor-in-chief) was mentioned the highest. The data showed that it appealed to respondents in each age group, while other programs mentioned ranged from seven down to one. (See Table 5 below).

Table 5: Programs more open in criticizing situations

| TV Critical Programs | 18-23 | 24-29 | 30-35 | 36+ | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Akhbar El Nas* (the people's news) | 1 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 5 |
| *Ban El Nass* (Among People) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| *El Zel El Ahmar* (the red shadow) | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 5 |
| *Fi El Omq* (in depth) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 7 |
| *Hadeeth El Madina* (the city talks) | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 7 |
| *Hewar Sareeh* (sincere conversation) | 1 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 4 |
| *Ikhtraq* (penetration) | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 |
| Interviews on Nile TV | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| *Khalf El Aswar* (Behind the fences) | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 3 |
| *Maza law* (what if?) | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| *Mesahet Itefaq* (a space of agreement) | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| *Ra'es El Tahrir* (The editor-in-chief) | 11 | 9 | 4 | 11 | 35 |
| *Takareer Ikhbaria* (News Analysis) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 |
| *Wark ala Wark* (paper on paper) | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| AIDS and Addictions warnings | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 |

Also, **the respondents then were asked whether they had ever called in to TV programs in order to participate and express opinion.** Out of the 78 viewers, only eleven called. Three aged 18-23 participated in programs such as *Haza El Masa'* (this afternoon) and Nile TV. Two aged 24-29 participated, while one failed to call because the line was usually busy. Six aged 36 and over participated or called in to TV programs: five participated and one was unsuccessful in her attempt because she criticized the presenter before being on air, so the line was cut. The programs included *Sabah El-Khair Ya Masr* (good morning Egypt), *Hadeeth El Madina* (the city talks), *Sabah El-Khair Ya Iskanderia* (good morning Alexandria), and *Lailaty* (my night). The issues were on scientific topics and on spouses' problems. (See Table 6 below).

Table 6: The number of respondents calling in to TV programs

| Age | Total Respondents | Yes | No | No response |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 18-23 | 29 | 3 | 25 | 1 |
| 24-29 | 15 | 2 | 13 | 0 |
| 30-35 | 5 | 0 | 5 | 0 |
| 36 + | 29 | 6 | 17 | 6 |
| Total | 78 | 11 | 60 | 7 |

Next, **the respondents were asked to determine how much of their viewing time they watch news, entertainment or educational programs.** Again, multiple programs were chosen by the 75 respondents to this question. Sixty-nine watched news, 67 watched entertainment programs, and 44 watched educational programs. The data showed that both news and educational programs appealed more to respondents aged 36-over, while entertainment programs appealed more to respondents aged 18-23, 24-29, and 30-35. (See Table 7 below).

Table 7: Frequency of viewing news, entertainment, and educational TV programs

| News | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Age** | **Never** | **Seldom** | **Sometimes** | **Often** | **Usually** | **Always** | **Total Respondents** |
| 18-24 | 3 | 11 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 26 |
| 25-29 | 0 | 7 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 15 |
| 30-35 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 5 |
| 36+ | 3 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 4 | 29 |
| Total | 6 | 24 | 17 | 12 | 8 | 8 | 75 |
| **Entertainment** | | | | | | | |
| **Age** | **Never** | **Seldom** | **Sometimes** | **Often** | **Usually** | **Always** | **Total Respondents** |
| 18-24 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 6 | 9 | 26 |
| 25-29 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 5 | 2 | 3 | 15 |
| 30-35 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 5 |
| 36 + | 4 | 9 | 3 | 7 | 2 | 4 | 29 |
| Total | 8 | 12 | 8 | 20 | 10 | 17 | 75 |
| **Educational** | | | | | | | |
| **Age** | **Never** | **Seldom** | **Sometimes** | **Often** | **Usually** | **Always** | **Total Respondents** |
| 18-24 | 16 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 26 |
| 25-29 | 8 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 15 |
| 30 + | 3 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| 36-over | 4 | 7 | 10 | 5 | 0 | 3 | 29 |
| Total | 31 | 11 | 17 | 9 | 3 | 4 | 75 |

**Then, the respondents were asked to express their opinion towards TV programs in general.** Out of the 78 viewers, the majority thought that TV programs were good. Also, the data showed that TV programs appealed more to respondents aged 36 and over. (See Table 8).

Table 8: Respondent's opinion towards TV programs

| Age | Total Respondents | Satisfying | Good | Fair | Bad | Upset | No Opinion | No response |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 18-23 | 29 | 1 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 4 | 1 | 2 |
| 24-29 | 15 | 0 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 0 |
| 30-35 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 36 + | 29 | 6 | 13 | 6 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Total | 78 | 9 | 26 | 19 | 13 | 5 | 4 | 2 |

**Then, the respondents were asked to tell whether they watch TV commercials and if so, which commercials they viewed recently.** Of the 78 TV viewers, 54 watched commercials and 21 did not. Again, multiple commercials were mentioned. The commercials mentioned were classified into three groups: Food, telecommunications and variety including *Toshiba El Araby* for television sets, *Ez* for steel and *Cleopatra* for ceramic. The data showed that viewers in general watched more commercials on food than on others. (See Table 9 and Figure 5 below). (Table 10 in Appendix A lists all the commercials that specifically mentioned by respondents).

Table 9: The number of respondents watching TV commercials

| Age | Total Respondents | Yes | No | No response |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 18-23 | 29 | 23 | 4 | 2 |
| 24-29 | 15 | 14 | 1 | 0 |
| 30-35 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 0 |
| 36 + | 29 | 14 | 14 | 1 |
| Total | 78 | 54 | 21 | 3 |

Figure 5: The number of viewers watching different type of TV commercials




Also, **the respondents then were asked to determine whether commercials differ from the past, and if so, in what way.** Of the 78 viewers, the majority thought that TV commercials differed from the past. Again, respondents gave multiple explanations of how commercials differed. Positive thoughts about commercials today were listed 46 times while negative thoughts 18 times. The majority thought that commercials became more advanced in terms of technology and computer graphics, while some criticized the presence of female models selling products in a sexy way. (See Tables 11 and 12 below).

Table 11: The number of respondents on whether TV commercials differ from the past

| **Age** | **Total Respondents** | **Yes** | **No** | **No response** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 18-23 | 29 | 22 | 3 | 5 |
| 24-29 | 15 | 13 | 0 | 3 |
| 30-35 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 2 |
| 36 – | 29 | 18 | 6 | 5 |
| Total | 78 | 56 | 9 | 13 |

Table 12: Respondents' views on TV commercials today

| **TV Commercials** | **18-23** | **24-29** | **30-35** | **36+** | **Total Respondents** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Positive Thoughts of Commercials** | | | | | |
| More advanced, using technology, Graphic, special effects, much better | 7 | 7 | 2 | 7 | 23 |
| More nice girls | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Less talk | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Funny, full of humor, interesting, new style | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 10 |
| Video clip, signing, dancing | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 6 |
| More creative | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4 |
| Total | 19 | 12 | 5 | 10 | 46 |

| **Negative Thoughts of Commercials** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| In the past, it was more creative; it depended more on cartoons than today | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| Dancing girls | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| Girls advertising in sexy ways | 0 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 7 |
| Girls more into western style | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Awful | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Girls wearing unsuitable clothes | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| In the past its theme was to save money, while today is to spend money. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Have more power that they always interrupt other programs | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Getting worse in terms of content | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Total | 4 | 3 | 1 | 10 | 18 |

**Part Two: Satellite**

**The respondents were asked to tell whether they receive satellite channels, and if so, how frequently.** Out of the 80 respondents, 39 received satellite channels, while 41 did not. The data showed that the majority watched satellite daily. Also, respondents aged 18-23 watched more satellite than the other age groups. (See Figure 6, and Tables 13 and 14 below).

Figure 6: The percentages of satellite viewers



Table 13: The number of viewers of satellite

| Age | Total Respondents | Yes | | No | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | No. | % | No. | % |
| 18-23 | 30 | 21 | 70 | 9 | 30 |
| 24-29 | 16 | 8 | 50 | 8 | 50 |
| 30-35 | 5 | 2 | 40 | 3 | 60 |
| 36 + | 29 | 8 | 27.6 | 21 | 72.4 |
| Total | 80 | 39 | 48.75 | 41 | 51.25 |

Table 14: The frequency of viewing satellite

| Age | Total Respondents | Every day | | Every two or three days | | Others | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % |
| 18-23 | 21 | 18 | 85.7 | 3 | 14.3 | 0 | 0 |
| 24-29 | 8 | 6 | 75 | 1 | 12.5 | 1 (once a week) | 4.76 |
| 30-35 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 100 | 0 | 0 |
| 36 + | 8 | 7 | 87.5 | 1 | 12.5 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 39 | 31 | 79.5 | 6 | 15.4 | 1 | 4.76 |

**Next, the respondents were asked to name which satellite channels they watch regularly**. Again, multiple channels were chosen. Of the 39 satellite viewers, the majority watched Arabic satellite channels. (See Figure 7 below). (See Table 15 in Appendix A).

Figure 7: The number of satellite channels the viewers watched regularly



**Then, the respondents were asked to name programs they watch regularly.** Again, multiple programs were chosen by the 39 satellite viewers. The highest number of viewers was of those watched such critical discussion programs as *El Itagah El Moakes* (the opposite direction), *Shahed Ala El Asr* (eye on the event), Hala Sarhan's programs, *Seri Lelghaiah* (very confidential), etc. (See Figure 8 below). (Table 16 in Appendix A lists all the programs specifically mentioned by respondents in each age groups).

Figure 8: The number of viewers of satellite programs watched regularly




Then, **the respondents were asked to name programs they think are more openly critical of current situations**. Of the 39 satellite viewers, only 18 responded to this question. Multiple programs were mentioned. Arabic programs were listed 23 times, while only one foreign program (Hard Talk in BBC) was referred to twice. Most the programs mentioned were broadcast in either Al Jazeerah or Dream TV. (See Table 17 below).

Table 17: Satellite programs openly critical of current situations

| **Programs** | **18-23** | **24-29** | **30-35** | **36 +** | **Total Respondents** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Al Jazeera programs including *El Ra'i and El Ra'i El Akhar* (the view and the opposite view) | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 |
| *BBC Hard Talk* program | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| *Kabl An Tohasabo* (Before being accountable) | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Dream TV programs including *Hala Sarhan's* programs | 3 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 |
| *El Itegah El Moakes* (the opposite direction) | 3 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 |
| *Fi El Mamno'* (in the prohibition) | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| *Noktah Sakhenah* (hot drop) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| *Shahed Ala El Asr* (eye on events) | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 4 |
| *Men Ghair Hedood* (without borders) | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |

Next, **the respondents were asked whether they had ever called in to satellite programs to participate and express opinion.** Of the 39 viewers, only two aged 36 and over called. (See Table 18 below).

Table 18: The number of viewers calling in to satellite programs

| Age | Total Respondents | Yes | No | No response |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 18-23 | 21 | 0 | 19 | 2 |
| 24-29 | 8 | 0 | 7 | 1 |
| 30-35 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 36+ | 8 | 2 | 4 | 2 |
| Total | 39 | 2 | 31 | 6 |

Also, **the respondents then were asked to determine how much of their viewing time they watch news, entertainment and educational programs.** Of the 39 viewers, respondents chose multiple programs. The data showed that the majority watched entertainment satellite programs. Also, the data showed that viewers aged 36 and over watched more news followed by entertainment programs. (See Table 19 below).

Table 19: Frequency of viewing news, entertainment, and educational satellite programs

| News | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Age | Never | Seldom | Sometimes | Often | Usually | Always | Total Respondents |
| 18-24 | 1 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 17 |
| 25-29 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 8 |
| 30-35 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 36+ | 0 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 0 | 1 | 9 |
| Total Respondents | 3 | 8 | 8 | 10 | 3 | 3 | 35 |
| **Entertainment** | | | | | | | |
| Age | Never | Seldom | Sometimes | Often | Usually | Always | Total |
| 18-24 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 11 | 17 |
| 25-29 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 8 |
| 30-35 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 36+ | 0 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 9 |
| Total Respondents | 0 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 10 | 14 | 35 |
| **Educational** | | | | | | | |
| Age | Never | Seldom | Sometimes | Often | Usually | Always | Total |
| 18-24 | 12 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 17 |
| 25-29 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 8 |
| 30-35 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 36+ | 1 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 9 |
| Total Respondents | 16 | 6 | 7 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 35 |

**Then, the respondents were asked to express their opinion towards satellite programs in general.** Out of the 39 satellite receiver, the majority thought that satellite programs were satisfying, (See Table 20 and Figure 9 below).

Table 20: Respondents' opinion towards satellite programs

| Age | Total Respondents | Satisfying | Good | Fair | Bad | Upset | No Opinion |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 18-23 | 21 | 14 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 24-29 | 8 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 30-35 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 36-over | 8 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Total Respondents | 39 | 24 | 11 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 |

Figure 9: Respondents' opinion towards satellite programs




**Part Three: Movies**

**Then, the respondents were asked whether they see movies, and if so, what type of movies they prefer.** Of the 80 respondents, the majority saw movies. The data also showed that the majority preferred to see both Arabic and Foreign movies. (See Table 20 and 22, and Figure 10 below).

Table 21: The number of viewers of movies

| Age | Total Respondents | Yes | | No | | No response | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % |
| 18-23 | 30 | 26 | 86.7 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 13.3 |
| 24-29 | 16 | 14 | 87.5 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 12.5 |
| 30-35 | 5 | 4 | 80 | 1 | 20 | 0 | 0 |
| 36 + | 29 | 20 | 69 | 6 | 20.7 | 3 | 10.3 |
| Total | 80 | 64 | 80 | 7 | 8.75 | 9 | 11.25 |

Table 22: Type of movies viewers preferred

| Age | Total Respondents | Arabic | | Foreign | | Both | | No response | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % |
| 18-23 | 26 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 7.7 | 14 | 53.85 | 10 | 38.46 |
| 24-29 | 14 | 1 | 7.1 | 3 | 21.4 | 10 | 71.4 | 0 | 0 |
| 30-35 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 100 | 0 | 0 |
| 36 + | 20 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 20 | 14 | 70 | 2 | 10 |
| Total | 64 | 1 | 1.5 | 9 | 14.1 | 42 | 65.6 | 12 | 1.6 |

Figure 10: Type of movies respondents preferred




**Then, the respondents were asked to mention the type of movies they most like.** Again, multiple types of movies were mentioned. Of the 52 respondents to this question, the majority liked foreign movies most. (Table 23 in Appendix A lists all the types of movies mentioned by respondents in each age group).

**Part Four: The Internet**

**Next, the respondents were asked whether they use the Internet, and if so, how frequently.** Out of the 80 respondents, 52 were Internet users. The data showed that the highest number of Internet users was of those aged 18-23. (See Figure 11 and Table 24 below).

Figure 11: The percentages of users of the Internet




Table 24: The number of users of the Internet

| Age | Total Respondents | Every day | Every two or three days | Others |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 18-23 | 25 | 15 | 9 | 1 |
| 24-29 | 12 | 7 | 2 | 3 |
| 30-35 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| 36 + | 11 | 2 | 5 | 4 |
| Total | 52 | 26 | 18 | 8 |

Also, **the respondents were asked to determine how often they use the Internet for research, education, information, news, entertainment, e-mails and chatting.** Out of the 52 Internet users, respondents gave multiple purposes. The data showed that the majority always used the Internet for checking their emails and then for research. (See Table 25 in Appendix A).

**Part Five: Vocabulary**

**Next, the respondents were asked to explain why some foreign words are used in the daily Arabic conversation such as okay, sorry, merci, etc.** Out of the 80, 38 responded to this question and gave multiple reasons. The majority thought that some people used foreign words while speaking to show modernity, prestige,

well cultured or well educated. Some referred to the media (the Internet and foreign movies), to the common interacting with foreign people, globalization and the former British and French colonization of Egypt as the main reasons. (See Table 26 in Appendix A).

**Also, the respondents were asked to give other examples of foreign words used in the daily Arabic conversation.** Some of the foreign words mentioned were fine, nice, mobile, message, at least, already, bye, maybe, see you, radio, computer, microphone, hello, hi, don't worry, fantastic, anyway, thank you, thanks, keep in touch, and etc. (See Appendix B for other examples).

**Next, the respondents were asked to explain why some foreign words are used in Arabic, and Arabic plural forms are applied to them such as camerat instead of cameras.** Of the 80, 37 responded to this question and gave multiple reasons. The majority thought that foreign words were shorter and easier when expressing something. The data also showed that computer terminology, globalization, and foreign media were the main reasons. Also, some respondents thought that it was difficult to say the Arabic translation for a foreign word. For example, in terms of ease, compare saying email and *El Barid El ALectroni.* Others thought people tried to Arabize foreign words because Arabic language was deeply rooted in their minds. (See Table 27 in Appendix A for all the reasons mentioned).

**Also, the respondents were asked to give other examples of foreign words used in Arabic, and Arabic plural forms are applied to them.** Respondents gave multiple examples such as sacation instead of sections; orderat instead of orders; deskat instead of desks; coursat instead of courses; Aflam instead of films; computrat instead of computers; the verb saive instead of save; and the verb vaoete instead of vote. (See Appendix B for all the examples mentioned).

**Part Six: Miscellaneous**

**The respondents were asked to determine whether clothing style has changed, and if so, in what way.** Of the 80 respondents, the majority thought that clothing style had changed. Only 55 respondents gave multiple views on in what way clothing style had changed. The views were classified into positive, negative, and neutral. The data showed that the majority (34 respondents) had negative views on clothing style today. Some thought that it became shorter, tighter, revealed midriff, more western, and did not suit Egyptian traditions or the average Egyptians. In terms of positive views, 15 thought it became more modern, fashionable, and practical. (See Table 28 below). (Table 29 in Appendix A lists all the views given by respondents in each age group).

Table 28: The number of respondents on whether clothing style has changed

| Age | Total Respondents | Yes | No | No response |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 18-23 | 30 | 22 | 5 | 3 |
| 24-29 | 16 | 15 | 1 | 0 |
| 30-35 | 5 | 4 | 1 | 0 |
| 36 + | 29 | 21 | 5 | 4 |
| Total | 80 | 62 | 12 | 7 |

**Next, the respondents were asked whether the relationship between males and females differ from the past, and if so, in what way.** Of the 80 respondents, 59 thought that the relationship between males and females had changed, while 12 did not. The respondents gave multiple views in describing the relationship today. The views again were classified into positive, negative, and neutral. The data showed that the majority thought that the relationship was getting worse. Some respondents thought that both males and females mingled more with each other out home, while others thought that the relationship became more informal and Western, and girlfriends and boyfriends became common. (See Table 30 below). (Table 31 in Appendix A lists all the views given by respondents in each age group).

Table 30: Responses on whether the relationship between males and females has changed

| Age | Total Respondents | Yes | No | No response |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 18-23 | 30 | 23 | 3 | 4 |
| 24-29 | 16 | 13 | 2 | 1 |
| 30-35 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 1 |
| 36 + | 29 | 20 | 6 | 3 |
| Total | 80 | 59 | 12 | 9 |

**Then, the respondents were asked whether the relationship between parents and children differ from the past, and if so, in what way.** Of the 80 respondents, 64 thought the relationship had changed, while seven did not. Again, 71 respondents gave multiple views on the relationship, and the views were classified into positive and negative. The data showed that the majority thought that the relationship was getting worse. They thought that because of media, children became more impolite and their attitudes reflected no respect to their parents. However, some respondents thought that children had more freedom and both parents and children became friends. (See Table 32 below). (Table 33 in Appendix A lists all the views given by respondents in each age group).

Table 32: Responses on whether the relationship between parents and children has changed

| Age | Total Respondents | Yes | No | No response |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 18-23 | 30 | 21 | 4 | 5 |
| 24-29 | 16 | 15 | 0 | 1 |
| 30-35 | 5 | 4 | 0 | 1 |
| 36 + | 29 | 24 | 3 | 2 |
| Total | 80 | 64 | 7 | 9 |

**Then, the respondents were asked to choose what best describes their relationship with their parents.** Of the 80 respondents, 39 described the relationship as being friends, while 26 as strong. (See Table 34 below).

Table 34: Descriptions of the relationship between the respondents and their parents

| Age | Total Respondents | Strong | weak | friends | Wide gap | No gap | Easily provoked | Old fashioned | No response |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 18-23 | 30 | 12 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 4 |
| 24-29 | 16 | 5 | 1 | 9 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 30-35 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 36 + | 29 | 9 | 0 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 |
| Total | 80 | 26 | 1 | 39 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 7 |

**Next, the respondents were asked whether the concept of marriage has changed, and if so, in what way.** Of the 80 respondents, 46 thought the relationship had changed, while 24 did not. The 70 respondents to this question gave multiple views on the concept of marriage. The views were classified into negative and positive. The majority thought that the concept of marriage was getting worse because it became materialistic; the minority thought that it became better since the couple selected each other, and got to know each other before being married. (See Table 35 below). (See Table 36 in Appendix A for more detail).

Table 35: Responses on whether the concept of marriage has changed

| Age | Total Respondents | Yes | No | No response |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 18-23 | 30 | 17 | 7 | 6 |
| 24-29 | 16 | 13 | 2 | 1 |
| 30-35 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 1 |
| 36 + | 29 | 13 | 14 | 2 |
| Total | 80 | 46 | 24 | 10 |

**Next, the respondents were asked to determine whether their marriage is traditional or modern.** Of the married respondents, the majority had traditional marriage. (See Table 37 below). (See Appendix B for the respondents' profile).

Table 37: The type of marriage given by married respondents

| Age | Total Respondents | Single | Married | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Traditional | Modern | No response |
| 18-23 | 30 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 24-29 | 16 | 6 | 6 | 4 | 0 |
| 30-35 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 36 + | 29 | 3 | 13 | 10 | 3 |
| Total | 80 | 41 | 20 | 15 | 4 |

**Next, the respondents were asked to choose what best describes their relationship with their children.** Twenty-one respondents could answer this question because they either had children or their children were old enough to describe the relationship. The data showed that the majority described the relationship as being friends. (See Table 38 below).

Table 38: Descriptions of the relationship between the respondents and their children

| Age | Total | Strong | friends | Wide gap | No gap | I don't understand | different | No response |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 18-23 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 24-29 | 10 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| 30-35 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 36 over | 26 | 4 | 15 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 |
| Total | 39 | 7 | 18 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 10 |

**Then, the respondents were asked to determine whether the role of women has changed, and if so, in what way.** Of the 80 respondents, 51 thought that the role of women had changed, while 21 did not. Again, multiple views were mentioned. The views were classified into positive and negative. The majority thought that the role of women was getting better since women played more significant and effective role in society, and became more liberated and independent. However, the minority thought that women should go back home where her real role and leave jobs for men who did not find any. (See Table 39 below). (Table 40 in Appendix A lists all the views given by respondents in each age group).

Table 39: Responses on whether the role of women has changed

| Age | Total Respondents | Yes | No | No response |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 18-23 | 30 | 18 | 8 | 4 |
| 24-29 | 16 | 12 | 3 | 1 |
| 30-35 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 1 |
| 36 - | 29 | 18 | 9 | 2 |
| Total | 80 | 51 | 21 | 8 |

**Next, the respondents were asked to determine whether the concept of education has changed, and if so, in what way.** Out of the 80 respondents, 51 thought that the concept of education had changed, while 19 did not. Again, the multiple views mentioned were classified into neutral, positive, and negative. The majority thought that there was no education in Egypt due to the lacking of good system, and care and effective teachers. Also, some respondents neutrally described the situation today. They thought that parents preferred their children learn in language schools and learn computer skills and women preferred education rather than getting married. (See Table 41 below). (Table 42 in Appendix A lists all the views given by respondents in each age group).

Table 41: Responses on whether the concept of education has changed

| Age | Total Respondents | Yes | No | No response |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 18-23 | 30 | 14 | 10 | 6 |
| 24-29 | 16 | 14 | 1 | 1 |
| 30-35 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 1 |
| 36 + | 29 | 20 | 7 | 2 |
| Total | 80 | 51 | 19 | 10 |

**Next, the respondents were asked to determine whether there is an impact of foreign media on Egyptian traditions, customs, and habits, and if so, in what way.** Of the 80 respondents, the majority thought there was an impact. Again, multiple views were given. Sixteen respondents thought that young Egyptians blindly imitated western style they receive through foreign media. Also, foreigners were stereotyped by most Egyptians as having much more comfortable and fashionable life. (See Table 43 below). (Table 44 in Appendix A lists all the views given by respondent in each age group).

Table 43: Responses on whether there is an impact of foreign media

| Age | Total Respondents | Yes | No | No response |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 18-23 | 30 | 17 | 5 | 8 |
| 24-29 | 16 | 15 | 1 | 0 |
| 30-35 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 1 |
| 36 + | 29 | 15 | 12 | 2 |
| Total | 80 | 50 | 19 | 11 |

**Next, the respondents were asked to determine whether there is a such thing as Egyptian identity, and if so, the respondents were asked to describe it.** Out of the 80 respondents, the majority believed that Egyptian identity did exist. Multi descriptions were given. Some respondents commented that Egyptians today lost some of their identity by getting rid of some of their good traditions. Also, the data showed that the majority described Egyptian identity as religious, traditional, humor, friendly, tolerant, sociable, etc. (See Table 45 below). (Table 46 in Appendix A).

Table 45: Responses on whether there is an Egyptian identity

| Age | Total Respondents | Yes | No | No response |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 18-23 | 30 | 21 | 2 | 7 |
| 24-29 | 16 | 13 | 3 | 0 |
| 30-35 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 1 |
| 36 + | 29 | 26 | 1 | 2 |
| Total | 80 | 63 | 7 | 10 |

**Next, the respondents were asked whether Egyptian identity is in danger from the impact of foreign media, and if so, in what way, and what suggestions can be offered to protect it.** Of the 80 respondents, 13 thought Egyptian identity was in danger, while 12 did not. Again, respondents gave multiple explanations. The majority thought that foreign media had a serious impact on Egyptian values and traditions. Also, respondents gave multiple suggestions. The majority suggested that Egyptians should go back to their traditions, to their customs and religion in order to preserve their identity. In addition, some respondents thought that national media should play a role in reminding and educating people of their identity. (See Table 47 below). (Table 48 and 49 in Appendix A list all the explanations and suggestions offered by respondents in each age group).

Table 47: Responses on whether Egyptian identity in danger from the impact of foreign media

| Age | Total Respondents | Yes | No | No response |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 18-23 | 30 | 9 | 10 | 11 |
| 24-29 | 16 | 8 | 3 | 5 |
| 30-35 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| 36 - | 29 | 13 | 12 | 4 |
| Total | 80 | 31 | 27 | 22 |

**Concerning the users of each television, satellite, and the Internet,** the data showed that the majority in general watched more television, followed by satellite. In terms of age, respondents aged 18-23 were more active users of three media than the other age groups. (See Figure 12 below).

Figure 12 : The number of users of each medium




**Concerning the average number of television channels watched compared to satellite channels by respondents in each age group:** The data showed that there is no significant differences among 30-35 and 36-over age groups in the average of watching television channels compared to satellite channels. Also, the data showed that respondents aged 18-23 watched more satellite channels than the other groups. However, in terms of the number of viewers, it was obvious that although only eight aged 36 and over watched satellite, they were heavy viewers. And in contrast, although respondents aged 18-23 were the highest number of satellite viewers, they were light viewers. (See Figure 13 below).

Figure 13: The average number of channels watched by respondents in each age group




**Concerning the number of TV and satellite programs watched by respondents:** The date showed that the majority of viewers watched both entertainment and critical discussion programs. Also, the data showed that satellite critical discussion programs appealed to more viewers than entertainment programs, opposite to the case of television. (See Figure 14 below).

Figure 14: The number of TV and satellite programs watched



**Conclusion**

The study found that the majority watched more national channel one, two, and Nile TV, and more Arabic satellite channels. In terms of age, the study found that even though viewers aged 36 and over watched less satellite, they were heavy viewers. In contrast, viewers aged 18-23 were light viewers; even thought, they watched more satellite channels.

The high exposure shown to Arabic channels and programs has supported the notion of "cultural proximity" when active audiences select programs closest to their own culture. (White, 2001).

In terms of vocabulary, the study found that Arabic language has significantly been affected by the former colonization era together with today foreign media and globalization. It is difficult to avoid using foreign words in the daily Arabic conversation since most of the new inventions and technology have foreign terms that spread quickly before Arabic alternatives being formed.

The study also found that both clothing style and the relationship between males and females have been influenced mainly by foreign media and has been getting more into western style. Also, the foreign media have shaped children's behavior, which shows almost no respect to their parents.

However, the role of women has improved. Women have become more liberated and independent. In terms of education, there is a wave towards both language schools and computer literacy. Higher education has replaced marriage as a goal for the future.

In general, the study found that global media have both a positive impact in terms of improving technology and the increasing of national talk shows programs, and a negative impact in terms of eroding Egyptian values and traditions, particularly among teenagers. This shows the power the media have that can be interpreted as media imperialism.

The study supported the views of some scholars such as Fred Fejes who refer to media imperialism as cultural imperialism. (Tomlinson, 1991).

It would be worthwhile to expand this study to make sure that the number of respondents in four each groups were equal and at the same time, the respondents of the group aged 18-23 should not be limited to the American University in Cairo in general, which had been done largely because of time constraints.

In conclusion, no culture will remain unchanged after exposure to advanced media technology, but the changes may not take the same form in all societies. As long as Egyptians know enough about their culture they have self-respect and therefore they have become difficult to be negatively influenced.

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# Gender and Refugees: The Case of Refugee Domestic Laborers *

**Amira Ahmed**

**Abstract**

*This paper addresses issues to the interrelations between gender, domestic work and refugees focusing on case studies among the refuge communities in Egypt. The paper emphasizes the role of paid household labor as a crucial means of survival. It further argues that refugees' survival strategies has to be analyzed within a framework that takes into account that globalization, forced migration and refugee women domestic workers as three correlated dynamics that both affect and affected by each other. Contrary to the prediction of early modernization literature, paid domestic work seems to in the ascendancy in both global North and South. Such ascendancy is accompanied by increasing feminization of labor and in particular informal labor. The first part of the paper examines the literature and theoretical notions of refugees, paid domestic work and globalization. The second part introduces the refugee community in Cairo. A subsequent part introduces some methodological approaches, domestic work market in Egypt with emphasis on refugees' presence. The main part of the paper is devoted to case studies on refugee women working as paid domestic workers. The case studies show clearly that domestic work as a survival strategy was crucial but it is also be a way of exploiting and abusing those women. Given the informal nature of domestic services, refugee women are able to transcend legal and other barriers to the job market. However, this informality impact negatively on their rights and working conditions and leads them without any legal rights. Drawing on the early studies on Nubian migrants to Cairo who worked as paid domestic workers, the paper conclude by showing many commonalities arising from the links between involuntary migration and informal sector jobs particularly paid domestic work.*■

* Abstract only is published here

# Functional Development' and Globalization: A Case of Misguided Assistance *

**Yamine Dorghany**

## Abstract

*Functionalism is in many ways analogous to globalization whose arms include that of development assistance. 'Functionalist development' refers to development efforts influenced by functionalist-oriented thought. Social equilibrium and consensus on cultural values and norms are taken for granted, conflict is rejected, the status quo is firmly maintained, all parts of the social system are assumed to be connected, evolutionary universals are imposed on all societies and positivism predominates within scientific research which influences developmental practices worldwide. All tenets of functionalism prevail in globalization and its development assistance arm. This functionalist development' phenomenon has its effects on many aspects of society, including education and gender, which are influenced by international 'aid'. Although international development assistance advocates female emancipation as a form of human rights protection, lack of cultural sensitivity and understanding, which is a result of functionalist development attitudes, causes problems for both development agency staff and the local cultures affected by their efforts. In trying to 'reform' local cultures and mould them into the western ideal of gender balance, efforts to give women their basic human rights many times go in vain.*■

* Abstract only is published here

# Women without Borders? Interrogating the Transnational Project of "Global Feminism"

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*Universalistic theories are not only ahistorical, but the result of ethnocentric thinking. If women in other cultures are not attracted to the women's movement, it does not mean that they are backward, that they fail to understand the workings of some universal system of sex oppression. It means rather, that they have had different experiences from our own, and different historical relations with imperialism. Rather than studying them, we must learn to listen to them, respecting and learning from their past and present experience of collective effort. Only in this way can we all work together to invent a new culture*[1].

*It has become quite fashionable to speak of living in a global village. Like most villages, it is characterized by deep structural imbalances between men and women, different castes and ethnic groups... Democratic norms are all too often circumscribed by underlying inequalities...yet, the manner in which the term 'global village' is used carries with it a clear invitation to people to shed their 'parochial' identities and become citizens of the world. In reality , the world's citizens are not quite ready to abandon their collective identity*[2].

## Introduction

Many feminist writers and activists have recently romanticized an invitation to a 'transnational feminist' response to universal types of oppression facing "all" women across the world. Contrastingly, other voices have expressed concerns about discursive and theoretical flows from North to South, a concern that valorizes the particularity of non-western feminist movements/women's activisms, non-western women's uniqueness, and their local cultures and politics.

The present paper is an attempt to engage in this debate through a critical examination of some Euro-American feminist discourses about "global feminism[3]," a "feminism in the singular," or, as Lorde[4] put it, a "pretense to a homogeneity of [all women's] experience covered by the word sisterhood."

Departing from these current debates over the issue of a borderless "flux" of "transnational sisterhood" vis-à-vis cultural particularism and indigenous "closures,[5]" the paper attempts to:

1. Examine the history, meaning, and theoretical foundations of "global feminism;"

2. Question the degree to which and whether (a) the Northern global feminist project has been sensitive to all feminisms across cultural and historic boundaries, valorizing non-Western local contexts; (b) whether non-western women, their existential concerns, and their "idiomic specificities" have been justly considered by the "singular" feminist initiative pioneered by some Anglo-American feminists; and (c) whether the tension between "worldwide patriarchy" and "universal sisterhood" in the name of WOMAN can be equally relevant/ advantageous across borders. In other words, the paper attempts to question the likelihood of constructing a universal, stateless, or "imagined community" comprising all feminisms that speak for the category WOMAN worldwide.
3. Contextually assess the futures of a "global feminism," also problematizing its viability and gains for women from less privileged communities/ spaces (namely "third-world" women[6], and more particularly women from in the Arab Moslem worlds).
4. Render problematic the romaniticized "internationalization" of a single feminism, arguing instead that despite the possibility and importance of situating feminism as a global movement/ideology, "Other" indigenous feminisms and women's activisms —in accordance with their specific locational (geographic), traditional, (cultural) and temporal (historic) realities—must also be valorized and encouraged.

Based on a wide range of feminist writings, the author hopes to find answers to these questions. A basic conceptual framework directing the paper is the question of representation, Othering, and "relations of ruling," namely the asymmetrical power balance between of women in the "First" World and women in the "Third" World; the former being the privileged gatekeepers, therefore speakers of and for the latter: the other, the "subaltern."

Attention will mainly be given to some Western feminists' discourses on women/women's activism in the so-called "third-world." These discourses are presented herewith as infrequently critiqued or insufficiently self-critical "Orientalist" or neocolonialist schemes, which expose a different kind of oppression: an oppression of women by women.

Following a deconstructionist model by Johnson-Odim, the paper combines second-wave, Black, and postcolonial feminist views, in hope to answer the aforementioned questions.

The paper's main argument and conclusion are grounded in a view that problematizes and decenters the practicality of such "modern" notions as "thinking ourselves beyond the nation[7]," "new nationalisms," and "global sisterhood," which often celebrate the annulment of cross-national boundaries and national identities, and more often than not employ satiric discourses to point up the absurdity and

primordial nature of affective/spiritual memberships. Such discourses, I shall argue, demonstrate a Eurocentric disregard of —rather apathy toward—national memories, subjective histories, and the particularistic needs of individuals.

Unless this insensitivity and unfit representations are abandoned, I conclude, little if any chances stand for a "global feminism."

**Women's Activism between "Flow" and "Closure"**

> It is not dollars that are flowing freely around the world, but Western culture—constitutionalism and Coca Cola, free market ideology and Bruce Willis... Cultures are open as never before to question, challenge, and influence from outside. No wall can keep out satellites and cyberspace...Western culture is ubiquitous, but not always welcome... The impact of globalization on culture is complex and the impact on women is especially so[8].

The recent notion of globalization has gained considerable momentum over the past decade, largely because of its rapid and far-reaching asymmetrical direction (North to South) affecting men and women in the South. Since the end of the Cold War, globalization has increased free capital flows that resulted in multiple and contradictory consequences, especially for women[9]. The complex reality posed by the "Global Age, " particularly the globalization of culture, stems partly from its accompanying "world citizenship" project, which has created an overwhelming amount of inconsistencies, catalyzing opportunities on the one hand and imbalances on the other, giving birth to new hopes yet renovating insecurities.

Geshiere and Meyer [10] note that men and women's realization of their involvement in global flows seems to intensify their efforts to affirm old, "authentic" 'cultural closures' and construct new boundaries. The global flow *of cultures, capital, and people*, they assert, has almost always resulted in resurgent fixation, a native expression of identity reconstruction and preservation[11]. Hence, the cultural implications of globalization are viewed by many persons —particularly those from the postcolonial South— in terms of uninvited intervention, or what Spivak calls "epistemic violence"[12].

Globalization has been associated with unpredictability that is accelerated by discursive and economic flows and a **homogenizing project**. In cultural terms, the homogenizing effect associated with globalization represents a structural imbalance in the relations of ruling, and in its best-intentioned depiction signifies an *imposed* heterogeneity advocating universal membership[13]. The latter view has been inspired by the intensified circulation of goods and people around the globe, as well as mass migration and "electronic mediation[14]," all of which Geshiere and Meyer believe to have already dissolved cross-cultural differences,

*local identities, and geographic borders*, converting them into McLuhan's utopian 'global village.' Conversely, defiant voices appear to challenge globalization, asserting their locality against globality. In short, the tension between global 'flux' and local 'closures' is deeply rooted in the debate for and against globalized homogenization[15].

In close connection with this argument are ascending debates about how to best pursue an "international approach to feminist concerns[16]." Undoubtedly, the acceleration of intercultural contact in the present "global Age" has amplified the connectedness between local gender systems across geographic borders, also hybridizing disparate feminisms. Based on this "glocational[17]" dialogue between different feminisms, some feminists have posited that creating a "global feminism" is indispensable in response to multiple types of oppression facing *all* women around the world. According to this view, women— virtually the products of comparable histories— are subordinate in analogous aspects[18].

On the other hand, although some feminist voices from the South acknowledge the merits of the "transnational feminist" project, they also emphasize the dislocated quality of discursive and theoretical flows between feminist activists in different parts of the globe, in which cultural flows from North to South take place more easily than in the opposite direction. Thayer explains,

> The barriers to South-North conceptual migration are both economic and discursive. *First*, the periphery and its intellectual products are constructed as both exotic and specific, while the center and its discourses and theories enjoy all-embracing, universal status. *Second*,economic inequalities ensure that distribution networks for *Southern* academic—and activist—do not operate with the same insistence and power as those that disseminate Euro-American discourses and theories.

While admitting the "impressing accomplishments" of the transnational feminist movement, she concludes that

> the movement has only recently started a process of constructing a social space where horizontal discursive travel could replace the fundamental asymmetries in global cultural flows, a space where women's movements in the North could benefit fully from the rich experience of feminists in the South[19].

In the bounds of this debate, later sections of this paper will present myriad views toward the substantiation of the author's argument with respect to the viability and future of global feminism in the Moslem/Arab world. The next section presents a historic account, a conceptual definition, and a deconstructionist attempt to theorize global feminism.

## Global Feminism: History, Concept, and Theory

To be able to critically assess the project of *global feminism*, its viability and specific implications in the so-called Third-world, (particularly the Arab Moslem world), and its practicality in general, it is of great worth to (a) try to understand its genealogy; (b) be able to place it in a logical conceptual frame; and (c) situate it within an appropriate theoretical construction.

According to Friedman, the term global feminism originally arose as part of the common assumption by second-wave feminists of a universal patriarchy and the promotion of a global sisterhood, united in its defiance of worldwide male dominance[20]. In the 1960s, Johnson-Odim notes, the onset of second wave feminism began with interrogating Anglo-American feminism about questions of race, class, and sexuality. A decade later, concerted voices started asking, "whose feminism for whom," making possible the inclusion of Latina and Asian American diaspora communities and Native American women. Toward the mid 1970s, African, Asian, Caribbean, Latin American, Middle Eastern, and Pacific Islander women became incorporated into Euro-American or "white" feminism through world fora. The fact that these "Other" women were included into the mainstream feminist project, Johnson-Odim remarks, suggests to us that

> location, both geopolitical and historical … , is a primary component of identity and worldview, therefore, an explicator not only of who and where we are situationally, but also relationally.

By the mid 1980s, the single white, Euro-American feminism started splitting up into European and Anglo-American feminisms, albeit still incorporating more recent members. Johnson-Odim notes that it is this membership of a multiplicity of women's voices that has forced feminist theorists to deconstruct the earlier singular version of feminism. The author herself engages in an effort to deconstruct *mainstream* feminist theory by posing some questions. Her first important question is about the ways in which current global power relations have influenced the development of feminist theory. Secondly, she tries to locate a shared struggle among women that does not loose sight of the role of class and/or race privilege in the lives of some women and the class or race oppression in the lives of other women, especially when both struggles are systemically related[21]. Stressing the importance of relating theory to praxis and struggle, her third question is about the inappropriateness of the language of feminist theory and its inaccessibility for all women. In this vein, she notes that the American bias in feminist scholarship is manifested in the frequent assumption that the essence of feminism is equality of rights. She then introduces Third World feminist_ theory, which posits that the so-called "Third-World" shares with the "West" the historical experience of colonialism and imperialism—in terms of economic *and* social dominations— which have underdeveloped certain areas in the world and perceived their populations as

inferior others needing to be made over in the Western imagery. Thus, she argues, what distinctively binds the third-world today is a common neocolonial oppression for the most part[22]. Women in this part of the world have come to realize that while struggling against sex discrimination internally and globally, many of the things that oppress them have been designed and sustained by an inequitable exploitative global order, which the struggle for sexual liberation/equality will not erase.

Jonson-Odim also notes that feminist theorizing needs to be informed by the realities of "third-world" women, praxis, and these women's multiple perspectives.

> I mean that women struggling for survival want to embrace a feminism that speaks to an improvement of their concrete material conditions, one that proposes an organized political process to make change that enhances the material quality of their lives and those of their loved ones (including men), and one that they see as having relevance to their lives....Women need to recognize themselves and their lives in theory.

She also notices that despite the fact that second wave feminist theorizing started out questioning the interplay between women's conditions and multiple relations of ruling; it has consequently based its discourse on the history and process of female subordination primarily represented along Western historical lines of thought. Many "third-world" women view western feminist theory, and its regard of male power as the major—and sometimes sole—locus of women's oppression, as sightless to the real sources of these women's oppressions...[23]

> since, *for instance,* the master of a black woman is as likely to be a white woman as a white man, ...black women have as much in common with black men as they do with white women when it comes to their oppression, what are we to make of feminist theory that singly proposes an end of equality between men and women? Which women are to be equal to which men? Are women to be equal to their cohort men—that is men with whom they share race, class, and location...? That is a sure formula for entrenching privilege in the name of feminism[24].

It is hence surprising for some feminist scholars that nothing has been written by feminists who are oppressed also by race and/or class that place *maleness* as other[25]. Therefore, "third-world" feminist theory shares with Black feminism a recognition of the salience of race and class oppression in their subordination as *women*[26].

The critique of feminism by "third-world" feminists resulted in a major shift in Anglo-American feminist theorizing. The shift was manifested through the incorporation of emerging feminist models[27]— within the past two decades— of difference theory into their discourses[28]. On the other hand, the notion of global

feminism has been fortified by the rising influence of NGOs, the UN conferences on women and human rights, and the abundance of local, national, and international women's organizations and their role in assuring human rights, equality, justice, and empowerment for women worldwide[29]. For the most part, advocates of global feminism[30] build their proposal on a normative (read homogenizing), liberal, essentialist vision that claims to save all women from the inherently patriarchal local structure, including its cultural, traditional, and national makeup, most likely rendered oppressive and exploitative[31].

Response to the latter universalistic view has ranged from idealized support to complete disagreement. On the one hand, universalists' enthusiasm[32] draws on essentialist inclinations by some Anglo-American feminists for the most part. On the other hand, women in non-western settings render global feminism as a hindrance in disguise, due to its isolation of gender from other contextual concerns such as colonialism, national identity, race, class, *and religion*, and for assuming a homogeneity among women based *only* on male domination, *overlooking the possibility that some women are potential oppressors of other women*[33].

In her dismissal of a universalist feminism, Audre Lorde, for instance, argues that

> by and large within the women's movement today, white women focus upon their oppression as women and ignore differences of race, sexual preference, class, and age. There is a pretense to a homogeneity of experience covered by the word *sisterhood* that does not in fact exist[34].

Lorde, hence, engages in a process of pluralization into multiple and independent *feminisms* housed in her firm acknowledgement of differences among women based on multiple oppressions. Since its beginning in the 1960s as part of second wave feminism, this pluralizing effort, Friedman and Johnson-Odim note, started deeming necessary the abandonment of a "feminism in the singular" by refusing any formulations of a universal sisterhood of women joined together against worldwide patriarchy in the name of WOMAN[35]".

In between the two latter views lies a yet cautionary[36] and critical view by some feminist writers[37], who, despite welcoming the internationalization of feminism, share a concern that this project may be nothing but "a circumscribed site of privilege from which free-floating intellectuals reproduce their elitism through assertions of universality.[38]" Sinha, Guy, and Woollacott believe that

> the real challenge for feminisms and internationalism today lies in a historic critique both of a *false* universalism that would subsume the diversity of feminisms within an elite or 'provincial' understanding of feminism, and of a relativism that would abandon any universalist claim for feminism in obeisance to

> reified and absolute conceptions of difference. Such a project requires both the uncovering of alternative feminist histories that challenge the selective memory of a parochial and univocal history *and* the recognition of the necessary imbrication of such alternative histories in a worldwide social formation fashioned by imperialism and colonialism[39].

In other words, the authors are equally critical of a relativist ideology that is fixated on resisting a universalized feminism, as they are suspicious of certain universalistic proposals which they believe to be situated in prejudiced and elitist discursive locations (white, Western, middle class, etc.) often resorting to selective memories to interpret Other histories.

Of immediate relevance to the latter view is the question of the one-sided Western representations of women in the South. The following section maps out several feminist discourses on such modes of representation[40].

**Representation or Re-*Presentation*? The Orientalist Othering of "Third-World" Women**

> *No one should speak for or assume another's voice. It becomes a form of colonization*[41].
>
> *Knowledge is not discovered, but socially produced, and...it is therefore never neutral, reflecting instead ambient power relations...Like gender, the categories of "East" and "West" too are social constructs. ..they are therefore subject to political praxis and hence can be changed or indeed abolished*[42].
>
> *In the context of a first/third world balance of power, feminist analyses which perpetuate and sustain the hegemony of the idea of the superiority of the West produce a corresponding set of universal images of the "third world woman," images like the veiled woman, the powerful mother, the chaste virgin, the obedient wife, etc. These images exist in universal, ahistoric splendor, setting in motion a colonialist discourse which exercises a very specific power in defining, coding, and maintaining existing first/third world connections*[43].

Since, as Shick notes, representation is central to the social production of reality[44], it is imperative to draw on prevalent ascriptions of non-western women produced by some Western feminist accounts. Although a top concern of feminists has been the invisible feminine voice in the oppressing masculine discourse, my interest is to investigate a different kind of oppressive Othering: that is, "Western"

or "Orientalist" representations by many American and European female feminists of non-western women, a concern that has attracted subaltern and postcolonial feminist thought[45].

Spivak asserts that representation comprises two components: (1) representation (*vertreten*) as restating or portraiture, and (2) re-presentation (*darstelleng*) as in effect being in the Other's shoes. She demonstrates a concern for the process whereby postcolonial studies sarcastically re-inscribe, rephrase, and co-opt Other's words. In her eminent *Can the Subaltern Speak,* Spivak maintains that postcolonial studies must endorse that postcolonial scholars intellectuals learn that "their privilege is their loss;" and that the subaltern must be given space to speak for themselves[46].

Yet, the question of exclusivity and representation has only recently been in the forefront of many feminists' thought and praxis[47]. In effect, the issue of "Othering" has recently stimulated multiple scholars and activists who question Western feminist representations, and whether they have been sensitive with regard to cross-cultural variations, and local specificities.

Schick notes that despite its inherent critical outlook,

> Feminism suffers from some limitations imposed by its own lineage; born as a Eurocentric post-Enlightment intellectual current, it occasionally succumbs to a certain mode of historicism and linear thinking that strongly affects its perspectives on non-western societies and on non-western women in particular[48].

In this regard, Celia and Kitzinger ask whether and how they should represent members of groups to which they do not belong, above all, those who are oppressed in ways they are not. Otherness, they argue, has multiple dimensions that are often marked by stratification structures including race and ethnicity, age, class, sexual identity, motherhood status, disability, *and religion*[49].

Wilkinson and Kitzinger[50] are vigilant of the recent discussion of the oppression of women of color and of non-western people in terms of speaking *of* and *for* the "Other." The authors draw on the powerful challenge posed by black feminist critique of Western feminism's universalism and imperialism.

> Acknowledgement of the diversity of ways in which women experience oppression (and oppress each other) has led to the awareness...of the non-homogeneity of the category 'women,' emphasizing differences *between* women based upon 'race,' and class, religion, culture and language, history and historical development. Representations of 'women' which imply a homogeneous category of Otherness render invisible the different experiences of women of varied ethnic, sexual and class locations[51].

In this respect, revisiting Said's *Orientalism* seems to the point. Said[52] calls into question the underlying assumptions that shape the groundwork of Western 'Orientalist' thinking. In his classic *Orientalism*, he holds that a denunciation of Orientalism entails a rejection of cultural constructions, biological generalizations, and religious and racial prejudices[53].

The "West," he affirms, must employ "narrative" rather than "vision" in interpreting the geographical landscape known as the Orient. In sum, Said invites Western scholars to refrain from depicting a view of half of the globe, and, instead, to carefully examine a complex and particular type of history that allows the imagination of a variety of human experiences[54].

Schick maintains that there is a great deal of commonality between feminism and the critique of Orientalist discourse; that western feminists must rethink their representations of "Third-world" women.

> Feminist approaches often betray a view of non-Western women as out of time with the West, and therefore a vehicle for misplaced Western nostalgia. Although a common past may be claimed by feminists, Third World women are often represented as mired in it, ever arriving at modernity when Western feminists are already adrift in postmodernism... The result is that the Othering process, characteristic of colonial discourse, resurfaces in western feminism... *Feminist representations* must be articulated as situated opinions and not as universal truths spoken from the vantage point of a more "advanced" society[55].

Schick concludes that since text, in the broadest sense of the term, plays a significant role in the Orientalist construction of the "East," it is only through text that this cultural artifact must be deconstructed. Hence, Orientalist discourse must be subjected to critique and reevaluation.

According to Hicks, Many Arab-American feminist's distressing experiences of being torn between two mutually "despising heritages" enhances their vision of global feminism, these women set forth the notion of examining who is trying to speak for whom.

"At the 1980 Copenhagen Women's Conference, the issue of clitoridectomy was extremely contentious partly because a group of western women attempted both to define the problem and impose their own plan of action on the women directly affected by this practice." This interventionist practice, Hicks argues, confirms that Western women did not know the details of the locations of the practice they were discussing[56].

In her account on Arab American "invisibility," Naber points at what appears to be a neocolonialist systematic process which Western scholars— and the Western media—draw on in their random or irrational representations of Arabs,

Middle Easterners, and Moslems. She attributes these accounts to neocolonialism, because

> neocolonialism employs contemporary ideological *that is media portrayals/popular narratives* ... to ignore, displace, unravel, justify, uphold, and explain racism, genocide, sexism, gender inequality, nationalism, colonialism, and imperialism....I add gender to my analysis by arguing that imaginary portrayals of gender relations among both the dominated and the dominant group are used to further justify lived colonialist, imperialist, racist, and patriarchal practices[57].

Naber also asserts that according to these flawed representations, Arab women are portrayed as victims of Islam, Arab culture, or the abusive male partner. Eventually, she adds, repeated images of extremely oppressed Arab-Middle Eastern-Moslem women justify Western intervention in Middle East affairs on the ground that Arab-Moslem societies need to be rescued from cruelty and backwardness by Westernization/civilization, especially that —according to liberal humanist discussions—religion seems to be an "anti- modern" system of knowledge[58].

That said, it is of great importance to acknowledge the damaging effect caused by flawed representations of non-western women depicted by some western feminists; for without amending them, there would be little –if any- hopes to take global feminism_ seriously.

The next section gives a picture of prevalent views in the bounds of the current debate between universalist and particularistic feminist visions[59].

**1. A Feminism in the Singular: The "Liberal" Universalist View**

> *What I do mean by feminism in the singular. is a locational feminism that is simultaneously situated in a specific locale, global in scope, and constantly in motion through space and time. A locational feminism is one that acknowledges the historically and geographically specific forms in which feminism emerges, takes root, changes, travels, translates, and transplants in different spatio-temporal contexts.*[60].

According to Serad, some scholars have argued that both Orientalism and Occidentalism should be replaced by a universalism, which packs the best of all cultures instead of emphasizing the tensions between them, since a"ll human beings are essentially alike.[61]"

Friedman's quote above exemplifies her inclination toward a universalist feminism that incorporates disparate feminisms, which she believes share a concern for gender equity. Therefore, according to this view, different women's

activisms/feminisms ought to be placed under the categorical umbrella of a single feminism, which yet requires a close attention to feminism's locational particularity, or what Gayatri C. Spivak calls "idiomic specificity," stressing the importance of paying close attention to the local idiom of feminist formations, and reflecting how specific languages are tied to specific spaces[62]. Friedman asserts that locational feminisms were created in differing times/spaces, and have traveled from one culture to another. Hence, indigenous and "traveling" feminisms have historically been under the influence of each other, which has resulted in a hybrid and global feminism[63].

In their vision of international feminism, Sinha, Guy, and Woollacott express a "desire to think together" in light of the wide range of different feminisms and women's movements that have emerged in historically specific sociopolitical contexts, albeit seconding the universalist ideals or "utopian goads" that have been claimed historically in the name of feminism. In their investigation of the local and global contexts of women's movements/feminisms worldwide, the authors identify mishaps of former claims for 'universal sisterhood' and 'global feminism,' namely the act of overlooking divisions among women along class, race, sexuality, ethnicity, *and religion*[64]. Yet, their outlook disagrees with feminisms based on cultural or national 'closures,' noting that this inclination may contribute to women's isolation and exclusion.

> What is becoming clear is that *the term* 'women' needs to be disarticulated from its function as the designated embodiment of culture and that cultures themselves need to be recognized not as fixed products but in terms of historical processes. The retreat into national or cultural feminisms...forecloses the analysis of the co-implication of these multiple feminisms in a shared history of the combined...evolution of a system whose economic, political, and ideological reach has in fact been worldwide for several cultures[65].

Although this good-intentioned view makes clear the threat of fixated cultural 'closures,' the authors may have benefited from specifying which "system" is at issue here or which cultures, and at which historical moment.

A view with a yet more intensified universalist orientations is expressed by Martha Nussbaum, who strongly believes in liberal universalism as an indispensable basis for a global feminism. Combining feminist and liberal traditions, she applies a "capabilities approach[66]" that focuses on a normative scheme of individual's human functional capabilities.

She applies this approach to questions of international policy-making, arguing that her list of capabilities exists at a high enough level of generality that can be applied across differences in class, culture, nation, sex, and religion; that with

proper education and cultivation of people in "other" cultures, individuals will recognize the common dignity and claims of humanity; and that "... for any discussion of women's rights and capabilities, universal standards of judging quality of **good life** are indispensable." Ultimately, according to Nussbaum, individuals and nations will work to "protect and promote human dignity through the international human rights movement and through support of international organizations.[67]"

Nussbaum insists that moral principles must be universalized in order to challenge local traditions – especially religion—that deny women basic rights or opportunities. In her view, "any universalism that has a chance to be persuasive in the **modern** world must...be a form of political liberalism.[68]." She strongly [69] defends her normative approach for women's development by demonstrating a romanticization of universalized cultural norms of justice, equality, and rights...

> Feminist philosophy has frequently been skeptical of universal normative approaches. I shall argue that it is possible to describe a framework for such a feminist practice of philosophy that is strongly universalist, committed to cross-cultural norms of justice, equality, and rights, and at the same time sensitive to local particularity and... the circumstances *that* shape...options,...beliefs,...and preferences.

However, she does not specify who or what entity is to define these universal rights (or wrongs); who gets to judge and determine the quality of "good life?" Is it, for instance, the UN, the IMF, international development organizationsor the peoples entitled to these rights? Have they an equal opportunity to take part in designing those "norms?"

Nussbaum's philosophy is built on the fact that women almost everywhere are universally oppressed, which validates *a* universalist feminism, albeit stressing the importance of cultural sensitivity and non-imperialistic approaches. Yet, she fails to describe the magic formula to attain this goal. In her version of international feminism, she criticizes impulsive involvements in making standard recommendations "that cross boundaries of culture, nation, religion, race, and class,[70]" and also believes in the legitimacy of concerns for diversity, pluralism, and personal freedom, which in her view do not seem incompatible with the universalization of norms as a set of capabilities that "protect...spheres of human freedom."

In agreement with Nussbaum, Allison Jaggar encourages the feminist "global discourse community" apparent in UN conferences on women and the growing number of NGOs devoted to women's questions. She argues that cross-cultural moral discourse might be challenging but is important, and that "global feminism means that feminism in each culture must re-examine *our* own commitments in light of the perspectives produced by feminists in others.[71]" However, Trevenen

sees Nussbaum's critiqu as on-sided and

> ... troubling...Nussbaum seems to caricature her opponents, and by extension, their concerns with local cultures and traditions...While Nussbam's liberal cosmopolitanism raises important questions for feminists, it needs to be challenged and augmented with increased attention to the history of colonial intervention (feminist and otherwise), and an actively cultivated ethos of openness to positions excluded or marginalized by any particular universalized identity or culture[72].

Eventually, Nussbaum's capabilities approach seems housed in a protective, development lexicon[73]. In addition, her liberal cosmopolitanism appears to be too rigid and overconfident to address "other" active perspectives contrasting her universalistic vision.

## 2. The "Loving Perception:" A feminism with cultural understanding

> *Don't claim to 'speak for' or, worse, to 'speak on', barely speaking next to, and if possible very close to: these are the first of the solidarities to be taken*[74].

Serad argues that the celebratory universalist approach represents a "sympathetic and honorable" world view, which has roots in the American and French revolutions, more recently expressed in the Declaration of Human Rights. However, the counter argument is that an anthropologist is still compelled to ask the question, "who is to decide what is best, whose definition of universal human values should prevail[75]?" Hall in this respect renders problematic the 'Western' "formations of modernity," a global process pioneered by an "externalist" worldview that is shortsighted to the accounts of the 'rest' of the world, a form of knowledge that entails the employment of processes that are not relevant or workable in certain societies, *much less in individual women's existential lives*[76].

Moreover, in response to the aforementioned views by Nussbaum, Uma Narayan writes about the importance of appreciating cultural difference and defying cultural essentialism. However, Naryan contends, instead of taking a relativist position, feminists must consider historical and political processes that shape and constantly define a given culture[77].

Other authors[78] offer a different perspective on how (post)colonial global feminism should advance. Schutte disagrees with Nussbaum's claim that

> ...concerning neglect of historical and cultural differences, we can begin by insisting that *the* normative conception of human capability is designed to make room for a reasonable

pluralism in specification.

Schutte believes it is the determination of what gets to be defined as _easonable _ that problematizes interactions between cultures and individuals

> Nussbaum's call for "good public reasoning" and "reasonable pluralism" ignores the perspectives and identities that are pre-emptively excluded from liberal public rationality[79].

Ferguson also acknowledges the potential "epistemological violence" and exclusions created when perceptions of "justice" and "good" life are formulated. Seconding Schutte, she encourages Western Feminist to become self- interrogatory, especially when proceeding in ethico- political projects she calls "building bridge identities." For her, the key to an international feminism is an appreciation of different and multiple knowledges and ethical practices.

Treneven also finds two problems with the ethical framework Nussbaum's adopts in her model of liberal universalism. Problematizing Nussbaum's "overconfident faith" in her particular model, Treneven remarks that the first problem is found in Nussbaum's characterization of "cultures and traditions" as always being negative forces in women's lives.

> By failing to give any examples of local, cultural, or traditional practices that enable and empower women's capabilities or quality of life, Nussbaum seems to pre-emptively discount the cultural realm of life, even if she doesn't actually think that all non-universalizable elements of life are automatically wrong (which of course, she doesn't).[80]

Unfortunately, despite the consumed rhetoric among social scientists boasting about empirical verifications and scientific objectifications, many contributions by Western feminist anthropologists have fallen into the pitfall of making 'Orientalist' or essentialist assumptions about Arab and Moslem women, to which other feminist scholars reacted stressing particularity and difference among women as a basic process of social life.

Inspired by those scholars' critique of speaking 'for' and 'about' _thers,_ and by their problematization of western feminist manufactured images *of* Moslem women rather than images *by* those women, the following section presents several western feminist texts dealing with Moslem women that contrast the Orientalist model.

In her critical review of Nussbaum's version of "feminist internationalism" and the "capabilities approach," Charlesworth[81] revisits the Nussbaum's view on the two key challenges facing feminist internalization in the context of international law. The first hindrance, she argues, is state "hostility" to a universalized feminism. In this regard, she critiques the political nature of cultural and religious claims defying United Nations and other international recommendations for the develop-

ment of women. The second challenge to feminist internationalization in her view stems from the international antipathy—as manifest in UN Conferences on women— toward differences among women cross-culturally. In this regard, she describes addressing a unified agenda including common global issues for 'women' as a complex and risky practice' for

> ...the search for universal women's predicaments can obscure differences among women and homogenize women's experiences....Emphasis on universal issues can...sideline the situation of women who suffer from multiple forms of discrimination.

**Charlesworth's alternative remedy lies in the notion of "commitments developed through dialogue," or a "loving perception" of other women, which involves...**

> first, the need to be explicit about our own historical and cultural context; second, an attempt to understand how other women might see us; and third, a recognition of the complexities of the contexts of other women, in other words, to try to see them through their own eyes[82].

Nevertheless, although this approach, as well as that of Nussbaum, involve humanistic intentions and moral implications, the empathetic and detailed attention to difference and the intimate "dialogue" aspects remain rarely seen in their accounts. Conversely, Nelson and Olsen's reading of the Islamic moral structure and its implications on gender relations appears to be more attentive to local realities, more eloquent in terms of 'idiomic specificity.' The authors' account fits, in my view, as an ideal manifestation of the "loving perception," perhaps without pretending to do so.

The authors argue that despite the fact that women in almost all cultures are and view themselves as more deprived and more disadvantaged than men, western feminist writing has not been attentive to multiple types of inequalities. Inequality, they believe, has become reified in Western —and particularly American— feminist thought as a symmetrical given worldwide. This view, the authors assert, challenges other principles that consider human beings as intrinsically dignified, worthy, incomparable, and ultimate beings.

> In the name of equality feminists have sought sameness of role or elimination of differentiating qualities of being, demanding the same rights, privileges, opportunities as men. The varying [Western feminist] conceptions of equality have this in common: all are based on comparison and measurement of some kind, thus raising the intriguing possibility that equality, the

> child of enlightenment, has become the adoptive kin of positivism, at least in the West and in particular, the United States.

According to the latter viewpoint, the Euro-American feminist model implies a notion of identicality, failing to identify differences and hierarchy among Other women. Since, in Nelson and Olsen's view, differentiation is the core of social life, selfhood, and moral realities, Western feminist writing must not "veil Islamic social reality" within their own western ideological glossaries and conceptual frames. Within this realm, the authors attempt to empathetically and sincerely speak from *within,* through a sensitive *understanding* of the moral bases of Islamic ideology and regulations undertaken by Moslem women. The strong commitment by Western feminists to the notion of equality, Nelson and Olsen asserts, has lead to their failure to empathize with or understand Islamic principles of man-woman relations, just as much as Moslem feminists in the past failed to identify with contemporary women's liberation movements, due to the latter's belief in *complementarity,* not equality[83]. In their attempt to understand the moral foundations of Islam, Nelson and Olsen emphasize the meaninglessness of the notion of equality in Islam, stressing instead synchronized role-playing, difference, and complementarity of man and woman [for that matter woman and women], which does not imply an ideology of oppression. On the contrary, they say, it is the *identicality* implied by feminist equality campaigners that fails to notice inherent differences and uniqueness of persons. Islam's test of person's equality is based on inner and spiritual worth, *on taqwa (roughly, integrity and God-fearing)* not on the external social position of persons[84].

> Islam ... provides a conceptual view of society in which *equality exists in the religious* sense within all men and women as each stands equally before God as his vice regent. Inequality exists but is based on the degree of one's Muslemness of a person is realizing his or her real nature then he or she is experiencing freedom not oppression. The ruling idea with regard to relations between the sexes is that the husband and wife complete each other through marriage[85].

In the mean time, Ahmed recognizes the power imbalance of scholarly discourse in the West on Islam and the legacy of colonialism that binds them. She describes her being a Muslim woman as a range of practices and possibilities determined by her historical, cultural, and class position. As Hick explains, Islamic society in Ahmed's view is not configured as an unchanging, irrational, uncivilized foil to European *civilité*, but as a contested arena where a group consolidates its influence and begins to assert hegemony over power and practices[86]."

This is not to deny that the discourse on gender in several interpretations of Islamic scriptures— as in other ideologies— are monolithic and serve the purpose

of those in power. Mernissi writes that Muslim women are denied human rights "neither because of the Koran nor the Prophet, nor the Islamic tradition, but simply because those rights conflict with the interests of a male elite".

Hick also confirms,

> These are the types of discourse which are habitually deployed by a hegemonic group or region to justify their invasion and subversion of another group. These are the discourses that Leila Ahmed, in Women and Gender in Islam (1992), skillfully critiques in order to both found the basis of a global feminism responsive to colonial, racial, cultural, and class issues in order to engender a greater understanding of Islam as a historical, political, and lived reality for women in the Middle East[87].

Nelson and Olsen best manifest contextual undrstanding of Moslem women by attending carefully to their accounts as they communicate to them —as does empirical evidence—the reality of these womn's segregated social spheres (public/private), which many western feminists usually portray as locations of oppression. These 'strictly female' spaces signify in fact sources of authority, independence, freedom, and solidarity for women, the authors assert.

I recall in this regard a remark that was once expressed to me by a group of 'liberal' Egyptian female friends telling about their fantasy of attaining _trictly female_ spaces, such as banks, swimming pools, or public spaces, akin to women's experience in some Moslem countries. The idea here is freedom from apprehension caused by an excessively feminized image preservation known to be favored by many men, or in other instances the liberation from a space that operates in terms of patriarchal male directives or oppressions. Similarly, many of my female acquaintances and friends who have worked as teachers for a long time prefer their jobs because they spare them the "hassle of dealing with men," despite the limited career potential their job holds. These women are not veiled, fundamentalist, or conservative. On the contrary, all of them- to my knowledge—hold strong feminist convictions, even without consciously detecting these tendencies. Many of these women justify the preference of a segregated space by their wish to "become oneself."

As previously noted, Nelson and Olsen assert that the liberal feminist conceptualization of equality implies identicality and a disregard of difference and complementarity.

> The principle of complementarity is in direst contrast to the principles of total equality between the sexes as the fundamental moral and structural principle underlying human society. However, it is not necessarily in contradiction to the principle of egalitarianism[88]

Their analysis proposes a model of cooperation—not jealousy—between man and woman, yet within the context of differentiation_

> an area where Marxist/socialist feminists and Islamic philosophy seems to converge, might well link subjective and objective factors, individual and economic structures, male and female [and may I add West and East] in a humanizing society.

Conversely, the paramount aim of Anglo-American feminist theorizing— that is, male/female equality— seems of little or no significance in terms of the biographies, existential needs, and personal ambitions of Moslem, Arab, or "third-world" women—ex. Clean water; affordable health care; decent education [marriage, and employment] for their children [or themselves]. Johnson-Odim in this regard explains why many "third-world" women hesitate to call themselves feminists. It is (a) because their lived experiences are erroneously represented—or underrepresented; and (b) because they are not only dominated by a gang of ["evil" men], but also by a global and racialized class order. Hence, man is neither the sole enemy and opponent of their freedom from want or poverty, nor is man the only denier of "the" non-western woman's freedom to have control over her life[89].

However, one cannot claim that the present reality of feminism is irreversibly gloomy. Ahmed, for instance, remains optimistic that feminism can maintain a vigilance and "passionate commitment to the realization of societies that enable women to pursue without impediment the full development of their capacities and to contribute to their societies in all domains.[90]"

**Conclusion: Deconstructing the Boundaries**

> *It is highly problematic to talk about globalization without gendering it and its accompanying processes. It is not to simplistically suggest that women as a category are uniformly positioned in relationship to globalization...The differences even within women... not only demonstrate the centrality of the experiential standpoint but underscore the significance of the local and the particular context of those experiences[91].*

> *Anthropologists, like any other students of otherness, have always approached the other from their own cultural home base. This fact was earlier the source of ethnocentrism in various guises. Nowadays, when anthropology has realized that reflexivity lies at the heart of our enterprise, it may very well be our strength. We can now afford to admit that we, like all others, are different, and we can envisage difference without im-*

*plying hegemony or domination*[92].

The present paper was an attempt to engage in a current debate concerning the universalization of a single, all-inclusive, global feminism. Emerging universalist proposals by feminist academics of the industrialized world stem from an assumption that the world— and women's activisms for that matter— is swiftly moving toward *uniformity*[93]. The author argues that such essentialization of a "global sisterhood" on the basis of comparable oppressions should be problematized, or at best rescheduled as a secondary step. The first step must be a self-critical approach by these universalist groups who are actually privileged in terms of class, race, and location.

The thesis the author has attempted to defend — as a non-western scholar, a woman, and a human being—reflects a concern for Other women and their just representation, which stands for a rejection of elitist 'Orientalist' thinking. In this respect what has been accentuated is not the binary opposites "them and us," "the West and the rest[94],' but rather an evaluation of such differences in a more humanistic and empathetic fashion, devoid of loaded imagery and reductionism. The "Orient," or the so-called "Third-world" Other, cannot be interpreted according to western glossaries and systems of ruling, much less following Eurocentric ideological packages. Rather, feminist writers (and cultural readers) are urged to contextually and systemically understand the feminine Other. The latter must not be spoken *of* and spoken *for* in terms of Western "idiomic specificities." Contrarily, advocacy from afar and second-hand representations must be replaced by attentiveness to local narrative, affects, and self-representations on the part of non-western women[95].

Instead of hastily inviting *all* women into *a* "global feminist" imagined community—a yet questionable notion even among Western feminists in terms of concept and praxis—I have attempted to present a "native" reaction to the Western theoretical context that continues to reproduce prevalent impersonal depictions by Anglo-American feminist of non-western women. These discourses must be seen as hindrances to Other women's actual autonomy and liberation, and for a borderless feminism.

According to Johnson-Odim, the evident global economic order that "privileges places like the United States," needs to demonstrate its readiness to accept that the oppression of non-western women is not exclusively attributed to internal male domination of patriarchy[96], and should not be solved through the male/female equality and the sexual liberation toolkits. Anglo-American feminists are invited to acknowledge the potential role that their privilege plays in the [epistemological oppression] of women elsewhere in the world[97]. They are required to ask, "who remains exploited in the process of other women being liberated[98]?

My conviction is that all these discursive pitfalls must first be deconstructed before proposing a "global feminism," a feminist "international citizenship.

In my view, the moment in which *all* feminist locations are justly grasped—embracing and respecting all their domestic subjectivities—would, in my view, be

the right time to seriously consider a 'feminism in the singular.' Borders separating different women's struggles cannot be dissolved unless "Other" ideological frames are valorized, not targeted to record over. In a word, the principal rehearsal for internationalizing feminism entails that Euro-American feminist writers become more self-critical and appreciative of difference, for, as Majaj asserts, "It is through a willing encounter with difference that we come to a fuller realization of ourselves.[99]"

**Endnotes:**

1 Caulfield, 1977: 7.
2 Shaheed, 1999: 61.
3 In this paper, the author employs alternative terms to be used interchangeably with the term "global feminism," such as "international," "transnational," "cosmopolitan," and "universal" feminism or "sisterhood." In part this is because the connotations of these differently spelled words are virtually analogous, and also because the use of each word follows the choice of certain cited authors. It is noteworthy, however, that the notion of "transnational feminism"— as opposed to "global feminism"—in some feminist accounts indicates a relatively higher valorization of the material and cultural specificities of feminist formations (See Friedman, 2001: 30).
4 Cited in DeKoven, 1997:15 [Emphasis added].
5 See Meyer and Geschiere, 1998.
6 The author admits that the conceptualization of such a space is immensely problematic. Terms such as "Islamic countries," "Moslem/ Arab women," "the Arab world," and/or the "Third World" used in this paper need to be problematized mainly because they refer to a diversity of locations and groups, and tend to stress the binaries "us" and "them." For instance, the term Islam itself should not be reduced to a single, standard blueprint. Similarly, the word "Arab women," even within the same temporal and special context can have different meanings. However, I find these terminologies useful; that is, until more accurate phraseology is developed.
7 See *Patriotism and its Futures.* In Appadurai, 1996: 158-177.
8 Stark, 2000:3.
9 Stark, 2000:3. The term capital here includes material and non-material capital (Ex. linguistic, cultural, educational, …etc.)
10 Geshiere and Meyer, 1998: 602
11 Geshiere and Meyer, 1998: 602 [Emphasis added].
12 See Spivak, 1988.
13 Geshiere and Meyer, 1998: 601 [Emphasis added].
14 See Appadurai, 1996.
15 See Geshiere and Meyer, 1998.

16 Trevenen, 2001:1.
17 The term "glocal" was originally borrowed from Japanese business, where the concept of products manufactured in accordance with local spaces can be marketed globally. It connotes how the local and the global are complicit and interdependent (Friedman, 2001:30).
18 Sinha, Guy, and Woollacott, 1998:345.
19 Thayer, 2000:229.
20 Friedman, 2001:25.
21 Johnson-Odim, 2001:110-112.
22 Johnson-Odim, 2001: 112-113.
23 Johnson-Odim, 2001: 115.
24 Johnson-Odim, 2001:115, citing Gerda Lerner [Emphasis mine]. It is important to note in this regard that resorting to Black feminist theorizing is appropriate to explain and understand "third world" women, and for that matter Arab/Moslem women and their multiple oppressions. The comparability seems logical because the two groups of women have in common certain contexts of oppression/ discrimination based on race, (post)colonial experience, class, or all the three.
25 Johnson-Odim, 2001: 117, citing *Cultural feminism Versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist Theory*, by Linda Alcoff.
26 Johnson-Odim, 2001:117.
27Including lesbian or queer theory, socialist feminism, classical liberal feminism, cultural or relational feminism, standpoint theory, and others (Johnson-Odim, 2001:118).
28 It is noteworthy that theorizing difference was catalyzed by other rising paradigms, including postmodernism, postcolonialism, poststructuralism, and eventually the increasing discourse on multiculturalism and pluralism.
29 Trevenen, 2001:2.
30 Including Nussbaum (1999; and 2000, for instance); Sinha, et. Al, 1998; Friedman, 2001; and others.
31 See Trevenen, 2001:6.
32 As can best be exemplified by Martha Nussbaum's vision presented in a later section of this essay.
33 Friedman, 2001: 25 [Emphasis added].
34 Lorde, Audre. Cited in Friedman, 2001:14.
35 Friedman, 2001:14; and Johnson-Odim, 2001:110-111...
36 For "anti-universalist" views, see, for instance, Spivak, 1988; Said, 1979, Nelson and Olsen, 1973 among others. Also, see Smith and Guarnizo, 1998.
37 Or may I say _ranslational_ project of women's experiences using Western dictionaries.
38 Smith and Guarnizo, 1998: 291-294.
39 Sinha, Guy, and Woollacott, 1998:346.

40 The two notions of representation and "Othering" are of significant relevance to the subject matter of this paper; for the main argument is that global feminism cannot be taken seriously or deemed viable unless an equitable, balanced, and compassionate mode of representation is employed by Anglo-American liberal feminists toward their non-Western counterparts.
41 Sinister Wisdom Collective. Cited in Wilkinson and Kitzinger, 1996: 1.
42 Shick, 1990: 3.
43 Shick, 1990: 14.
44 Shick, 1990: 15.
45 See, for example, Schick, 1980, and Spivak,
46 See, Spivak, 1988, for example.
47 Afshar, 1993: xi.
48 Schick, 1990:2.
49 Wilkinson and Kitzinger, 1996:1 [Emphasis added].
50 Wilkinson and Kitzinger, 1996: 5.
51 Wilkinson and Kitzinger, 1996: 5. Also in this context, see Clark, 1989.
52 See Said, 1979 and n.d; and Wilkinson and Kitzinger, 1996: 5.
53 Serad, 1996.
54 Serad, 1996.
55 Schick, 1990:8. The quote is by Aihwa Ong.
56 Hicks, N.d.
57 Naber, 2000:44.
58 Naber, 44-45, 52.
59 It is noteworthy that the latter stance is not in any way an entire rejection of global feminism._
60 Friedman, 2001: 15.
61 Serad, 1996.
62 Friedman, 2001:15.
63 Friedman, 2001: 16.
64 Sinha, Guy, and Woollacott, 1998: 345 [Emphasis added].
65 Sinha, Guy, and Woollacott, 1998: 346 [Emphasis added].
66 Beginning with the questions, "what activities characteristically performed by human beings are so central that they seem definitive of a life that is truly human," Nussbaum ( 2000: 78-80) lists ten central human functional capabilities, including, life, bodily health, bodily integrity, senses and imagination, emotions, practical reason, affiliation, capabilities of other species, and control over one's environment. Women in most parts of the world, she believes, are deprived of exercising in full capacity these capabilities. (Also, see critiques/ citations of Nussbaum's capabilities approach in Trevenen, 2001).
67 Nussbaum, 1999:6. Cited in Trevenen, 2001:3. [Emphasis added].
68 Nussbaum, 1999:9. Cited in Trevenen, 2001:2 [Emphasis added].

69 Nussbaum, 2000: 7.
70 Nussbaum, 2000: 1-7, 31-33, 34-5, 106-110.
71 Cited in Trevenen, 2001:4-5.
72 Treveren, 2000:9-10.
73 Nussbaum (2000: 106-110), for example, explains how lucky an unprivileged women from the developing world can be lo live a few minutes from an international NGO that is capable and willing to fulfill promises of development and liberation ignored by native governments.
74 Quote by Asia Djebar. Cited in Nelson and Rouse, 2000: 148.
75 Serad, 1996.
76 Hall, 1992: 318 [Emphasis added].
77 Cited in Trevenen, 2001:4.
78 See, for instance, essays by Ofelia Schutte, Ann Ferguson, and Drucilla K. Barker in *Decentering the Center* (Cited in Narayan, 2000).
79 This critique by Schutte was originally articulated Naryan, 2000 (Cited from Trevenen, 2000: 5.
80 Trevenen, 2000:6-7.
81 Charlesworth, 2000: 75.
82 Charlesworth, 2000: 75.
83 Nelson and Olsen, 1977: 27-8.
84 Nelson and Olsen, 1977: 29 [Emphasis added].
85 Nelson and Olsen, 1977: 29.
86 Ahmed, 1992. Cited in Hicks, N.d.
87 Hicks, N.d.
88 Nelson and Olsen, 1977:32.
89 Johnson-Odim, 2001: 115-117.
90 Ahmed, 1992: 248. Cited in Hicks, N.d.
91 Nelson and Rouse, 2000: 146.
92 Trankell, 1995.
93 Geshiere and Meyer, 1998: 601 [Emphasis added].
94 See Hall, 1992.
95 See Serad, 1996 [Emphasis added].
96 Or theological structures for that matter.
97 Johnson-Odim, 2001: 116. [Emphasis added].
98 Johnson-Odim quoting Gloria Joseph, 2001: 116.
99 Majaj, Lisa Soheir, 1994: 83.

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# Desire across Boundaries: Marriage and Sexuality in a Transnational and Global Context

**Mustafa Abdel Rahman Abdalla**

**Introduction:**

In recent years, globalization has affected many aspects of our life. It has influenced us socially, culturally, geographically and economically. The shift to global economy, adopted by many states around the globe, has its direct impact on the lives of many people all over the world. In general, globalization has increased the mobility of many people and as a result larger groups of people have the opportunity to travel as tourists and interact with other cultures, which ultimately shapes their perceptions of the other, the locality and in many times their own selves.

Moreover, global pressures and the formation of a global market have forced many countries, especially in the developing world to restructure and adjust their economies. These changes were often a result of an internal economic crisis but in many cases the adjustments took place to meet external demands from international bodies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Consequently, there has been a lack of appropriate advances in sustainable economic development, especially in providing job opportunities for young people. The states' failure of creating the framework for economic prosperity has led to the development of negative stances and feelings of alienation amongst large groups of the population in different countries.

The social as well as economic developments adopted by many states have mostly affected people at the grass-root level who have resorted to different 'survival strategies' in order to cope with the economic hardship as well as the social problems in their societies. Bayat (2000) argues that millions of people in the Southern Hemisphere of the globe who used to rely entirely on state services have now to depend on their own efforts to survive. He adds that it is largely agreed upon the fact that "the economics of globalization, comprised of a global market 'discipline', flexible accumulation and 'financial deepening' has had a profound impact on the post-colonial societies" (Hoogvelt, 1997 as cited in Bayat, 2000: 534).

Consequently, many informal and at times illegal forms of generating incomes have appeared on a large scale, such as street vendors, prostitution, begging and robbery. Recently technological advances have helped in creating new job patterns such as offering cell phone services for a little amount of money in the streets, which can be observed in many cities in Egypt. These behaviors show forms of adaptation to the economic difficulties and current changes.

However, other groups of the population have developed passive positions toward their governments and have created forms of resistance as manifesting themselves in the emergence of new political and religious groups. This explains the appearance of fundamentalism and terrorist groups in many parts of the world. These active movements have been, by large, toppled by ruling governments, as for example the Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt during the 1990s.

The expansion of these groups is related to the extensive modern developments in capitalism, the cornerstone of globalization that has led to unequal production growth depending on region, class, gender and race, which is also coupled with job insecurities and income gaps (Keddie, 1998). Keddie further explains that economic hardship, economic stagnation and income insecurities have encouraged the appearance of right-wing movements in many parts of the world such as in the developed world, the Middle East, South Asia, Africa and Latin America. These movements have appeared since people search for a secure identity in the face of fast socio-economic and cultural changes represented in widening income gaps, changes in the family, women's status and sexual morals (1998).

**Tourism as a Solution:**

Due to the obvious boom in the tourist industry, this sector appears to be the solution for many people's economic dilemmas. Many young people all over the world seek jobs in the formal and informal tourist businesses in order to survive the increasing globalized economies.

My argument is that at a time when some segments of the population have resorted to informal means to make their daily living and to adapt to the rapid economic and social changes and others have developed negative stances toward their governments, another group has tried to make use of the job opportunities in the tourist industry, which seem to offer endless possibilities as MacCannell argues that "[A] pro-tourist position is held by many planners of marginal economies who look to tourism as a new way of making money" (1999:162). Furthermore, I argue that in the framework of tourism, some people use their sexuality as a survival strategy, at times on commercial basis such as male and female prostitution, but at other times based on other benefits that sexuality creates for the ones involved. The latter type is the concern of this paper, which is prevalent in many regions of the world between men who are mostly from underdeveloped regions and Western women as can be observed for example in Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, some South Asian countries as well as other African and some Latin American countries. This phenomenon of men using their sexuality as survival strategy has appeared since globalization has increased mobility and thus made tourism on a large scale possible, which allowed for people from different cultures to interact with each other. Over the last few years, tourism has increased immensely (Waters, 1995), and tourist industries have given the people a chance to construct preset ideas about

certain communities and localities.

This paper is based on ethnographic research in Dahab, one of the tourist destinations in Egypt. It investigates heterosexual casual relationships between Egyptian men and foreign female travelers. It focuses on Egyptian men's constructions of sexuality and health regarding their daily interactions with foreign women.

I argue that Egyptian men in Dahab initiate relationships with foreign female travelers and use their sexuality and *'urfi*[1] marriages as survival strategies in order to face the difficulties of the socio-economic hardship in Egypt as well as police control in Dahab. Through negotiations related to sexuality and reproductive health, foreign women play the active role in the relationship with their Egyptian partners who are socialized to be the dominant actors in a relationship. Finally, I argue that these relationships are part of Western colonial discourses of sexuality in modified modern and post-colonial forms.

**Contextualizing Dahab:**

Dahab is a small town situated on the Gulf of 'Aqaba , South Sinai. It is about 85 kilometers North of Sharm El Sheikh. In spite of its closeness to Sharm El-Sheikh with its well-structured, formal, high-class tourism, Dahab by large has not witnessed this type of tourism. It is still the destination of individual travelers and backpackers due to its cheap accommodations, which can be as little as five Egyptian pounds. Nevertheless, Dahab is not invulnerable to organized tourist groups and packages, which might reach it soon, as a number of hotel chains are planning to build branches and others have already done so.

During the Israeli occupation to South Sinai, many tourists have shown interest to experience the authentic, traditional Bedouin way of life. Upon their arrival to Dahab they asked, "Where is the Bedouin village? (Lavie, 1990:224)." These demands encouraged the Bedouins to build an artificial Bedouin village for the tourists, which consequently attracted mainly hippie type of tourists who came to enjoy the "exotic" Bedouin culture, eat their food, drink their tea and at times find a young lover. Lavie (1990) quotes one of the tourists who is originally from Amsterdam and was in Dahab with a head cover that looked like a veil, she answered the question: "Why the veil?" saying: "I heard it helps to attract a young Bedouin lover. When Israel was here, I bathed here nude, but what the guys seemed really interested in was my nose and mouth. So I'm covering them to make them more mysterious (Lavie, 1990: 228)."

During the Israeli occupation, Dahab became known worldwide for nudity, drugs and as a hippie hang out. Many guidebooks wrote about the practices that take place on its beaches. The lonely planet guidebook explains,

> "Dahab is the wannabe Koh Samui of the Middle East. Banana fritters and Bob Marley, stoned travellers in tie-dyes and shops with names like 'Laughing Buddha' offering tarot card read-

> ings – it's all here. Accommodation virtually on the beach can cost as little as E£5 per night and common is the backpacker who pitches up here for a night or two and ends up saying[2] on for weeks, if not months (Lonely Planet, 1999: 492)."

Due to the reputation of Dahab, it witnessed influxes of young Egyptian men who sought not only jobs in the tourist business but also relationships with foreign travellers. Furthermore, the phenomenon that started under the Israeli occupation when foreign women came to Dahab to establish relationships with the 'exotic" "oriental" men continued after the Sinai was reverted to Egypt.

Dahab is divided into three main parts; *Al-Madinah* [Dahab city] is where the post office, two police stations, the public hospital, the telephone office and the bus station are located. It also has some apartment buildings that accommodate the government employees working in the region. *Al- Mazbat* is the tourist center, and most of the Bedouins reside in *Assalah.* Young Egyptian men who migrate from different parts from Egypt to Dahab looking for better job prospects are concentrated in the *Mazbat* area and dominate the informal tourist businesses in Dahab. Moreover, Dahab has the reputation among Egyptians as well as foreigners for its availability of drugs and for its unusual sexual freedom and is sometimes called "Amsterdam of the Middle East.[3]"

The demographic profile of *Mazbat* consists of Egyptian men, some Bedouin men, foreign males and females. The presence of Egyptian females is very rare in *Al-Mazbat* since they mostly live in *Al-Madina.*

**Socio-Economic Conditions in Egypt:**

After the independence of Egypt in 1952 from the British occupation, the Egyptian government adopted a socialist system and granted education, housing, health care and employment to all citizens and thus the Egyptian citizens relied largely on the state regarding many aspects of their life. However, due to the economic decline experienced by Egypt during the 1970s the state resorted to the 'open door policy'. Hence the government had to adopt different strategies since it was incapable of providing the masses with the promised services. Consequently, the people had to take the responsibility to make a living, which previously had been granted by the state. As a result, people have resorted to different strategies to be able to survive the economic hardship. For some, the changes have resulted in a feeling of alienation and passive stands toward the state and its policies.

Many men in Dahab express their dissatisfaction with the state policies and relate their migration to Dahab to look for work and as a means to leave the country to seek better job prospects abroad due to the fact that the government does not provide jobs to young people anymore. Yasser, a 29 year-old man from Gharbia says:

> "I have been here in Dahab for three years. After I finished my education, a commercial diploma, I started working with my father in a bakery. However, the economic difficulties that my family faced pushed me to travel to Jordan to look for better job prospects. My trials to find work in Jordan failed and I decided to come back to Egypt. When I heard from a friend that work possibilities in Dahab are better; I decided to come here. The opportunities and salaries here are better than in Cairo or any other place. The problem is once the young people finish their education in Egypt they face lots of difficulties. The possibilities to find jobs are very rare since the government does not employ anybody. Now employment is limited to certain people; the ones who have connections, other than that there is no chance, which makes me wonder about the importance of education since there is just no chance for employment."

Yasser's experiences and the accounts of many of the young men in Dahab illustrate the bitterness of the experiences and the hostile stands they have developed toward the policies adopted by the state that led to their feelings of insecurity. The economic difficulties that men experience in general do not only affect their possibilities to find work, but also they affects their future to build a family and meet the expectation lined out by the society. As a result, the men in Dahab seek solutions for their economic problems in the informal tourist businesses and rely on relationships they establish with foreign tourists to overcome and confront the violence of an increasingly globalizing economy.

**Dahab and Job Opportunities:**

The fact that tourists in Dahab depend basically on local Egyptians in arranging their accommodation, food, transportation and desert trips has created a range of different jobs attracting young men from all over the country who suffer from unemployment. Lots of young men work in the tourist industry as shopkeepers, taxi drivers, in diving centers, hotels, restaurants, cafeterias and cafes located at the seaside. As a result, these jobs allow them to interact on daily basis with female tourists. Therefore, the informal interactions between locals and tourists create an additional source of informal income to the Egyptian men since they gain some extra money for services they offer to tourists and receive commissions when arranging for their needs, such as safari trips and accommodation. They receive commissions from the people who offer services when the young men in Dahab bring them customers. Saleh, a 24 year-old man, works in one of the camps and has been living in Dahab for 3 years, explains that:

> "The relationship with any woman here starts as a business.

> By helping the tourist arrange for a trip or finding a place to stay we get commissions for these services from the safari office or the hotel since we bring them customers."

The men in Dahab consider establishing a relationship with a foreign woman to be an opportunity to earn some extra money, since most of the young Egyptian men depend largely on the money of their temporary foreign wives. During my fieldwork in Dahab, I observed a couple, an Egyptian man, 27 year-old married to a 38 year-old Dutch lady. I noticed that during the visits of the lady to Dahab, she takes responsibility for all expenses and the man does not spend any money during her stay. Moreover, there are also other indirect benefits that men get from their partners such as gifts that they get besides the direct economic benefits from the relationship.

**Complicating Marriage:**

In spite of the fact that Egypt has witnessed an economic deterioration in the past few decades, marriage in Egypt has become more and more difficult. According to Hoodfar (1999) the social and economic modification has exerted a great deal of pressure on men since it has given rise to more material expectations. Nowadays, there are many constraints that young people in the Egyptian society face to get married, varying from buying an apartment and furniture to buying a [*Shabka*] the gold that the groom offers the bride, and paying [*el-Mahr*] the dowry to the bride, in addition to the expenses of the wedding itself and consequently establishing a family.

According to Khalifa (1995) financing marriage is far beyond the ability of a great number of the Egyptian young men. He adds that the high prices of housing leaves the Egyptian young people with little space in a very crowded society. On one hand, marriage is required by the society in order for the people to carry out any sexual relationship. On the other hand, marriage is made difficult by the society. This is a contradiction, which is the basis for the counter culture that emerged in different places in Egypt, such as in Dahab. These difficulties led the Egyptian young men to look for alternatives to marriage and that has resulted in the appearance of the *'urfi* marriage phenomenon among the university students, which has caused a great deal of unrest in the Egyptian society in the past few years. Moreover, the young people have also resorted to other strategies in order to discharge their sexual frustration. Khalifa (1995) explains further that many young people resort to dark streets in their cars seeking 'valuable moments of intimacy.' This has become an obvious phenomenon in many parts of a big city like Cairo. However, the strategies followed by the young people in the periphery still needs to be researched since they suffer from lack of public spaces as the ones available to those in a big city like Cairo.

Furthermore, the *'urfi* marriage is part of the cultural stock, although a marginal one. According to Abaza (2001), *'urfi* marriages have always been practiced on a

small scale. She adds that the Grand Sheikh of Al Azhar issued a *fatwa*[4] to allow *'urfi* married women to have access to divorce. However the social unrest resulting from the *'urfi* marriages of the past few years took place basically because Egyptian girls were involved. In a society where virginity is highly valued and a prerequisite for marriage, especially for females, sexual intercourse is only to be practiced within the wedlock. In contrary, the young men in Dahab enter sexual relationships with foreign women on daily basis; however, this phenomenon has not caused any disturbance in the Egyptian society since the main actors are men and almost no Egyptian women are involved.

The Phenomenon in Dahab has appeared due to the fact that marriage in Egypt has become difficult and the demands of the family have become hard to fulfill by large numbers of young men. Khalid, a 32 year-old man from Sharqia verbalizes his concerns and criticizes the current circumstances, he says:

> "Marriage these days has become a commodity. The parents of the bride impose very difficult conditions as if they are entering a business deal with the groom. They do not consider what kind of person is proposing to marry their daughter. They only want a person who has money. What can young men do in a society that deals with them in this way? "

The materialistic demands and the family expectations from young men in the Egyptian society have translated into their anxiety about work and employment opportunities. Furthermore, complicated marriage demands that men have to meet in order to get married such as arranging for an apartment, dowry and a list of household items, made it difficult for many men to meet these requirements (Ali, 2002). As a result, the age of marriage among young people in Egypt has risen and sexual frustration among them is prevalent due to the complications of marriage, which is the legal channel required by the society in order to carry out a sexual relationship.

**Foreign Female Tourists in Dahab:**

In contrast to common tourist patterns in many parts of Egypt, according to Behbehanian (2000), tourists in Dahab enter many casual interactions with Egyptians who arrange for the tourists' daily needs. Direct contacts take place in order to arrange for their accommodation, transportation and safari trips to the desert. These interactions are the main opportunity for negotiating the establishment of sexual relationships.

According to my informants in Dahab, some of these relations take place casually, while others establish a serious emotional involvement that might entail *'urfi* marriage by one of the lawyers in Dahab. In many cases, this marriage takes place only to justify the sexual relationship between the Egyptian man and the foreign woman who are not allowed to have any contacts together outside of wedlock.

According to my informants, the police in Dahab chases unmarried couples, and, in some extreme cases, push them to get married. As a result of the newly established relationships, the length of stay of the female tourists is often prolonged. One of my foreign female informants told me that she was planning to go to Turkey after her visit to Egypt; however, she extended her stay upon meeting her Egyptian partner.

Many researchers have examined the motivations for tourists' behavior. It has been suggested that many tourists are not motivated by the special qualities or attractions of their destinations, but rather by the degree of a particular psychological satisfaction of their destination (Crompton, 1979 as cited in Ryan and Hall, 2001).

Due to the fact that Dahab is an affordable tourist destination compared to many other places in Egypt, many tourists tend to spend longer periods of time there. Therefore, their long stay in Dahab gives them a chance to interact with Egyptian men and in many cases establish sexual relationships.

When asking the male informants in Dahab about reasons that attract foreign women to come to Dahab, their responses show that their attractions to foreign women do not stem from physical attraction based on beauty, rather they construct the foreign women as persons who come to Dahab to seek certain satisfactions that they cannot obtain in their societies. Hany, a 24 year-old Egyptian man from Souhag who has a *'urfi* marriage with a Scandinavian lady says:

> "The women who come here *andahum na'as* [lacking]; they come to try to find satisfaction to their *na'as* [lack] here through the relationships with Egyptian men. There is always something wrong with them, old, sometimes very fat, very thin, their legs are not pretty or have something wrong with their eyes. These women cannot find partners in their countries and come here to meet men and satisfy the need of being desired women. I know that my wife is fat and before I had another partner who had serious problems with her eyes."

Saad, a 31 year-old man supports Hany's argument, he says:

> "You can always find *mushkila*[5] a [problem] with the women who come here that make them unable to find men in their countries. Just look around and you will see many old Western women married to men in the age of their children. These women would never be able to find young men interested in them in their societies as it happens here. They mostly buy the men with their money and the presents they give them, today a mobile phone, tomorrow something different."

The male discourse in Dahab constructs female tourists who enter relationships with men as women who seek experiences that differ from the ones with emascu-

lated males in their countries of origin. Moreover, it also marks the white women tourists as women who "*endahum na'as*" [are lacking]. In Dahab, Egyptian males use the term "lacking" to imply that the female tourists are lacking some physical or psychological feature that makes them unacceptable or undesirable in their own societies.

One can easily observe that in many cases the men's attraction to foreign women in Dahab is based on economic advantages rather than physical or emotional appeal. Therefore, by establishing these relationships with women the men in Dahab find solutions to their economic problems and the women find satisfaction to what was described by my informants as *na'as* or [lack].

**Constructing Sexuality:**

It is difficult to talk about sexuality, markedly in the Egyptian society where sexuality is a taboo. However, the men in Dahab talk openly about their sexual activities. According to my observations, the conversations between them center on women and sex. The comments that foreign women hear in the streets, addressed to them in English or Arabic are highly sexual. As a 31 year-old British tourist, who was interviewed after one week of her visit to Dahab, puts it:

> "Dahab is less aggressive in terms of selling like everywhere in Egypt such as Cairo and Luxor where they try to sell you stuff rather than approaching a female to have sex with; everywhere else they want your money, while here they want you rather than your money [....] While sitting in one of these camps you listen to one of the Egyptians talking about how he pulled this girl from England and having a different woman every night and talking about which girl tonight."

According to Blumer (1969) the action of people toward objects is based on the meanings they carry for them. When I asked my informants which meaning sex carries for them, I got the following answers: "Sex is like sports, it is fun, relaxation; it is just a feeling." Another one says: "For me it means that I sleep with any woman." And a third says: "For me it means enjoyment and I came to Dahab especially for this enjoyment."

Therefore, one can observe that sexuality for the men in Dahab connotes momentary pleasure that does not necessarily involve emotional attachment or social responsibility to the women in the relationship. Furthermore, sexual relations carry other meanings than just pleasure. The men in Dahab enter casual relationships with female travelers in order to satisfy their sexual desires that they cannot fulfill within marriage, but at the same time they use their sexuality as a strategy to attract women in order to find solutions for the economic hardship by arranging for their services against commissions, which they obtain from the people who offer

these services such as travel agencies, hotels, cafeterias and dive centers. Furthermore, they use their sexuality as means to leave the country, especially, when the women take the relationship seriously since many countries apply strict rules on granting visas to Egyptians; such regulations become easy once they are married legally to one of their citizens. The men in Dahab construct the meaning of sexuality around their economic needs regardless of the personality of the partner as long as she helps them to reach their final goals, which is to travel abroad. One can notice that the constructed meaning is very different from what most Egyptians believe about sex and sexual relationships.

**'*Urfi* Marriage as a Survival Strategy:**

Policemen in Dahab try hard to control any kind of interactions between Egyptian men and foreign women, although there is no law that regulates sexual relationships outside of marriage in Egypt. The only law that exists, law number 10 issued in 1961 that handles only cases of prostitution (Ali and Salim, 1992). Therefore, acting in this manner, the police authorities exert power on the young people by the enforcement of a law that does not exist. As a result, the men in Dahab practice the *'urfi* marriages to protect themselves and create another survival strategy. This survival strategy acts on three different levels. The first one operates in relation to the police as submission to the current hierarchy and responding to the demands of the police because of their own powerlessness. The second level concerns their own goals, which are the economic gains as well as the hope of leaving the country through a successful relationship with a foreigner. Finally, as a downside, they lose respect in the society by acting in a non-accepted manner and therefore the *'urfi* marriage works at their own expense. According to Samir, a 22 -year old man from Cairo who has been working in Dahab for 2 years:

> "In many cases, interactions with foreign women develop to more than a business relationship. In most of the cases men here see the female tourists as an opportunity to help them leave the country. The majority of the young people here think that the solution for their problems is to travel abroad regardless what they do to reach their goal."

Samir's dream is to go to the USA; however, he understands that this is very difficult and it has become even more difficult after the attack of the 11th of September in New York and Washington. Samir now looks for alternatives to leave the country. The case of Samir summarizes many stories of the young men who live in Dahab. It also shows to what extent the young people in Dahab are willing to go in their relationships with foreign women in order to leave the country and look for better chances abroad. Another case is Hany who explains:

> "After I finished my high school Diploma I tried to find a job,

> but it was impossible. I worked with my father for sometime to make bricks and support the family, but such a job did not make me happy. A friend of mine brought me to Dahab and since then I have been working with foreigners. My work with foreigners opened another dimension to my ambition, not only to find work, but also to leave the country. I have entered many sexual relationships with foreign girls hoping that one of them would work out and end up with a legal marriage in order to be able to leave the country. I did not have to get the *'urfi* marriage contract with most of my partners since I work in a camp, which is full of travelers. So the police is not able to find out easily about my sexual activities; however, I got married (*'urfi*) two times when I saw that the girls were a good potential for help. At the end, the girls always left me and went back to their countries when they felt homesick."

It is clear that the *'urfi* marriage relations for the young men in Dahab connote several meanings. On one hand, they use the relations with foreign women to satisfy their desires and solve their sexual frustration and on the other as a strategy to travel abroad, especially, when women take the relationship seriously and legalize the marriage. It is also clear that *'urfi* marriage is used as a survival strategy in order to justify their relationship with foreign women and color it with legality to avoid conflicts with the police.

**Health:**

According to Sholkamy[6], it is difficult for people to talk about their health when they are healthy; they start to talk about their health when they lose it. However, I found that most of the young people in Dahab are aware of the health hazards that can result from their sexual behavior and a feeling of insecurity about their health accompanies them all the time. In spite of this, they mostly do not take prophylactic steps to protect themselves. Moreover, they believe in different ways of protection, for instance by practicing religion and staying away from women. However, many of the young men I spoke with have not shown any intention to change their behavior. I use the following quotation to highlight how men construct health. Nader, a 24 year-old man originally from Cairo articulates his concerns about his health, he says:

> "Of course I think about my health. In fact, foreign women think about health more than I do because they have extensive health awareness. I think about the condom before anything because of two main reasons: Firstly because of my health and secondly

> women would not accept to have intercourse with me without it. However, I prefer to have intercourse without it because it feels much better, but I always fear prostitutes and the [*madlu'een*][7]."

Nader's expression of worry about his health when it comes to prostitutes and the women who ask about sex directly shows how generally men in Dahab construct their ideas surrounding their health. A woman whom they approach can be a potential sex partner and is perceived as no risk for them; however, the same woman would be considered a source of danger if she shows interest in having sex with a man.

**Agency and Desire:**

Sexuality involves control, power and obedience according to Foxhall (1998, as cited in Wassef and Mansour, 1999). Sexuality in the Egyptian society always involves a power relation between men and women. In most of the cases, men are the ones who are expected to initiate sex and have desires, while women are not supposed to have desires and should not show them.

However, my interpretation of the discourses on sexuality in Dahab shows that these dynamics work differently since foreign women, according to the informants, determine their needs and have power over their sexuality and also their partners'.

The interviews that I conducted in Dahab revealed that women come to Dahab to enjoy the nature and the sea and during their stay men approach them to establish relationships. Therefore, in this regard women are the passive actors, because they do not initiate the relationship.

One can see that men are the main actors in initiating relationships. However, the gender roles change once the relationship is established. Then, women not only initiate sex but also determine how the sexual activity should be carried out e.g. practicing safe sex or in other times asking for medical tests, which men have to fulfill. Furthermore, due to the fact that some women insist on the use of condoms, men consider carrying them along since they know that they will not have access to some women without them.

Moreover, according to my informants most of the women come to Dahab with condoms and the men have to use them sometimes even if they prefer having intercourse without them. In some cases, according to some informants, women bring medications for men to use in order to enhance pleasure during intercourse. Moreover, the agency of the foreign women entails that Egyptian men satisfy their sexual desires to a degree that the same men, according to my informants, show unwillingness to grant to Egyptian women.

In addition, the women further determine how to continue the relationship e.g. casual, long term or permanent. Therefore, I conclude that women play an active role once the relationship is established.

**Post-Colonialism and Modernity:**

During colonial times, "the Orient" was an exotic place for many Westerners and the dream of many Western male travelers. The discovery of its mysteries and the access to its women was their goal. Books, such as the "Arabian Nights," were sources to construct a picture of "the Orient," the Muslim world, the women as well as the *harem*. For long years, many Western male travelers fantasized and were fascinated about the *Orient*, the veil and the *harem* (Mabro, 1991). However, generally they were not able to meet women or observe them since women were always confined to the private sphere. Moreover, private spheres like the *harem* were used to differentiate between masculine men and weak women, not only by the Muslim men but also by many Westerners who constructed their ideas and views of women in "the Orient" upon the belief that the *harem* is a place where men have sexual access to multiple females (Ahmed, 1982 as cited in Mabro, 1991). Such perceptions of the *harem* and of women as the site of sexuality and desire motivated many Western men to travel to "the Orient" in order to discover the mysteries of the *harem* and to posses its women. However, the boundaries between the public domain and the private one were impassable barriers for the Western men to access the 'exotic' Oriental women. Some of these men confessed that they did not see women at all during their visits to the Arab, Muslim world and mostly all the written accounts of these travelers retell the stories of local men (Mabro, 1991).

I argue that the female accounts in Dahab in the contemporary time are a continuation of the past. Contrasting the male accounts, recent white female accounts in Dahab have shown that they have reproduced Western narratives of desire, but in modified forms based on the historical context, their gender as well as their invasion to the public domain. Moreover, the perceptions of "the Orient" do not only include men's perceptions of women but also women in the West have developed stereotypical ideas about the Eastern men. I refer here to the Western women coming to Dahab with preset ideas of Eastern men as oversexed, masculine and exotic beings. Given the fact that these encounters take place in a different era, in the framework of tourism and on a different level in the public domain represented by men makes it easier for the women to satisfy their fantasies about Eastern men in a context that is linked to power and politics within the framework of globalization and colonialist histories between Egypt and the West.

**Globalization: Is it Affecting Us?**

Waters (1995:3) argues that:

> "In a globalized world there will be a single society and culture occupying the planet. This society and culture will probably not be harmoniously integrated although it might conceivably be [...] no tight set of cultural preferences and prescriptions. Insofar as culture is unified it will be extremely abstract, ex-

pressing tolerance for diversity and individual choice."

In the Egyptian Society, globalization manifests itself in different ways such as travel, tourism and global patterns of goods and material consumption. Within this context new ideas about gender relations and sexuality are entering Egyptian society, putting strains on more "traditional" notions of male-female relationship. As much as such processes create new opportunities for rethinking gender relations in Egypt, they also are a way that Western ideas about sexual relations and sex are increasingly penetrating Egyptian sexual practices.

Waters' view of a globalized culture and society can be observed in Dahab. There is a dominant culture that can also be found in many other parts of the world. It is a culture that gives space for differences and freedom of choice for each individual. In addition, this culture tolerates the variations of ideologies that people adopt and also puts people close together in spite of differences in religion and social background. One can see that globalization has affected people in many parts of the world not only socially and economically but also in respect to intimate matters where common practices in the West were assumed to be the solution to the problems of many people around the world.

Some of the informants support the idea that what happens in Dahab will become a common culture. They justify this by examples they raise that in places like Cairo young men enter sexual relationships with Egyptian girls.

**Conclusion:**

The activities that take place in Dahab are not limited to this particular location. However, the fact that Dahab is a place where these activities are extensively practiced makes it unique in Egypt. Global trends and economic hardship, in addition to social problems in Egypt have led to the emergence of this subculture. The informal tourism business in Dahab dominated by underprivileged young men who come from the grass-root level and who lack training, has opened them a space for them in the tourism industry. This disenfranchised group who suffer directly from the economic changes in Egypt have adopted different strategies for survival in which sex is used as means to reach their goals. By doing so, the young men have jeopardized their relationship to their society and have entered in conflicts with the state represented in the police, which, attempts to put regulations for practices, although not considered illegal according to Egyptian law.

It has been illustrated how the interactions with foreign women have resulted in changes in the men's views about their culture and their sexuality. Moreover, cultures like the one in Dahab are worth the study since they show the effect of interactions with different cultures on people's views as well as different coping mechanisms that young people adopt to face the changes taking place in the Egyptian society.

In addition, many young Egyptian men who work in the tourist industry are vulnerable to diseases, especially because many of them have limited knowledge about STDs. Therefore, sex education and awareness programs are very important in helping young people to understand their vulnerability by adopting certain behaviors or attitudes.

Finally, this study is a vivid example that sexuality and most importantly masculinity are not static and socially constructed; therefore, women not only in Egypt but worldwide should be encouraged to play an active role in their relationships and should ask for their sexual rights.

**Endnotes:**

1 'urfi marriage is unregistered customary matrimony that can take place in a lawyer's office with the presence of two witnesses. This type of marriage is well known amongst the Western females in Dahab as the "Dahab marriage."
2 Misprinted in original text, meaning 'staying.'
3 http://www.egyptfocus.com/dahab_here.htm

4 A Fatwa is a formal, legal and religious advisory that is mainly issued by the state's religious institutions.
5 Referring to their physical appearance.
6 Personal conversation with Dr. Hania Sholkamy, Cairo, 2001.
7 Madlu'een means the ones who approach men and show strong desire of having sex.

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# Empowerment of Women in the Context of Muslim Societies A Transformative Strategy for Poverty Eradication in a Globalizing World

**Sherine Saadallah**

**Abstract**

*One of the most pervasive challenges to development at the turn of the 20th continues to be poverty. The eradication of poverty is a priority within the agenda of national governments, donors, multilateral and UN organizations in addition to a host of dynamic actors that have gained responsibility for development and agency for specific issues within a globalizing, world system. It is beyond need to substantiate that women are among the most effected by poverty [since they constitute 70% of the world's poor.] This dubious distinction transforms women into the main target group for poverty eradication programs, strategies and projects by international aid/donor agencies. While there is a global commitment to poverty eradication, women should continue to be the focus. At the same time the international community should strive to recognize the special needs of women as a focus group, and underline the inhibiting factors that act against granting them freedom from the burden of poverty due to gender inequalities and structural factors.*

*Social values and norms usually set gender roles, within a specific cultural context. Thus gender roles and levels of inequality vary cross-culturally and from one country to another. Gender inequality hence in developing countries shall not manifest the same structure and causes that permeate in industrialized societies. Thus the level of development shapes the level of inequality where it is safe to make the assumption that the lower the level of development the higher the gender inequality. This is basically due to the limited resources, the level of education and awareness, the higher the competition for values services such as health and nutrition etc. This is reinforced by the main value system controlling individual societies. Within patriarchal societies of the Muslim world there is a dominance of religiously derived values and norms that structures gender socialization. Hence the main focus of this paper shall be the 'empowerment of women' in the context of Muslim societies as a transformative strategy for poverty eradication in a globalizing World. The analysis shall discuss levels of empowerment of women as a transformative strategy in general, and Muslim women in particular.*■

# Efficiency Processes in Egyptian Enterprises: Current Status in a Transition Economy

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Business organizations are essentially resource transformation agents that aim at satisfying the needs of societies for goods and services and to improve the quality of life. Resources, whether, physical, human, financial, technology or information have to be acquired, maintained and managed. Egypt, an economy in transition, is still developing its free market institutions. This paper evaluates the current status of efficiency processes of Egyptian business firms during this transition stage.

Business organizations are the main bodies entrusted with the efficient transformation of society's resources. Transformation processes are expressed in a simple formula that ironically have proven difficult to implement. The formula is based on the concept of value creation, where appropriate resources are acquired at a competitive price, their value is enhanced in a transformation process to deliver at the end a product or service at a reasonable cost and acceptable quality. It is noticed that the principle of efficiency is observed all the way through this process; its neglect at any stage will make business firms fall short from this desirable end .At a higher level of competitiveness business firms are required to develop areas of competence or competitive advantage. Efficiency can be viewed as a journey where in its early stages, reliance is mostly on physical resources and later on intangible resources. The efficiency process is in essence a series of hundreds, perhaps thousands of transactions carried out between individuals in the business firm and with agents outside the business firm.

The objective of this paper will be served by answering three basic questions: What, Why and How. The "What" question deals with current achievements in this area. The "Why" question attempts to identify the forces for or against efficiency orientation. These forces could be at the international, national and company levels. The "How" question deals with the different ways companies have adopted to move forward or backward on the efficiency scale. In the latter case the efficiency criteria has been aborted or cut short.

In terms of current achievemenst it is clear that the Egyptian economy has not performed well in terms of international competitiveness. However, this differs between categories of companies. Those who have succeeded in entering the international markets are definitely more efficient than those who have remained

local. The former are being governed by the rules of international division of labor. Even in the latter group efficiency differs. A rough standard would be the ability to survive the current prolonged recession. Companies which have shown financial troubles have definitely failed to manage their resources.

The forces pushing Egyptian firms toward more efficiency are many, notwithstanding their limited ability to deal with them. As the economy opens up and becomes integrated in the global economy it is obliged to abide by a number of international agreements and protocols that are designed to foster international division of labor and global efficiency. Examples are the areas of environmental protection, money laundering, intellectual property rights, prohibition of child labor and dumping practices. Also, a number of laws have either been passed or are still being considered which are designed to augment the strategic factor markets such as labor, stocks, bank loans and intellectual property. Egypt is also attempting to join a number of trade zones with Europe and the United States which also forces the abolishment of obstacles to trade and the removal of government subsidies. In addition, a significant privatization program has been undertaken. All these forces are creating pressures on business firms to improve their efficiency in a market which is increasingly consumer-guided[(1)] Despite an early start toward a market economy, the process of institutional development so far can be characterized as lukewarm This is largely due to an inept bureaucracy of a patron state which so far has failed to develop the necessary institutions of a free market economy (Harik,1997) .Efficiency measures undertaken so far can be characterized as slow, inadequate and lack a strategic vision .The welfare function, in particular has been carried out in an ad hoc manner and not as part of a systematic strategy.[(2)]

During the socialist stage allocation and management of resources is guided by political and social considerations, while in a market economy, market forces perform this task. During the transition stage from the former to the latter system the guiding criteria for business decisions does not automatically change but is held back by inadequate development of formal and informal institutions. These shortcomings will diminish as the country moves along the scale of a market economy and the level of industrialization increases. (Lubatkin & Momar, 1977).

Transactions carried out within the firm or with outsiders are expected to be based on clear "rules of the game" in order to create predictability and minimize transaction costs. These are formal rules provided by a variety of institutions supported by informal rules which are society's values enhancing predictability and equity. In this sense, transaction costs would be the costs of negotiating, measuring and enforcing exchanges. The existence of these institutions help reduce transaction costs. (Yeager, 1999). Outside the firm, examples of these institutions include strategic resources markets such as the stock market, banks, insurance companies and labor market. These markets should be based on competition, mobility of resources and transparency. Within the firm there should be a system

of management that governs transactions which assure predictability, efficiency and equity. Enforcement of rules will be handled in the society at large by an efficient legal system and at the firm level by performance appraisal and appeal systems. Immobility of resources, inaccurate information and individuals incapable of making choices in addition to the absence of a fair enforcement mechanism will lead to opportunistic behavior and inefficiency due to misguided decisions.

Until the new system and its institutions gain a strong foothold, decisions will rotate between social welfare, political and efficiency considerations. Until the welfare function is firmly accommodated in the different institutions outside and inside the business firm, it will continue to be handled in an ad hoc fashion.

It is expected that changes in culture will lag behind the development of formal institutions. This is a serious matter because implementation of rules depends largely on the values held by individuals and in their confidence and trust in these rules. Evidence shows that despite nearly a decade of training given to managers on "market oriented economies" in such countries as the Check Republic, Poland, China or Vietnam, one frequently finds that, while managers use the "the proper words" the concepts are not truly "living "in their minds and hearts. This is particularly true in some countries like China, where economic change is occurring but political systems are holding steady. Changes in the economic, political and social systems do not happen at the same speed (Napier & Vu, 1998).

Businessmen in transition economies are reluctant to make a final shift in their orientation and actions to an open market approach due to the unpredictable stop-go behavior of governments of these countries. Some East Asian countries have shown more or less a linear trend in the direction of export promotion and external orientation. Others in Latin America have shown mor oscillatory" stop-go" pattern of policy choices, with more market –oriented episodes temporarily followed by a return to import substitution policies in a more or less continuous fashion. Liberalization packages are adopted and experimented with for a time, only to be abandoned once again under the impact of external shocks like fluctuations in the prices of primary goods or business cycles (Ranis, 1997).

During the socialist era, business firms depend to a great extent on the State to obtain resources. Even with the economies opening up, private sector managers continue to expect active assistance from the government. Many managers in South Korea and Argentina prefer protectionism (Austin, 1991).

Transition from patronage system to a merit system is not easy and it can be hampered by a lack of a strong cultural tradition of the "public interest"(Klingner &Campos, 2001).

Formerly State-Owned companies in transition economies are not likely to have an entrepreneurial ideology, dynamic core competencies, strategic flexibility, or a capability for adaptive to change. They lack the past experience that would allow them to develop these competencies. Top management of these firms can not be

classified as agents for change or as institution builders. Without the old rules of the game and without the new rules of the game, organizations are left to founder. The firm's capacity to learn has diminished, because there are no frameworks or schemes to help organize, interpret and react to new information (Newman, 2000). Efficiency processes imply a risk taking activity whereby businessmen and managers manage resources in a way that relate company resources to market needs. Lacking this ability, business firms would resort to different practices that reduce risk but generate inefficiency such as producing to order, risk –sharing with consumers by requiring advance booking of products, charging price on the basis of what the market can bear, violation of contract requirements as in licensing or subcontracting, cost-plus pricing, low equity/debt ratio and over-reliance on government contracts.

Businessmen, encouraged by institutional shortcomings try to realize their gain early in the efficiency process by capitalizing on acquisition of resources in a resource-scarce society. This is based on the assumption that the market value of these resources will increase by time or they can be used as a collateral to obtain other resources. This practice of aborting the efficiency processes in business firms is inherited from the socialist era. However, business firms which abandoned this practice have proven to be more successful since they dealt with the efficiency processes in their entirety and not only with the early portions. This paper will expound on this issue using examples from published sources. The paper will be divided into sections according to types of resources.

**Raw material and Parts**

Egypt is a country short of a variety of raw materials. However it has been gifted with a limited fertile soil and an appropriate climate that made it comparatively advantageous to grow long fiber cotton and command high prices on it in the international market. During the socialist era the government adopted a complicated web of subsidies that permitted textile companies to use this expensive cotton to produce cheap fabrics for the masses. There was a value loss as a result and the textile sector suffered huge losses for many years. These losses became clearly visible when companies were set free from government support and they were charged the actual market value for their raw material.[3] A limited number of companies however have preferred instead to import cheaper cotton from abroad, manufactured it locally, capitalized on cheap Egyptian labor and then re-exported to America and Europe. In this case they were reimbursed with the custom dues paid for the imported raw material. This action required a careful assessment of the relative costs of different factors of production. They chose to depart from the habitual practice of using locally produced raw material, inappropriate and expensive. These companies were also keen on benefiting from government -provided incentives in the form of tax rebate on materials imported for re-export.[4]

Savings realized at the material acquisition stage could also be a major source for company profits without having to worry too much about the issue of efficiency. The automobile assembly industry in Egypt is a case in point. Following an import substitution policy, the government charges much higher tariffs on complete automobiles than on knocked down units. This has encouraged the creation of assembly operations for a variety of models even that the local market size is very small. These companies are restricted, by license agreements, from exporting abroad. The same problem applies to assembly factories for appliances that were established in reaction to similar government incentives. Taking advantage of benefits at the input stage should not be viewed in isolation of the remaining stages of the efficiency equation. Many of these companies currently suffer from unutilized capacity. So while, they may be making profit in the short term, their long term viability is in question in view of the impending foreign competition as barriers to imports are removed in accordance with international agreements.(5)

There are a group of companies, when deciding on their product mix, have made sure to benefit from the comparative advantage Egypt has in certain raw materials. Compared with long fiber cotton, which is not any more competitive in the production of moderate quality fabrics, Egypt still enjoys comparative advantage in a number of raw materials used for industries such as cement, ceramics, food processing and carpets. In addition to low cost local raw material, these companies have used modern technology that helped them to produce products that are competitive locally and abroad. A number of these companies have been able to attract foreign capital and involvement with multinational companies and some established production facilities in the U.S. market.(6)

During the socialist era, business firms were interested in hoarding raw material and parts to get around restrictions on imports and the possibility of rising prices. As the economy opened up, importation has been eased considerably, restricted, however, by the availability of foreign currency. Recent experience has shown that companies which have an idle stock of raw material, parts or finished products have suffered from liquidity problem, obselence and high storage costs.(7) While business men and managers are currently aware of this fact, the continuous shortage of hard currency forces management of different firms to sacrifice efficiency to assure availability of resources. The long custom clearance procedures of imported items, possible delays of shipment in addition to the possibility of rising value of foreign currency give these firms strong incentive to maintain a certain amount of stock just in case. It is questionable that management actually balances the benefits and costs of this action. Uncertainty of the market forces many companies to produce according to incoming orders, putting a further strain on efficiency. Restricting production through limiting resource acquisition is a practice carried over from the socialist era. In order to prevent further losses, companies used to restrict production instead of looking for additional market opportunities. As the government has

embarked on its privatization program, unloading gigantic stock of raw material and parts of many public firms has been an important element of the restructring program. While certain measure of inefficiency can be tolerated in a closed market, the increasing level of competition in the Egyptian market in addition to the need to export is forcing the issue of material management to the forefront.

Traditionally, Egyptians have considered real estate to be a good area for investment and a real storage of value. However, this orientation has reached an astronomical level during the oil boom of the seventies, when remittances from Egyptians working in Arab countries were used to finance an unprecedented boom in construction and the acquisition of land. This has reinforced the old-established faith in real estate as a storage of value against a depreciating currency. In a situation where information and planning capabilities are limited, following established wisdom or imitating others, however disastrous, could be a way of dealing with uncertainty. Following the herd mentality is the prime reason for overexpansion in real estate development and its current slump. A number of businessmen have used real estate development to diversify their investment portfolio. Some have used their over-priced holdings of land as collateral for bank loans to fuel their expansion in different fields. (8)

Realizing that acquiring assets, without giving consideration to their economic feasibility, has also been a common practice exercised by public sector companies. One of the major ingredients of the privatization program has been to unload these assets. Redundancy of resources (slack) is useful whenever planning capacity is limited. Outsourcing has been used to avoid hoarding resources in light of the increasing complexity of business firms and the uncertainty of the environment which renders planning useless. However, outsourcing requires coordination ability and advanced information capacity which is limited in developing countries.

Until now Egypt has not succeeded in serving as a production platform for parts needed by multinational companies, even in fields traditionally known to possess some sort of comparative advantage, such as textile, leather products, furniture or in modern industries such as automobiles. Until now, Egypt has not been recognized as an attractive location for foreign investment directed toward exporting. Most of the foreign investment currently existing is directed to serve the local market.

**Financial Resources**

Egypt is considered a capital scarce country and its capital resource institutions are still in the process of being developed. This applies to the stock market as well as to the banking sector. (9) Most of the business firms belong to the family sector, and to maintain family control they are either unwilling or unable to obtain funds through public offerings. A limited number of companies, which have sought public sharing in ownership, have only allowed this for a small percentage of their stock. Private companies prefer bank credit as a source of financing, however

conducted imprudently. Encouraged by a lax credit policy, during the expansionary period of the eighties, many companies have sought bank loans to augment their expansion plans. The mentality of acquiring resources without paying enough attention to their management has led to many business failures. For some business firms the basics of finance and project feasibility were not observed. (10) A whole set of institutional shortcomings combined with short-term orientation, and sometimes greed of businessmen, have contributed to these failures.

Acquiring funds in the form of deposits and savings at a certain rate is the major preoccupation of commercial banks to be eventually loaned out at a higher rate with the differential being the bank's commission. During the period of high liquidity and lax credit policy, referred to above, banks were keen on acquiring these financial resources to lend them out. In fact performance of bank officials was partially judged on their marketing effort to attract these funds. Banks' profits consisted basically of he margin between the debt interest and the credit interest. Realizing this profit at the outset without going heavily in the complex process of management was tempting for many bank officials. (11) A Number of business scandals where a number of businessmen failed to meet their credit obligations have forced banks to reexamine their credit policy and to introduce some institutional changes to safe guard against credit abuse. Some banks have overreacted, becoming restrictive in granting credit. Instead, they preferred to focus on granting personal loans, especially for higher income salaried individuals, which are more easily managed and carries smaller risk because of its guaranteed liquid collateral. Some banks, however, were not as prompt in reaction to environmental changes and continued the practice of attracting new depositors without having viable avenues for investment, discovering later they had considerable sum of idle funds.

A well-known practice that was followed extensively during the socialist era and is still influencing business practices during the transition stage is the cost-plus contracts. This system does not motivate the businessman to consider efficiency or quality. The Ministry of construction still gives itself the right to raise prices in the coastal cities depending on actual cost. However, with the current excessive number of unsold units, it may be forced to stop this practice .In a price- conscious society many producers prefer to reduce content or quality of their products to maintain their profit margin rather than to improve their efficiency.

In the area of services, determining contractual relationships is always difficult and depends to a great extent on the professional and ethical values of the parties. (Yeager, 1999). Here rules of the game are largely informal which increases unpredictability and raises the chances of lowering quality. Egypt is a major source for exporting television series to Arab countries. Many transactions are concluded prior to the actual airing of the series, depending on the unique position Egyptian cultural and entertainment industry has in the region in addition to reputation of the actors in question. Exploiting the good well and expectations of consumers or

clients could be disastrous in an increasingly competitive market. However, independent producers and actors have a tendency to expand unnecessarily the length of their series where length of airing time is used as a basis for determining compensation by Egyptian State Television. This in some cases led to disappointments once the series are aired. In times of scarcity consumers used to wait in line to reserve a product months in advance of delivery. The consumer did not get to inspect the product before hand. Increasing competition in different fields is currently forcing companies to honor their commitments. However, in the absence of clear rules of conduct and the accompanying values many practices still lag behind.

An inherited approach from the socialist era is minimization of inputs in order to reduce potential losses. This happens whenever there is fear that the value of these inputs may not be recuperated. Expenses are spared without regard to potential revenue. This orientation has caused some problems for the government in the privatization effort when investors declined to purchase run down public sector companies. The Minister in charge regretted not modernizing the companies before attempting to sell them. Another example of poor financial management is not putting aside some reserves to replace assets which have limited life. Until the present time, in fields like education, health, public transportation and water management resources are disbursed almost free of charge even with an unmistakable waste and poor quality.

For some businessmen profit is still calculated on the basis of what the market can bear. The benchmark is trade activity, which enjoys high returns in view of the high turnover of capital, and not adding a reasonable margin to per unit cost, a practice more suitable to industrial activities. What constitutes a cost and what constitutes a profit is not yet quite clear. For example, not setting aside a sum for depreciation would unduly inflate profit. Furthermore, social cost is not incorporated into actual cost like in developed countries. However, with the enactment of environmental law this problem is gradually disappearing. As competition is increasing profit based on exploiting externalities is gradually disappearing. The concept of quality is not yet fully appreciated. Emphasis is still on functional quality and not cosmetic quality or aesthetic considerations. The relationship between price and quality are still viewed as contradictory and often used as competing alternatives. When costs go up the tendency is to reduce quality or quantity and not to improve efficiency.

**Foreign Exchange**

Acquiring foreign exchange has been the prime preoccupation of Egyptian business firms for many years. A combination of misguided government policies in addition to business failure in the management of this resource have contributed to creating a chronic problem in this area. Most of the material and physical inputs of Egyptian industry have to be imported. In the mean time exports have been growing

slowly resulting in a chronic deficit in the balance of trade, which have forced the government to continuously regulate this market. Pressures for liberalizing the economy and removing barriers to trade and in the mean time trying to control import prices have forced the government to walk on a tight rope, failing at times. There are a number of business firms which have managed to establish for themselves a fairly stable export market thus becoming self-sufficient in their foreign exchange needs. However there is a considerable number of firms which have focused only on the local market and have been vulnerable to its erratic behavior. Business firms resorted to the black market, requested import licenses or pressured the government for protection to avert the threat of unavailability of foreign exchange or of foreign competition. Content with the security of the local market they refrained from improving their products or efficiency. Some of the methods of managing foreign exchange risk are within the reach of Egyptian managers but some require a major overhaul of management and production systems. While institutional shortcomings make it difficult for businessmen to use modern techniques of foreign exchange hedging but the inability of some to use traditional methods of hedging is inexcusable and can only be explained by the absence of business orientation. Balancing assets and liabilities as well as income and expenses in foreign currencies is one basic way of hedging. Some businessmen have borrowed in foreign currencies without ascertaining sources to cover future payment of obligations. This has proven to be fatal when the Egyptian pound was devalued.[12]

**Human Resources**

During the socialist era, the government took upon itself the responsibility of providing employment to every body. Objectives of public firms at the time were largely social and priority was given to the needs of the people over business needs. This has helped to create a government bureaucracy that has swelled over the years to unprecedented proportions. Public companies became also overstaffed, particularly in non-production functions. The whole process of human resource management was not observed Differentiation between individuals based on merit or qualifications was ignored in recruitment, salary determination, job assignment, performance appraisal and promotion. Standard rules were applied, to maintain surface equity, but hid underneath a considerable amount of nepotism and favoritism. The negative effects of this mismanagement of human resources were carried forward later on when the economy was liberalized. Due to shortage of qualified managers individuals who were previously associated with the government and public sector, and who subscribed to these values, were given positions of responsibility in joint companies as well as private ones. Some of these executives are highly paid with a questionable return to their firms in terms of system building. With the appearance of recruitment agencies and consulting firms human resource management is definitely improving. Forces of privatization, the spread of modern

information systems and the creation of multinational companies' branches and licensing agreements, have all led many private firms to pay close attention to the issue of human resources management. (13) Laxity in acquiring human resources over many years has led to an over-reaction now with the economic pressures of efficiency mounting up. As part of the privatization programs and restructring effort by many companies, the social taboo of not laying off any body is now a thing of the past. Most companies now have early retirement programs in addition to high efficiency expectations that have to be met.

A number of forces have joined hands to make the management of human resources during the transition stage anything but an easy task. This applies equally well to private companies, joint ventures, public companies and foreign branches and subsidiaries. Some of the forces are common between the different types of companies and some are unique to each case. Transition status does not only apply to economic and institutional issues but also to values and business practices. Some of the approaches followed by the management of firms showed elements of inconsistency, contradiction and lack of continuity. Apparently there was conflict between the values of the public sector which were social and political in nature and those espoused by a free market economy which favored efficiency. For example, changes in the composition of ownership from public to private did not coincide with a corresponding change in the style of management. Top management of firms demanded lower levels employees to achieve ambitious goals but did not provide them with the necessary approach. The attitude of top management, being above criticism is inherited from the socialist era. Ironically the similarities exist between companies which are either privately or publicly owned may suggest some common cultural reasons. As pointed out earlier, the public sector was the main source of managers for companies in the private and joint sectors which automatically suggests some deep seated values. However, there are companies which have capitalized on relatively cheap technical human resources modern technology and management and they have done well. (14)

In a major joint bank, as part of a restructring program, its top management attempted to evaluate employees on the basis of results achieved. However, due to the lack of clear objectives, resulting from a well formulated strategy, branch managers were left wondering how they could ever achieve them.

Top management of the bank chose their subordinates in their own image so they would not challange them and be loyal to them. During the socialist era, emphasis was placed on political appointments. Ex-ministers and top army officers and top officials were placed in top management positions. These people were more externally oriented rather than internally oriented. They played a major role in protecting their firms, obtained resources but were not technically qualified enough to develop the internal systems of their organizations. This practice continued even during the transition stage. The spread of nepotism and favoritism in business

organizations have led to giving preference to relations over competence. Public companies were required by law to hire school and university graduates every year regardless of need. Additionaly, hiring people can bring in social gratification in pleasing of acquaintances and relatives. While, in the liberalized stage forced employment has gradually dissippated, social gratification in extending favors is still strong. Top and many middle managers who were raised during the socialist era did not have efficiency values deeply engrained in them so they could not foresee the long term implications of unsound hiring practices.

Currently many organizations are trying to restructure and improve internal efficiency to be faced with tens if not hundreds of employees who are not up to the new task. Newly hired employees, due to their education have a more modern outlook at work but they are faced with highly paid traditional managers, thus facing a generation gap. The older employees create a value system that is difficult to change. This presents a major hurdle in front of any change effort.

**Information**

While the previous resources are considered traditional, information is a relatively modern resource. Information and its proper management help guide management decisions in the quest for efficiency. Compared with other resources, development and usage of information have more stringent requirements. During the socialist era, the government was in control of the economy and central planning was applied. Decisions by fiat replaced market mechanism. Companies were required by law to use a standardized accounting system. Information on the economy at large and on single companies were available and highly standardized. Ironically, when the economy was liberalized and the government grip was loosened availability of information became problematic at both the macro and micro levels.(15) Public sector companies, which are increasingly privatized, are still bound by the same information requirement and the same applies to joint companies if the State or any of its enterprises are majority owners. Also, private companies whose shares are publicly traded on the stock market are required to publish their financial statements. However, closed companies, which constitute a majority of business firms, are not bound by the same requirement.

While in a socialist system, companies are required by law to share information for central planning purposes, in a market economy they should have the will and motive to cooperate. In a transition stage, where businessmen are keen on reaping immediate gain and are short- term oriented, can not see an immediate gratification in the idea of developing and sharing information. They may appreciate the acquisition of assets that have marketable value such as land or capital. They can put them to immediate use and can reap profits as a result. On the other hand, developing information is an arduous process that has no immediate gain in sight.

In a transition economy the government, fearing to scare off businessmen

who are still not sophisticated enough, may delay the requirement of information transparency.

While availing of information is a problem in a transition economy, putting it to good use is even more difficult. This requires changing the decision making style of managers as well as the functions actually performed by different departments. Optimizing the use of information systems currently implemented by many companies should help in this regard.

**Technology**

Unlike land, human resources and some types of raw material, technology is not a locally available resource and as such is relatively scarce. It does require foreign exchange, another scarce resource. Public sector companies and many small private firms have managed to make do with whatever machinery they possessed back in the sixties. (16) The State budget depleted by endless social and military demands have been unable to provide replacements. Private businessmen, concerned primarily with supplying local market needs, have been content with reaping profits and not putting aside funds for possible replacement in the future. It was not until foreign competition invaded the local market and trade became liberalized that a full realization of the depth of the problem took place. Generally, factories established in new industrial zones utilize modern technology which adheres to environmental regulations.

**Organizational capabilities**

These are primarily responsible for the proper acquisition of resources, their safe keeping, utilization and eventually developing them into areas of competitive advantage. This is the management system that is developed over the years to handle the management of resources. It involves using a proper strategy, careful choice of resources and a coherent management system. (17) Organizational capability is currently viewed as a major sources of competitive advantage. Its core is the culture of the organization. It requires a major transformation from personalized management to professional management. For many companies in transition economies, this development is not yet in place.

Management processes, compared with other physical or financial assets, is considered an intangible asset. Because it is not understood it is sometimes taken for granted particularly in cultures which do not tolerate ambiguity; there is no appreciation for the role of intangible assets to organizational success. This attitude explains the resistance of many companies to join the European modernization program which aims at improving the management system of middle-size and small companies on a cost-share basis. Businessmen preferred instead to be supported in the financial and technological fields.

While functional structures are useful to develop areas of specialization but at

a certain stage emphasis should be given to processes especially when the environment becomes more uncertain. Different management processes help integrate the organization. This requires trust and cooperation between different units which are fostered by a company-wide performance assessment that discourages sub-unit orientations. However, a quick assessment of these processes in Egyptian firms still show major deficiencies. For example decisions may be hastily made without due consideration to the different alternatives. Communication is largely one way and there is limited feedback. In leadership, leaders do not walk the talk and as a result they may neglect the details. Coordination is limited due to functional orientation. Group processes are hindered by individualistic behavior and self interest. It is no surprise that reaction to market and consumer needs are still slow, notwithstanding the noticeable improvement due to the growth of the private sector and competition. Due to the absence of strong organizational norms, performance-based measurements lead sometimes to political behavior such as piracy of resources and destructive conflict. Even in technology processes, inadequate emphasis is given to human ware more than hardware and software. Even in the different functional processes important stages are still neglected in many companies and they are not tied closely to organizational objectives. This applies to functions such as finance, marketing and human resources. This is a crucial shortcoming in view of the need to master various functional processes before developing special and unique competencies.

**Conclusion**

All firms in developed and developing societies face high level of uncertainty. What adds to the difficulty in transition economies is that the rules of the game are also changing. This adds an additional burden on business management. In Western societies, businessmen have devised ways to deal with uncertainty. Techniques like business alliances, outsourcing, vertical or horizontal integration and internalization are ways to deal with external and/or internal uncertainty and the associated transaction costs. In societies in transition, due to the absence of stable rules that govern transactions, business firms resort to a number of options. Some business firms prefer to operate in a competitive environment, e.g. exporting, and to abide by its rules while in the same time enjoy whatever benefits they can get from the imperfections of a transition economy. Relying on monopoly position or government protection would be other ways to deal with uncertainty. Benefits occurred here are short- lived due to the impending competition. Some other firms capitalize on the acquisition of resources in order to avoid the complexity of efficiency processes. Here, efficiency is aborted or miscarried. Business firms are either incapable to deal with complex transactions or find it costly to do so. Limiting the possibilities of transactions could be another approach. For example, doing assembly operations rather than actual manufacturing. Companies operating in

fields that require less transactions, such as trade is also another example. In addition to high returns, this is why most business groups in Egypt have a trade component in their activities.

In order to deal with an increasingly complex world, there is a need for a simultaneous development of rules of the game in the environmental context of the firms as well as inside the firm itself. There is an urgent need to develop the internal capabilities of business firms to handle complexity. This requires initially a separate attention to the development of different functions handling different resourcs; e.g., human resources, finance and material management coupled with a simultaneous attention given to the interaction and coordination between these different functions .In the absence of clear and fair "rules of the game" to govern transactions within the business firm, substitute methods will emerge such as over emphasis on hierarchical authority, political behavior, nepotism, favortism, intuition, redundancy of resources, trial and error and reversible decisions. There is definitely a current recognition of the need to introduce efficiency measures in Egyptian organizations. There are even many change programs are currently being undertaken. In order to achieve viable results, multidimensional changes need to be undertaken in a simultaneous fashion. Due to the limited capacity of business firms and their leaders to handle complexity, this effort is often fragmented and often short-lived. This can be characterized as a vicious cycle of organizational incapacity. To break loose from this cycle there is a strong need for enlightened leaders who need to have a focused set of values that guide their mission. Development of institutions are held back by welfare considerations which may have political connotations. Creating the proper balance between efficiency and welfare in an institutionalized manner is important. Newely established companies have, at least partially, escaped this problem because they are not loaded with inherited excess employment. Many years ago, David McClelland attributed economic underdevelopment to the predominance of social and political motives over economic and achievement motives. The above practices show the current on-going tension in the Egyptian scene between these conflicting values. Creating the proper balance requires the development of the proper institutions inside and outside the firm.

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**Notes**

1. Examples include privatization, removal of trade barriers, European –Egyptian Partnership Agreement, removal of subsidies, Modernization Program for the Private Sector, early retirement program simplification of customs procedures and restructuring. Large public companies such as Egypt Air and the Egyptian Telecommunication Company are undergoing major restructuring programs which have started to reap results. At the firm level there are now many organizations undertaking a variety of efficiency measures which are not necessarily handled as an integrated strategy. Examples include reviewing product and service lines lines, target-based performance evaluation, transparent internal and external recruitment programs to minimize nepotism and favoritism, restructuring and early retirement programs and upgrading the human resource function.
2. Some public firms have been kept afloat despite their huge losses such as the Iron &Steel Company and the Kema Fertilizer Company in order to preserve jobs for the work force and for strategic considerations which are not clearly spelled out. Also, a return to the subsidy system is currently considered by the government in order to relieve the negative effects of the devaluation of the pound on the poor masses.
3. There is now thirty public sector textile companies, most of them are losing with total debt of 8 billion pounds and unsold stock reaching 1 billion pounds due to high price of raw cotton. Raw material cost represents 50 percent of total production cost. Pakistani and Syrian cotton is 30 percent cheaper than Egyptian long fiber cotton and is more appropriate for casual cloth, El-Akhbar, 8/7/2001.
4. Export-oriented companies import cheaper yarn from India, Pakistan and other Far

Eastern countries under the Temporary Admission System (TAS), which gives tax rebate when the finished product leaves the country. In 1999-2000 ready-made garment export reached $ 1.5 billion, Business Monthly, November 2001

5. Percentage of idle capacity in passenger car assembly is 90%, in steel 50 %, in refrigerators 20 %, AlAlam Elyoum 21/12/2002. In cement 15 %, in shoes 53 %, in pharmaceuticals 40 %, Al-Ahram 7/3/2002.
6. For example, Oriental Weavers Company, a carpet producer, has established a factory in Georgia, U.S.A. to supply the U.S. market with high quality synthetic carpets targeting the middle range of the market. Local ceramics industry has been able to beat foreign competition. Only 1 percent of the local market now relies on imports and 99 percent on local production, which used to be the other way around.
7. In June 2000,total value of inventory of spare parts in public sector companies amounted to 2.65 billion pounds compared with 3.875 billion pounds three years earlier. The difference is due to privatization and restructuring efforts. Al-Ahram, June 10, 2001.
8. Total credit increased from 20 percent of total GNP in 1990 to 40 percent in 1997 due to enormous influx of funds into the banking sector. Preference in giving credit was to larger firms on the assumption that smaller ones pose higher risk .Due to absence of risk assessment capabilities preference was given to using physical assets as collateral over the potential of the project, which requires careful analysis of the project cash flow. Sherif Delawar, Al-Ahram Decembr 29, 2001. According to the Governor of the Central Bank this situation has been rectified, AlAllam Elyoum Jan, 20, 2002.
9. In 1999 a report by the Central Agency for Accounts has pointed out a number of irregularities in the credit policy of a number of public sector banks such as concentration of credit among a few large customers, inactive loan collection, inadequate collaterals and over reliance on physical collaterals rather than on earning capacity. Interview with the Governor of Central Bank, Al-Ahram, June, 2001.

   In the stock market, 70 percent of stock dealings are between individuals and the rest is institutional. This leads to instability because trading decisions are not carefully weighed. Al- Ahram, May 12,2001.
10. A case in point is Cairo Bank where in June 2000 a total of 37 big clients accounted for 53.1 percent of total credit. Inadequate collateral means transferring the risk to the bank when you give the client loans that exceeded their capabilities. This encouraged clients to unwisely widen and diversify their activities and go into areas they are not equipped to handle. A number of these clients, after failing to pay off their debt decided to flee the country. Sout Eloma, 6/6/2001.
11. Specialized banks which are charged with developmental or welfare tasks are

often more subject to inefficiency considerations than commercial banks which are more strictly controlled by the Central Bank. These include Industrial Development Bank, Real Estate Bank and Agricultuarl Development Bank. Some of these banks charge extremely high interest rates on loans, are highly inefficient and the degree of achievement of their objectives are highly questionable. The Industrial Development Bank obtains some of its funds in the form foreign grants or soft loans to re-lend them at a very high interest rate. (Akhbar Elyoum, 22 Feb, 2003)

12. In 1991 the Egyptian pound was equivalent to .3 to the dollar. In 1999 it went down by 1.9 percent. From October 1999 until October 2000 it went down by 3.8 percent and then went down in December 2001 to .222 to the dollar. (Ahmed Elsayed Elnaggar, Crises of the Egyptian Foreign Market, Al-Ahram 4/1/2002. Egyptian companies which had foreign operations or export activities were able to sustain the effects of devaluation. Their dollar-denominated foreign debt was compensated for by revenues from foreign subsidiaries or sale of foreign assets. An example is Orascom-Telecom which has subsidiaries in several Arab and African countries. Oriental Weavers has over 50 percent of its revenues in dollars. On the other hand, the devaluation burdened companies whose business depended in imprts. Ahram Weekly, 12-16 August, 2001.
13. A strategy of restructring has been adopted in the public sector and in some private companies. One important ingredient of this strategy is downsizing through early retirement and freezing of employment. Estimates of the size of redundant employment in the public sector ranges between 15 and 30 percent and it is much higher in the government proper. See Regui Assad, An Analysis of Compensation Programs for Redundant Workers in Egyptian Public Enterprises, Privatization, Performance and Reform, The Economic Research Forum for The Arab Countries, Iran and Turkey, 2001.
14. Egypt has a potential edge in IT industry because it is labor intensive and the local value added is high. The IT sector grew by 70 percent in 2000 against an over-all growth of just 3 to 5 percent. Egypt is considered to have a competitive advantage in the development of software for the export market. Total exports now are $50 million per year. It is expected this figure will be $500 by the year 2005. (Are Technology Producers prepared to compete, Business Monthly, September 2001, p.25.
15. Contradictory figures exist on major indicators such as unemployment, export, import, balance of payment deficit depending on the source and the meaning of these indicators. Akhbar Elyoum, May 27,2001.
16. The textile sector suffers from obsolescence of machinery and lack of skills in fashion design. Quality of dying and finishing are really low. One important component of the European cooperation program with the Egyptian government is to establish a textile technology center. Interview with the Minister of

Industry, Moustafa Elrefai, Ahram Weekly, 25-31, 2001.

17. The ceramics industry has succeeded because it has applied a coherent system of modern management with carefully selected resources in the form of locally based raw material combined with high technology, application of international standards of production and efficiency measures to reduce rejects and apply a low margin. Successful textile companies have combined a strategy of exports with the use of cheaper imported material and highly trained local labor with modern technology. Exporting enables producers to produce at least 10000 pieces of a certain design, while the local market does not allow more than 3000.In this sense, exporting allows more efficiency. Also, in exporting there is immediate payment while in the local market there is more reliance on credit. So, the liquidity situation and availability of foreign exchange for export – oriented companies are much better than locally-oriented companies. Al-Ahram, January 19,2002(opinions of experts).

Intense competition in the telecommunication field has forced Mobinil to diversify internationally and to apply efficiency measures to lower cost such as controlling operational expenses, development of human resources and reduction of debt obligations in hard currency.) AlAllam Elyoum, annual repotrt of Mobinil, 28/4/2002) ■

# Understanding the Cultural Differences Between Americans and Arabs: The Egyptian Case

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## The Key to building Cross-Cultural Effectiveness

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**Abstract**

*Cross-cultural competency requires awareness of other cultures values and gaining intercultural skills which improves human relationships and minimizes cultural conflicts. This text examines how different characteristics are viewed and dealt with from both the American and Egyptian perspectives and how they affect attitudes, behaviors, and management styles in multicultural Egyptian and American business dealings.*

**Cross-Cultural Differences**

Cross-Culture competency, the successful negotiation of different cultures in an international environment, is a key issue in today's global business setting. Competing in an economy where everything is global, dealing with culturally diverse managers, employees, trainees, customers and suppliers necessitate individuals' paying closer attention to developing cross-cultural competency. This includes a cultural empathy, including both on-the-job and personal styles, which are necessary to supplement managerial, communication and technical skills.[1]

That mix of skills is essential in building relationships across cultures and providing strategies for developing a high performance multicultural team. One's degree of cultural competency can lead either to the success, improved effectiveness of individuals, and greater opportunities for synergy or can lead to restricted career opportunities, cultural shock and failure when people are unable or unwilling to recognize and appreciate other cultures' distinctiveness.[2]

To be effective in an international or intercultural working environment, one needs to be aware of underlying values and assumptions of other cultures. The first step is to be aware of your own cultural values and assumptions. Once you know what makes you "American", "Egyptian", "German" or "Chinese", it becomes easier to be open to the values and assumptions of the cultures you work in, understand them in their own context, effectively communicate and interact with, and become able to tolerate their differences.

Becoming culturally aware is the first step in the process of learning intercultural skills.[3] Much of the work in the area of understanding cultural differences has suggested a range of dimensions in making comparisons between cultures. The comparative model designed by Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961 & 1973) distinguished six basic cultural orientations which may be exhibited differently by various cultural groups. These orientations comprise the nature of people whether good or evil, their relationships to nature whether they are dominant or in harmony with nature, their relationship to other people whether they are individualists or collectivists, their relationship to activities whether they have a doing or a being culture, their focus of human activity whether they are past, present or future-oriented societies, and finally, their conception of space whether it is private, public or a mixed-oriented interpretations about space. [4]

Hall (1976 & 1984) also developed a model to interpret communications in reference to the context and intended meaning transmitted in which he differentiated between high-context cultures in countries like Japan, China, Korea, and the Middle East and low-context cultures in countries like Germany, Switzerland, and the United States (Mead 1994: 56-60). Hofstede's research (1991 & 1984) goes furthermore to compare how work-related attitudes differ across cultures. Hofstede made a survey in IBM branches on 116,000 employees in fifty countries among which were the United States and Egypt. Different cultures were compared on the basis of four criteria: Power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism versus collectivism, and masculinity versus femininity all of which can have practical implications for managers,[5] who ought to consistently monitor shifts in these dimensions to be able to structure their operations in the right way. Economic development, for example has a significant effect on the collectivist values of cultures. Economic development reduces the person's dependence on the group and increases the degree of his individualism. Hofstede's studies also showed evidence of a positive correlation between collectivist cultures and poorer countries. [6]

The following text examines the major cultural differences between Americans and Egyptians. A brief introduction on Egypt and what shaped its unique culture is followed by an analysis of several cultural characteristics, and how these characteristics are viewed and dealt with differently in Egypt and America. The representations made in this publication are by their very nature stereotypical. Neither all Americans nor all Egyptians exhibit these characteristics exclusively. Information provided in this publication is meant to be a general reference, which has been distilled from the education, experience, and observations of the authors, who have each lived and worked in both American and Egyptian cultures. While many of these characteristics are interrelated and sometimes difficult to separate in their behavior manifestation, in this publication we examine each independently for clarification purpose.

**Egyptian History**

Egypt, an ancient and proud civilization, a nation of more than 65 million people, is geographically situated in North-East Africa. Egypt is the most populous country in the Arab world and the second-most populous on the African Continent. The Egyptians are fairly homogeneous people with Mediterranean and Arab influences appearing in the north, and some mixing in the south with the Nubians of northern Sudan.[7] Ethnic minorities include a small number of Bedouin Arab nomads in the eastern and western deserts and in the Sinai. Egypt has used its excellent location, vast and rich culture, size, religion, and political system to position itself and play an important role in the area, and to become a major gateway to Africa and the Middle East.[8]

Egypt's culture has been shaped by many factors: its rich ancient history, a long history of colonialism, especially the French and British colonialism, several wars, and its strategic location. All these factors shaped in one way or another the Egyptian culture. Another element that had a big impact on culture was major changes occurring in the Egyptian economic system. During the 50s and 60s Egypt adopted a socialist approach to its economy in which enterprises were state-owned and decisions were centrally taken, thereby impacting the Egyptian mentality, personality and culture. Starting the mid 70s, Egypt adopted the open-door policy, that embraced western culture through education, joint development programs, and joint venture agreements.[9]

In line with these developments, and Economic Reform Program supported by international organizations like the USAID, the World Bank and the IMF started in the early 1990s to restructure the economy and enhance liberalization, privatization, and the entrepreneurial spirit. Legislations were introduced which provided incentives for private investment (domestic and foreign), opened foreign trade to private companies, and eliminated most controls on worker emigration.[10] This resulted in an interactive interface between Egyptian and Western culture that was

boosted through education, joint development programs, and joint ventures agreements.[11] These and other various factors contributed to the differentiation and emergence of sub-cultures in the Egyptian society.

The following three are the most distinguishable sub-cultures existing in the Egyptian business environment:

1. **Government Sub-Culture:** This was the most dominant culture in the 50s and 60s, a very rigid and conservative culture that was eased with the new shifts to privatization and globalization.[12]
2. **Family Owned Sub-Culture:** Egyptian family – owned business and merchants have long endured in the Egyptian economy. They were historically the most resistant to western infiltration of their identity and culture; however the new generation's (Children or Grand Children) exposure to western education is likely to ease such cultural resistance.[13]
3. **Emerging Westernized Sub-Culture:** The sub-culture of Egyptian businessmen who have been exposed to western education have acquired new characteristics which mix their root ethics with new management styles. They are the top managers of most joint-venture companies and have proved very successful in managing their companies in the Egyptian market.[14]

The different sub-cultures emerging in the Egyptian business environment are however still operating within major historical Egyptian cultural traits and characteristics that are viewed and dealt with differently in America and other western countries.[15] The major differences in sixteen cultural aspects in the two countries are as follows:

**Cultural Characteristics**

1. **Individualism, sense of self and space:** Cultures differ in the way they define personal identity and uniquely validate self. The comfort one has with self, self-identity and appreciation can be expressed differently within cultures. While most of the world identifies strongly with membership in a group, such as one's family or clan, some cultures base personal identity on independent, individual attributes (Fatehi 1996:195-196). Examination of previous literature,[16] revealed that there is consensus that cultural differences act in close relation with time to affect group structure, performance and outcomes.[17] For example, according to Earley (1993), people's performance with a group is affected by the degree of their individualism or collectivism. In fact, collectivists tend to achieve less in an individual work context whereas individualists perform less effectively when working in a collectivist work context than when working alone. This suggests that managers ought to understand that more coordination among culturally diverse groups is necessary for greater synergy.[18]

   In their research Sosik & Jung (2002) went further to identify conditions favorable for work-group development. Results of their study in both the U.S

and Korean samples, thereby representing the most individualistic and collectivistic cultures respectively, suggest, opposite to earlier studies,[19] that in most organizations including those ones in individualistic cultures, managers might think of using workgroups as a proper means to carry out organizational duties. In fact, in their study, Sosik & Jung reported higher levels of functional heterogeneity, group potency, preference for teamwork, group performance and outcome expectations for workgroups in individualistic cultures like the United States than in collectivistic cultures in Korea. This implies that managers ought to meticulously understand cross-cultural differences to be able to improve group achievement. [20]

The American social culture is an outcome of **individualistic** behavior: Americans value individual identity and independence over groups or shared identity. Americans were ranked the highest (rank numbers: 1-highest, 53-lowest) in Hofstede's country rankings on the individualism dimension.[21] Obligations are few and social bonds are fairly flexible and loose. Motivation is typically achievement – or power – based, and tasks take priority over relationships. Speaking one's mind is encouraged, respected and viewed as a sign of honesty.[22] Americans, have a sense of space that requires more distance between the individual and others, they are direct, open, and self-reliant.[23]

Egyptians on the other hand are **Collectivistic:** they tend to get much closer and demonstrate a conformative behavior. Egyptians, like other Arabs were ranked 26-7 in Hofstede's country rankings on the individualism dimension.[24] They subjugate individual interests to group interests, and they value group harmony, family, relationships, and spirituality over efficiency. Personal identity is defined by groups to which an individual belongs, and harmony is valued over speaking one's mind. Conformity to group standards, policies and procedures is expected. Motivation is affiliation – and security based, and relationships are more important than tasks. Managers' roles in collectivist cultures emphasize coordination and teamwork to produce a supportive working environment.[25]

2. **Communication and Language:** value orientations to communication frequently differ very subtly, but can cause a multitude of problems in sales, negotiation, teamwork, etc. The communication system, verbal and nonverbal, distinguishes one group from another.[26] The presence of so many different languages world wide (3000 languages and 10,000 dialects) affect how people from different cultural groups communicate and perceive each others values and beliefs. In doing business across cultures, the ability to communicate and perform business transactions through a common language is considered a competitive advantage.[27] Nonverbal communication by means other than language include several forms among which are facial expressions, eye contact, body positioning, walking behavior, interpersonal distance, etc.[28] Such various forms account for 80-90 percent of information conveyed among people

within a certain culture.[29] Meanings given to gestures, for example, often differ by culture. Pointing to someone, smiling or raising your voice has different impacts in different cultures. So, while body language may be universally acknowledged, its manifestations differ by locality. Subcultures, such as military, have terminology and signals that cut across national boundaries (such as a salute, or the rank system).[30] It is well to note that when dealing with Egyptians one should refrain from showing his soles when sitting since it is considered offensive. Egyptians will respond with "Yes", which can simply mean, "Yes, I hear you" but it does not necessarily mean "Yes, I agree". Misunderstandings, however, are likely to occur because of cultural differences which exist in the meaning transmitted through nonverbal languages.[31] It is essential therefore in dealing with people from different cultures to take time to assure that the right message is being conveyed.[32]

Americans prefer an **Instrumental** culture: communication is used to reach objective and unemotional conclusions; and the accuracy of communication, rather than its appropriateness or style, is stressed. What is said is more important than how it is said. Displays of emotions are regarded as being unprofessional and irrational. Egyptians are more **Expressive.** Relationships are centered and individuals readily display emotions. Affectionate body language is an acceptable form of behavior among acquaintances.[33] Eloquence and subtlety of expression may be highly valued.[34] Americans are **Informal.** Informal cultures value change and progress over historical tradition and continuity. Informal cultures are uncomfortable with social or power differences and prefer a relaxed, friendly atmosphere when doing business.[35] Egyptians are more **Formal.** They value social customs and rituals and respect rules and procedures. Formal cultures have a strong sense of history and tradition. It is important to be conscious of the social hierarchy and observe established business protocol when doing business within formal cultures.[36] For example it is preferable and appreciated to know some Arabic phrases when doing business in Egypt.[37] Although it may take longer to build a relationship developed in a formal culture, the relationship may be deeper and more permanent once in place.[38]

3. **Dress and Appearance:** This includes the outward garments and adornments, or lack thereof, as well as body decorations that tend to be distinctive by culture.[39] Many Egyptian women participating in the work force wear the veil adhering to Islamic value. May subcultures wear distinctive clothing: the "organization-man" look of business, the jeans of the youth culture throughout the world, and uniforms that segregate everyone from students to police. Egyptian businessmen and government officials tend to be more **Conservative** than their counterparts in the west, who tend to be more **Casual**. For example, while we may see casually dressed US presidents, the Egyptian President is

seldom seen without a suit and tie.[40]

4. **Food and Feeding Habits:** The manner in which food is selected, prepared, presented, and eaten often differs by culture. One man's pet is another person's delicacy. Americans love beef, yet it is prohibited to Hindus. The forbidden food in Moslem cultures is normally pork, which is eaten extensively in America. Alcohol, similar to pork, due to religious sensitivities should preferably be avoided while dining with Moslem Egyptian counterparts. Feeding habits also differ, and the range goes from hands and chop sticks to full sets of cutlery. When Egyptians invite somebody to dinner or lunch in hotels and restaurants it is common that they will pay for their guests. Egyptians expect the same when they are invited by their partners.[41] Americans, on the other hand, might invite somebody for a meal but might not offer to pay. In such case, the guest should be ready to pay for his own meal.
5. **Time and Time Consciousness:** A culture's use of time imparts powerful information about how members of the culture relate to each other and the world around them. Sense of time differs by culture: some are exact and others are relative. Different concepts of time among cultures can lead to bad relationships between business partners and wrong decisions by both groups with regards to agreement requirements which eventually may lead to dispute.[42] In some cultures, promptness is determined by age or status: thus, in some countries like Egypt, subordinates are expected on time at staff meetings, but the boss may be the last to arrive. Setting deadlines, in fact, is how Americans approach critical or relatively important business matters (Hall 1960), and "time is money" is their general approach towards time.[43] While in American business, people are usually prompt and accurate in their business appointments, they must acknowledge that Egyptians sometimes move at their own pace: "Egyptian time" can be frustrating to westerners. Some subcultures, like the military, have their own time system.[44]

   In some cultures, trying to fix a deadline is considered rude, overly demanding, and impelling.[45] Time is not divisible into minutes or seconds and the Arab time, in general is affected by religious values. For example, it is common to find the word "Inshaallah" in chatting with Egyptians to imply uncertainty of meeting deadlines as promised if it is not God's will. In contrast, Americans believe that God's will has nothing to do with what gets done. It is human will and sincere intentions that determine what gets done.[46] It is, therefore, important in business agreements between Americans and Egyptians that managers learn to adjust to each others perception of time and punctuality to prevent disappointments that are likely to arise because of misunderstandings of local time.[47]

   Americans are **Monochronic**; they are highly committed to doing one task at a time and meeting set deadlines.[48] Americans monochromic temporal tendency positively influences group performance and competitiveness within business

organizations as employees are more occupied with understanding the requirements of their duties.[49] Devising and then adhering to a detailed plan or schedule is highly valued. Punctuality is defined precisely and time is sliced into fixed categories such as seconds, minutes, and hours. One's time is scheduled and managed in great detail at work and at home, and "wasting time" is unethical. Individuals tend to focus on tasks rather than relationships.[50] Egyptians are more **Polychronic**: they tend to perform multiple tasks simultaneously with a higher commitment to relationship building than to task completion or meeting deadlines,[51] which negatively affects their group performance and competitiveness.[52] Tasks are accomplished through building strong relationships rather than creating detailed plans. Punctuality is defined in looser terms as some delays are expected and deadlines can be adjusted. Whereas "soon" to an American usually means in the next few minutes, hours or days, "soon" to an Egyptian may mean three days or even weeks, or whenever they are ready. Time is not fixed but rather an organic, flowing process.[53]

6. **Work Habits and Practices (e.g. Rewards and Recognitions):** Other dimensions for examining a group's culture are attitudes toward work, the dominant types of work, the division of work, sharing of work information, and the work habits or practices, such as promotions or rewards. For some cultures, the worthiness of the activity is narrowly measured in terms of income produced, or the worth of the individual is assessed in terms of job status.[54]

   In Egypt, where a religious view of work still prevails, work is viewed as an act of service to God and people, and is expressed in a moral commitment to the job or quality of effort. It is recommended, therefore, when doing business in Egypt that an understanding of Islamic faith and customs is attained.[55] The cultural loyalty to family is transferred to the organization that employs the person and the quality of one's performance. Work habits are however somewhat contradictory. Whereas Egyptian social culture encourages group work and team participation, we find that individualism is an obvious trend in the Egyptian business culture. Individualism could take different shapes and exist for various reasons among which are lack of security and need for power. This might include holding technical information tight in order to gain more prestige and attention especially in Government and Military subcultures. Key personnel in these subcultures, who have learned to perform new techniques or complicated procedures, might hold on to this information for themselves fearing that losing the font of knowledge to others would compromise the power edge they perceive they have in their environment. Considering the nature of work, we find that work usually requires considerable expenditure of**Physical Energy**.[56] However, America, being the example, more **Emotional and Mental Energy** is necessary because the nature and tools of work have changed due to the availability of new technologies in the form of computerized systems, automa-

tion, robots, etc. New conceptions of work are evolving, and shift in work is away from material production to nonmaterial goods, like information processing and service. The emphasis is upon quality of work life – the "worth ethic" now considers an employee's worth beyond the job. Emphasis is placed upon results and final output which is achieved through cooperation and team work. Therefore, no matter how diverse the backgrounds, cultures and personal objectives are, the need for cooperation and team working is dominant.

7. **Relationships:** Cultures tend to categorize human and organizational relationships by age, sex, status, and degree of kindred, as well as by wealth, power, and wisdom. The family unit is the most common expression of this characteristic. In some cultures, the authoritarian figure in the family is the head male, and this fixed relationship is then extended from home to community, and explains why some societies prefer to have a dictator head the "national family".[57] Relationships between and among people vary by category – in some cultures, the elderly are honored, whereas in others they are ignored; in some cultures, women wear veils and appear deferential, while in others they are the female is considered the equal, if not the superior of the male.[58]

   Egyptian business people, much more so than in the west, cultivate and nourish relationships with family, friends, neighbors, and co-workers. Not surprisingly, nepotism is common in many Egyptian organizations. On the other hand, Egyptian culture is exemplified by high power distance, characterized by acceptance of a superior's opinion simply because it emanates from one's superior. For example, research findings demonstrate that because of the hierarchical structure of the Egyptian society, and the Arab society in general, any change in information technology should come from top management otherwise resistance among employees might occur.[59]

   Americans, on the other hand, define the family in terms of the nuclear family, mainly the father, mother and offspring. The American culture, in addition, refuses to allow favoritism displayed to friends or relatives in business. As an individualistic culture, the U.S. culture encourages self-esteem, individual authority and accountability, and stresses personal accomplishments and individual talents. In fact, in less stratified societies like the U.S. hiring and promotion procedures seek the most qualified employees regardless of their class or other attributes.[60]

8. **Values and Norms:** The need systems of cultures vary, as do the priorities they attach to certain behavior in the group. Those operating on a survival level value the gathering of food, adequate covering and shelter; while those with high security needs value material things, money, job titles, as well as law and order. America is a country of values revolution as the concern is more for higher values, like the quality of life, self-fulfillment, and meaning in experiences. In any event, from its value system, a culture sets norms of behavior for members

of that society. Some cultures in the west require high levels of honesty and integrity in dealing, while others do not share these values. While saving face is hardly recognized in the U.S., it is of utmost importance in the Egyptian culture. Egyptians hate to say NO, a phenomenon, which may appear to westerners as dishonest and lacking integrity, but is instead the result of a strong desire to preserve harmony.[61] Establishing a harmonious business environment in a different country whose culture is different from one's own country requires, thereby, mutual respect of values, beliefs and superstitions of various cultures.[62] Examples of areas of business decisions disputes among different cultures could be employment rules, systems, human rights, customer support, and environmental and societal responsibility, as well as political behavior in other societies.[63]

Values undertaken by different cultures also shape their attitudes toward time, age, education, and status which, in turn, affect international business opportunities at hand within a given culture. Understanding the role of cultural differences in international business is of great significance if a company aspires for cultural competency.[64] For example, in some_anthropological studies of products like television and its effect on some villagers in upper Egypt, it was found out that, quite the opposite of what was used to be thought of as local culture, some Egyptian cultural values such as women's education or the right age of marriage are products of the mass-mediated cultural texts transmitted through Egyptian television signals. This, in turn, explains how "culture" is viewed not only as a concept that reveals common feelings and practices, but also as something whose component parts are produced, regulated, and transmitted nationwide.[65]

In the context of her work on understanding the dynamics of intercultural communication and differences in value orientations, Professor Ting-Toomey (1992) developed her face-negotiation theory and applied its implications to business management customs. She also tested the theory's implications in both Eastern and Western cultures specifically in terms of Hofstede's individualism-collectivism dimension in understanding organizational management habits. Professor Ting-Toomey, as well as other researchers believed that this dimension is the most informative about cultural variations between eastern and western countries since it is associated with the idea of personality. For example, while individualistic cultures (western countries) stress the "I" identity, collectivistic cultures (eastern cultures) give more importance to the "We" identity. Professor Ting-Toomey work on face-negotiation highlights the need for greater efforts in multi-cultural research to identify unknown cultural core constructs. Her work also emphasizes the importance of developing listening skills of people who do business overseas especially in high context societies where listening involves the eyes and the

heart in addition to the ears.[66]

Some researchers, however, found out that cultural differences and the resulting conflict management behaviors can not be merely accounted for in terms of the Individualism-collectivism cultural aspect since it combines several values and viewpoints, thereby, makes low correlation between certain values and performance, and even obscures the relationship between them.[67] Even, in one culture there might be many variations in one cultural aspect. For example, despite the fact that Egyptian culture, being part of the Arab society, tend to emphasize values like fatalism, compliance, charity, and collectivity, recently greater weight is placed on open-mindedness and creativity.[68]

9. **Environment, Beliefs and Attitudes:** Possibly the most difficult classification is ascertaining the major belief themes of a culture, and how these and other factors influence their attitudes toward themselves, others, and actions in their world. Cultures operate with dissimilar orientations as to the locus of control in the world. While some cultures believe that individuals and groups can control their own environment and therefore determine their future, others believe that the events in a person's life are determined by chance, fate, or supernatural force. People in all cultures seem to have a concern for the supernatural that is evident in their religions and religious practices. Religious traditions in various cultures consciously or unconsciously influence attitudes toward life, death, and the hereafter.[69]

Egyptians as Moslems generally do not question events and are more likely to accept the uncertainties of life. Egyptians tend more towards **Constraint Culture**; they believe that it is presumptuous to claim direct control over any part of the environment, including a business. External forces, the cycles of time, and resource limitations are often seen as more influential than personal actions. Because of the presumed power of external forces planning is rarely detailed. Things are accomplished through relationships rather than through monitoring and control systems.[70]

Americans have a **Control Culture.** They believe that the environment, including other people, can be molded to fit human needs. The future can be planned for and therefore a high value is placed on implementing systematic organizing, monitoring, and control systems in order to achieve goals and objectives. Plans tend to be precise, task-centered, and aimed at producing measurable results. Problems are opportunities just waiting for solutions and should be attacked head-on.[71] Attitudes expressed in gift-giving; rituals for birth, death, and marriage; and guidelines for privacy, [72] showing respect or deference, and expressing good manners differ tremendously from one culture to another. Attitudes however are often different in different sub-cultures.[73] For example, in Egypt, while tipping is accepted in the tourism and food service business, tipping should never be considered with government officials

or business people.[74] Also, in Egypt gift giving is a usual habit which might be expected in a business meeting. Gifts should not be expensive. Nevertheless, they should convey some meaning. It is also likely that Egyptian businessmen or government executives give gifts to their partners in business negotiations.

10. **Action:** Action refers to a person's relationship to activities, not whether they are active per se. The distinction between doing and being cultures lies in whether one's activity is task driven or relationship driven. Americans have a **Doing Culture:** they stress achieving goals and improving standards of living. In business, performance objectives are determined, performance is measured against set standards, and rewards are given on the basis of goal achievement. Spending time with other people tends to revolve around some shared activity. Individuals define themselves by what they do for a living.[75]
    On the other hand, Egyptians are a **Being Culture:** they stress their affiliations and personal qualities. Greater value is placed on quality of life and relationships than on task accomplishment. Job satisfaction and motivation are based more on the quality of organizational life than on the promise of rewards. Spending time with other people is an activity in and of itself. Individuals define themselves in terms of their affiliations.[76]
11. **Power Distance:** Egyptians operate in **Hierarchical Cultures**, they promote centralized power and authority and the maintenance of tightly controlled hierarchical social and organizational structures. Managers tend to make unilateral decisions and work does not bypass the chain of command. Inequality among hierarchical levels is accepted and managers are expected to behave in ways that reinforce their more powerful standing.[77] Managers' power over employees is seen as more effective than reward mechanisms.[78]
    On the other hand, Americans operate in **Equality Cultures**: they dislike inequality and therefore attempt to minimize conditions where it exists. Power is decentralized and organizations tend to be flatter. People believe that power and privileges should be earned, not automatically given to persons who occupy certain positions. Managers are consultant figures more so than authority figures, they promote information sharing, often seek participative decision making among their employees, and give employees a substantial amount of leeway in implementing plans and performing tasks.[79] American employees, therefore, manage their work independently and dislike direct supervision.[80]
12. **Competitiveness:** While some cultures stress job and material success, others are more concerned with the quality of life. Americans have a **Competitive** nature; they value ambition, decisiveness, initiative, performance, speed, and size. Achievement, performance, and the acquisition of money and material goods are high motivators. The ethos is "We live to work". Whenever possible, results are quantified and compared, and success is measured in finite terms (profits, goal achievement, etc.).[81] Relating this to the impact of

cultural differences on conflict management behaviors, we find that Americans' inclination towards self achievement is behind their tendency to undertake a competing approach to resolute conflicts in workplace.[82]

Egyptians have a more **Cooperative** nature. They value quality of life, sympathy, nurturing, and relationships. Job satisfaction, quality of life, and interdependence are of greater concern than material acquisition. The ethos is "We work to live". Success is measured in broader terms than profit or task achievement; i.e. service.[83]

13. **Structure:** Structure refers to the extent to which member of a culture feel uncomfortable with or threatened by ambiguity and uncertainty.[84] Egyptians, being part of the Arab world rank high on the Uncertainty Avoidance Index, UAI (UAI is used to classify countries into clusters that will act similarly in business circumstances). Egyptian managers, therefore, express preferential attitudes towards rules and regulations, clear-cut instructions and specifically assigned tasks.[85] The Egyptian culture is a high **Order** culture, it attempts to reduce ambiguity and uncertainty and make events predictable and interpretable. They view conflict and change as threatening and perceive a need for rules, regulations, and procedures. Members of order cultures feel stress in the face of uncertainty, resist change, and are less willing to take risks.[86]

    The American culture is a more **Flexible** culture which is more tolerant of ambiguous situations, unknown people, and new ideas. Americans, in contrast to Egyptians' UAI score of 86 have a low score of 46 implying more difficulty in abiding by strict frameworks or specific instructions which probably might cause some cultural disagreements between business managers.[87] Conflict and change are viewed as natural and inevitable rather than threatening. Pragmatism is a dominant philosophy, and people are more willing to take calculated risks.[88]

14. **Thinking: Deductive** oriented cultures like Egypt emphasize ideas, moral values, theories, principles, and abstract thinking. The conceptual world, symbolic thinking, and the powers of thought per se are valued over the amassing of facts. The focus is on the Why rather than the What or How.

    **Inductive** oriented cultures like America prefer to derive principles and theories from amassing facts and analyzing data. Empirical observation and experimentation are valued, and much faith is placed in methodologies and measurement. The focus is on the cost and benefits associated with alternative courses of action.

    Americans tend to be **Linear**; when confronted with a problem, they break the problem into small chunks that can be linked in chains of cause and effect. Detail, precision, and pragmatic results are stressed. Egyptians tend to be more **Systemic**; when confronted with a problem, systemic-oriented cultures utilize a holistic approach whereby they focus on the whole and the relationships or connections between parts of the whole.[89]

15. **Religion**: The influence of religion on most societies is enormous. Not only does it affect people's relationship to each other in one society, but also it shapes its upholders attitudes toward work habits and practices, consumption patterns, individual attributes, future orientations, as well as the prevailing business environment.[90] Egypt is a country which is culturally identified with Arab-Islamic civilization. Religion plays a fundamental role in the way most Egyptians think, and act, particularly in traditional group interactions...it is a way of life for most Egyptians, as it is their essence of security with self, others, and what will happen next; i.e. the future. Religion for most Egyptians is what shaped the hierarchical nature of the Egyptian culture today and the unquestionable acceptance of authority.[91] The ultimate impact of religion is indeed enormous: it is what created many dependencies on others (family, friends, etc.) for all types and levels of personal support. It is for these reasons that fear of the unknown, and uneasiness with change render the planning for the future as an uncomfortable exercise; hence curtailing one's vision and aspirations to only in the immediate short-term.[92]
Egyptians, in general, will take willingly knowledge that does not oppose their Islamic principles, and in comparison to other Arab countries, they are more receptive to Western concepts. For example, the movements of some Islamic fundamentalist towards religious revival in Egypt few decades ago do not refuse the country's efforts towards improvements in industrialization, development, technology advancements, etc. as these are necessary for modernization.
On the other hand, in America, religion does play such an important role, in the same sense as in Egypt. Religion is important to many Americans, as it provides them with a sense of togetherness and a personal value system, which defines their relationships with others. The attributes of honesty, commitment, fairness, tell only the truth (even if it hurts), directness, and freedom of speech emerge from religious tenets. The United States Constitution is explicitly founded on these norms, but the approach the forefathers took was to separate religion (as a practice) from the affairs of the state. This was done in order to allow effective governance in the face of obvious societal diversity. It was probably the only successful mechanism that could work, given the multitude of ethnic, religious, and origin diversities in just about every aspect that make up the American social system. The practice of religion itself is therefore held as a private and personal matter; hence group dependency gives way to self-dependency. The resultant is individualistic approaches to life (social, business, etc.) but with fundamental religious norms that define relationships among people.[93]
16. **Humor:** Humor is imbedded in the Egyptian Culture as a mechanism to say what might otherwise be unacceptable, instead of confronting people directly. It provides a way to maintain harmony in high context society. As a coping mechanism, it lifts people's spirit from day-to-day harshness and relieves

them from pressures. In business dealings, humor is often used to send messages and communicate with employees. In the American society however, involving humor as a mechanism of business communications is generally considered unprofessional, and humor is typically reserved for use outside business relationships.[94]

**Cultural Differences and Management Styles:**

Cultural differences among nations critically affect their attitudes and management styles towards business conducted and are reflected in management systems differentiated patterns. In his studies, Hofstede discussed the implications of cultural variations in terms of motivation, leadership, and organization.[95] For example, countries operating in hierarchical cultures are more likely to dislike flatter organizations.[96] Research reveals that cultures that value greater power distance prefer centralized decision-making and less delegation of authorities.[97] On the contrary, low power-distance cultures are more likely to be formalized, decentralized, have a narrow span of control, and are organized by function.[98]

Sustaining an organizations competitive advantage, therefore, requires shaping its culture through effective communication, problem solving, appropriate reward systems to desired behaviors, etc., all of which highlight the importance of the role of strategic leaders in sustaining an effective organizational culture.

Because of cultural variations, different managerial concepts, however, might cause ineffective business interactions, which cause disappointment for participating individuals and reduced business performance. For example, while American managers believe in employee empowerment, Greek or Egyptian subordinates expect orders from their superiors. As a result, both the Americans and the Egyptians become unable to understand each other because of differences in their cultural expectations.[99] Another example here would be challenges facing successful information technology transfer to Arab countries. Because information technology was mainly designed and produced in conformity with western social and cultural systems, great cultural and social impediments are encountered when attempts are made to implement technology transfer in developing countries.[100] Therefore, understanding values underlying cultural differences assists managers, especially of joint ventures, to deal efficiently and objectively with conflicts between managers from different cultures that might be otherwise mistakenly ascribed to personal attributes or purposes.[101]

The effect of cultural differences on the way management functions are performed across societies is also considerable. In high context and collectivist cultures where cooperation and group loyalty are more valued and where cultural clues like nonverbal behavior and situation are as important as words in identifying the intended meaning spoken, personal relationships and building trust with business partners are more important in carrying out negotiations and business

contracts. In Egyptian dealings, business discussions are often initiated by engaging into a general chat about family or friends in addition to other informal topics.[102] In contrast, in low context and individualist cultures where individual initiatives and decision-making are preferred, more emphasis is placed on explicit information, personal relationships with business partners are less important and business negotiations rapidity depend on the terms of business deals.[103] It is, therefore, that marketing messages customized to low context cultures like in the United States tend to be fact oriented whereas those messages customized to high context cultures like Egypt are typically more emotion oriented.[104]

People's work roles and managers' authority inside and outside the organization differ also due to their cultural differences. Egyptians, or the Arabs in general, tend to extend role models even outside their work fields. Managers' work and private life are not separate. Good managers are also concerned about other people in the family and are more likely to solve problems for their subordinates. On the other hand, the Americans are more likely to dispatch their roles as superiors in their daily work from their roles outside the organization as soon as they step out of their offices. Managers' authority is not extended to non-business settings. People in conflict in work settings might be good friends off the job.[105]

To sustain efficiency and effectiveness in international business transactions despite many national cultural variables, skillful international negotiators ought to use team assistance by carefully representing business meetings with managers from different cultures.[106] Also, more companies in one country are urged to provide their employees with negotiation training about other countries' history, cultural dimensions, business strategies,[107] as well as their silent language and subtle cues overseas business.[108] Much care must also be taken at the face-to-face meeting between parties from different cultures who also will generally hold different expectations about negotiation stages. For example, at the negotiation table, while Americans might spend from five to ten minutes in non task sounding to discuss topics other than business before engaging in international business negotiations, Egyptians will spend a large time in such preliminary talk to learn about their partner's background and interests to avoid problems that might develop in later stages of negotiation.[109]

**The Greatest Challenge: Gaining Cross-Cultural Experience**

Understanding the general applicability of cross-cultural issues helps one to gain new insights for improving human relationships, boosting intercultural communication, and minimizing any potential for cultural conflicts and clashes in multicultural Egyptian-American business dealings.

Winners are the ones who can develop and enrich their cross-cultural experience by identifying their own core values and the basic dimensions that shape their culture, while at the same time being completely aware of the key cultural differences and

their impact on the social and business dealings in the global marketplace.

Successful cross-cultural persons will be those who appreciate the values of other cultures while at the same time retaining and perhaps reshaping their own set of values. They will resemble a tree that has strong roots and branches but flexible twigs and leaves that can adapt to the sunny, stormy, or windy external, cultural-driven environment.

**American-Egyptian Cultural Value Orientations: A Summary**

| Cultural Variable | American Cultural Value | Egyptian Cultural Value |
|---|---|---|
| Individualism, sense of self and space | Individualistic | Collectivistic |
| Communication and Language | Instrumental, Informal | Expressive, formal |
| Dress and Appearance | More casual | More conservative |
| Food and feeding habits | Diversified | Pork and alcohol forbidden |
| Time and time consciousness | Monochromic | Polychronic |
| Work Habits and Practices | Emotional and mental energy, moral commitment to individuals | Physical energy, moral commitment to job |
| Relationships | Informal and friendly, value directness, openness | Value family and friends, nepotism |
| Values and norms | Honesty and integrity | Saving face |
| Environment, beliefs and attitudes | Control culture | constraint culture |
| Action | Doing culture | Being Culture |
| Distance power | Equality culture | Hierarchical culture |
| Competitiveness | Competitive | Cooperative |
| Structure | Flexible | Order |
| Thinking | Inductive, Linear | Deductive, Systemic |
| Religion | Personal, Implicit | Public, Explicit |
| Humour | Outside business dealings | Inside and outside business dealings |

**Endnotes**

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# Technology Transfer to Improve Manufacturing Competitiveness[1]

**Lotfi K. Gaafar, Ph.D. and Karim F. Saad**


## Abstract

*This paper presents part of an ongoing research aiming at investigating the use of technology transfer to improve the competitiveness of the manufacturing sector in Egypt. The paper addresses four main technology transfer issues including the identification of a key area that, if modernized, will have a significant positive impact on manufacturing competitiveness, assessing the current technology absorptive capacity of Egyptian firms in this key area, investigating the different channels of transferring technology, and recommending guidelines that will help Egyptian firms acquire valuable technology in the identified area.*


## 1. Introduction

The Egyptian economy is currently facing a great number of challenges due to the globalization process and the ever-increasing competition pressures. Adding to these challenges are the difficulties caused by the global economic recess and the poor performance of the Egyptian industry and its inability to export manufactured goods and gain access to international markets in a significant way. All of these challenges highlight the need for significant manufacturing and technological capacity upgrade.

However, for a real industrial and technological capacity building to occur, a country needs to transfer know-how, specifically manufacturing know-how, so that it can apply and produce the technologies itself. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) draft International Code on the transfer of technology defines technology as the "Systematic knowledge for the manufacture of a product, for the application of a process or for the rendering of a service". Knowledge should be seen as including both the technical knowledge and the organizational capacity. Technology transfer is further defined as "the process by which commercial technology is disseminated" (Chen 1996).

Many factors affect the success of technology transfer. In this paper, the main factors that are critical to the success of the technology transfer process are identified and discussed. These factors include the selection of an appropriate target industry (sector), the technological absorptive capacity of the recipient industry, the technology transfer channel, and the value of the transferred technology in terms of the expected benefits, and the costs associated with the transfer process.

In the remainder of this paper, Section 2 describes the selection of the targeted sector. Section 3 discusses the factors affecting the technological absorptive

capacity. Section 4 describes various technology transfer channels and discusses the main features of each channel. Section 5 discusses technology selection and valuing. Finally, Section 6 presents the main conclusions.

## 2. Sector Selection

Figure 1 depicts the value of Egyptian imports and exports over the period from 1995 to 2001. It is clear that imports far exceed exports, and while there is a slight increase in exports in 2000 and 2001, a significant deficit still exists.




Figure 1. Egyptian exports and imports from 1995 to 2001
(Source: World Bank 2003)

Another alarming statistic is the fact that high-technology exports represent less than 0.2% of Egyptian manufacturing exports (World bank 2003). High-technology exports are products with significant research and development content. They include aerospace products, computers, pharmaceuticals, scientific instruments, and electrical machinery.

Manufacturing activities rely on natural resources, labor, and equipment. Egypt has the first two, but is heavily dependent on importing the third. If machines are manufactured locally, it will serve a wide range of industries, decrease costs of production, save foreign currency, and Egypt will become more competitive in both local and global markets. According to the statistics of the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Trade, Egypt imported, in year 2000, machines and related equipment in excess of US$ 1.47 billion from five countries (USA, Germany, UK, Japan and Italy). A significant portion of this amount may be saved if machines and electro-mechanical equipment are manufactured locally.

Accordingly, the machine tool sector has been chosen for investigation in this research, as the literature indicates that if this sector is modernized it will have a positive impact on the industry. For example, one of the reasons behind the Indian progress in the pharmaceutical industry is that India encouraged from the very beginning pharmaceutical firms to manufacture their equipment locally (Mourshed,

1999). Also, according to Moubarak (2002) "building a modern machine tool industry is a critical factor for the modernization of the Egyptian industry."

Furthermore, Figure 2 shows the various reasons given by Chinese machine tool manufacturers for transferring technology. Improving competitiveness and access to markets directly account for over 69% of the reasons. The other reasons can also easily be linked to improving competitiveness and access to markets




Figure 2. Various reasons for transferring technology given by Chinese machine tool manufacturers.

Figure 2 supports the choice of the machine tool industry as a sector that could have a significant impact on improving the manufacturing competitiveness of Egypt.

## 3. Technology Absorptive Capacity

The technology absorptive capacity is defined as the ability of local firms to select, assimilate (learn how to operate and use the technology), and adapt foreign technology to local conditions (e.g., operator skills, geographical location, and social norms). The technology absorptive capacity of the recipient country also includes factors such as the strength of national research and development, self-learning and learning-by-doing abilities (Saggi 2000). Moreover, a firm's ability to absorb technological information is a function of its previous experience with related knowledge.

The technological absorptive capacity of a country can be measured using a "Technology Index" indicator based on the various variables influencing this technology as mentioned above. The technology index can be calculated using mathematical techniques such as factor analysis and analytical hierarchy (Jayaraman, 1996). The index may then be incorporated in the mathematical model. Field data will be collected to estimate the models' parameters and further modify it to fit Egyptian machine tool manufacturing sector.

## 4. Technology Transfer Channels

Technology may be transferred through formal and/or informal channels.

Formal channels include foreign direct investment (FDI), joint ventures, franchising, licensing, turnkey operations, and contracting. Informal channels include reverse engineering, industrial espionage, cooperative research arrangements, open literature, and conferences and shows (Bennett and Vaidya 2002). Researchers continue to debate which of these channels achieves the most benefit to the recipient country (Chen 1996). A central question of interest is whether technologies introduced by a multinational company (MNC), either through FDI or joint ventures, diffuse to local firms.

Taking China as an example, it transfers 53% of its technology through joint ventures and 23% through licensing, while all other channels account for the remaining percentage (Bennett et al. 1999). The following discussion will focus on four main channels, namely, FDI, joint ventures, contracts, and licensing. A main source used for this discussion is Youssef (1999).

### 4.1. Foreign Direct Investment

In FDI, the MNC is the sole or major owner of the foreign subsidiary. It maintains a high degree of control on the affairs of the local unit. Some degree of technology diffusion and absorption will indirectly take place through training of employees and procurement of parts from the local market. It is possible that the local subsidiary will promote the technological know-how among its suppliers to assure a certain level of quality. On the other hand, the subsidiary may rely on imports rather than the local procurement for quality concerns. How much learning employees will gain will depend on how well they are integrated into the top positions of the subsidiary.

Examples of policies to take advantage of FDIs include China's requirements that MNCs generate enough export proceeds to cover their import needs. The Mexican government accepted an IBM policy of a 100% ownership of its foreign subsidiaries in exchange for an active program by IBM to develop local technical capabilities (Chen 1996).

### 4.2. Joint ventures

Joint ventures are arrangements in which the MNC has a local partner who manages the business. Having a local partner improves market accessibility, assures local acceptance, and reduces risks. However, Joint ventures usually have a high rate of failure because of the expectations mismatch that may exist between the foreign and local partners, and the different work approaches due to cultural differences (Chen 1996).

### 4.3. Contracting

In this arrangement, the local producer functions as a production platform for foreign retailers according to certain detailed specifications provided by the foreign

retailer. This arrangement is used by a number of Egyptian producers in the field of ready-made clothing. The foreign retailers are usually highly concerned about design, quality and delivery dates. Adhering to quality and time constraints usually requires technical help from the retailer (Youssef 1999). Developing a management system that serves a certain delivery schedule and quality standards is one of the major benefits of this arrangement. The local producer has a great opportunity for learning during the period of association with the foreign retailer.

### 4.4. Licensing

Licensing is an arrangement whereby a foreign manufacturer allows a local producer to utilize certain know-how to produce a product locally, protected by legal rights, in exchange for a fixed fee and sometimes a percentage of the sales value. This technology transfer arrangement has been used as a temporary measure to induce learning and self-reliance. Japan and South Korea are examples of two countries that used licensing as a temporary measure with great success.

Suitable statistics are being collected and reviewed to determine the appropriate channel(s) for technology transfer to the machine tool sector in Egypt based on the above discussion.

## 5. Technology Selection and Valuing

The relative importance and factors affecting the value of technology differs between owners and acquirers of technology. Accordingly, valuing technology differs based on which side is doing it. It is, therefore, a crucial question in most technology transfer arrangements. Technology valuation is not simply a matter of calculating costs and prices; rather it requires a broader consideration. A recent framework developed by Bennett et al. (1999) for valuing technology takes into account that the net benefit for both parties contains quantifiable and non-quantifiable elements both of which cannot always be specified objectively. In general, the recipient of the technology aims at achieving four main objectives when consider transferring technology (Bennett et al. 1999):

1. to improve technological capabilities,
2. to support long term strategic development,
3. to increase domestic market sales, and
4. to gain access to the world market.

Regarding the transfer of machine tools technology, a number of factors have to be considered during the selection process. Grant and Gregory (1997) summarize these factors into appropriateness, robustness, and transferability. A process that can be transferred unchanged to fit the requirements of a given recipient is said to be appropriate for that recipient. A Robust process is one that can be transferred unadapted to fit any recipient conditions. Transferability refers to the possibility

adapting, transmitting, and assimilating, the process independent of the conditions of the recipient within reasonable time and resource constraints.

The above factors will be integrated into a model that will serve as a decision making tool that could be used during the selection and valuation stage of the technology transfer process.

## 6. Conclusion

This paper describes ongoing research that aims at developing guidelines for successful technology transfer to improve the competitiveness of Egyptian manufacturing. The machine tool industry is selected as a target sector for technology transfer. Factors affecting technology transfer have been discussed. They include the technological capabilities of the recipient country, the strength of research and development in the country, the presence of previous knowledge and experience with the type of technology transferred, the channel through which technology is transferred, and the objectives of both sides engaged in the technology transfer process.

The next phase of the research will focus on quantifying the technological capabilities of the Egyptian machine tool industry to develop a model for assessing its technology absorptive capacity. Another model will be developed for technology valuing based on the factors discussed in Section 5. These models may be used to identify potential sources from which to transfer technology and the favorable channels through which technology will be transferred.

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# The Readiness of Egyptian Businesses to Implement Business Process Reengineering[1]

**Lotfi K. Gaafar, Ph.D. and Hany W. Shoukry**


## Abstract

*This paper documents the results of a national survey to measure the readiness of companies in the Egyptian private sector to implement Business Process Reengineering. The survey objectives were to assess the degree of readiness of such companies to implement BPR and to provide guidelines for a national program to improve BPR readiness.*

*A total of 94 valid responses to the survey were obtained and the results indicate that the degree of readiness is very low. The degree of readiness varied among factors and industrial sectors. The results also point to several actions that must be taken at the national level to improve BPR readiness.*


## 1. Introduction

In the early 1990s, the Egyptian government began a far-reaching program to upgrade the Egyptian private sector. Several national programs that focused on training senior and middle managers on general managerial skills and helping companies to formulate marketing strategies and business plans were implemented. These programs also provided limited funds to support the purchase of consulting services or information systems. However, despite the gradual increase in Egypt's exports, Egypt is still facing severe problems in promoting its products in the global market, and in competing with imported goods and multi-national service companies. There has been considerable pressure on all industries to upgrade the quality of their products, apply international standards, and increase the efficiency of their operations to provide their products at competitive prices.

Business Process Reengineering (BPR), originally defined as the fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of business processes to achieve dramatic performance improvements (Hammer and Champy 1993, p32), may be the best fitting methodology to achieve the objective of radically upgrading the private sector in Egypt. BPR emerged first in the United States, then in many other countries around the world. As a performance improvement methodology, it has shown a capability to achieve radical transformations in relatively short times (Sung and Gibson 1998, and Prosci 1999). BPR uses information technology as one of its most important

enablers. Therefore, it is most suitable for companies that have not made the best out of what technology makes possible, which is the case of many Egyptian companies.

Two major issues need to be addressed before the implementation of successful BPR programs in Egyptian companies is possible. First, there is very limited research on how to measure the readiness of an organization to implement BPR, and to assess what preparations are required before the project begins, in order to increase the chances of its success. Second, very little is known about the readiness of Egyptian companies to succeed in reengineering their processes. Many important questions need to be answered: How are "radical change" and "performance improvement" thought of in Egypt? What are the major barriers for Egyptian companies to implement successful BPR? Are BPR concepts applicable to the Egyptian culture? What are the requirements of a successful BPR model that would fit the Egyptian business environment? The reported research addresses these issues.

In the reminder of this paper, Section 2 describes the BPR critical success factors. An instrument to measure BPR readiness based on these factors is presented in Section 3. Section 4 provides an analysis of the main results obtained from the survey. Finally, Section 5 provides the research conclusions.

## 2. BPR Critical Success Factors

BPR Critical Success Factors (CSFs) are the generic conditions that must be met in order to raise the chances of success of any BPR project. BPR CSFs are drawn from various sources including case studies, literature on BPR models, philosophy, and best practices, literature on other areas relevant to BPR like change management, and interviews with top executives and consultants that were part of BPR projects. In this research, utilizing most of these sources, ten BPR success factors were identified; namely, the business case, leadership, resources, vision, organizational awareness, methodology and project management, business process orientation, information technology, new management style, and total system approach. Table 1 lists the key references that support theses CSFs.

| | Success Factor | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reference | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Hammer and Champy, 1993 | | √ | | √ | | | √ | √ | √ | |
| Manganelli and Klein, 1994 | √ | √ | √ | √ | √ | √ | | | | |
| Majchrzak and Qianwei, 1996 | | √ | | | | | | | √ | √ |
| Strebel, 1996 | | | | | √ | | | | √ | √ |
| Champy, 1997 | | √ | | √ | | | √ | | √ | |
| Guimaraes, 1997 | √ | √ | √ | √ | √ | √ | √ | √ | | √ |
| Hammer, 1997 | | | | | | | | | √ | √ |
| Hendricks and Mumford, 1997 | | √ | | | | | √ | | √ | √ |
| Kliner, 1997 | | √ | | | √ | | | | √ | |
| Lumb, 1997 | | | | | √ | | √ | | √ | √ |
| Miles, 1997 | √ | √ | √ | √ | √ | | | | | √ |
| Sung and Gibson, 1998 | √ | √ | | √ | √ | √ | √ | √ | | √ |
| Hammer and Stanton, 1999 | √ | √ | | √ | √ | √ | √ | | √ | √ |
| Prosci, 1999 | √ | √ | √ | √ | √ | √ | | | | |

Table 1 – Sources used to identify the 10 critical BPR success factors

The following is a brief description of each factor:

1. The Business Case for Change: Before reengineering efforts begin, it should be made clear to everyone in the organization why is such a radical change needed. A business case may refer to external pressures, like competition, market economics or regulatory changes. It may also refer to internal effectiveness problems like technology changes or employees dissatisfaction. A business case would define the problem and its effects, the scope of the solution, the expected costs, and the targeted returns.
2. Leadership: Reengineering an organization needs a huge energy. It involves radical changes and generates considerable resistance. It has been agreed that BPR stands no hope of success without an empowered leader who can motivate and guide the organization, fully convinced of the importance of change. Not less important is that middle management becomes equally convinced of the process, and able to contribute their share of leadership.
3. Availability of Resources: From the very beginning of the BPR project, each and every resource should be assessed and made ready to be allocated at the appropriate time. BPR requires investments in people, technology, facilities and consulting. In addition to making the appropriate financial resources available, allocating and assigning the appropriate people with appropriate knowledge, and giving them enough time to focus on the reengineering project is of paramount importance.
4. Vision: Before BPR starts, a clearly stated vision, with specific objectives and measurable targets must be in place. Processes are redesigned to achieve the organization objectives. Therefore, BPR projects should never start before the

organization is able to formulate a long-term business plan, and a framework of values and policies binding its operations.

5. Change Management: Internal resistance is considered one of the most important barriers to BPR success. The level of employees' awareness of the need to change is an important factor to be considered before implementing BPR. Empowerment of implementers and support of top management is important. Every BPR project must be accompanied by a clear plan to overcome objections and frustration, and to support the new process implementation. BPR projects must be managed in a way that would ensure business continuity. The delay of the expected outcomes can result in the total failure of the project as the stresses caused by radical changes can be easily transformed into frustrations in case the expected outcomes were not achieved at the expected time.
6. Methodology: BPR is a process by itself. It must follow a methodology and utilize many analytical, modeling and statistical tools. It requires specific skills of information gathering, documentation, facilitation and communication.
7. Process Perspective: BPR is all about processes, not functions. Everybody in the organization should understand the difference, and every step in the way should reconfirm this concept. People must change their scope and their language, from departments and hierarchies, to processes.
8. Information Technology: Nearly every BPR project uses Information Technology (IT) as one of its most important enablers. BPR, as a methodology, is not directly linked to the implementation of IT solutions. However, BPR capabilities would be considerably limited if solutions are to be implemented in a non-IT environment.
9. New Management Style: The top executives of the organization, and the leaders of the process redesign efforts, must demonstrate a willingness to implement the concepts that are usually linked to BPR and process management methodologies.
10. Total System Approach: A major cause of failure in reengineering projects is the limited scope of change. BPR is not intended to only change work procedures, but it will also have its deep effects on the total system of the organization. The total system refers to the processes, organizational structure, salaries and compensation, advancement policies, culture, work area layout and many other aspects that work together with significant interaction.

Of the ten identified critical success factors, the first eight factors may be considered as conditions, or prerequisites, that must be met before the implementation of a BPR project. The degree to which each condition is met is assumed to be proportional to the probability of success of BPR. The last two factors, namely the new management style and the total system approach factors are only relevant during the actual implementation of the project. Therefore, readiness assessment will focus on the first 8 factors only.

**3. The Survey Instrument**

The 8 identified readiness factors were broken into practical survey questions that may be answered by senior executives in Egyptian companies. The survey content was validated and pre-tested before it was distributed to a sample of Egyptian private sector companies. After the survey was administered using standard surveying procedures, the collected data were coded and an extensive analysis was conducted using the Statistical Package For Social Sciences (SPSS Inc., 1999). The purpose of the analysis was two-fold: to measure BPR readiness in Egypt, and to provide enough data to assess the validity of the tool.

Two of the key survey sections are shown in Figures 1 to 2. To save space, aggregate results are also shown on the same figures. A third section of the survey addressing implementation issues is not included in this paper as the focus is on readiness.

## Summary of Results: BPR Corporate Readiness Survey (Page1)

**Address:** 64.9% Cairo-based, 35.1% in 6 other cities

**Title:** 72.3% Top, 21.3% Middle, 6.4% Quality Manager

**No. of years in Position:** Mean = 9.8 Years, Median = 5 Years

**No. of years in Company:** Mean = 12.95 years, Median = 12 Years

**No. of Company years since establishment:** Mean=19.7 Years

**Current number of employees:** Mean = 457, Median = 180

**Invested Capital (Egyptian Pounds):** Mean = 128 Millions, Median = 15 Millions

**Legal form:** [55.2%] Joint Stock [12.6%] Limited Liability [32.2%] Partnership

**Is the company family owned?** [51.1%] Yes [48.9%] No

**Business:** [55.3%] Manufacturing [20.2%] Services [19.1%] Trading [3.2%] Construction [2.1%] Banking

**Please give a short description of the industry:** 22 Different Industries

A. Circle the letter to the right that best fits your answer. Use the scale below.

| Y | Yes | IP | In Progress | N | No |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|

| A. Introductory General Questions (Total of 94 Answers) | % | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Y | IP | N |
| 1. Does your company have a *Vision* of where it shall be in 5 years, in terms of its financial and market positions, its products and its technical capacities? | 58.5 | 26.6 | 14.9 |
| 2. Does your company have a documented *Business Plan* for the year 2002? | 73.4 | 8.5 | 18.1 |
| 3. Is your company *ISO certified*? If yes, state when | 26.6 | 10.6 | 62.8 |
| 4. Is your company working under any type of foreign license or brand name? | 37.2 | | 62.8 |
| 5. Is your company currently involved in any major change program(s) like process redesign, automation or technology changes? Please state | 51.1 | | 48.9 |
| 6. Have you, in the last 2 years, been introduced in any way to the concepts of *BPR*? | 28.7 | | 71.3 |
| 7. Have you previously thought of doing *BPR* in your Company? | 46.8 | | 53.2 |
| 8. Have you, in the last year, had access to consultants working in *BPR*? | 19.1 | | 80.9 |
| 9. Do any of your employees have a relevant background to *Process Redesign*? | 46.8 | | 53.2 |
| 10. Can any of your current employees perform project management techniques? | 75.5 | | 24.5 |
| 11. Does the company have a formal Human Resources function (Not only personnel) | 48.1 | | 51.9 |
| 12. Does the company have a *Process Chart*? | 58.5 | 6.4 | 35.1 |
| 13. Does the examples of processes reflect knowledge? (Surveyor Judgment) | 27.7 | 26.6 | 45.7 |

**Figure 1: Summary of the survey results, page 1.**

Summary of Results, BPR Corporate Readiness Survey (Page2)

| VS | Very Strong | S | Strong | M | Medium | W | Weak | VW | Very Weak |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

| B. Corporate Status Questions (Total of 94 Answers) | % | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | VS | S | M | W | VW |
| 1. How strong is your company's actual position in the market? | 25.5 | 45.7 | 27.7 | 1.1 | 0 |
| 2. How strong are the *external effects* on your company? | 26.6 | 44.7 | 24.5 | 3.2 | 1.1 |
| 2b Do they represent threats (40.4%), opportunities (22.3%) or both (37.2%) | | | | | |
| 3. How strong is the need to improve the performance of your company? | 31.9 | 36.2 | 27.7 | 4.3 | 0 |
| 4. How strongly does your company need a *redesign of its processes*? | 12.8 | 38.3 | 37.2 | 10.6 | 1.1 |
| 4b How strongly do you believe needed redesign must be radical? | 7.4 | 21.3 | 37.2 | 28.7 | 5.3 |
| 5. How strongly is your *middle management* aware of the need to change? | 8.5 | 29.8 | 27.7 | 27.7 | 6.4 |
| 6. How strongly do you think your *middle management* is capable to lead & support a radical change program like business process reengineering? | 3.2 | 34.2 | 38.3 | 11.8 | 8.5 |
| 7. How strongly are your employees aware of the need to change? | 1.1 | 22.3 | 39.4 | 24.5 | 12.8 |
| 8. How strong do you rate process improvement priority among other major priorities in your own *Agenda of priorities*? (Please refer to the glossary). | 14.9 | 40.4 | 30.9 | 12.8 | 1.1 |
| 9. How strong would you rate the training currently given to your employees? | 7.4 | 27.7 | 35.1 | 19.1 | 10.6 |
| 10 How strong would you rate your employees' computer skills? | 11.7 | 36.2 | 35.1 | 12.8 | 4.3 |
| 11 How strong is your company's current *Information Technology (IT) infrastructure*? (Personal Computers, Applications, Internet, Intranet). | 14.9 | 28.2 | 26.6 | 28.2 | 2.1 |
| 12 How strong do you think the effect of Information Technology may be in improving the performance of your company | 42.6 | 39.4 | 13.8 | 4.3 | 0 |
| 13 How "strong *barrier to change*" do you consider each of the following: | | | | | |
| a. *Egyptian Work Regulations* | 26.6 | 27.7 | 24.5 | 16.0 | 5.3 |
| b. *Internal Resistance* from Managers & Employees. | 8.5 | 34.0 | 34.0 | 13.9 | 8.5 |
| c. Unavailability of resources needed for the change | 10.6 | 36.2 | 37.2 | 10.6 | 5.3 |
| d. Other | | | | | |

C. Generally speaking, would you consider implementing a business process reengineering program in your company?

67 (71.3%) Yes 27 (28.7%) No

If you answered "No" to the last question, please write your reasons in the following lines:

**Figure 2: Summary of the survey results, page 2.**

Readiness is assessed based on responses to the various survey questions (pages

1 and 2) according to the passing conditions presented in Table 2.

Table 2 – Readiness assessment

| Factor | Passing Condition |
|---|---|
| 1. Business Case | B3 * B4a * B4b ≥ 36 |
| 2. Leadership | C * B6 * B8 ≥ 12 |
| 3. Availability of Resources | B1-B13c ≥ 1 |
| 4. Vision | 2 * A1 + A2 >= 2.5 |
| 5. Organizational Awareness | (B5 * B7)/B13b ≥ 3 |
| 6. Methodology | (3 * A9) + (A8 + A10 + A11) >= 3 |
| 7. Process Perspective | (2 * A13) + A12 >= 2.5 |
| 8. Information Technology | (B10 * B11) >= 12 |

The following is a brief explanation of the logic of each passing condition.

1. Business Case: A strong need for performance improvement (B3) and for radical change (B4 a, b) must exist, supported by strong expected effect of IT on the organization's performance. The model reflects how the three factors may make up for one another.
2. Leadership: In this factor, the leader must be willing to consider BPR (C) or a zero score will result. Both of the other two responses must be better than weak with at least one strong or better. This model implies that B6, B8 could compensate for one another.
3. Availability of Resources: Unavailability of resources must be judged by the top executive as not being a strong barrier to change to indicate an acceptable level of readiness.
4. Vision: For an acceptable level of readiness, the organization must have a long-term vision (A1) and is in the process of developing, or has already developed, a documented business plan (A2).
5. Organizational Awareness: This factor is measured at two levels: middle management (B5) and employees (B7). The middle management and employees awareness of the need to change must stand an acceptable level versus the expected internal resistance during the project (B13b). As the model indicates, the higher the internal resistance (B13b), the higher the awareness of the need for change must be.
6. Methodology: The organization must either have individuals with process design background (A9), or possess a formal human resources function and project management capabilities and be willing to hire a consultant to support BPR efforts (A8, A10, A11).
7. Process Perspective: For an organization to be ready for BPR, the top executive must have some understanding of processes (A13) and the organization must be in the process of preparing, or already has, a process chart (A12).

8. IT Readiness: For BPR readiness, both the organization's IT infra-structure (B11) and its employees computer skills (B10) must be better than weak, with at least one strong or better.

## 4. Results and Analysis

Due to space limitations, only key results are presented here. The interested reader is referred to Gaafar (2002) for full details of the study. 94 valid responses were obtained. Aggregate results are listed in Figures 1 and 2. The survey was distributed to Egyptian private sector companies, with more than 35 employees, and more than 0.5 million Egyptian Pounds of invested capital. The valid sample covered a broad range of industries, sizes, and legal forms. It includes companies that are family and non-family owned. More than 95% of the companies in the sample have at least one location in Cairo, 10th of Ramadan city, Alexandria or 6th of October city. Figure 3 presents the key survey demographics. As the figure indicates, most of the surveyed companies were joint stock manufacturing companies, mainly in the textile and garment area with an average of about 20 years in business. Other sectors, industries, and legal forms were included as detailed in Figure 3. It is believed that the surveyed sample is a good representation of the targeted distribution.

Demographics



a. Core Business



b. Distribution of industries among the sample



c. Company legal form



d. Company years in business

Figure 3. Summary of the survey key demographics.

Figure 4 shows the percentage of companies that passed each readiness

construct. Calculations are based on the conditions listed in Table 2. It is interesting to note that the most passed factor is the business case indicating a real need for BPR, while the least passed factor is the process orientation, which is somewhat of a technical aspect of BPR implementation.




Figure 4. Percentages of passing constructs

The number of passed factors is shown in Figure 5. It shows the number of companies that passed 1 factor, 2 factors, etc. A normal behavior can be observed in Figure 5. Only 1 company (out of 94) passed all 8 factors and is accordingly ready to implement BPR. This is a rather very low percentage that when contrasted with the fact that the most passed factor is the need for BPR (business case) indicates a need for a national effort to enable Egyptian companies to take advantage of the radical changes BPR is capable of producing.




Figure 5. Number of factors passed.

The number of constructs passed is normally distributed with a mean, median

and mode of about four. More than 55% of the companies passed from three to five constructs. Table 3 shows the readiness responses and analysis classified by the business sector.

| Readiness questions and constructs | Business Sector | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Manufacturing | Service | Trading | Banking | Construction |
| Company has a Vision | 0.73 | 0.76 | 0.64 | 1.00 | 0.50 |
| Company has a Business Plan | **0.63** | **0.71** | **0.78** | **1.00** | **0.17** |
| Access to BPR consultants | 0.17 | 0.21 | 0.28 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Employees capable of process design | 0.40 | 0.58 | 0.56 | 0.50 | 0.33 |
| Employees capable of project management | 0.71 | 0.89 | 0.78 | 0.50 | 0.67 |
| Presence of a formal HR function | 0.42 | 0.58 | 0.50 | 1.00 | 0.67 |
| Actual position in the market | 4.02 | 3.95 | 3.89 | 3.50 | 3.67 |
| The need to improve performance | 4.02 | 4.00 | 3.72 | 4.00 | 4.00 |
| The need for process redesign | 3.35 | 3.58 | 3.17 | 3.00 | 3.67 |
| The need for radical process redesign | 2.92 | 3.16 | 2.89 | 3.00 | 3.00 |
| Middle management awareness | 3.08 | 3.11 | 2.89 | 3.50 | 3.33 |
| Middle management leadership | 3.19 | 3.00 | 3.11 | 3.00 | 2.67 |
| Employees awareness | 2.63 | 3.00 | 2.67 | 4.00 | 2.67 |
| Process improvement priority | 3.60 | 3.47 | 3.50 | 4.00 | 3.33 |
| Employees computer skills | 3.15 | 3.89 | 3.44 | 3.50 | 3.67 |
| Current IT infra-structure | **3.19** | **4.11** | **3.33** | **4.00** | **3.00** |
| Unavailability of resources as a barrier | 3.48 | 3.42 | 2.94 | 3.00 | 3.67 |
| BPR implementation | 0.79 | 0.58 | 0.67 | 0.50 | 0.67 |
| Presence of a process chart | 0.62 | 0.61 | 0.64 | 1.00 | 0.33 |
| Understanding of process concepts | 0.44 | 0.26 | 0.47 | 0.25 | 0.50 |
| Business Case | 0.56 | 0.63 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.67 |
| Leadership | 0.56 | 0.32 | 0.44 | 0.50 | 0.67 |
| Resources | 0.46 | 0.42 | 0.61 | 0.50 | 0.33 |
| Vision | 0.56 | 0.53 | 0.44 | 1.00 | 0.33 |
| Organizational Awareness | 0.48 | 0.58 | 0.50 | 1.00 | 0.33 |
| Methodology | 0.44 | 0.63 | 0.56 | 0.50 | 0.33 |
| Process Orientation | 0.46 | 0.21 | 0.39 | 0.50 | 0.00 |
| Information Technology | 0.44 | 0.79 | 0.56 | 1.00 | 0.33 |
| Factors Passed | 3.98 | 4.11 | 4.00 | 5.50 | 3.00 |

* Numbers are means of row variables across column categories

** Significant associations are shown in **BOLD** font in gray cells

Table 3: Readiness responses and analysis classified by business sector

Other analysis of the results (not included) indicates the following:

1. Unavailability of Resources is an important barrier, but not the only barrier to BPR implementation.
2. Bigger companies are more ready.
3. Joint Stock companies are the most ready.

4. Non-Family owned companies are much more ready than family owned ones.
5. Working under a foreign license does not seem to provide a significant advantage.

## 5. Conclusions

It may be concluded from the above presentation that the readiness to implement business process reengineering in Egyptian private-sector companies is very low. More than ten years after its application in the United States, the majority of Egyptian companies are only mid-way through being ready to use BPR as a tool for performance improvement. The analysis shows that there is a real need for BPR and hence a need for many companies to overcome their problems and become ready to begin BPR. It may also be concluded that there is much room for improvement in all the readiness dimensions, but the most important areas for improvement are the three least passed, namely, process orientation, leadership and resources.

A national program to prepare the private sector for BPR is recommended. Executives need to be educated on process management concepts. The program must emphasize the importance of internal performance measures beside the traditional measures of financial success. The program may promote a standardized technique for measuring internal performance. It must also include support for companies to formulate their business cases for change and to calculate the real return on the change investments. The issue of unavailability of resources must also be addressed. A financial aid model must be developed to allow the program to offer support for companies that cannot wait for the BPR to payback. Special attention should be given to the development of middle management in Egyptian private sector. Another important issue that needs promotion is improving performance by implementing information systems and technological solutions to support the redesigned processes. In addition, family-owned private sector companies need special attention from any national program as the results showed that they were significantly less ready than non-family owned companies. Finally, the strongest drawback of the management culture in the Egyptian private sector was the unwillingness of the top executives to involve all the levels in their organization in the BPR efforts and their disagreement with empowerment concepts. A national performance improvement program must address these cultural issues as part of its cultural change objectives.

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# Challenges Facing Foreign Direct Investment In Egypt

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In recent years, Egypt has been doing great efforts to attract FDI due to its critical role in creating meaningful employment opportunities for its growing population and in participating in manufacturing and technology transfer all of which are vital for the country's economic development. Egypt's interest in attracting FDI is explained by the important role that investment plays in developing privatization of state-owned enterprises; in investing in new physical facilities; in attracting capital; in providing greater access to new technology, management skills and export markets; and in increasing future economic growth in a greatly competitive world. Attracting foreign direct investment to Egypt also generates additional job opportunities and increases the rate of growth of exports. However, Egypt's effort to stabilize the economy is not adequate to speed up growth. Hence, increasing investments and saving levels over the long run is essential to sustain economic growth. Domestic savings, however, will not be enough to finance investment requirements for economic growth, which consequently will lead to a deficit. Therefore, Egypt has recognized that foreign direct investments are the most promising in supplying additional savings (El Samalouty 1999: 47-50).

On the other hand, Egypt still maintains a socialist policy mindset with the size of the government being still higher in the Egyptian economy. Egypt's legal and regulatory regime applied to foreign investment is confusing, inconsistent and comprising execution procedures that are tedious and costly. Moreover, legislative decrees and enactments with force of law for FDI are excessive and are operated with huge bureaucracy. Some macroeconomic reforms like privatization and trade liberalization are not supported by unions and face sectors' oppositions (Egypt: A Comparative Study of Foreign Direct Investment Climates 1997: 72).

The purpose of this study, therefore, is to examine Egypt's efforts to attract FDI, examine the factors inhibiting FDI to Egypt and to find out the relationship between institutional constraints and low levels of inflows of investments to Egypt.

### Foreign Direct Investment and Development

Direct foreign investment is a means by which a company can enter foreign markets and engage in international business activities. Unlike other forms of

international business, it requires the ownership and control of 10% or more of property, assets, and long-term interests in host countries. The 10% threshold was chosen by International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to show the foreign company's capacity to effectively influence and control the management of operations in host countries (Egypt: A Comparative Study of Foreign Direct Investment Climates 1997: 23-24). "In actual management a company does not have a majority of shares in a host country's property assets or companies. On the contrary an FDI may have minority of shares but more control as the rest of shares might be fragmented. Thus, it ends up having more power", declared Dr. Tarek Hatem, Professor of Management at The American University in Cairo.

But why do Foreign Direct Investments take place? In this respect, there are three international investment theories that help explain the occurrence of FDI:

***Ownership Advantages Theory:***

This theory proposes that through foreign direct investment, a company possessing valuable holdings such as superior technology, economies of scale or a well-known brand name which produce a competitive advantage domestically, can employ that competitive advantage to expand into new foreign markets.

***Internalization Theory:***

Internalization theory proposes that companies tend to make FDI or internalize international production within the company when transaction costs are high, where transaction costs are the costs of making a transaction pertaining to negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing a contract. Conversely, when transaction costs are low companies tend to prefer other means of market penetration like franchising a brand name, licensing technology, or exporting their products.

***Dunning's Eclectic Theory:***

This theory suggests that FDI is more likely to occur under the following three circumstances:

a) A company owns a valuable competitive advantage that is able to survive the unfavorable circumstances caused as a result of competing with companies in host countries.
b) A company finds it more profitable to produce in a foreign location than in a domestic one due to lower costs of factors of production.
c) A company is more likely to expand to new markets through FDI for the purpose of actively controlling its business activities and gaining the advantages of internalizing its international production (Griffin & Pustay1999: 106-108; Krugman, P. and O.M. 1998:159; Dunning, J. 1979: vol.41).

Direct investment may be made through building new facilities (The Greenfield Strategy), purchasing the prevailing property and assets in the host country (The Acquisition Strategy), or creating a joint venture where one or more companies agree to cooperate and form a jointly owned establishment which is separate from their firms to develop their mutual interests. Greenfield strategy, or alternatively building new facilities, involves beginning a new operation from scratch where a firm can choose the site that best satisfies its needs. Governments, in general, offer investment incentives to attract inflows of these investments since they create more new jobs for citizens. However, firms usually take some time to make successful implementation or find a land with reasonable price. Firms also may face threats of government regulations or be perceived as a foreign enterprise. Firms are motivated to adopt an acquisition strategy, on the other hand, to gain more control over property and assets acquired, to gain access to new markets, to increase their revenues with no new capacity required. However, the acquiring firm is bound to incur all the financial and managerial liabilities (Griffin & Pustay 1999: 436-39; Kogut, B. and S.H. 1988:411-432).

"Encouraging foreign direct investment promotes economic efficiency as it allows producing goods and services in places that already have a comparative advantage for such production. FDI also permits a high profit potential as it avoids tariffs and non-trade barriers. Moreover, foreign direct investments have the opportunity to easily acquire knowledge of local market, which enables them to be more responsive to changes in customers' needs and preferences. FDI allows market expansion; access to new technology, new managerial skills, cheaper supplies; and diversification of sales and supplies to circumvent fluctuations in currency or business cycles. In addition, FDI allows minimizing competitive risk through following suit competitors in new markets to ensure that they don't gain a competitive advantage. For example, BMW started investing in Egypt only when Mercedes started its business in the country", explained Dr. Hatem. On the other hand, FDI involves higher financial assets, greater managerial investments and complexity, and tenderness to restrictions on foreign direct investment. Moreover, FDI might face higher vulnerability to political risks as governments of host countries might be concerned about control issues. In fact, when foreign investors control a company, governments may be worried that decisions of national importance may be made abroad in FDI home countries. Therefore, an FDI may have a high share of assets in a certain company but a low level of control because a host country government can restrict its operations (Griffen & Pustay 1999: 436, 446-7).

There is two main factors that drive foreign direct investments to developing countries: higher sustainable expected rates of return and the opportunity of risk diversification. Higher expected rates of return are the result of more stable host countries' economic environments, structural reforms, and a favorable international environment. These improvement efforts also contribute to the progressive

decline in country risks for the foreign investor. Together, the higher expected rates of return and the reduced risk strengthen a country's economic performance and credit worthiness, which in effect induce larger private capital flows.

Opportunities for risk diversification, the second structural force driving FDI, is a recent phenomenon which started in developing countries in the 1990s as these countries have extended their capital markets. Despite the fact that market capitalization in developing countries is much lower than that of industrial ones, average market capitalization has been increasing, and thereby has provided foreign investors with significant diversification opportunities. Investors' holdings of international assets help them increase their expected rate of return and decrease their overall portfolio risk of investment (Private Capital Flows to Developing Countries 1997: 85-90).

Studies show that despite the fact that more FDI is attracted to more developed high and middle-income economies, there is little connection between flows of FDI and per capita income levels. Also, while increased trade liberalization has allowed more FDI flows, it has also jeopardized the economies of host developing countries as it exposed them to systematic risks caused by portfolio capital movements, and further widened the gap between rich and poor economies. Developing countries who have successfully managed to prevent the negative effects of liberalization and generate significant return-over have been exclusively endowed by governments that have effectively been able to promote suitable environments and make institutional developments that attracted FDI. For example, while bad governance in Indonesia have impeded growth, in Singapore a committed government has been able through institutional reforms to utilize FDI effectively to yield significant spillovers (Rasiah 2000: 1,6,8-9).

Despite the fact that countries vary regarding their economic indicators, legal systems, and business climates, they all strive to make their markets more attractive to FDI. In choosing where to make FDI investors consider some economic indicators which reveal the extent of the host country's investment risk, competitiveness, openness, and economic freedom. The country's infrastructure, economic growth, inflation, exchange rates, and capital market are some of these indicators.

**Global Inflows of FDI**

In general, capital flows received by Egypt and other developing countries are proportionately modest compared to investments received by developed countries? If we look at the flow of investments world wide (figure: 1), we will find that developed countries receive the lion's share of investments, which is 68%, developing countries get 28%, whereas Central and Eastern Europe countries receive only 4%.




Figure1: Global Inflows of FDI 1993-2001
(Source: FDI statistics, in UNCTAD's Division on Investment, Technology and Enterprise Development:
http://r0.unctad.org/en/subsites/dite/fdistats_files/fdistats.htm)

**Foreign Direct Investment in Egypt**

Among developing countries, Egypt has stood to be one of the top receivers of foreign direct investment in twenty years till 1989. Egypt's rank, in fact, was the fifth following Mexico, Brazil, China, and Malaysia from 1980 to 1989. From 1990 to 1996, however, FDI received by Egypt was reduced sharply from $1.6 billion in 1989 to $605 million in 1995, which made Egypt ends up being not among the twelve top receivers of FDI among developing countries (El Samalouty 1999: 47-50). Slowdown of FDI inflows to Egypt might be attributed to the stagnation of the economy during this period. During the mid 1990s, however, FDI inflows started increasing again with the beginning of the privatization plan, which enabled Egypt to easily attract more foreign investments. In 1998, therefore, annual net foreign direct investments increased to $1108 million as compared to $770 million in 1997 with an increase of approximately 40% (Abdel Latif 1999: 25-6). Inflows of investments reached their peak in 1999 then started falling down sharply to become only $510 million in 2001 (Fawzy 2002: 7-9) (see figure 2 for trends of FDI to Egypt over the last twelve years).




(Figure 2: FDI Inflows to Egypt (1989-2001) in millions of dollars)
(Source: FDI statistics, in UNCTAD's Division on Investment, Technology and Enterprise Development: http://r0.unctad.org/en/subsites/dite/fdistats_files/fdistats.htm)

Arab investors hold the largest market share of FDI in Egypt. Following Arab investors are American and European investors whereas investors from the Far East constitute a smaller portion of foreign investments in Egypt (Abdel Latif 1999: 26). Originally the purpose of various incentives provided by consecutive investment laws has been to support Egypt's plans for sectors development and increase employment opportunities. Egypt's goals then changed slightly to incorporate developing certain geographical areas in new cities like 10th of Ramadan City, October 6th City, El Sadat City, etc. Still, however, more attention could be given to the development of advanced technology and software since only limited investments have been targeting these activities ("For the sake of not turning the first information center for regulating and promoting investments into a mess" 2001).

The most significant objective of FDI has been the support of the manufacturing sector particularly industries of chemicals, building materials, engineering, food, metals and textiles. Rapidly growing from a low starting point, the manufacturing sector received 50% of the total FDI flows in 1998. The tourism industry is the second important recipient of foreign investments both through privatization programs and non-equity investment forms (UNCTAD 1999: 1). Egypt offers investors the opportunity to establish their projects in several other fields among which are mining; housing; petroleum services that support drilling; exploration of gas as well as its delivery; infrastructure operation such as sewage, electricity, roads, communications, and undergrounds; reclamation and cultivation of arid and desert lands; establishment of hospitals and medical centers; production of computer programs, systems and software designs; in addition to the development of new urban zones (General Authority for Investment and Free Zones, www.gafi.gov.eg/docs/faq.htm: 2-3).

According to the World Investment Report of 2002, though Egypt enjoys a high FDI potential, it is classified on the Inward FDI Potential Index (figure 3), which ranks countries according to their potential for attracting FDI, as a "below Potential" country since it slides in FDI attraction because of its low FDI Performance as a result of its weak competitiveness.

| | High FDI Performance | Low FDI Performance |
|---|---|---|
| High FDI Potential | (Front-runners)<br>Canada Belgium Chile<br>Norway New Zealand | (Below Potential)<br>Australia Greece<br>Egypt |
| Low FDI Potential | (Above Potential)<br>Brazil China Tunisia<br>Armenia Bolivia | (Under-performers)<br>Algeria Ghana Kenya<br>Rwanda |

(Figure 3: Country Classification by FDI Performance & FDI Potential)
Source: World Investment Report 2002: Transnational Corporations and Export Competitiveness, In UNCTAD Division on Investment, Technology and Enterprise Development).
(http://r0.unctad.org/en/subsites/dite/fdistats_files/fdistats.htm).

**Egypt's Competitive Position**

Comparison of investment levels of Egypt and some developing countries (figure: 4) also shows the downward trend in FDI flows to Egypt in the last four years.



Figure 4: Source: FDI statistics, in UNCTAD's Division on Investment, Technology and Enterprise Development: http://r0.unctad.org/en/subsites/dite/fdistats_files/fdistats.htm)

Though Egypt is making great efforts to attract FDI, other developing countries are making similar attempts as well. For example, they offer tax benefits as well as other incentives for foreign investment. They also lower high effective tax rates to levels, which are more competitive by restricting tax incentives only to a particular group of companies while keeping high tax rates for others. Compared to other countries in the region, in fact, Egypt ends up applying higher taxes. For instance, Egypt rank was 47 out of 53 countries with regards to its average corporate tax, which was 42% whereas other countries average was between 30% and 35. Therefore, Egypt's tax system is not adequately encouraging or competitive to lure FDI (El Samalouty 1999: 50-52).

In a study conducted by the Development Economic Policy Reform Analysis (DEPRA) Project, on behalf of The Ministry of Economy and International Cooperation, Government of Egypt, **in** which FDI climate of Egypt was compared to its major regional competitors for attracting FDI, specifically Turkey, Israel, Morocco and Tunisia, it was concluded that at present Egypt ranks at the low end in comparison to its rivals. Egypt is considered to have the poorest record with regards to pro-business policies and regulations despite the fact that none of the countries have yet moved greatly in formulating a free market economy. Egypt has the highest corporate tax rate. It also limits profits remitted to the level of the foreign exchange bank balance of the company. On the other hand, Israel offers the most favorable treatment to foreign investors, while Morocco and Turkey have good records despite the fact that they impose some restrictions on foreign investment.

Among the five countries, Turkey has the largest market and best growth potential while Israel has a large market due to its consumers' high purchasing power and increasing exports' levels. Egypt's large market potential, on the other hand, is confined by government policy restrictions with regards to private investment limitations on diversified export development, and the low purchasing power of its population. As a result, overall ranking of the five countries placed Morocco and Tunisia as the countries most attractive to FDI whereas Egypt's rank was the worst, with the exception of exchange rate stability where Egypt was ranked the best since 1990, and political stability where it ranked the second after Tunisia (Egypt: A Comparative Study of Foreign Direct Investment Climates 1997: 19-20).

**Egypt's FDI Potential**

Now let's have a quick look at Egypt's potential to attract capital inflows.

***Geographic Location***

Egypt's geographic location provides investors with an unparalleled platform for entering different countries all over the world with equal ease.

***Populous Market***

Egypt is the most populous market in the Middle East and the North African region, of approx 70 million people and population growth rate of about 2% per year, which furnishes the potential for an expanding consumer market. But real GDP growth rate has been declining over the last 5 yrs (now 3.5% in 2002/2003) and real GDP per capita is very low (5976L.E. or $1041 @ 5.73) which shows that the real size of the market or consumer purchasing power is small. (Source: Ministry of Economy & Foreign Trade).

***Labor Pool***

Though Egypt has a large labor pool and low wage levels which permit comparative advantage in producing certain labor-intensive goods and services at lowest costs it suffers from lack of skilled labor.

***Infrastructure***

Development of the infrastructure was the first phase of the economic reform program started in 1991, in which the government has initiated a very large program of building, strengthening and reestablishing the infrastructure. Major investments were made to improve infrastructure in several fields among which were roads, railways, ports, bridges, telecommunications and approximately $60 billion were spent on such fields over the past 15 years (Salama 1996, and Egypt: A Comparative Study of Foreign Direct Investment Climates 1997: 25).

Notwithstanding these efforts in improving infrastructure, Egypt's basic facilities and services required for proper functioning is moderately well developed. Moreover, infrastructure operation is still inefficient and costly in general since it is exclusively controlled by the government (Abdel Latif 1999: 31). The government, in fact, still dominates key infrastructure activities like telecommunications, roads, railways, etc. which still are inadequate and inefficient despite their great importance for attracting new FDI and fostering economic development (Egypt: A Comparative Study of Foreign Direct Investment Climates 1997: 72). In trying to invite private sector participation to invest in infrastructure, the government started thinking of constructing infrastructure projects such as electricity generation, transportation, and telecommunication on a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) basis (Fawzy 1998: 9-10).

***Economic growth, Inflation, and Exchange Rates:***

As per 2000 estimates, Egypt's GDP was $247 billion with a real growth rate

of 5% (Egypt's Fact Book). However, to increase growth rates to 7%-8%, which are the rates necessary for achieving high quality and efficient growth, Egypt's domestic savings and investments should be raised at rates of 25%-28% of GDP. To this end, the government is upgrading and improving its exports capabilities and aims at raising real savings levels to finance investments. The government further has been initiating structural reforms with the purpose of achieving a faster economic development rate.

Economic growth in Egypt is revealed by the contribution of the private sector to GDP growth which has increased from 20% in 1981 to 73% in 2000 (American Chamber Key Economic Indicators) despite the fact that private sector has not yet re-attained its contribution level to GDP which was 85% before the 1952 revolution. Economic growth is also revealed by a freely convertible currency with full rights to repatriate profits abroad, the drop in foreign debt from 76 billion to 5.2 billion L.E from 1993-1998, the drop in budget deficit to less than 1%, and the drop in the inflation rate from 9.4% to 4% from 1994 to 2002 as a result of tight fiscal and monetary policies (Egypt: A Comparative Study of Foreign Direct Investment Climates 1997: 16-17, Investment in Egypt Present Future: Preface, chap. 5).

Egypt has also achieved financial stability after devaluing and unifying the exchange rate in the substantial reforms undertaken in the 1990s by means of Central Bank intervention, Balance of Payments surpluses, and Egypt's successful efforts in lowering inflation and liberalizing interest rates (Egypt: A Comparative Study of Foreign Direct Investment Climates 1997: 16-17; Cardos, E. 1996: 15-23).

**Treaties and Agreements:** Egypt has inaugurated various bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements to protect investments. For example, in1998 Egypt joined the COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa), which reduced tariffs with other COMESA members by 90%, in 1999 Egypt, and the US singed a trade and investment free trade agreement (TIFA) to enhance trade cooperation, and in 2001 Egypt made a partnership agreement with the EU. Also, the tax ties which Egypt signed with its major trading partners protect investors against double taxation

**Egypt's Measures to Attract FDI**

***The General Authority for Investment and Free Zones (GAFI)***

The General Authority for Investment and Free Zones (GAFI, has been established since 1971 as Egypt's main governmental authority and the "One-Stop-Shop" responsible for regulating and promoting investment (General Authority for Investment and Free Zones, Investors Guide 2000). GAFI services which are provided at no cost to the investor, range from company registration to site location to partner identification to contracts and licenses acquisition. GAFI also acts on behalf of investors in front of governmental agencies in several activities such as residence recommendations, work permit acquisition, and foreign employment

recruitments (General Authority for Investment and Free Zones, www.gafi.gov.eg).

Lately also, GAFI has decided to establish a highly advanced Investment Information Center the responsibility of which would be supplying investors with all information required for their projects, investment opportunities, as well as export opportunities and domestic market consumption. This center will also help in reducing investors risk aversion to new projects and in solving the phenomenon of repeated investment projects which are not based on proper feasibility studies, and will direct money invested to the right projects in the right sectors. Repeated projects that are not based on proper feasibility studies are, in fact, reasons of difficulties and sometimes the bankruptcy that some companies might face, and the stagnation of some sectors. ("For the sake of not turning the first information center for regulating and promoting investments into a mess" 2001).

***Investment Tax Association***

An investment taxes association has been launched recently to constantly study investors problems and locate complete solutions for them. In its last session, the association attended to the concerns of different investors with regards to the construction of new companies. Some of these concerns were the long investigation time span, increased legal adviser's fees five times as much as they were before January 2002, exaggerated minimum capital required by some GAFI sectors, and deletion of some parts of some project in spite of fulfilling all requirements. Investors also presented after- construction problems some of which were liability of imported capital to sales tax and poor coordination between taxes authority and GAFI with regards to administration of some settlements (2002 "Ebeid Soon Announces Decisions to Encourage Investment in Reconsideration of Estimating Taxable Income after September 11th Event").

***Investment Laws***

Egypt has launched as many as twenty different laws to encourage investments ever since 1974 when it adopted the new policy of "Infitah" or "Open-Door Policy" of opening up the economy. Among these laws is Law no. 43 of 1974 which focused on encouraging foreign investment. The law, however, was unclear about some issues like details of acceptable investment projects. In addition, the law was mainly directed towards investment in export firms, whereas it confined investment opportunities in the then developing domestic market. The law also carried on firm control on foreign exchange, as well as repatriation and remittances of foreign currency profits (Egypt: A Comparative Study of Foreign Direct Investment Climates 1997: 5).

Law 43 was, therefore, modified in 1977 to relax exchange control requirements, to better explain economic activities in which FDI can operate and to

improve its incentive structure that is designed to attract FDI. Moreover, in 1989, Law 230/1989 was passed to mainly decrease discrimination against foreign investors, in addition to increasing flexibility in transferring profits, allowing foreign ownership of project-related landed property, and explaining and increasing investment incentives (Egypt: A Comparative Study of Foreign Direct Investment Climates 1997: 30-31).

Lastly in 1997, Law 8 was promulgated to assert Egypt's positive attitude in the direction of an investment-friendly environment capable of attracting more foreign as well as domestic investments. Law 8 provides investors with several incentives among which are:

a) Projects could be entirely owned by foreigners and are not susceptible to nationalization or expropriation.
b) Investors are allowed to repatriate capital and profits. Also, salaries of foreign experts who stay in Egypt for less than one year are exempted from income tax.
c) Projects are granted tax holidays of five year tax exemption if they are located in the Old Valley, ten year tax exemption of they are established in new communities, industrial or remote areas, twenty year tax exemption if they are located in the New Valley in areas like Toshka, Al Kharja, Siwa, etc. (Kheir El Din, H. et al 2000: 5).
d) Projects are granted a three years exemption from fiscal stamps and authentication fees starting from the date these projects are enlisted in the Commercial Register.
e) Projects which are enlisted in the Egyptian Stock Exchange are exempted from paying corporate tax on profits equivalent to the lending or discount rate set by the Central Bank of Egypt. (General Authority for Investment and Free Zones, www.gafi.gov.eg/docs/faq.htmp.2).
f) Equal treatment is granted to foreign investors as domestic ones with regards to investment laws and business rules and regulations with the exception of only some strategic industries like arms and munitions where foreign investment is forbidden (Abdel Latif 1999: 27).

Egypt also encourages investments in Free Zone areas by providing several privileges, incentives, exemptions and guarantees to projects set up or transformed to these regions. Among the investment law privileges to transactions in free zones are the removal of restrictions on the nationality and the size of capital, the ability of investors to select investment projects, the opportunity to choose the legal form of projects (whether individual, partnership, joint stock or a branch of a foreign company project), the freedom to repatriate profits and invested capital, in addition to freedom of foreign investors to obtain residence and work permits during their stay in Egypt. In addition, capital assets are released from custom duties and

imports procedures; and imports and exports are relieved from sales taxes, customs charges, and imports procedures. Free zones projects and profits earned are also exempted form taxes and charges throughout the projects' lifetime in Egypt. Moreover, imports from local market are exempted from sales tax. Hence, more freedom on activities and exchanges are granted to projects established in free zones which, in effect, helps lure more FDI to Egypt (General Authority for Investment and Free Zones, www.gafi.gov.eg/docs/freezones.htm: 1-3).

**Elements of Egypt's Structural Reform Plan to Enhance the Economic Environment for FDI**

To achieve a more competitive position and a sound business environment which is capable of attracting foreign direct investment, the government launched a structural reform plan the elements of which were: Privatization, financial liberalization, tradeLiberalization, export promotion, coordination between fiscal & monetary policies, and deregulation (Korayem, K. 1997: 1-23)

***Privatization:***

Considering the important role that the private sector may play in helping Egypt achieve a sustainable GDP growth rate of 7%-8%, and the successful experiences of other countries like East Asia suggest the importance of creating a stable, credible and sustainable macroeconomic environment that guarantees a strong response of the private sector to the investment incentive structure. The importance of privatization lies in the prospect of increasing competition, reducing fears of government's plans being reversed, stimulating private sector investment, and repatriation of capital (Fawzy, 1998, p.5-7).

The private sector was given the opportunity to take the lead in economic growth ever since the 1990s when the government started implementing more liberal investment policies (Fawzy, 1998, p.2-5). Moreover, Economic Reform and Structural Readjustment Program (ERSRP) was initiated through which the government expanded the private ownership base by encouraging the private sector to increase its proportionate weight in the national economy, and by transferring the ownership or management of publicly owned enterprises to privately owned ones, thereby reducing the former relative weight. As a result the private sector's share of development projects rose from approximately 33.2% in 1992/93 to 62.9% in 1997/98 (Investment in Egypt Present and Future, www.sis.gov.eg/public). The contribution of the private sector to GDP growth has increased from 20% in 1981 to 73% in 2000 (American Chamber Key Economic Indicators). The productive service sector took the lead in privatization with the highest growth rate in private investment whereas the share of the commodity sector in private investment tended to decline despite the increase in the relative importance of the agricultural and industrial sectors (Fawzy 1998: 2-5).

The private sector participation, however, is still not sufficient to push Egypt's growth. Despite its expanding role, in fact, the private sector has not yet re-attained its contribution level to GDP, which was 85% before the 1952 revolution. Also, the private sector in Egypt does not stand a good position when compared to the share of the private sector to GDP in other countries with similar levels of development. For instance, in Brazil, the private sector's share of GDP is 80% while in Uruguay it is 74% and in Indonesia it is 72%. In 1998, only 91 out of 314 firms were privatized. Though privatization process further included joint venture banks, public banks and public insurance companies, still the share of the government in GDP is high in comparison to that of the private sector. Despite this, however, the private sector is notable to generate the most value added in all activities with the exclusion of some activities like money and banking, petroleum, electricity, and insurance (Fawzy 1998: 2-5).

Several features account for making the private sector ineffective in speeding growth. First, the size of firms influence their power to promote growth. First, though small and micro firms account for 98% of the private sector size, create three quarters of job opportunities, and generates 80% of Egypt's private value added, still they are not contributing efficiently to the country's growth. Unlike large firms, these small companies encounter institutional constraints, mostly serve low-income consumers and usually supply products of low quality and low price. They also tend to use obsolete technologies. On the other hand, well-developed large-size firms are too limited in number to stimulate large growth in the private sector. Second, the private sector power to promote economic growth is also reduced due to the prevalence of the legal partnership form of firms since approximately 90% of firms in the private sector are partnerships which are to some extent run on a family basis than on a corporate basis, and are not traded on the stock market. Thirdly, the presence of a large informal sector due to the fact that the majority of small and micro firms are informal also hinders fostering large private sector led growth, as informal assets cannot be utilized in efficient and legally secure transactions. The prevalence of the informal private sector could be due to inherited socialist policies, awkward administrative systems, and high transaction costs. Fourth, development of the private sector is handicapped by regulations and bureaucratic procedures that are basically to the advantage of the public sector. Egypt still needs more institutional reforms to achieve foreign trade and financial liberalizations, reduce restrictions that impede private investment, carry on privatization to government-owned companies particularly in strategic infrastructure activities, and increase FDI inflows all of which contribute to fostering the Egyptian economy competitiveness and helps realize an export-led economic growth (Egypt: A Comparative Study of Foreign Direct Investment Climates 1997: 28-29; Jones, L.P. 2002:1-27; Khattab, M.1999: 3-25).

***Financial liberalization:***

To foster economic growth Egypt also initiated reforms in the financial sector, like removing the ceiling on nominal interest rates, using the treasury bill auctions to manage liquidity, and abolishing foreign exchange controls all of which resulted in some positive improvements such as the revival of the stock market, changing the "Dollarization" phenomenon, and achieving greater efficiency in financial agreements. (Fawzy 1998: 9). Check validity of reference Also, the Banking Act was amended and a law was created to allow foreign majority ownership in the equity capital of banks in Egypt which ceased the 49% ceiling on non-Egyptian shareholding in joint-venture and private banks working in both local and foreign currency (Salama 1996).

The relative financial strength and sound economic performance of Egypt, along minimum investment risk, is considered by international economic and financial rating institutions like the World Bank, IMF, Standard and Poor and IBCA to be of great attractiveness to foreign capital and investments into the Egyptian market and allows Egypt to access the world's capital market. The World Bank, in fact, appreciated financial and economic stability which enhanced economic growth. IMF also affirmed the outstanding performance of the government which is reflected in increasing growth rates and as minimum as possible inflation rates. As for standard and Poor's, Egypt was ranked at grade A3 for foreign currency investments and A2 for short-term local currency investments in treasury bills and bonds. IBCA rated Egypt at (BBB-) grade indicating an environment of low investment risk, political stability, internal and external economic equilibrium and social stability and services, which in effect, confirmed the eligibility of Egypt to an investment grade (Investment in Egypt Present and Future, www.sis.gov.eg/public).

However, Egypt still suffers from some shortcomings in its financial system. First, state-owned banks still control about 70% of bank assets. Second, private banks generally focus on short-term loans to large and medium-size private companies ignoring thereby the small enterprise sector. Third, the insurance industry needs to be more advanced and less concentrated. Finally, the stock market is not involved efficiently in financing the private sector though achieving liberalization of the financial sector contributes to mobilization of savings, encouraging accumulation of physical resources and labor which help supply the required inputs for private sector operations (Fawzy 1998: 9).

***Trade liberalization:***

Egypt has joined several bilateral and multilateral agreements and treaties to liberalize trade. The growing number of regional and international economic groupings eliminated borders and unrestricted the flow for goods and services, people, skills and ideas. In the Uruguay Round in 1986 market access for developing countries was increased and the ratio of industrial products allowed to

developed countries was raised from 20% to 44%. In effect, volume of trade reached $2.7 trillion for goods and approximately one trillion for services. Egypt has been a member of the GATT since 1971 and has joined the WTO in 1995 but its trade performance has been modest as it continues to concentrate on petroleum and cotton despite the increase in its per capita export manufactures. Egypt has also joined several other economic groupings among which are the following:

a) The Greater Arab Free Trade Area agreement in 1998 whereby custom duties and non-custom restrictions are expected to be removed by 2007. This will lead to an Arab Common Market (ACM) which will increase job opportunities for citizens of participating countries, provide economies of scale, and give more weight to Arab countries relative to other weighty economic groupings like EU, NAFTA, etc.
b) Egypt signed its partnership agreement with European Union (EU) on June 26, 2001, whereby Egypt can have a better access to EU markets (EU has a 350 million consumer potential market with an average per capita income of $ 15000). Also the quota systems imposed on Egypt's exports, especially textile and spinning products, will be eliminated, European financial aids offered to Egypt to modernize its industry will be redoubled and the quota of agricultural exports will be enhanced.
c) Egypt signed a US-Egyptian Partnership for Economic Growth and Development in 1994. Also, in 1999, the two countries signed the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) as a means for free trade area agreement. This agreement is very critical to Egypt's current phase of economic development as it opens lucrative opportunities for Egyptian companies to export their products to the US. The Egyptian government strategy supports these exporting companies by providing guide particularly to exports of furniture, iron and steel, major non-traditional products to the US market. (Egypt and Economic Blocks 2001: Issue 23).
d) The Common Market of East and South Africa (COMESA) which was created in 1993.
e) The 16 member-state Coast and Sahara grouping created in 1998 the goal of which is to achieve economic integration.
f) The Group of–15 which seeks to find solutions for the problems of developing world like in-debt ness, unemployment and poverty.

Though Egypt has lowered its tariff and non-tariff barriers to free trade, Egypt maintains a highly protective tariff structure, and many protective measures still predominate the country's trade policy. For example, while as a result of the GATT negotiations, average tariffs on manufactured and industrial goods were decreased from 40% to approximately 6.3% and then to 3.8%, Egypt has lagged in reducing import tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers. Average tariff rate was reduced from

31% in 1998 to 24% and then to 28% in 1997. At the same time maximum tariff on imports declined from 160% in 1989 to 80% in 1993, then to 55% in 1997. Imports of large cars were an exception, however, as they were reduced from 160% in 1996 to 135% in 1997 (Egypt: A Comparative Study of Foreign Direct Investment Climates 1997:16-17, 29).

Other protective measures, which impede free trade, include a 5%-25% sales tax, which is levied on the CIF value of imports. Customs procedures are also awkward, inconsistent and subjective, and quality control inspection standards are discriminatory and usually carrying out procedures is delayed which adds to the frustration of investors and importers (Egypt: A Comparative Study of Foreign Direct Investment Climates, 1997, p. 29). Moreover, according to the new Unified Investment Law 8 of 1997, exporters or importers have to be authorized to engage in foreign trade. In addition, importers of certain consumer goods have to be Egyptian companies. Difficulties in trade policies, however, negatively affects inflows of FDI to Egypt since free movement of imports and exports is a fundamental condition for effective performance of intra-firm trade of multinational companies in the "New Global Economy" (Abdel Latif 1999: 32-33).

Though tariff and non-tariff barriers to imports protect local industries by blocking competition from imports, this protection helps inefficiency to linger since it does not compel domestic firms to grow into globally competitive companies. High import restrictions also discourage exports since firms find it more profitable to satisfy local demand rather than export, and thereby encounter global competition. Egypt, in fact, is among the countries in the world with the lowest per capita exports. Import restrictions also increase production costs for prospective export firms, and therefore, impede the development of new and non-conventional exports (Egypt: A Comparative Study of Foreign Direct Investment Climates 1997: 28). Moreover, the prevalence of a trade-weighted nominal average tariff, which still exceeds the world average, as well as the average of other developing countries, adds to the problem of low productivity and negatively affects efficient resource allocation. In addition, administrative and foreign trade procedures have not been amended along with tariffs which increased transaction costs pertaining to trade (Fawzy 1998: 10).

But what are the implications of these trade partnership agreements to FDI inflows to Egypt? Partnerships agreements will have offsetting incentive effects for FDI. On the one hand, removal of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers will reduce trade costs, which will foster competition, induce more efficiency and augment trade of goods and services. On the other hand, with free trade, inflows of FDI might be reduced, as investors would no longer have the incentive to produce in Egypt. These investors might be enjoying economies of scale in production in their home countries, and thereby no longer have the motive to make investments in Egypt (Galal and Hoekman 1996: 13).

These partnerships, also, raise some people's doubts about the Egyptian local industries capabilities to compete with European goods gaining access to the Egyptian market in the future (Wahish 1999: 6-12 May). Therefore, in its efforts to upgrade the Egyptian industry, the government established the Industry Modernization Program to raise the efficiency of as many Egyptian companies as possible up to the standards of international champs of performance and productivity The program was jointly funded by the Egyptian government (Euro 103 million), Egyptian private sector and investors (Euro 74 million), and the European Union EU (Euro 250 million, whereby this program is considered the largest program ever provided to a country external to EU). The program is subdivided into a technology assisted corporate and development program, a foreign direct investment helping program and a training program to enhance and develop human resources efficiency and skills particularly in management and marketing (Year Book 1999).

Realizing the fact that they are in a race to build their competencies, some companies have been able to reconfigure themselves to capture new opportunities. About 120 companies in Egypt have obtained the ISO 9000, series representing international standards for quality systems, which offers them marketing and competitive advantages in both the local and international markets. However, the lack of information, worker's resistance to change and the lack of a governmental body supervising the issues related to ISO standards are all problems facing Egypt. An accreditation body is, therefore, recommended to regulate and supervise both consultancy and certification companies. Also, media and educational institutions should play a role in providing people with more information about ISO standards, the process of acquiring certification, etc. (ISO Standards, www.amcham.org.eg).

***Promotion of Exports:***

In moving toward macroeconomic reforms, Egypt gave particular attention to the promotion of exports. Over the last ten years, Egypt has adopted several measures among which is trade liberalization, endorsement of tariff reductions as well as temporary admission plans, in addition to facilitating import charges procedures. Not only does exports help correct the deficiency in the balance of payment, but also they help in creating new jobs and help attract foreign direct investments, in addition to domestic capital flows, all of which help enhance production as a result of technology and management skills transfer (Export growth takes center stage 2001: vol.11).

As a result of Egypt's measures to promote exports, they increased from US $ 4.2 billion in 1990/91 to US $ 6.3 billion in 1999/00. In addition, the ratio of manufactured exports to total exports increased from 27% in 1990/91 to 45% in 1999/00, whereas the ratio of natural resource-based exports like crude oil, mining and agricultural products dropped from 40% in 1990/91 to 19% in 1997/98. Not only did Egypt's exports come to have greater variety with regards to their

composition, but also they were different as to their geographic destination. For example, European Union countries' share in total exports declined from 35% in 1990/91 to 26% in 1999/00 whereas that of Middle East and North Africa countries and the United States went up from 16% and 8% to 45% and 16% respectively for the same period.

Unfortunately, however, the contribution of merchandise exports to GDP declined extremely from 14% in 1990/91 to approximately 7% in 1999/00, and after ruling out oil exports the figure decreased even more to reach 4.7%. In addition, the contribution of manufactured exports to GDP went down from 4% in 1990/91 to 3.3% in 1999/00. Also, about 32% of Egypt's exports were increasing despite the fact that world consumption of these commodities was declining. Conversely, approximately 17% of exports were decreasing while world consumption was rising, which in effect, indicates that Egypt's basket of exports is not responsive to changes in world wide demand.

Despite efforts to promote exports, per capita exports in Egypt is much less than per capita exports in other countries. For example, while per capita exports is $63 per person in Egypt, it is $266.7 in East Asia and Pacific, $531.40 in Europe and Central Asia, $562.7 in Latin America and Caribbean, $466.4 in Middle East and North America, and $122.2 in Sub-Saharan Africa. Egypt's figure only exceeds that of South Asia, which is $40.5. In addition, Egypt's share of world's exports decreased from 0.11% in 1990 to 0.09% in 1999. All these comparisons indicate that, in world market, Egypt's exports performance is still disappointing.

There are two elements, which contribute to Egypt's problem in promoting exports. Originally, policy makers in Egypt still retain the mindset of the former centralized government-controlled economy. (Egypt: A Comparative Study of Foreign Direct Investment Climates 1997: 28). Old technology, undeveloped management techniques, as well as inefficient marketing and development strategies limit Egypt's export capability to compete in worldwide markets. A comparison of the rates of return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA) of two like producers in terms of output, costs and balance sheet, for example, illustrates that both rates are higher for the producer for the domestic market than the producer for overseas markets. This indicates, therefore, that the government's protection measures adopted for the benefit of producers for the domestic market neutralize the effects of the export incentive structure applied to exporters and the trade liberalization reforms that has started since the 1990s. At any rate, in comparing Egypt's export incentive structure to that of other developing countries it is apparent that Egyptian duty drawback and taxes on capital goods and intermediate inputs exceed these countries averages. This shows that Egypt's incentive structure has yet to significantly support Egyptian exporters relative to their competitors. Moreover, Egyptian exporters lose much when they give up some of their revenue as a result of the pound overvaluation and higher profit tax rates which

suggests that more efforts could be dedicated in the areas of exchange rate, import charges on finished goods, and profit taxes ( Galal & Fawzy 2001:1-4). In effect, Egypt's "Open Door Policy" to increase openness only created limited liberalization of the economy which continued to be governed by the public sector (Galal 1996:3).

The other factor contributing to Egypt's problem in encouraging exports have been inflows of foreign exchange income from petroleum exports, Suez Canal tolls, tourism, grants from foreign countries, inflows of short-term private capital, as well as remittances of Egyptian citizens working abroad which have allowed the country to overlook promoting exports. Lately, however, these inflows have started to shrink which, thereby made them unreliable as a source of finance to increasing imports required to forward economic growth. External government debt, for example, absorbs half of total foreign exchange earnings generated by export of goods. (Egypt: A Comparative Study of Foreign Direct Investment Climates 1997: 28).

***Coordination Between Fiscal and Monetary Policies:***

**Fiscal Policy**: To promote economic stability, Egypt has adopted a tight monetary policy since the beginning of the reform program in 1991. One goal of such monetary policy was to attain price stability through reducing the inflation rate gradually so that it is possible to arrive at the weighted average of trading partners of Egypt, and then keep the rate as low and stable as possible thereafter. Another goal is to retain the constancy of the nominal exchange rate of the Egyptian pound against the US Dollar. One outcome of this policy was high interest rates. Other outcomes, however, were a decreasing discount rate, reduced interest on deposits with three months duration, and a low treasury bills rate from 1992 till 1996. Nominal interest rates, however, continued to be high with an obvious difference between interest rates on Egyptian pounds and those of the US Dollar. This absolute difference between both rates was tempting to capital inflows until 1997.

During the period from 1991 through 1997, foreign exchange operations were the most functioning tool of the monetary policy and the co-relation between the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and The Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) was perfect. The large volume of Treasury Bills (L.E. 4.0 billion in 1991/92) helped in absorbing liquidity, and financing the current and the previous years budget deficit. However, in 1991/93 CBE started depending on tools other than treasury bills to serve its purposes. For example, CBE accepted term deposits in Egyptian pounds with remuneration, and it issued T-bonds of longer-term maturities in the context of public debt restructuring. From 1991 through 1997 Egypt adopted a fiscal policy one aim of which was to lower the annual budget deficit in a gradual manner, in order to remove its effect on the enlargement of the government domestic debt. The second objective of the fiscal policy during this period was to restructure the government domestic debt in the direction of long-term maturities.

**Monetary Policy:** The ministry of finance responded to the objectives set for fiscal policy, during the period from 1991 to 1997, by increasing revenues through introducing sales tax, applying a unified and accommodated income tax, advancing tax administration and lowering customs to improve long-term revenues. On the other hand, spending was reduced by cutting down subsidies, managing wage increases, and restructuring and privatizing the public sector. Coordination between fiscal and monetary policy, in effect, was successful in achieving financial stability and high economic growth.

Recently, however, the coordination was not as effective as it was during the first seven years of the reform program. In 1998/99 and 1999/00, fiscal deficit grew sharply, growth in different business divisions started to become sluggish, and balance of payments shifted to an increasing deficit with a negative current account indicating that the attitude of policy makers in Egypt shifted from a tight fiscal policy to an expansionary one due to excessive spending on national infrastructure projects and lower foreign exchange earnings since 1998. In 1998/99 and 1999/00 the expansionary fiscal policy affected the management of the monetary policy by imposing pressure to maintain the interest rate high or to further increase it. Such fiscal policy also caused a shortage in liquidity and affected its distribution in the economy. It also affected the exchange rate due to the selling of foreign exchange to meet the market liquidity obligations and alleviate stagnation in the economy.

Nevertheless, Egypt's monetary policy persisted in being restrictive and offset the liquidity shortages with high short-term injections of liquidity. In effect, the economy went into deep inertia, instability in the exchange rate, and severe reduction in international reserves due to the selling of foreign exchange all of which suggested a new method of harmonizing monetary and fiscal policies. Therefore, since June 2000, the MOF has planned to form a new debt management unit and shift towards a flexible exchange rate system which further required coordination of monetary and fiscal policies objectives and instruments. Coordination, however, has to be sustained by institutional (organizational and legal) and operational arrangements. The new debt management unit is required to manage cash balances, to measure the stock of debt as well as its flow, to establish a debt program and focus on cost minimization of debt services, in addition to attracting foreign investment (El Refaie 2001:16-26).

***Deregulation:***

The government's decision to deregulate the economy was to encourage more private sector contribution to economic activity. Reorganization of the economy embraces simplifying company registration systems, smoothing out customs procedures and approvals, and releasing laws to expedite on business operations. Deregulations contributed to increasing market competition, lowering transaction costs, protecting property rights, all of which doubtlessly induce more private

investment. In response to these efforts, real GDP increased from 1.9% in 1991/92 to 4.7% in 1994/95, and then up to 5% in 1996/97 and 1997/98. These improvements, however, are still not good enough when compared with economic growth, trade liberalization, openness and investments in other countries like, for example, East Asia and Latin America (Fawzy 1998: 10-11).

Egypt's success in implementing its macroeconomic policies and reforms is limited since it has not yet gone rapidly enough or greatly in implementing these reforms. The economic reform efforts of the government should target policies that will boost FDI and make exports play the leading role in economic development. Successful reforms in East Asia and Latin America have been achieved after targeting such policies (Egypt: A Comparative Study of Foreign Direct Investment Climates 1997: 28).

**Institutional Constraints to FDI**

Despite Egypt's structural reforms, still, Administrative barriers constrain FDI inflows to Egypt. Despite the fact that the institutional investor credit rating of Egypt has increased in recent years, still it is considered low especially when compared to estimates of leading countries in the international economy. Investors still claim that numerous institutions in Egypt impede their firms operations. Notwithstanding Egypt's economic reform program, yet the effective extent of privatization, trade liberalization, as well as other reforms continues to generate difficulties. Administrative barriers to trade liberalization, for example, remain complex, and thereby allow the government's protection measures to shelter inefficient industries in Egypt from the threat of international competition which eventually hinders moving towards a free market economy (Egypt in the Global Economy 1998: 2-3).

Sound institutions induce economic efficiency and growth since they foster high market competitiveness and specialization, lessen uncertainty, and, most important, reduce transaction costs or the costs of doing business (Fawzy 1998: 12-14). Notwithstanding Egypt's large labor force and low average wage levels, Egypt continues to be a "High Cost" country because of its significantly high transaction costs which induces skeptic investors attitudes towards business activity in Egypt (Egypt in the Global Economy 1998: 3). Examples of transaction costs here could be the cost of obtaining spare parts, telephone prices, and interest rate spread between the rate at which banks borrow from savers and the rate at which banks lend their clients (Benham 1997: 5-6). Reducing transaction costs, however, involves reducing the government's role in the economy and simultaneously magnifying the commitment of the private sector to institutional reforms (Egypt in the Global Economy 1998: 3). Reliable institutions, thereby, influence private sector growth and efficiency, and attract foreign direct investments.

To explain the low level of FDI inflows to Egypt and limited growth of the

private sector, and help negotiate for more improvement and deregulation of the economy, induce more foreign direct investment, and set growth targets, a cross-country comparison of institutional environments was established. The study focused on contract rejections, risk of property denial, corruption, rule of law, as well as bureaucratic attributes all of which are critical to the attraction of FDI inflows to Egypt. In estimating Egypt's rank among countries like Malaysia, Thailand, Korea, Chile, and Singapore, it was found out that despite the fact that Egypt's rating has generally improved during the period 1991-1999, which in effect reflects efforts made to improve Egypt's institutions framework, institutional limitations are still high in comparison with other countries (Fawzy 1998: 12-14).

Studies also indicate that macroeconomic reforms and institutional reforms are indispensable to each other if a country is to achieve sustainable economic growth (Galal 1996:8; Noll, R.G. 1997: 1-21). "The inability of societies to develop effective, low cost enforcement of contracts is the most important source of both historical stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment in the Third World", asserted North (1990: 54). The need for integrating macroeconomic policies and reforms, and institutional reforms is also clear and pressing since decisions of investors as to whether or not to launch business activities in a particular country will depend on both. In fact, institutional problems will discourage inflow of FDI to a certain country despite its efforts to upgrade its economic environment.

But what are the institutions that impede FDI inflows and private sector development in Egypt? Pinpointing the institutions which are of significance to investment decisions is not an easy job, however, since institutions comprise both formal rules like laws, constitution, and property rights, in addition to informal restrictions such as taboos, sanctions, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct. This, in effect means that institutions are too broadly defined to enable policy makers to undertake improvement policies in the short run because of informal constraints, which are outside their scope (Galal 1996: 1-2).

To find out which institutions inhibit inflows of investments to Egypt we have to start with an overall evaluation of institutional constraints. According to a survey conducted in 1998 on 154 firms in the private sector, it was found out that primary institutional constraints in Egypt, according to their importance, are tax administration, commercial dispute settlement, support services, labor quality and regulation. These constraints are followed by difficulties in exporting, cost and access to finance, economic policy uncertainty, insufficient local demand, and input procurement problems, which are of moderate significance to business operations in Egypt. At the end of the scale, on the other hand, lies unofficial payments as the least significant obstacle to the business environment in Egypt (Fawzy 1998: 12, 14-15).

The intensity of institutional constraints confronting the business environment in Egypt varies by industry. For example, severity of constraints is highest in the trade sector and lowest in the oil sector while it is moderate in construction,

manufacturing and tourism sectors. Tax administration is also more problematic for the textile and engineering industries while it is less severe in food processing industry possibly because food processing companies are guaranteed temporary tax exemptions, and thereby do not encounter tax regulations problems. Labor regulations are more pressing in the textile industry (which are more labor intensive), while cost and access to finance is more binding in the engineering industry. Access to intermediate inputs is also most problematic for the textile industry whereas it is the least binding constraint for the food industry. Problems with regard to inputs price, quantity, quality and delivery time are encountered since textile firms depend mainly on state owned enterprises to obtain their supplies. State owned enterprises, however, monopolize the spinning and weaving markets, and give first priority to their export targets. Private firms, thus, find themselves stuck with inputs leftover. On the contrary, food firms either obtain their inputs from various suppliers in the private and public sector, or they are self sufficient (Fawzy 1998: 15-16).

Severity of constraints also differs according to the size of the firm. In general, small firms are more troubled with institutional constraints than large ones particularly with regards to tax administration and dispute settlements since these small firms cannot meet the expenses of accountants and lawyers. At the same time small firms access to bank credit is limited, as compared with larger firms, since providing loans to these small companies entails high processing costs, and extensive risk of default due to lack of collateral. Small firms, on the other hand do not suffer from labor matters since these firms are basically family businesses where implementation of labor laws is weak. This is especially true in those firms with a labor force of less than ten employees (Fawzy 1998:16-17).

Moreover, it was found out that domestic firms suffer more than foreign ones from institutional constraints, except for labor and market size constraints. This might be attributed, however, to the fact that foreign firms selected for the sample were functioning in the oil sector which is bound by international contracts (Fawzy 1998: 17).

The following are the institutional constraints to the business economic environment in Egypt arranged according to their severity:

**1) Tax Policy and Cost of Investment:**

Egypt's tax structure threatens the efficiency of the existing tax system for a variety of reasons.

➢ *Existing tax system executes high and several tax rates on a narrow base:*

In fact, Egypt applies a 40% corporate income tax (on net profits before taxes according to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) to joint stock companies, limited liability companies, partnerships which are limited by shares, and foreign

companies whose parent companies are located abroad. Lower tax rates are applied, however, to companies engaged in industrial manufacturing and export activities. In such cases corporate income tax is only 32%. Aside from the corporate income tax there are also a 2% tax on excess profits, from 10%-40% real property tax on the estimated annual rental value of agricultural and improved land, a 10% sales tax on specific goods and services, and the regular collection of stamp taxes charged on capital and transactions (Egypt: A Comparative Study of Foreign Direct Investment Climates 1997: 66).

➢ *Existing tax system creates several investment distortions:*

The current tax system, in Egypt, creates several investment distortions since it fails to deal fairly with different investment options, thereby reducing productivity and efficiency of the country's investment resources. The current corporate tax law creates many investment distortions not only by sector (manufacturing versus services, etc.), but also according to the type of financing, as well as the different organizational forms.

**a) Investment Distortions by Sectors:** In a study by the World Bank (1995), Marginal Effective Tax Rate (METR) was calculated to measure incentive effects and its drawbacks for specific investments for both manufacturing and service projects (El Samalouty 1999: 26-29). METR is a summary measure that integrates all the aspects of the tax system of a country which influences the probability of investment activities (El Samalouty 1999: 2). METR can also be effective in comparing different tax systems in various countries, as well as the proceeds for foreign direct investment (El Samalouty 1999: 27). The following conclusions were drawn based on METR estimates in the study made by the World Bank:

- Higher corporate income tax rates are applied to services (42%) than in manufacturing activities (34%). This discrimination among different kinds of investments is, thus, counterproductive to non-traditional industries to develop their production, as well as their exports.
- Though the tax system is favorable to machinery over inventories, and the government allocates 25% initial allowance for most capital equipment categories, the effective tax rate on machinery is higher than that on inventories. The high machinery's ETR are attributed to the value-added tax on capital and inflation.
- The tax system discriminates against inventories since generally Egyptian businesses use the FIFO method for estimating inventories despite the fact that they are allowed to use the LIFO method. This, however, leads to high ETR during inflationary periods.
- ETR on land is negative which indicates that investments in land used for

production purposes will end up making losses though land investment itself is profitable. The advantage of a negative ETR, however, is that it protects income from taxation (Kheir El Din, H. et al 2000: 11-23).

**b) Distortions due to the Type of Financing:**

Interest deductions allow investors to escape paying corporate income taxes. It is therefore, apparent that the tax system in Egypt favors debt financing.

**c) Distortions due to Different Organizational Forms:**

The tax system is favorable to corporations since they are taxed relatively lightly, particularly joint-stock companies, over non-corporate forms of businesses (El Samalouty 1999: 26-35).

➢ *Tax system applies tax holidays that are of limited effectiveness to FDI*

Large tax incentives such as tax holidays result in a complex and narrow-based tax system which generates little revenue while not really fostering investment. (El Samalouty 1999: 55-56; Kheir El Din, H. et al 2000: 20-22).

To promote industrial and technological development, Egypt applies the tax holiday form of corporate tax incentive. Generally, under the tax holiday incentive, new companies are exempted from paying corporate income taxes for several years. Companies are also released from being seized by tax officials, and are encouraged to finance their investments through using their retained earnings instead of using debt because interest reductions are of small value with tax holiday. As a result, FDI will be able to avoid the likelihood of becoming bankrupt. Nevertheless, tax holiday has several disadvantages which out weight its benefits among which are:

- Tax holidays allow benefits particularly to highly profitable manufacturing firms while it grants no benefits to loss-making companies.
- Tax holidays tend to diminish government revenues.
- Tax holidays are seldom easy to manage in practice.
- Tax holiday's effectiveness to foreign direct investment is limited since such incentive is more advantageous to those firms with short-term interest in the economy than to ones with long-term interest.
- Tax relief granted by the Egyptian government is recaptured by the foreign company's home country when income is repatriated (El Samalouty 1999: 38-41; Kheir El Din, H. et al 2000: 20-26).

Therefore, compared to international standards, Egypt's taxation levels of capital are relatively high. Inefficiencies in Egypt's current tax system and the existing differential incentive program result in misallocation of resources since investors are inclined to choose those activities that will reduce taxes to the

minimum instead of engaging in those projects that are most profitable. A distorted tax system also prompts reductions in government revenues which are needed to finance infrastructure reforms necessary to support private sector development and encourage FDI. (El Samalouty 1999: 16-17, 25-26).

Proposed tax policy reforms to reduce cost of investment are useless and may not have the aspired effects, however, without the existence of an efficient tax administration system (El Samalouty 1999: 57). Despite the fact that tax administration is not a decisive factor of the investment climate particularly in developing nations where the political environment, capital markets, credibility of fiscal obligations, labor force skills, as well as the legal environment affect the investors decisions to make capital inflows, tax administration is the chief problem facing FDI in Egypt since it increases transaction costs and hampers efficiency of the firms (El Samalouty 1999:1).

➢ *Problems with tax administration*

In Egypt, problems with regards to tax administration lie in the lack of confidence between tax collectors and taxpayers, the prevalence of an inefficient dispute system, and the inconsistency in evaluation of taxable profits. Investors complain that estimation of taxable profits is subjective, ambiguous, and tax collectors have complete authority to assess the taxes to be charged. Bonuses are distributed on tax collectors on the basis of collected taxes, which possibly induces them to over estimate due taxes. The process of tax estimation is also time consuming and costly (Fawzy 1998: 18-19). In addition, settling taxes informally with tax collectors is a special concern for foreign companies since it may take years to settle a dispute. These companies, unlike Egyptian ones, find it hard to cope with the system which is sometimes liable to corrupt practices (Egypt: A Comparative Study of Foreign Direct Investment Climates 1997: 19). Finally, investors complain that in Egypt the tax system does not take into account indirect costs incurred by branches of foreign enterprises when estimating the taxable profits despite the fact that these indirect charges amount to 6.65% of total costs (2002 "Ebeid Soon Announces Decisions to Encourage Investment in Reconsideration of Estimating Taxable Income after September 11th Event").

**2) <u>Dispute Settlement:</u>**

The Dispute Settlements System in Egypt abides by laws developed during the period of centralized control which makes it unable to deal successfully with needs of newly adopted open market economy. Bankruptcy, broken agreements, tax collection problems are examples of the main reasons for disputes. Not only is litigation expensive, but it is also time consuming since it generally takes four and a half years to resolve disputes in court as compared to one year outside it (Fawzy 1998:19).

**3) Supporting Services:**

High cost and poor quality are the major problems of supporting services in Egypt which discourage inflow of FDI. High cost and low quality of domestic transportation impede investors' activities while lack of adequate knowledge reduces transparency about suppliers and markets. Scarce and inefficient marketing and distribution skill, and networks also hamper business activities. Moreover, Egyptian firms suffer from insufficient technical assistance in production planning, technology updating and quality management. Shortage in training services further aggravates the problem of lack of technical assistance (Fawzy 1998: 20).

**4) Labor:**

FDI participation in improving employment levels is weak in Egypt since only 9% of the total labor force is employed in manufacturing enterprises incorporated under Law 43 of 1974 (Abdel Latif 1999: 34). Labor force quality is a major problem for business activities in Egypt because of the absence of high quality human resources due to weakness in the country's educational system which does not consider the skills required in the domestic labor market. Labor regulations with regards to the lay off of workers is very protective of labor which result in high costs for businesses which think of downsizing or introducing new technologies to sustain their competitiveness. Such regulations also induce business to invest more in capital-intensive techniques as opposed to labor training because of the absence of labor laws that can discipline misconduct and low productivity (Fawzy 1998: 21; Ali, A.A. 2002:12-24; Radwan, S. 2002:8).

**5) Difficulties in Exporting:**

Difficulties in exporting are viewed by investors as a moderate problem since, in Egypt, firms generally produce for local market consumption rather than for exporting purposes, and thereby are not deeply affected by export constraints. For those investors who export, however, there are several constraints. Tariffs imposed on imported inputs are the main problem. Still other problems are the absence of marketing and distribution companies; cumbersome, tedious and costly drawback and temporary admission system; confusing export procedures; and the lack of export credit and insurance services (Fawzy 1998: 21-22).

Therefore, Egypt persists to have a trade deficit with no perceived improvements. Non-oil exports are relatively low and their development is restricted by the following elements:

- Improper government policies embraces high levels of safeguard measures against imports which, therefore, depress competitiveness and export-led growth within the private sector.
- Low productivity of capital and labor factors of production, and high production costs due to cumbersome institutional constraints.

- Overvalued and inflexible exchange rate increases production costs for prospective exporters.
- Shortcomings to lure foreign direct investment with worldwide market access opportunities, managerial skills, and improved technology.
- Lack of marketing capabilities in markets abroad.
  (Egypt: A Comparative Study of Foreign Direct Investment Climates 1997:33).

6) **Cost and Access to Finance:**

Firms primary financial concern is the cost of credit. Collateral requirements ranks second, and is followed by enormous time needed to acquire approvals and the difficulty of getting access to formal credit. Access to finance is mostly difficult, costly and restricted to large firms which comprise a minor part of the private sector. Small and micro firms, on the other hand, which constitute the majority of the sector, depend primarily on family and friends, and on their retained earnings to finance their business (Fawzy 1998: 22-23). Still, also, the securities market has not contributed to private corporate finance in Egypt (Abdel Latif 1999: 30).

7) **Economic Policy Uncertainty:**

According to 1998 survey results, problems of policy uncertainty are no longer perceived as the primary constraint to business activities. This can be attributed to reforms launched to increase credibility of the economic policy, as well as to protect investors from reversibility of policies, and the recent coordination between the government and the private sector with regards to decision making matters. Investors, however, still complain about the absence of transparency in law making, lack of respect for property rights, and policy instability (Fawzy 1998: 23).

8) **Insufficient Local Demand:**

The problem with local demand is not in its absolute size since Egypt, the most populous market in the Middle East, suggests a substantial large home-demand base. The problem, however, lies in the absence of information about the domestic market, complicated procurement regulations set by the government, and incapability of marketing and distribution channels. Investors need sufficient information about the local market to assess market potential, levels of competition, legal and political environment, and socio- cultural influences. Local demand in Egypt is also unsophisticated since it is focused on basic goods. This unsophisticated demand clarifies why firms in Egypt are loose with regards to quality standards. Contributes to this also is the absence of laws to protect consumers. This, in effect, causes consumers to prevent trying new brands which makes it costly for investors to develop consumers by increasing brand awareness, and frustrates innovation attempts (Fawzy 1998: 23).

**9) Input Procurement:**

Tariffs and surcharges, customs tedious procedures, and inefficient port services are cited as the major constraints to procurement of imported inputs. On the other hand, domestic inputs are restricted by poor quality of products and inconsistent specifications, as well as late delivery (Fawzy 1998: 24).

**10) Corruption:**

Despite the fact that the Egyptian economy suffers from corruption, bribes were considered the least intense of the constraints to the business economic environment. Not only do bribes have a negative effect on transaction costs, but they also cause uncertainty since investors do not know whether or not they are going to pay the same amount every time in the case of changes in government executives. The survey results show that bribery is common in import and export transactions, collection of taxes, labor insurance examination and investigations, and bank loans. Severity of corruption varies by economic activity. It is highest in construction sector since the government is involved in a large portion of construction transactions. On the other hand, it is lowest in the oil sector since it is subject to international contracts. Also, foreign investors are more afraid and risk averse concerning corruption and bribes than Egyptians (Fawzy 1998: 24-25).

**Conclusions and Policy Implications:**

Critical to Egypt's sustainable economic growth and development are:

➢ **Private sector participation**

Critical to Egypt's sustainable growth are the private sector participation and the attraction of FDI to economic sectors that are crucial to the continuation of growth. Hence, Egypt ought to increase its efforts to expedite privatization, reduce institutional constraints to inflows of capital, accelerate management and supervisory reforms, and encourage competition.

➢ **Building human capacity**

Critical to alleviation of institutional constraints is achieving effective transformation of the means corporations organize and manage their human resources. Organizations that have successfully transformed themselves were gifted with leaders or had the opportunity to hire consultants who helped shape employees future vision, provided an advanced way of thinking and behaving, allowed information sharing, and determined high standards of performance for both individuals and organizational subunits, all of which improved institutional performance (Kilman 1988: 27-31).

➢ **Tax system reconsideration**

Perceived negative effects of tax holidays on attracting investors suggest that Egypt has to find other alternatives to such incentives which provide more efficiency and are of less cost.

Suggestions are to give highest priority to improving indirect taxes and move towards a consumption-based value added tax which will remarkably lower marginal effective rates on business income, and thereby, reduce restraints to investment (El Samalouty 1999: 56)

➢ **Enhancing institutions' performance**

Successful and sustained institutional reforms would require reducing governmental control over assets. Enhancing institutions performance also involves persuading all stakeholders of institutional reforms – Politicians, businessmen, citizens, media people, etc. – of the importance of focusing on transaction costs, calculating them, announcing them formally in public vis-à-vis other countries, which in effect, would provide a benchmark for policy makers and increase the likelihood of successful policies and correction measures (Benham 1997: 11-16).

Investment incentive schemes are recommended to provide investors with a comprehensive incentive structure against threats of limits on foreign investors' participation and inaccessibility to sectors.

Different kinds of investors will react differently to various institutional constraints that will challenge FDI. Therefore, people formulating policies in Egypt might constantly try to grasp what bothers investors and try to confront these concerns to be able to attract further capital flows and achieve better levels of economic growth (El Samalouty 1999: 46-7).

The return from institutional reforms is inclined to be higher if the government tries to reduce policy uncertainty and rationalize tax administration. Also, since severity of constraints differs among industries, more consideration might be given to industry-specific problems (Galal, 1996, p.15). For example, the government might adopt new policies to enhance technological and organizational capabilities that correspond to industry-specific needs.

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# Globalization: Early Art and Commerce and the Role of Accounting and Taxation *

**Dr. William Brent Carper, Department of Management**
**Mrs. Betty Estelle Carper, ARTV**

**Abstract**

*Most historical works regarding the comprehensive history of accountancy and taxation trace the origin of the disciplines to Babylon (modern-day Iraq) in approximately 1200 B.C. Anecdotal evidence in the Middle East (a cradle of civilization ) indicates the early origins of accountancy and taxation initially appeared much earlier. Anthropologists indicate that early man began the transformation from hunters to gatherers, building agrarian societies around 8000-7500 B.C. In this regard, sporadic references to accountancy and taxation may exist dating all the way back to the transition of mankind from hunters to gatherers resulting in the formation of tribes. In fact, some linguistic experts believe that accountancy and taxation may have been primary reasons for the early development of written language, specifically as relates to various numbering systems used to account for everything from time and commerce to the taxation of seasonal harvests. This manuscript attempts to document early Middle Eastern and North Africa anecdotal references to early accountancy and taxation, in conjunction with the continuing global evolution of art and commerce. The research methodology is extremely pragmatic, eclectic, and unscientific. It is primarily a function of the authors' on-going anecdotal research as relates to early Middle Eastern art and commerce and the role of accounting and taxation.*

*The role of early accountants known as "scribes" was not unlike the role of corporate accountants in multi-national enterprises (MNEs) today. Additionally, the early scribes were held in such high regard by society that they even had their own personal god and goddess, Hathor and Seshat! Scribes were expected to possess many of the same characteristics as accountants in the modern global world; i.e., ethical behavior, above average intelligence and highly skilled in math and language. Scribes often worked closely with the king and held positions of power. Thus, scribes insured smooth operation of the king's administration. Scribes also kept records of all of the king's holdings and estates. It seems that scribes also worked closely with artisans who worked on temples and monuments in order to substantiate the king's wealth and holdings on the bas-reliefs on the walls of the king's temples and tombs. Interestingly, scribes apparently were instructed not to include imperial disbursements for the artisans' portrayal in the wall carvings. Only accrued wealth was portrayed. So how is this different from*

*today? Candidly, the motivation for the aforementioned financial presentation appears to be the forerunner of many financial statements today, both in the private as well as the public sector around the world. Quoting from the old show tune by artists Johnny Mercer and Harold Arlen, from the Paramount film Here Comes the Waves, 1944, "Accent-tchu-ate the positive [management], E-lin-my-nate the negative [investors and tax collectors], Latch on to the affirmative [public relations], [and] Don' mess with Mister In-between [auditors]."* ■

* Abstract only is published here

# Globalization for Economical and Ecological Sustainability

**S.M.El-Haggar[1] and D.A.Sakr[2]**

**Abstract**

*Human impact on the environment is exceeding what nature can regenerate. If the increasing consumption of raw materials continues, we will deprive future generations from meeting their basic needs. Today, increasing the efficiency of material utilization is the main challenge of the world as set by the Rio summit in 1992 and Johannesburg Summit in 2002.*

*In a trial to imitate nature's ecological systems, we are beginning to think about ways to connect different industrial process that produce waste promoting Industrial Ecology concept. Implementing Industrial ecology through adapting Cleaner Production technologies is the main road toward sustainability and reaching zero pollution. It is also the only way to reconcile the globe's ecological and economical development by integrating the environment with business.*

*Developing industrial ecology network between north and south is the best way for solidarity among countries through the exchange of information and experience. The Industrial Ecology network or eco-industrial networks and eco-industrial parks can be considered the science of "Globalization". Now, Globalization can be redefined as the way to develop economical benefits between north and south through the leading role of the environment.*

*The rapid and increasing globalization of trade and markets might increase the gap between north and south. However, Environmental Globalization will decrease this gap and develop more job opportunities for both sides. The potential barriers to international trade will be removed through eco-label to accelerate the implementation of the approaching General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).*

**Introduction**

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), signed in 1947, was designed to provide an international forum that encourages free trade between member states by regulating and reducing tariffs on traded goods and by providing a common mechanism for resolving trade barriers. GATT will offer member countries an opportunity to enter more and larger markets around the world. People will be able to access more capital flows, technology, cheaper imports, and wider export markets beyond their national borders through globalizing their national economies. However, this global market doesn't guarantee that these benefits will be shared equally between member countries especially developing countries. This

will depend mainly on how fast can developing countries' economies integrate into the global economy. In the past years, a large number of developing countries have shown slow progress or even lost ground. This is causing the gap between rich and poor countries to grow more and it is expected to grow wider if globalization will lead to its isolation from world economy.

In parallel to this globalization, Earth's natural systems are being extensively deteriorated by incorrect human activities. The common future of the people of the world is under the risk of shortage of natural resources required to sustain life. However, the actions directed to protect the environment is lagging behind the overwhelmed concern for improving the economy. This is due to the worldview of the environment as a part of the economy instead of the economy as a part of the environment. Today, we are challenged to shift this worldview before environmental degradation leads to a long-term economic decline causing us to lose both our environment and economy. We need redefine the relationship between environment and economy and find means to integrate them together.

We are talking about sustainable development all the time, but we have lost the direction to our goal because we need to think first how can we develop sustainability. Our real environmental and economical problem in this century is that development of science and technology have increased human capacity to extract resources from nature, then process it, use it, but finally it is not returned back to the environment to regenerate it. Unsustainable human activities are creating an open loop that can not continue and has to reach one day to a dead end. On the contrary, sustainability is the rule that governs natural economics. Natural economics regulates every transaction involving the exchange of any of its resources among the members of the system. Natural economics never pushes nature's inventory of resources beyond critical limits for sustainability. Human economic systems should learn from natural economic systems that there is a need to attain cooperation among individuals to enhance the economic efficiency in the use of resources for each member of the community that will in return maximize economic effectiveness for the community as a whole.

The tool for sustainable human economic systems is industrial ecology, and the means to achieve industrial ecology are cleaner production concepts [El-Haggar and Salama, 2003]. Industrial ecology (IE) is the study of industrial systems that operate like natural systems. In a natural system there is a closed materials and energy loop; where animal and plant wastes are decomposed by microorganisms into useful nutrients to the plants, then plants produce food to the animals to consume it, and finally the loop is closed again when animals die and are either converted to fossil fuels or nutrients for the plants. Industries can follow the same system through making one industry's waste another's raw materials, where materials and energy are circulated in a complex web of interactions.




These web interactions can be implemented through constructing eco-industrial parks for new industrial developments and using information technology for the existing ones.

An eco-industrial parks are industrial facilities clustered to minimize both energy and material wastes through turning it into revenues. The case of the business community in Kalundborg- Denmark demonstrates an excellent example of the eco-industrial parks. The park houses a petroleum refinery, power plant, pharmaceutical factory, wallboard factory, and a fish farm. Residual heat from the power plant warms fish farms and most of the area's homes and businesses, while excess steam is piped to the nearby petroleum refinery and the pharmaceutical factory. The air scrubbers on the power plant's smokestack turn sulfur dioxide into gypsum, which is then sold to the wallboard factory, which gets power by burning unused natural gas pumped from the petroleum refinery. As to the power plant, it uses the refinery's wastewater for cooling. The fly ash from the power station is sold to cement manufacturers to extract valuable metals from the wastes. The pharmaceutical factory transports the refuse from the fermentation reactions to local farmers who value it as a good soil fertilizer. Through these interactions, the companies have all saved money while reducing pollution and reducing consumption of water, energy, and other resources. They create a revenue of about \$15-million a year on an investment that has initially cost about \$75-million.

As to the existing industries who can not benefit from the eco-industrial park concept they still can implement industrial ecology. The 20th century has opened the gate to transfer of information with the most efficient, secure, and fastest means. The world wide web could be utilized as an open waste market that links interested parties together to exchange information about their industries' wastes and conduct business transactions. A demonstration was created in the American University in Cairo for the possible prototype of the 'Waste Exchange' webpage as shown:




The society of this project referred to as 'The National Society for Environmental Protection from Industrial Waste (NSEPIW)' has the following members:

- Students
- Professors
- Industries
- Decision makers

The proposed webpage is divided into <u>seven</u> sections:

**1) Society Mission**

It conveys the mission statement for the NSEPIW, which focuses mainly on conservation and utilization of natural resources (wastes) through research and technology to protect today and future generations' health and environment.

**2) Project Description**

The project addresses a critical environmental issue that is a primary source of pollution of serious impacts on all natural resources. The main two objectives of the project are:

1- Free the environment from different forms of industrial wastes.
2- Manipulate this waste in a constructive manner using innovative techniques and emerging technologies to convert it into materials that could be utilized in other industries.

**3) Waste Section**

This section is password protected, where the company logs in to input data about the quantity and quality of its industry's waste. The info will be then sorted by waste category.

**4) Student Area**

This section contains research work done by students to utilize industrial waste

as a raw material for another industry with the means of innovative techniques. The research work is available for industries to browse and adopt such technologies in their own industries.

5) **Technologies Section**
Once the students have their material in place, the research is then moved to this section where it is available for browsing.

6) **Market Opportunities**
Are available as potential business linking the technologies to the industry.

**Conclusion**

Developing industrial ecology network between north and south is the best way for solidarity among countries through the exchange of information and experience. The Industrial Ecology network or eco-industrial networks and eco-industrial parks can be considered the science of "Globalization". Now, Globalization can be redefined as the way to develop economical benefits between north and south through the leading role of the environment, which can be called "Environmental Globalization".

The rapid and increasing globalization of trade and markets might increase the gap between north and south. However, *Environmental Globalization* will decrease this gap and develop more job opportunities for both sides. The potential barriers to international trade will be removed through eco-label to accelerate the implementation of the approaching General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

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**Endnotes**

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# Globalization and Individuals with Special Needs

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## Abstract

*There is no doubt that globalization has a strong impact on every aspect of our contemporary life. Such impact is projected to continue and perhaps amplify thus introducing significant changes in the lifestyle of mankind. Although, there is no unique definition as to individuals with special needs, yet their representation in the society, qualitatively and quantitatively, can never be underestimated. However, there is relatively little data on the impact of globalization on this important segment of the society.*

*This paper is part of an ongoing study that was prompted by specific AUC activities involving students' organizations aiming at further strengthening of AUC support to individuals with special needs. The paper represents an attempt to cast light on specific impacts of globalization on individuals with special needs. Data is acquired from literature as well as available statistics both globally and in Egypt. A small sample comprising both individuals with special needs and other individuals will be interviewed to assess the relevancy of this data to the literature and explore their views regarding opportunities and threats associated with globalization.*

*This work highlights sample of efforts exerted by AUC for the integration of individuals of special needs. The work –at that early stage- reveals a strong opinion that globalization indeed offers a wide range of opportunities to individuals with special needs. Special emphasis has been made on positive opportunities through means of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and overcoming physical disabilities and geographic barriers. However, the author, among others, points out some potential drawbacks of globalization that can possibly minimize contributions and development of individuals with special needs in some domains. This work will be resumed where statistical data will be analyzed and presented at a later stage for findings and conclusions.*

**Keywords (Globalization, Special Needs, Education, Engineering)**

## I. Introduction

When asked "Is globalization good or bad for Egypt?", the former General Secretary of the United Nations Botrus Botrus Ghali replied in a public lecture held at AUC in January 2003: "It is not a question of what is good or what is bad. Rather, it is simply a matter of survival and how to cope with the international trends since

nations cannot afford to isolate themselves from strong global tides" (1).

Globalization is becoming a common term covered by numerous studies, lectures and deliberations over the past five years. In fact, the AUC had a lead in allocating a previous *AUC Research Conference* in 1998 in which various aspects of globalization have been visited. Yet, it is safe to say that there is no unique definition and there seems to be no agreement on full implications of the term itself. However, globalization –for the purpose of this paper- is concerned with the strong international forces that take strong global shape and impact various aspects of our contemporary life.

Egypt, together with a multitude of nations, has paid a specific attention to globalization particularly since the start of year 2000. The then famous Y2K problem by the end of 1990's is but a simple example that raised attention on global problems that can have repercussions on a global scale. Needless to say, globalization has much more profound implications and thus globalization-related concerns included economic, political and societal issues are being tackled worldwide. Global economic forces, international trade agreements, poverty alleviation and international crime are strong areas where globalization has both quantitative and qualitative implications.

Individuals with special needs are with no doubt an integral part of the fabrics of societies and efforts are being made to insure their adequate integration into the community and to maximize the benefits of their contribution. Credible educational institutes, such as AUC, aim at catering educational deliverables to individuals with special needs as well as exerting effort towards setting a model and raising awareness. This work of this paper was prompted through an awareness session attended by the author during the Fall 2002 semester in which students and various entities at AUC presented ideas, projects and activities aiming at healthy integration into the AUC educational and societal matrix.

The major objective of this work in progress is to investigate the effectiveness of tools and means in an era of globalization to strengthen deliverables of educational programs to cater for individuals with special needs in one hand and to enhance the contribution of individuals with special needs into educational programs. Specific emphasis is geared towards engineering applications and the reciprocal interaction between individuals with special needs and the rest of the community within those disciplines.

Meeting the objective of this study is to be fulfilled through interrelated tasks that can be summarized as follows:

- Performing a literature review particularly to work of international agencies as well as pilot projects targeting individuals with special needs within a global context.
- Conducting a small-scale survey that covers individuals with special needs as well as other individuals to investigates means and tools to

strengthen integration.

- Exploring means for the promotion of joint-work with other interested institutes that is concerned with individuals with special needs.
- Developing good involvement and assessing the effectiveness of active non-governmental organizations (NGO's) targeting individuals with special needs.

**II. Categories of Individuals with Special Needs**

The term special needs, when it comes to individuals, refers to forms of physical, mental or psychological conditions that characterize a group of people from the rest of their peers in the community. Some may agree with the fact that needs in general are magnified or distinguished for the group of individuals referred to by this term. Rightly or wrongly, it is often the case that the term "special needs" is mixed up with the term "disability".

According to a classification provided in the UNDP report, there exist various forms of disability which can be on the whole classified as follows (2):

- Physical disability that affects the body and its ability to perform certain tasks
- Psychiatric disability which can affect the mind
- Sensory disability which can affect the senses
- Cognitive disability which can affect the ability to learn
- Emotional disability and others

Clearly, some forms of disability are interrelated in one hand and can either be temporal disability that can be healed or recovered to some extent while other forms may have a long-term nature.

In Egypt, although the author is not aware of accurate statistics for individuals with special needs partially due to the borderlines set for the definition itself, yet the UNDP report highlights the fact that at least 2.1 millions can be identified with some forms of disability in Egypt. Such disabilities seem to be classified into three clusters and as illustrated –in an aggregated form in Figure 1:

- Mental disability (about 73% of the 2.1 millions identified)
- Visual, hearing and sensory disabilities that are –perhaps- either by birth of formed with age (about 15%).
- Motor disability which impacts the ability of the body to perform specific tasks (about 12%)

Regardless of the accuracy of the statistics as well as the categorization process itself (which is not the focus of this work), there is no question that the significance and presence of individuals with special needs is distinctive and thus the rest of the society needs to well identify and caters its deliverables –as much as possible- to

fulfill their needs in one hand and explore means for proper integration and make use of their capabilities for the welfare of the community on the other.

### III. Education and Individuals with Special Needs

Two of the most important concerns of education when it comes to individuals with special needs are the following:

1. To recruit, capitalize and make use of those individuals as participants in the educational programs and services rendered by institutes.
2. To insure a good level of education and raise awareness of the community –as a whole- into adequate consideration and establish bridges of integration with individuals with special needs.

Taking the American University in Cairo as an example, the mission of the University includes to "*Provide High Quality Educational Opportunities to Students from all Segments of Egyptian Society as well as from other Countries to Egypt's Cultural and Intellectual life*" (3). Thus, including various segments of the society is certainly within the crux of the mission. This means that educational programs in any institute need to consider the manner and extent of the deliverables rendered to individuals with special needs.

For instance, the ABET accredited Engineering programs at AUC state in one of their objectives the following: "*Inspire Students to Recognize and Consider the Impact of Engineering Solutions in a Global and Societal Context with an Ability to Understand and Be Sensitive to Other Cultures*" (4). In that sense, students are to be educated about the considerations of individuals with special needs and not only limit its deliverables to the rest of the community.

Figure 2 presents part of the new proposed Egyptian code for the disabled (that can very well be in a final endorsement stage). This shows dimensions that need to be considered by the architects for adequate design of facilities with consideration of both clusters of individuals (5). In addition, students' projects, theses and special problems can also be tailored to include those individuals and be covered by educational programs.

Another vital component for the integration of individuals with special needs and integration is students' activities. Sample of such activities within AUC are activities of "*Best Bodies*", "*Hand in Hand*", "*Volunteers in Action*" and the "*Help*" clubs. These activities are characterized by three healthy characteristic:

- Extending the concerns and integration beyond the boundaries of classrooms with a possible good degree of flexibility.
- Healthy interaction when properly conducted between students, staff and faculty in fulfillment of the goals set by activities.
- Catering the activities to individuals outside the university boundaries and implement societal interaction and exchange of views.

To give an example for AUC efforts in that direction, the EOAA at AUC mentions in one of its publications that a blind student for instance is entitled to reasonable accommodation which may include but is not limited to making existing facilities readily accessible, adjustment of exams and acquiring or modifying equipment or devices that will help the student with disability perform tasks and assignments (6). Academic Computing Center at AUC has new adaptive technology corner for the blind and visually impaired, and the use of software that allows access to the internet and another software as a scanner with a hearing aid for the visually impaired.

**IV. Impact of Globalization**

Similar to the majority of professional fields, individual clusters and focal groups, globalization has a strong impact currently and in the future upon individuals with special needs. This impact is clearly viewed by the author in the following clear clusters:

- International Codes and Norms: Globalization waves can provide regulations, experiences and means for better integration of individuals with special needs into the society. The example illustrated in Figure 2 is but a demonstration from a code that can be transferred and adopted elsewhere. Also, opportunities of forming alliances and group work, local or international, are strengthen by globalization.
- Information and Communication Technology: There is with no doubt an increased role of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in the globalization era. This provides more –and often better- access to information for all individuals sound or disabled. In fact, it can be considered as an opportunity that individuals with special needs should make use of. In terms of education, Distant and Electronic Learning offer good opportunities of education for undergraduates, graduates and non-degree students. In that sense, delivering education and granting degrees can be catered by the technological edge through D & E-learning. The reader is referred to the fruitful discussions and papers delivered on AUC conference for e-learning in January 2003.
- New Concepts and Attitudes: It is becoming customary to pay more consideration for the needs and the demands of various individuals and ethnic group in new era. In fact, globalization should carry with it a smoother and more efficient transfer of healthier concepts and attitudes for the population at large.
- Minimizing Geographic and Movement Barriers: Along the same lines of the above points, geographic barriers in terms of distance as well as movement barriers in terms of disability are significantly minimized through a multitude of globalization-induced factors. This is an encouraging element

that alleviates obstacles for a wide group of disabled although it does not contribute in itself as much to enrichment of mental/psychological disability.

- "*Work-from-Home*" Concepts: Adequate employment can not be separated from education and its importance may be magnified for individuals with special needs for whom this represent not only a "job" but rather self-fulfillment and some form of independence. Financial, informatics and Computer-aided design and work are examples for domains where individuals with special needs can make use of.
- Concern for Increased Alienation: Although most of the above points demonstrate more of a positive impact than negative, yet, there is a concern that globalization can also create some form of alienation for individuals with special needs and therefore it should not be used to minimize their presence and physical contact with the rest of the community which can be promoted by "in-door" environment. This negative impact should be avoided to allow better understanding of the community and healthier consideration with the individuals with special needs.
- Entity and Cultural Features: There had been extensive discussions that were inclusive to the society at large with respect to potential negative dissolution or changes to entity and cultural aspects as result of globalization.

## V. Concluding Remarks

Individuals with special needs represent an essential component in the fabrics of the society. In that sense, it is the responsibility of the society at large to integrate them and make best use of their capabilities. Within the education fields, there are two main thrusts: First to encourage the disabled to pursue their education and quest for learning (conventional and/or distant learning) and work towards alleviating barriers that may hinder them. Globalization through ICT and the conjugate changes in concepts and attitudes should be used as a driving force in that direction. Second, the rest of the community needs to receive better and sounder education as to how to incorporate the individuals with special needs in their daily practice and scheme of work and be able to integrate them and not only to sympathize and consider their needs. However, care needs to be taken towards potential negative globalization-induced impacts such as increased alienation and potential changes of cultural entity. A survey is to be conducted in the future to highlight educational elements and provide some quantification for the extent of globalization impact on the learning and contemporary practices of individuals with special needs.

## Acknowledgement

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


Figure 1- Approximate distribution of major forms of disability in Egypt (after 2)



Figure 2- Sample extracted from the proposed construction code for the disabled (5).

of EOAA at AUC and Ms. Mahitab Mekkawi for providing useful data and helpful sources for this work.

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# Raves in Egypt: A Global Reflection

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Illicit drug use is not new to our society or our time. It is a critical problem that hinders all effort to achieve socio-economic development. Most worlds' governments consider illicit drug use as an issue of national security since it mainly targets youth who represent the human capital in any process that aims to achieve sustainable development. In addition to examining the derivatives of class formation and the dynamics of social mobility, strategic planning to promote illicit drugs in any given society entails constant monitoring of youth communities. Careful examination of youth cultures, their trends, attitudes, modes of behavior and life style, all represent the feedback information necessary for drug-traffickers to develop effective plans to promote illicit drugs.

Inspired by globalization, the drug market has taken advantage of the major achievements in information technology and means of communication to develop new ways to reach far greater numbers of youth populations throughout the world. The idea of creating a 'global drug market network' seems to be a main component of most illicit drug-promotion strategies.

Various mechanisms have been employed to achieve uniformity of a global drug market network. Many Western-based ideas of social movements that mainly focus on 'music freedom', 'youth liberation,' and other forms of youth festivities and bizarre practices in which drug use often represents a common theme, have been diffused to different parts of the globe, and in consequence, helped in the promotion of different kinds of recreational illicit drugs at the global level.

One vivid example is the 'rave movement,' which always asserts on a linkage between music, partying (which mainly attracts youth), and drugs. The 'rave movement,' and most particularly the 'rave culture,' with its concomitant fashions and utopian futuristic philosophies, which emerged in Britain and the United States in the mid-1980s, has helped in the promotion of various forms of illicit psychoactive drugs, especially MDMA (commonly known as Ecstasy), to different parts of the globe, including the Egyptian society.

'Raves' are social contexts commonly manifested in music parties. They are mostly attended by youth who spend all night dancing to special kinds of music, particularly Techno, where euphoric transcendentalism is sought through a combination of music and psychoactive drugs that can further enhance the music experience.

The present research aims to investigate, describe, and analyze the main features of the growing raves in Egypt, while focusing on the prevalence of MDMA (Ecstasy) among ravers. It aims to provide data on use patterns of Ecstasy among a sample of young adults who have attended rave parties held in Egypt and used Ecstasy at least once in raves.

Being descriptive and analytic in nature, the present research aims to investigate the main characteristics of both raves and ravers in Egypt, while exploring the reasons that make Ecstasy the most commonly used drug in raves.

Analyzing these research problems will shed light on the main features of the social context where Ecstasy-use is provoked and stimulated, as well as the main reasons behind the prevalence of Ecstasy use among youth in Egypt.

A thorough analysis of these interrelated variables is crucial for developing and implementing effective policies to tackle the problem of drug use, especially with the fact that new types of illicit psychoactive drugs have begun to replace the drug-list that has traditionally been consumed in Egypt. Focusing on the social aspects related to illicit drug use, and not merely the psychological or medical dimensions, is vital to understand the etiology of drug use in Egypt, especially with the growing number of new types of 'social drugs.'

*The research is still in progress.* ■

# The House of Knowledge Management in Academic Libraries

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**Abstract**

*In this paper, an engineering concept called Quality Function Deployment (QFD) together with its implementation model – The House of Quality - are applied into the development of a model for knowledge management for academic libraries.*

*In this paper, a methodology coined by the authors as the House of Management in Academic Libraries is proposed for selection of appropriate policies that are embodied in the development of a comprehensive knowledge management framework in order to assess technologies and systems and their role in improving knowledge management. The overall outcome of this paper is that it shows that the concept of the House of Management has a great potential in planning an appropriate, and adaptive, policy for Academic Libraries.*

**Introduction:**

According to Hauser and Clausing (1988), the House of Quality originated in 1972 at Mitsubishi's Kobe shipyard site. The Japanese manufacturers have used it successfully and they used it in services as well as manufacturing. The foundation of the House of Quality is the belief that products/services should be designed to reflect customers' / users' desires and tastes.

Quality Function Deployemnet (QFD) is a method for structured product/ service planning and development that enables a development team to specify clearly the customer's wants and needs, and then to evaluate each proposed product or service capability systematically in terms of its impact meeting those needs (Cohen, L, 1995). The QFD process involves the construction of one or more matrices (sometimes called "quality tables"). The first of these matrices is called the "House of Quality" (HOQ). It displays the customer's wants and needs (the "Voice of the Customer" or "What") along the left, and the development team's ("Technical Response" or "Hows") to meeting those wants and needs along the top. The matrix consists of several sections or sub-matrices joined together in various ways,

each containing information related to the others. Figure (1) illustrates the different sections of the House of Quality.




Figure (1): The various sections of the House of Quality (HOQ)

**Quality Promotion in Academic Education**

Libraries as well as colleges and universities are facing major transformation change as digital technology fundamentally alters how services are provided, research is conducted, and learning is enabled (Hawkins, B.L., 2001). For many in the academic world, Knowledge Management (KM) is an old concept, a function historically performed by librarians. KM is defined as the process of transforming information and intellectual assets into enduring value. The key to KM is capturing the knowledge of process-how organisations get their work done and of how various elements of information connect to this process.

Much of the writing about KM has focused on competitive advantage, on how one firm can have a leveraged position over another. In the academic world, however, collegial rather than competitive motivations change the nature and the dynamics of the KM model. Having a larger or more comprehensive research library have been used competitively to try to attract better faculty, but for the most part, the culture of higher education is based on the free flow of information without competitive concerns.

According to Aiyepeku, W (2001) KM is arguably the fastest growing component of burgeoning, "big business" knowledge industry which incorporates much of the theory and practice of library, archives and information services.

The challenge is to design a customised, yet flexible infrastructure that supports both individual and collective learning so the academic library can adapt to discontinuous change in its operating environments.




Figure (2): The "User" in higher education

The proposed model in this paper aims to address this challenge through the development of a model called the House of Knowledge Management in Academic Libraries.

**The Academic Library and the Continuous Flow of Information**

Stratigos (2000) argues that end-users have already begun to see a wider role for the library, less bound by traditional library functions. The bottom line is that users are not asking for better reference services or a good hard copy collection. Rather, they want the library too provide information to their desktops; help with internal information and experts, alerting services on selecting topics, and high value research services. From management's perspective, the library is seen as a source of content expertise that can be leveraged in the new intranet.

In the digital era and through the rise of electronic information resources, Hawkins (2001) states that there is no clear and defined role for the following categories:

1. Librarians with regard to the selection, preservation, and provision of the digital resources accessible through the Net.
2. Students and Faculty need to learn how to evaluate these information resources, and this is far more difficult to do with resources on the Web than

with those in a traditional library.

3. Academic departments and even scholars create their own collections of Web sites, selecting and describing network resources they find useful and credible.
4. Search engines such as Yahoo, Google, and Altavista. Though such services offer much wider coverage than any traditional cataloguing approach, they do so with far less quality and filtering and with a very different, often less powerful, level of description. In addition, these search engines are also tainted by a bias routed in their commercial advertising relationships.
5. Most (re) searchers do not use – or know how to use – the advanced features and the more sophisticated search algorithms embedded in these applications.

Figure (3) shows the concept of Quality Function Deployment (QFD) and its main stakeholders in the context of the academic library.




Figure (3): The concept of QFD and the stakeholders in the academic library context

**The Academic Library and Quality Function Deployment**

End-users such as students, faculty, researchers, librarians, publishers, authors and reviewers are left with the following difficulties:

1. Incomplete information.
2. Little if any organisation.
3. Rudimentary, inefficient and often inaccurate searching.

4. Validity of information is questioned and not refereed.

QFD is a structured framework to translate the 'voice of the customer' into the actions and resource commitments needed to meet customer expectations. This is done by mapping the customer requirements into specific design features (and eventually into manufacturing processes) through one or more matrices of 'expectation and fulfilment options'. QFD is used as a systematic approach to both identify and prioritise customer requirements, and to translate these requirements into product and processes specification. QFD is the converting of customer demands (WHATs) into quality characteristics (QCs) (HOWs), and eventually into process plan and production plan. The problem for the designer or design team is to make the product specification so as to satisfy what the customers want. Normally, customer desires are obtained through a survey conducted by the marketing department, and the output of this is a list of qualitative 'customer attributes' (CAs), such as easy to use, resistant or durable. On the other hand, design specifications are quantitative and based on engineering properties. Thus, conflict can arise between marketing and engineering, as they speak different languages. A method that helps in matching those CAs to design specifications and, therefore, improves communication between the different experts of a company is needed. The Quality Function Deployment (QFD) method serves for this purpose. It is concerned with the translation of the customer attributes (voice of the customer) into 'engineering characteristics' (ECs). These ECs are very closely related to the CAs and are those that the design team can modify (by setting targets) in order to best satisfy the customer. Therefore, this method aims at satisfying customer desires through improving communication between departments and finding appropriate target values for each EC.

The QFD approach seeks answers to the following seven questions:

- (What) Voice of the customer. What do our customers need and want?
- (How) Voice of the Engineer. What technical measures relate to our customers' needs?
- (How Much) Cost and target Values. What are the objective values to be achieved?
- (Correlation Matrix). What are the relationships between the voice of the customer and the voice of the engineer?
- (Competitive analysis). In terms of our customers, how well are we doing relative to our competitors?
- Technical comparison. How does our product or service performance compare to our competition?
- Trade-offs (Prioritisation). What are the potential technical trade-offs?

Figures (4) and (5) demonstrates two simple examples of customer requirements and technical solutions that can fulfil those requirements in academic libraries.




Figure (4): An example of academic library customer requirements versus technical solutions that can satisfy those requirements.



(Adapted from Lancaster, F.W., 1993)

Figure (5): An example of academic library customer requirements versus technical solutions that can satisfy those requirements.

**Case Studies related to academic libraries**

The following example demonstrates how customer requirements were fulfilled in an academic library application as quoted by Levine (2001). Results from a project from the University of Zagreb which developed a "Digital Collection for Blind and Visually Impaired People" and which supports the 5,500 citizens in Croatia and is now operated with the cooperation of the Croatian Association for the Blind and Croatian Library for the Blind. This project includes voice output and copyright issues. The project features copyright-free full-text, e-books in Croatian, mailing lists for the blind, and links to serial publications and magazines for the blind. The project provides blind university students with literature to support their studies and examinations. Primarily library and information science students conceived this project.

The authors of this research paper have developed the House of Quality to demonstrate how it can be applied to satisfying the needs of blind and visual impaired researchers as shown in Figure (6).




Figure (6): The House of Quality and relationships applied to the needs of blind and visual impaired researchers.

In the House of Quality (HOQ), the "Whats" are transformed to "Hows" in subsequent matrices as shown in Figure (7). This allows a more detailed analysis of actions where producers become customers in subsequent levels of the HOQ model.




Figure (7): Diagrammatic representation of "What to How" translations

To illustrate the concept of translations of "Whats to Hows" in the academic libraries, the model in Figure (8) shows phases of QFD in academic library application.




Figure (8): Phases of QFD in academic library application

**Discussion**

The strength of the House of Knowledge Management is that it enforces efficient information sharing by creating a disciplined outline. This, in turn, enhances implementation of maintenance policies. The benefits can be categorised into the following generic areas:

- Knowledge-base.
- Training and Communication.
- Planning & Development.
- Integration.

***Knowledge-base***

The knowledge base developed from such a model enhances decision-making. Knowledge can be preserved in one concise place, in contrast to unruly design-standards manuals. The matrices and charts prepared during the procedure create a working document that can be easily referenced and learned from. The knowledge-base holds great promise for future decision making efforts. It holds the answers to questions concerning what decisions were made and why and can simplify similar decision-making endeavours.

***Training and Communication***

In addition, the developed model can be used to train entry-level practitioners. By reviewing the results of successful projects, entry-level practitioners begin higher up on the learning curve. The main strength is that the process itself becomes a catalyst that generates team effort and cooperation. The model then becomes a mechanism for communication among the various areas working on the project.

***Planning & Development***

The model not only focuses the attention to knowledge management requirements from different business functions, it also provides a mechanism to target selected areas where gains could help improve competitive advantages – areas with undeveloped potential. The proposed model lays the foundation for future work – you don't have to continually reinvent the wheel or wonder how you did it last time. It also provides a needed discipline, much like a pilot's checklist. An avionics engineer may have flown 300 missions, but he still checks off every instrument when he gets into the cockpit. The model prioritises products and technologies characteristics and highlights areas requiring further analysis.

***Integration***

The House of Knowledge Management can be thought of as the glue that binds the various policies together: By tying different activities together, it provides integration of the various functions. The model is of greatest benefit when applied

to complex systems that do not lend themselves to such traditional approaches as rule-based design.

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# Big Media in A Shrinking World: Challenges of the Cultural Imperialism Thesis For Public and Private Sector Media Managers

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Globalization and oligopolization of news organizations over the past decade have grabbed the international headlines and raised the fear that only a few mega-media magnates will control the hearts and minds of a global audience. So far, the results are inconclusive. Will public and private sector media managers discover that the news for their citizens and consumers will be all-bad?

"Mega conglomerates" with mass media companies in their fold have spawned a generation of warnings that these oligarchies one day will control information and influence government policies around the globe in a way detrimental to citizens and consumers. Library shelves groan under the weight of such alarmist books, most of which plead for world-wide legislation to counter the perceived threat of cultural and global market dominance by post-industrialized, multi-national media conglomerates. In addition, scholars have worried that such a heavy domination of media messages results in a new form of colonialism—electronic and cultural.[1]

Multi-media organizations do influence a sizable percentage of what the world's population watches, hears, reads and ultimately thinks about.[2] They do this through newspapers, news wire services, magazines, niche publications, videos, outdoor signs, cable television, motion pictures, computer software, books, the Internet and just about any symbol the human mind can conceive and disseminate to others. Because of this diversity, scholars argue that the data show a different story than the "myths and erroneous assumptions" that the media industry is, *a priori*, controlled "by a few monolith master manipulators." The playing field recently is simply too large with many new teams showing up almost daily.[3] A recent example of this was the media that covered the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in April 2003. Not only did television viewers have the option of getting their news from Cable News Network (CNN) and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)—representing the Western concept of media—they also had a choice of Arabic satellite channels, Al Jazeera from Qatar, Abu Dhabi TV and a new addition to the field, Al Arabiya from Dubai.[4]

While Gutenburg printing operation in the 16th Century took days to produce a single sheet of information by hand, today's communications innovations can spread the word around the world with a stroke of a key. Technological advances in America and Western Europe, primarily the development of satellites, computers and digitalization of space bands are fueling globalization thus raising fresh challenges for public and private sector managers who include mass media in their

communication strategies. Middle East residents were not only served by international newspapers to augment the locally produced one, but they also had a wide choice of news over the Internet.[5]

A direct result of the world's shift from production (extractive and manufacturing) to a service economy was the growth in the entertainment industry, including movies, theaters, music, cable television, home videos, and other recreational services.[6]

Globalization has been blamed for litany of ills attributed to Western capitalism: an upturn in crime, public and private sector corruption, unemployment and worker displacement, pornography, political unrest, frustrated expectations of youth, a coarsening of cultural mores, and, worse yet, cultural and economic imperialism.[7] These "evils" prompted intellectuals and political leaders in the former Third World to call for international regulation of mass media "to level the communications playing field" and create a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO).

NWICO developed from the 1980 MacBride Commission Report, *Many Voices, One World*, that proposed checks the unfettered Western press concept that was seen as excessively unfavorable to Third World countries, most of which had authoritarian or communist regimes that had evolved its own theories of what was news and how news should be covered and disseminated.

Western media interests regarded NWICO as troublesome, vague, full of hidden socialist agendas and potentially harmful to their bottom lines. The socialist bloc and most third world countries viewed NWICO as a reasonable counterweight to what it thought was unfair distribution of global information flows and resources that did little to promote the positive aspects of indigenous social and political cultures. Perceived as anti-Western, NWICO dominated the agenda of UNESCO for two decades and contributed in the withdrawal from the organization of the United States and, for a short period, Great Britain.[8]

A small advocacy group of academics and developmental journalists, formed in 1989 and meets every two years as the MacBride Roundtable to foster some of the ideas raised in the original report. The collapse of the group's major benefactor, the Soviet Union, in 1991, has made their efforts seem anachronistic to Western critics.

Mass media messages are promoting liberalized economies and the promise of democratization of countries on every continent under the rationale that if people only knew what they were missing in a democracy, they would demand from their leaders free and fair elections, multi-party government, a more open society, and all the human rights enjoyed by citizens in the West.[9] The immediate results, however, have not fully supported that theory. Not all economies have been liberalized over the past decade that has witnessed accelerated efforts to create a global economy.

Though there are more "democracies" on the planet than ever before, the U.S. think tank Brookings Institute says evidence of that Westernized mass media is

fostering Western-style democratization "is mixed."[10] The world is far from the homogenized liberal-democratic broth pundits have both predicted and decried.

What should be clear at this juncture is that money makes this global media world go around. Consistently high producers on the pre-9-11 New York Stock Exchange were corporations that possessed multi-media properties, mixing mass entertainment, information and news. Today's parent companies of news organizations are heavily invested in entertainment production and distribution companies, a media convergence trend that shows no signs of slowing down and even has a name: *mediamorphasis.*[11]

**Media mergers toward an oligarchy**

A half century ago, 83% of the 1,854 daily newspapers in America were independently owned and household newspaper penetration was highest ever at 37%.[12] Today, more than three fourths of the 1,533 daily newspapers in America are owned by national and international corporations, reaching under 20% of the households.[13] In addition to labor unrest and competition from high-tech, non-union newspapers, publishers had other things to worry about. First radio, then television challenged and eventually surpassed the print media in popularity. By the end of the 1960's, television had supplanted newspapers as the consumers' preferred media.[14]

Newspaper groups purchased family-owned newspapers and broadcast stations, a rarity internationally, because they had cash reserve generated in part by their other properties, some of them non-media. The take-overs were aided by favorable tax and consolidation regulations by governments. But most of the action in the past decade has not been the acquisitions of individual newspaper properties, but whole media groups with print and broadcast companies, then whole horizontally integrated conglomerates, partly through leveraged buyouts or stock exchanges.[15]

Media concentration takes several forms: local monopolies, multiple ownership, multimedia ownership, and conglomerates.[16]

Examples of multiple media ownership companies abound, and might be the rule and not the exception. Most small newspaper and radio groups in the United States and Canada fall into this category.

As media corporations buy other media corporations, the concentration of media power becomes a factor with which politicians must reckon. Bagdikian estimated that half the total revenues from all media (including recordings, cable and videocassettes) were earned by only six international media conglomerates: AOL Time Warner (U.S); General Electric (U.S.), Disney (U.S.), Viacom (U.S.), News Corporation (Australia) and Bertelsmann (Germany). Less than a decade ago, 17 multi-nationals earned half of all such sales. The big are getting bigger through mergers and consolidations.[17]

Traditionally, newspapers have more influence than their circulation would

immediately indicate. They are the media of record and the choice of political elites everywhere. While MTV might reach millions more than the most widely circulated international paper, political decision makers pay more attention to the sparsely distributed newspaper of record than the lyrics of songs his wife and children hum.

There are several newspapers with large international circulation, but none has so far emerged as *the* world's newspaper. With 2.2 million copies printed world wide, *The Times of India,* is the world's most circulated English language newspaper. A truncated international edition of *USA Today* has yet to gain traction globally, though its world-wide circulation is over a million, most in North America. But *The International Herald-Tribune,* based in Paris and widely distributed in Europe, the Middle East and Africa, might come closest to a truly international newspaper—though not a global one. A cooperative effort of the Washington Post and New York Times, *IHT* has publishing agreements to include local news supplements from the premier newspapers in Israel, Italy, Germany, Greece, Lebanon, Spain, South Korea, Japan and The Netherlands as a way of attracting local readers. The publication's paid circulation is less than 280,000 daily.

Commonwealth papers also enjoy a international reputation. *The Financial Times,* a daily, and *The Economist,* a weekly, both from London, and the *Economic Times* of India enjoy world-wide readership. The *Asian Times* from Bangkok is distributed throughout the Orient. After acquiring United Press International and perfecting its distribution systems in South America the conservative-leaning Washington *Times* is also positioning itself as a global player.[18] Despite all these attempts by English-language newspapers to penetrate global markets, circulation remains minimal compared with existing local newspapers, even those printed in English in Commonwealth countries. Readers by wide margins prefer locally operated publications to international ones, even though the publisher is the government or the ruling political elites. The same is true about radio and broadcast stations.

**Government policies help big Westernized media become bigger**

By international convention, the airwaves belong to people, not broadcasting corporations, and government regulates their use. In actuality, commercial broadcasters often use favorable regulations (many written by broadcaster lobbyists) to maintain a vise grip on space band allocations at a time when almost anyone can be a broadcaster. In the 1920s, for example, operating a small AM radio station was something of a fad in North America, much like what is taking place today on the Internet with individuals posting "radio stations" on host web sites. Commercial radio lobbied the U.S. Government in 1934 to regulate the airwaves by licensing requirements most amateur hobbyists and public agency broadcasters found difficult or even impossible with which to comply. The 1996 Telecommunications Act touched off a media merger frenzy that saw 4,000% of America's radio and

television stations change hands.[19]

Great Britain is concerned with media concentration as well. Its Broadcasting Act of 1996 attempted to assess the impact on newspapers when broadcasters in their regions merge, which the act, of course, made easier.[20]

In the days when space band allocation allowed for only a few stations to broadcast on the AM and FM bands authoritarian governments, especially in the formerly known Third World countries, locked up licenses except for state-owned companies, a few non-profit agencies, cronies and relatives of the power elite. Former colonies and other newly independent states restricted foreigners from owning any part of broadcasting and publishing mediums. But two computer assisted things happened at once to open the global markets to best-positioned (read: "financially able") companies. The first was a plunge in the cost of telecommunications that allowed separate offices to be coordinated cheaply around the world.[21] The second was the invention of digital broadcasting[22] that expanded the space band 12 fold over analogue, and the third was gradual liberalization of broadcast licenses to allow participation by foreign capital and local investment. Countries that did not liberalize the broadcast licensing process found their airwaves swamped with "off-shore" stations that avoided prohibitively expensive license fees or high value added taxes on advertising revenues. These "pirate" radio stations can pose potential problems to regimes not otherwise open to free information flows.[23]

Government was particularly helpful in building the Internet through joint partnerships between the military, higher education and businesses. A national tax policy that favored faster "write offs" of computer and other high-tech communications equipment has resulted in boom times for computer and software manufacturers. International trade policies that reduced or eliminated tariffs on printed material and some production equipment also helped international corporations speed up computerization in developing countries, without which today's globalization would not have occurred.[24]

Internationally, nation-states experimented with various forms of governance since the emergence of technology. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, waves of liberalization, democratization and transparency swept the planet. Among the last nationalized industries to be "privatized" were the telecomms and radio and television licenses. As mentioned previously, the move to digital signal for telecomms and broadcasting was a watershed event. With the multiplicity of channels, more governments are loosening their iron grips of broadcast licenses and liberalizing regulations about who and who cannot own broadcast stations in their country. The increased capabilities will actually mean more voices—many speaking local dialects—not less.[25] For governments fearful of "cultural imperialism" liberal policies toward licensing for diverse local broadcasting might be a good strategy since evidence is convincing that readers, viewers and listeners prefer

local programming to international. That seems the strategy in play in the Middle East with the growth of satellite-based media companies such as Al Jazeera from Qatar, Abu Dhabi TV and Al Arabiya from Dubai, which serve Arabic speaking peoples throughout the Middle East, North Africa and parts of Europe. In addition Al Jazeera during the 2003 Anglo-American-Iraq War launched an English-language web site, and announced plans for an English-language satellite channel.[26]

The trends of media consolidation, centralized management, use of technology to replace workers have been finely tuned in the United States, and probably will serve as a model for would-be media barons in the former Third World to follow in their own and neighboring countries as available technology is utilized.

Business executives who are not necessarily journalists are now running media companies in the United States,[27] and issues about competition and rivalries among newspapers were put aside to preserve the industry itself.[28]

Some recent studies have shown big Western media corporations seeking globalized impact have been stymied by local competitors, especially those who beam their local language programs over satellite.[29] As with newspapers, viewers prefer to watch local television featuring their local personalities in slickly produced programs with high production values like in the West. For example, the most popular television show in the Middle East is an Arabic version of "Who Wants to be a Millionaire?" The program uses the same format, set design, lighting and music as the top-rated U.S. program of the same name, which is a replica of a British show. It's host, George Khadahi was elevated to regional stardom in the Middle East.[30]

Critics of the "cultural imperialism" theory of global media might not fully understand how and to what extent media affect consumers. Media scholars DeFluer and Dennis are skeptical of the power of media to change cultural mores in their "minimal effects theory" of communication. Essentially, the two scholars question the "big effects" theory held by some anti-globalists because:[31]

- People vary too much psychologically
- Socio-economic status and social standing and group membership (political cultures) play a greater role with individuals than media
- Contemporary peoples are not isolated but are bound by webs of social relationships based on family, neighborhoods, and work relationships
- Selective perception means that people's individual preferences, group membership, socio-economic status and individual differences militate against understanding and interpreting media content.

For these reasons, among others, Western messages through a global media might positively affect both developed and developing countries by increasing diversity of information, retaining or strengthening local cultures, and building local economies. History has shown this will not be a one-way street. While some

intellectuals, politicians and clerics rail against the evils of globalization, the man and woman on the street rather like it.

In fact, Americans and Europeans have remarkably similar positive views on globalization, according to separate opinion samplings in 2000. In a poll of Europeans commissioned by the U.S. state department 65 per cent of the British responders, 73 per cent of the German, 57 per cent of the French and 62 per cent of the Austrian and 50 per cent of the Italian thought globalization was a positive event. In a separate Harris Poll, 64 per cent of Americans held positive views.

The perception that Europeans were fending off 'cultural imperialism' by Americans—an often-expressed fear by countries in Africa, Asia and, especially, in the Middle East—was not borne out by opinion polls. Europeans hold a benign view of American culture. Only 19 per cent of Italians, 23 per cent of Britons, 31 per cent of Germans and 38 per cent of the French thought U.S. popular culture as a serious or very serious threat to their local cultures. More to the point, 62-79 per cent in those four countries saw it as a 'minor' threat or 'no threat at all.' What's more solid majorities in Italy (62 per cent), Britain (67 per cent), Germany (59 per cent) and France (52 per cent) viewed U.S. popular culture favorably, about the same as the American view of its own popular culture (60 per cent).[32]

**New Media: the engine driving globalization**

Globalization of the Western media accelerated in the 1980s with multi-channel television, which took advantage of the falling costs of launching communications satellites. Miniaturization made it possible for individuals with small dishes and signal decoders to pick up signals directly from satellites 36,000 kilometers in space. But satellites are only hardware. The software (programming) essentially came from those countries with the programming available, primarily the United States, which had been experimenting with satellites for interactive communications since the early 1970s.[33] The battle for the world-wide hearts and mind was underway, though the final outcome is less than clear.

New technologies (e.g., interactive media, CD-ROM, high-definition television, digitalization, miniaturization) will change international markets dramatically and present a variety of research opportunities.[34]

The financial potential of the new media drew in most media companies, big and small. But 2001 proved a difficult year with those media corporations heavily invested in the Internet taking a beating. Rupert Murdoch's Sydney-based News Corporation Ltd. was an exception. While his international competitors were buying dot-coms, he scaled down his company's involvement. That strategy paid off. While fellow Big Six companies like AOL-Time-Warner, Disney and General Electric suffered multi-million dollar losses; News Corp recorded a £1.33 billion profit. The lesson was not lost of another of the Big Six. Bertelsmann announced in September 2002 it, too, was pulling back its online efforts.

Other media corporations are also interested in the potential of the Internet. Reuters News Service plans to spend $800 million over the next four years on its Internet services, and the Thomson Corporation is even more ambitions. Thomson divested itself of all but one of its 131 newspapers 'to more sharply focus on technology-driven information and solutions for businesses and professions.' Over the next five years, Thomson expects to derive 80% of its revenues from electronic information distribution. In 1999, Thomson's "cash boxes" and "money presses" netted $220 million on $810 million in revenues.[35]

A key information agreement is helping the rest of the world adopt proven technologies. One of the world's biggest trade deals, the Information Technology Agreement was signed by representatives from 28 countries that conduct most of the world's $600 billion high-tech trade business. The agreement abolished import duties on computers, software, semiconductors and telecommunications equipment by 2000. By lowering the cost of high tech equipment, the pact in effect was a "global tax cut."[36]

Buoyed by such international agreements, the speed of globalization was accelerated. The World Wide Web has been growing 10 fold every year since 1993 when it had only 50 users. By 2001, the Internet had exceeded a half billion users.

**Impact of globalization on resource-developing countries—a mixed bag**

The greatest interest in global media effects is not whether companies will find it profitable to expand its media reach, but what is the impact of globalization on the political, social and cultural structures in the countries receiving the media.

Samuel P. Huntington in 1993 touched off a continuing controversy when he predicted a coming 'Clash of Civilizations' in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union.[37] Research scholars of media effects theory, persuasion theory and cultural diffusion theory, all indicate an initial impact on a culture from media intervention, but the effects are usually not sustained over time once the novelty has worn off.[38]

The questions many public managers ask today are whether international media and the growth of intrastate media are changing the way governments in non-democracies conduct their business. Kovach has argued that global media have wrestled control of foreign policy away from the state, thus transcending its agenda-setting function to drive international relations.[39] Others suggest authoritarian regimes might take credit for good economic times for their peoples, or blame the "cultural imperialists" and fan the flames of nationalism when economic times go sour. Either way, authoritarians stay in power.[40]

Kegley and Wittkopf asked five provocative questions for which, they concede the answers may be elusive:[41]

- Are states becoming obsolete and losing their power and sovereign control?
- Is interdependence a cure or a curse? Is technological innovation a blessing or a burden?

- Will geo-economics replace geopolitics as transnational economic forces become more important relative to interstate-armed conflict over territory? What constitutes human well-being in an ecologically fragile planet?

In response to the above questions, Western mass media are non-state actors, though decidedly elite ones, which manipulates language into statements of power.[42]

Richard Falk later questioned whether state sovereignty could even exist in the age of global media:

> Effects of technology on national security (if not sovereignty) include loss of national economic control, improved crisis management, loss of control of propaganda, loss of control of sensitive technologies, the technological battlefield; and greater difficulty of strategy surprise and covert action.[43]

Snow and Brown suggest media, in their agenda-setting role during a time of humanitarian crisis often prod governments to "do-something," which often leads to hasty policy decisions with unpredictable results. Public pleadings by international news organizations, especially international broadcasters, might have been "guilted" the Western powers into Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo and out of Afghanistan in the 1990's and the Middle East prior to 9/11. A key function of diplomats and government leaders is to gather, analyze and report information on local conditions back to decision makers in their respective capitals, a function that has been usurped by global media interests.[44]

The international media's role in intense reporting the Persian Gulf War and the ill-fated military excursion into Somalia has given rise to a phenomenon described as the "CNN Effect"—cable television's suspected influence on foreign relations.[45] Though political and media scholars generally discount the impact of media on foreign policy. Other factors include a country's long-term economic development strategies, long-term strategic planning, long-term military interests, almost all conducted secretly. However, the *possibility* that news media could err on delicate negotiations by premature reporting or ill-informed criticism is certainly a consideration of today's diplomats.

> All-news, high-tech television is a new creature, but it has not changed the basic nature of reporting or altered the traditional relationship between government and the media in the making of foreign policy ... After all, Saddam is watching, too. And live. Apart from that, nothing is different. Bad policies will not be sustained without CNN, and good policies will not be undermined with CNN.[46]

In absence of simple cause-effect media relationships, it is clear, as Keohane and Nye (1996) pointed out in *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transi-*

*tion*, that there are 'complex interdependencies' among nations that requires a study of 'international political economy' (IPE)[47]

Snider said new information technology can help bring the United States—and by extension the world—closer to the democratic ideal. With democracy's technology and institutions failing to keep up with technology, governments neither know nor implement the public's will. Technology, Snider asserts, empowers people:

> ... some day allowing them to vote in elections from their homes, attend electronic town meetings, and to participate in instant public opinion polling.[48]

Some writers are concerned that cultures end up the losers in a zero-sum game when global conglomerates become involved in the cultures of developing countries.

> Most of Disney's major cartoon production is based on fables and folklore originally told by people in other countries. *The Little Mermaid* had Danish origins, *Beauty and the Beast* and *Cinderella* were told in France and Italy, and *Aladdin* was a story that originated in the Middle East. But by copyrighting its own particular version (in words, music and images) Disney 'can then sell these stories to people around the world and any others the right to use them.'[49]

Under international law, Disney can deny uncompensated use if *its* version and treatment of the story, but not the generic story itself. This is the international debate over "intellectual" properties, a concept not universally recognized especially by those around the MacBride Roundtable.[50]

In what could be prescient, given the events of September 11, 2001, Paul Kennedy eight years earlier warned of a cultural backlash to international media. He warned that poorer societies might come to resent cosmopolitan capitalism and the consequences of the financial/ communications/ multinational revolution. Nor does transnational information transmission via 1.5 billion radios and 600 million televisions sets necessarily lead to universal enthusiasm for the Western lifestyle.

It is a remarkable technical and manufacturing achievement that as the 1980s ended, billions of people from the Inner Mongolian plains to the Andean mountains were able for the first time to see the outside world via television. It is also true that the information revolution played a critical role in the demise of several communist and authoritarian regimes that had visibly failed to keep up with the West.

**Response to globalized media fears and conclusion**

Paul Kennedy warned that developing countries investing in new technologies, including those providing information services, might suffer 'unintended conse-

quences' of modernity, substituting few high tech jobs for many low-tech jobs in agriculture and manufacturing and mining.[51] While some critics of globalization grumble that American-based media promote through product advertising the West's 'cultural imperialism' there is considerable evidence to the contrary. Those same critics tend to complain about the capitalism that builds in obsolescence and waste, causes rampant and unnecessary consumerism, consumes resources at a hazardous rate, and frustrates the expectations of consumers by giving them technological advances they do not need nor want, such as high-definition television.[52]

The critics of global media are generally wrong in several respects, media research would indicate. First, global markets act the same as local markets; they exist because they supply what is demanded. Product advertising has never *created* demand for those products. As media scholars have pointed out: advertising is affective only when subjects are predisposed to act in the way intended.[53]

In a 1963 study of five nations (United States, Britain, Germany, Italy and Mexico) Almond and Verba found that political opinions of average citizens of any country will be heavily influenced by their culture that were resistant to casual cues (such as advertising) to change buying or voting habits.[54] Rogers (1955) found adoption of innovation took time to establish as a norm and varied among cultures.[55]

Media globalization began its acceleration two decades ago with improved technologies that permitted televised images to be sent around the world in seconds by bouncing them off an orbiting satellite. The technological advancements—partly from spin-offs of the space race such as geo-stationary satellites, digitized signal compression, computerization and miniaturization—allowed cash-rich media conglomerates to expand across national boundaries first, then across oceans. In the process, public administrators were convinced to allow commercial interests to use the public airwaves. Deregulation of government rules and procedures gave favorable treatment to existing media companies and allowed large, national and international corporations to buy up competitors, which produced ever-greater cash flows.

Since resource-developing countries historically have been 'behind the curve' of media technology, many international media consultants, believe these countries will 'leap frog' to the new technologies, primarily The Internet. Large, empowered and wealthy international non-governmental organizations representing journalists and democracy advocates monitor governmental impediments to the free and uncensored flow of information and champion press freedom causes.[56]

The accelerating pace of news organizations turning to electronic editions removes the barriers of time and space between publishers and information consumers. It also obviates attempts by government to control and manipulate information for its own purposes. Internet users in Timbuktu, Mali, can peruse the current edition of the London *Times*, the Asia *Times*, the Cape *Times*, the Hong Kong *Times*, the Johannesburg *Standard-Times,* The Cairo *Times* or the New York *Times* equally and at minimal or no cost. Not only that but governments are posting

official documents, judicial proceedings, parliamentary actions and legal notices directly on the Internet, bypassing interpretation (and potential misunderstanding or misrepresentation) by news media by going directly to the public. In a resulting democratic model transplantable around the world, governments would be held accountable by the news media, and the news media would be accountable to a public operating in a market-oriented, transparent society.

In conclusion, globalization of world media might initially lead to an *appearance* of westernization of culture in its temporary adoption of certain symbols (i.e., Michael Jordan tee-shirts, rap music, Coca Cola, Mickey Mouse, KFC and McDonald's). But over time, these symbols will be adopted as the culture's own.[57] The digital age has made mass communications less expensive to start up in developing countries, and the variety of indigenous media will successfully compete economically and culturally with global media.[58]

> Look at the top-rated shows in almost any country, and most or all will be local products. Audiences watch imports only as a second choice—and American television channels increasingly repackage their shows when they take them abroad to give them a local presenter and a local feel ... In fact, the technological change that makes it less expensive to distribute American programming around the world swill sometimes help reinforce local culture. True, global competition threatens the survival of the high-cost programming that many state-owned broadcasters in Europe produce. But technology will cut the cost of producing cheap-but-cheerful local programming ... globalization of media may underwrite a globalization not merely of Mickey Mouse, but of the many cultures valued by people who are separated by distance from their geographic or ethnic origins.[59]

Simply put, when it comes to globalization of mass media in the developing world, public and private sector managers might find that the news is not all that bad after all.

**Notes**

1 Herbert I. Schiller. *Mass communications and American empire.* (2nd Ed.) Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992.

2 Edward S Herman and Robert W. McChesney. *The Global Media: The New Missionaries of Corporate Capitalism.* Cassell. London, 1999.

3 Benjamin M. Compaine. "Mergers, Divestitures and the Internet: Is Ownership of the Media Industry Being Concentrated?" Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, 26 September 1999, based on Chapter 10, *Who Owns*

*the Media?* by B. M. Compaine and Douglas Gomery, Lawrence Erlbaum. New York, 2000.

4 In addition, viewers in the Indian subcontinent, South America, all of Europe, Australia and Asia heard the news in real time from their own announcers over satellite feeds and relays. The 2003 war was as much a war between transnational media as it was between combatants.

5 While the Internet is a growing phenomenon in the Middle East, the United Nations' Development Programme's Arab Development Report, 2002, points out that less than 2% of the region's 270 million population has access to the Internet.

6 Randy Hodson and Teresa A. Sullivan. *The Social Organization of Work* (second edition) Wadsworth. New York, 1995; and William Greider. *One World, Ready or Not: The Manic Logic of Global Capitalism* Simon & Schuster. New York, 1997

7 Benjamin R. Barber: *Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism are Reshaping the World.* Ballantine Books. New York, 1996.

8 Another factor was that of 161 UNESCO members the U.S. was the only one to vote against what its delegation considered irresponsible financial management of a bloated $375 million budget. But NWICO's anti-Western, pro-development press concept eagerly embraced by the Soviet bloc was the dominant factor. Great Britain rejoined UNESCO in 1997 after the organisation shed most of the MacBride Commission's proposals and adopted a free press concept . For a discussion of NWICO see Thomas L McPhail: *Global Communication: Theories, Stakeholders and Trends.* Allyn and Bacon. Boston, 2002.

9 Majid Tehranian.*Global Communication and World Politics: Domination, Development and Discourse* Lynne Rienner. Boulder, CO, 1999.

10 Catharine E. Dalpino. "Does Globalization Promote Democracy?" *Brookings Review.* Vol 19, No 4 Fall, 2001.

11 Roger Fidler. *Mediamorphosis* Pine Forge. Thousand Oaks, CA, 1997.

12 Ben H. Bagdikian. *The Information Machines: Their Impact on Men and the Media* Harper & Row. New York, 1971.

13 *Editor & Publisher.* "New Directory Shows Prolific Community Press" Vol 129, No 45, 9 November 1996.

14 Doris A. Graber. *Mass Media and American Politics.* Congressional Quarterly Press. Washington, 1993.

15 Robert Bolitho and John Cribb. "Newspaper Publications Report" Fall/Winter, 1997. One reason large media companies buy out former mom and pop operations is simple: they have the financial resources to pay for the properties, often combining cash and securities. Inheritance taxes in the United Kingdom and the United States often work against handing publications down through the family anymore. Newspaper and broadcast facilities are highly desired

because of their liquidity and financial return. The average return on investment for a newspaper is between 10 and 25%; Broadcast stations are expected to pay for themselves in five years, according to Robert E Summers and Harrison B Summers: *Broadcasting and the Public* (3rd edition) Wadsworth Publishing. Belmont, California, 1968.

16 Hodson and Sullivan *op. cit.*

17 Ben H. Bagdikian. *The Media Monopoly* (6th edition).: Beacon Press. Boston, 2000.

18 William A. Hachten. *The World News Prism: Changing Media of International Communication* (5th ed.) . Ames, IA: Iowa State University Press, 1999. Also Luc Barben: Personal conversation with author Lusaka. Zambia, August 3, 1997.

19 David C. Coulson and Stephen Lacy. "Journalists' Perceptions of How Newspaper and Broadcast News Competition Affects Newspaper Content" *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly* Winter, 1996.

20 M2 Presswire. "Independent Television Commission: United News and Media Merger with MAI" *M2 Presswire"* January 31,1997.

21 *The Economist.* "Schools Brief: Capital Goes Global" Vol 346, No 8052, January 18, 1998. Adjusted for 1996 dollars, the cost of an international telephone call per minute has dropped from $300 in 1930 to $1 today.

22 For a layman's history of digital and high-definition television, see *Defining Vision* by Joel Brinkley (1998), reviewed by author in *Transnational Broadcasting Journal*, No. 10. Fall 2002. Available at http://www.tbsjournal.com.

23 David Hendy. *Radio in the Golden Age* Polity Press. Cambridge, 2000.

24 For example, Zambia in 1996 joined other countries in SADC (the South African Development Community) in dropping all import barriers to computer equipment and software, the effect of which was to make computer equipment more plentiful and cheaper once the market was liberalised.

25 *The Economist.* "A Connected World: A Survey of Telecommunications" Vol 344, No 8034, 13 September 1997. The Kenya Broadcasting Company broadcast over two channels in 1994—one in the official language of English, the other solely in Kiswahili; in 1997, the government of Zambia was opening its licensing process and issuing local licenses in Bemba and Tonga languages from the capital, and other regional dialects in other parts of the country. Egypt's national radio also has an international channel that daily broadcasts in Arabic, English, Greek, Spanish, Italian and French.

26 "Different Truths: Iraq and the World's Media." Open Democracy, 16 April 2003. Available at www.opendemocracy.org.

27 A U.S. university study in 2001 found that only 17 of 131 outside directors of the 17 largest media corporations had any journalism experience. See Geneva Overholster, "Hard Look at Public Ownership and Ideas for Control" *Colum-*

*bia Journalism Review.* September/October 2001.

28 David M. Cole and Christopher J Feola. "Paper Partners" *The Quill.* Vol 83, No 9, 1995.

29 Naomi Sakr. *Satellite Realms: Transnational Television, Globalization & The Middle East* I.B. Tauris. London, 2001; also see Catherine Yang: "Commentary—Media Ownership: Why Bigger Is a Big Mistake" *Business Week Online.* Available at http://www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/content/01_40/b3751045.htm?mainwindow (August 2002).

30 In addition to general knowledge questions, contestants are often asked about detailed information found in the Muslim's holy book, the Qu'ran. Top prize is one million Saudi Arabian Riyals, about £172,000 (US$267,000).

31 Melvin DeFluer and Everette Dennis. *Understanding Mass Communication.* (5th edition) Houghton Mifflin. Boston, 1994, p. 57. The minimal effects are on the receiving end of communications by a consumer. There might well be stronger economic effects than cultural effects, such as those described by Robert K Schaeffer: *Understanding Globalization: The Social Consequences of Political, Economic and Environmental Change.* Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc. Lanham, Maryland, 1997. Schaeffer referred to intellectual properties, ownership of distribution systems as well as production facilities tend to drive out local media industries (pp. 197-198). Of course, he assumes local media would not adapt and adopt to the changing situation to be more competitive. The experience in the Middle East in 2002 concerning Al Jazeera and other regional networks that use high-production values demonstrates that competition is not only possible but also preferred by regional viewers.

32 Steven Kull. "Culture Wars? How Americans and Europeans View Globalization" *Brookings Review.* Vol 19, No 4, Fall 2001.

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34 Joshua Eliashberg and Steven M. Shugan. "Film Critics: Influencers or Predictors?" *Journal of Marketing* Vol 61, No 2, Spring 1997.

35 *Econtent.* "Industry News" Vol 23 April/May, 2000.

36 Lawrence G. Brewster and Michael E. Brown. *The Public Agenda: Issues in American Politics* (4th edition) St. Martin's Press. New York, 1998.

37 Samuel P Huntington. "Clash of Civilizations" *Foreign Affair Vol* 72, No 3, Summer 1993.

38 For a review of this phenomena, see Everett M Rogers, *Diffusion of Innovations*: Free Press. Glencoe, Illinois, 1955; DeFluer and Dennis, *op. cit.*; Thomas R DeGregori and Oriol Pi-Sunyer: *Economic Development: The Cultural Context* John Wiley & Sons. New York, 1969, among others.

39 Bill Kovach. "Do News Media Make Foreign Policy?" *Foreign Policy* 102, 169-79. (1996, Spring)

40 Dalpino, *op. cit.*

41 Charles W. Kegley Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf: *World Politics: Trend and Transformation* (sixth edition) St. Martin's Press. New York, 1997, p. 518.

42 David Apter. *Rethinking Development: Modernization, Dependency and Postmodern Politics.* Sage Publications. London, 1987.

43 Richard A. Falk. "Sovereignty," pp. 853, in Joel Krieger (ed.) *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World.* New York: Oxford University Press. 1993. Quoted in Kegley and Wittkopf, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

44 Donald M. Snow and Eugene Brown: *The Contours of Power.* St. Martin's Press. New York, 1996, pp. 457-458.

45 James O. Goldsborough. *CNN Effect? The Media's Role in Foreign Policy* The Henry I. Stimson Center and the Overseas Development Council. Washington, 1997.

46 *Ibid.*, p. 46.

47 Quoted in Snow and Brown, *op. cit.* Snow and Brown write about the reasons for the rise of the IPE: declining importance of military factors with the end of Cold War competition; movement of the United States from dominance to more equal participation in international economic system; evolution of international economic structures; declining role of state in directing or controlling intentional economic behaviour; and emergency of new centres of international power based in economic strength (p. 347-352). Of course, realist theorists who argue that sovereignty is whatever a country can successfully defend against adversaries, treat the whole notion of interdependency with scepticism. One could paraphrase another realist, Mao Tse-dong: "Rupert Murdoch? How many divisions does *he* command?"

48 James H Snider: Democracy On Line: Tomorrow's Electronic Electorate. *The Futurist.* Vol *28*, (September October, 1994), pp. 15-19.

49 Schaeffer, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

50 The Roundtable is a biannual meeting of scholars of the NWICO, who continue to monitor the growth of international communications and its impact on developing societies.

51 Paul Kennedy. *Preparing for the Twenty-first Century.* Random House. New York, 1993, pp 62-64.

52 E. W. Kieckhefer. "Improved Technology Doesn't Mean Better TV" *Milwaukee Journal Sentinel.* April 11, 1987.

53 Werner J. Severin and James W. Tankard Jr. *Communication Theories: Origins, Methods and Uses in Mass Media* (4th edition) Longman. New York, 1997.

54 Gabriel Almond and Stanley Verba. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and*

*Democracy in Five Nations* Princeton University Press. Princeton, 1963.

55 Rogers, *op. cit.*

56 Adam Clayton Powell III. "Net Foils Censors, Gets News Out, Editors Say" *Free! The Freedom Forum Online.* 14 November 1997. Paper presented at an international conference in Nairobi. An example of the Internet frustrating attempts at censorship can be found in Nigeria where government seized the printing facility and telephone lines of *TheNEWS of Nigeria.* The editor, in hiding from police, produced his newspaper on a laptop computer and posted it on the Internet. "With my laptop, I can move around the country," said Babafemi Ojudu. "Without this technology we could not exist. It is becomes of this that we are still functioning. The world is informed, thanks to e-mail." Though half the 200,000 readers of the daily *Cape Times* in Cape Town, South Africa, receive the electronic version of the newspaper, most residents of Africa and Asia and Eastern Europe have no immediate access to the Internet because telecommunications (mostly owned by governments) have not kept pace with technology that would lower the price per user. Privatisation of telecomms, if developed countries serve as models, will lower those telephone line prices and make Internet access universal.

57 Rogers, *op. cit.*

58The most popular television news shows in developing countries still are the locally produced ones. During a recent trip to Lusaka, Zambia, I stayed at a hotel where the custom was to congregate in the large bar during the evening news hour. Zambians would demand loudly the lone television set be turned to the Zambia News Hour rather than CNN or the BBC, despite the predilections and protestations of the visiting *muzungus* (white people). Admittedly, some parts of the world will adopt American icons faster than others. Yet, the homogenising process of media is slow and uneven. Consider the United States where national media reaches into every home eight hours or more a day. There are still regional accents, community cultures, and even some neighbourhoods that differ from the next in what is and is not acceptable behaviour.

59 *The Economist.* "Schools Brief: A World View" Vol 346, No 8052, 18 January 1998, p. 28. ■

# Toward a Global Panopticon: Media as Instruments of Social Control *

**Rebekkah Logan, Department of Journalism**

**Abstract**

*The arrival of the 21st century marked the onslaught of an era of electronic surveillance. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 activated the actualization of Big Brother, and created a society terrifyingly parallel to the Orwellain dystopia of 1984.*

*Each new technological advancement is another brick in the wall of the Panoptic society that we have constructed around ourselves. This paper will include a brief history of the Panopticon as originally designed by Jeremy Bentham in the l8th century and Michel Focualt's application of it to modern society. It will also contrast the ideological similarities of the fictional works of George Orwell and to a lesser extent Franz Kafka, to the current social order. Furthermore, it will discuss how current methods of electronic surveillance pervade virtually all aspects of our lives, from work to recreation to online shopping*

*Obviously some experts, such as David Lyon and Stephan Green disagree with the negative connotation of a Panoptic society. They find gaps in the allusion to be inconsistent with existing social theories. However, especially in the days of Post 9-11, the theory of a Panoptic society is rapidly solidifying. Hence, I argue that we have embarked on a epoch of surveillance and invasion previously unknown to the world at large.* ■

* Abstract only is published here

# Foreign Licensed Press; Is Censorship Really Needed in Light of Today's Mass Media?

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## Introduction

The press industry in Egypt is changing, even if slightly but it can be sensed. Is Even though the re-privatization of the national papers is ruled out by government officials, a very partial privatization of the market is taking place through the introduction of a new private press. The new element is still small compared to the political party and the national press (Von Korff, 2000).

Government policies in Egypt have changed over the years to reflect the different political regimes and ideologies in the country, perhaps the only land on earth to experience such a wide variety of governments during back seven millennia. Once the land of Pharaohs, modern Egypt has been controlled by the Ottoman Empire, a royal family, an authoritarian-socialistic regime a gradual liberalization and a quasi-market economy under a quasi-republication federalism. Among the recent changes has been an acceptance of a foreign-licensed press that has flourished in a relatively uncontrolled information environment, assisted by Egyptian laws that grant relative freedom of expression to Egypt-licensed publications in exchange of heavy value added tax of 36% on revenues, both advertising and paid circulation. Foreign licensed publications, however, seem to have traded the relative press freedom for a tax free status through licensing offshore that offers services to publications (Berenger, 2002).

These offshore-licensed publications are referred to as 'Cyprus Press' or sometimes called 'yellow press.' In the intra-Egyptian debate about this kind of Publications at the beginning of 1998, the private press, in particular were attacked for violating these standards. However semiofficial and party newspapers also were criticized.

This so called 'Cyprus Press' has grown considerably during the 1990s most of the in English and some are in Arabic.

This paper surveys the different opinion of editors of foreign licensed publication on censorship, and the viewpoint of people as well.

Egyptian mass media, print and broadcasting, has long assumed a leading role among other Arab countries (Amin and Napoli, 1997). But there has been always this criticism to the Egyptian media. it is either with or against the government. The

with version represents the national government owned newspapers like Al Ahram, Egyptian Gazette, and Al Ahram Weekly. The opposition papers are like Al-Wafd, Al-Ahali, Al-Arabi, and Al-ahrar. These papers represent the political party that exist in Egypt and voice their speeches and viewpoints.

Until 1996, it was legally very difficult to obtain a license for a private newspaper. They only way were to obtain a license through a private shareholder company. In this company no shareholder has the right to obtain more than 0.2 percent of the capital. The company has also to obtain approval of eight government authorities (Von Korff, 2000). From 1952 until 1996, no such paper was ever created. However things have changed in 1996. The law was eased, and new private papers have been issued.

**Foreign licensed Press Based in Egypt**

One solution to the restrictive laws of the press was to obtain the license from abroad, London, Athens, or Nicosia. After printing two or three issues abroad, the paper apply at the Ministry of Information for the permission to print it in Egypt, and in many cases the Ministry would grant this license. The advantage for the authorities as compared to the Egyptian-licensed papers is the legal option of applying an import-censorship or of withdrawing the printing permission.

Even though these papers are legally foreign, they have to be considered Egyptian. The headquarters of the papers would normally be in Cairo, most articles deal with Egypt., and the staff consist of Egyptians, or in case of English-language papers, at least of journalists who live in Egypt. There are no official figures about the development of the so-called Cyprus press, but there is some evidence that it has been the growing phenomenon in the 1990s. However, even so, the private press can account for only a small share of the newspaper market. This is especially true for the dailies. Among the weeklies the showing of the private press is stronger (Van Korff, 2000).

In addition to the two categories of the press shown above, we still have two more categories. The independent popular weeklies; which normally obtain a foreign press and after operating for several years they convert the license into an Egyptian one by transforming the company into shareholder company. Among these are Sout Al Ummah, Al-Naba', Afaq Arabia, Al Midan, Al Kahera, October, Al Mosawar, Rose El Yousef.

The fourth category of the press is the foreign licensed publications, and these can be classified into two major groups, Non Egyptian publications distributed in Egypt; most of them are daily newspapers like Al Hayat, Asharq Al Awsat, AL Quds Al Arabi. The second group is Egyptian based , foreign licensed publications such as Cairo Times, Egypt Times, Business Today, and several women's and family magazines that are issued in both Arabic and English languages.

**The Paper's Objective**

This paper focuses on the foreign licensed publications and censorship as practiced in Egypt. There are reasons behind this strategy, which we will attempt to define the reasons as well as to clarify the objectivity of the censorship in a society like ours.

**Literature Review:**

Middle East journalism tends to be closely merged with politics, and reporters are expected to reflect a partisan view and judge, evaluate and discuss events from a position of commitment. The press was a tool of nationalism and politics. Today government control of the press goes far beyond occasional censorship.

To many Arab leaders, this is a necessity as their countries pass through the stages of revolutionary transformation. Most countries of the Middle East view the media as an instrument of national policy, devices by which the goals of the national state or the government in power can be furthered. Middle Eastern governments often claim that freedom of the press endangers national security and the welfare of the state. They justify their control of the press on the grounds that the majority of the people are ignorant and irresponsible and a free press would expose the state to the danger that some could play upon the ignorance of the people and incite them to irresponsible actions which in term leads to the inexistence of a free press.(Curry, 1982).

Nasser nationalized the Egyptian press in 1960. This period of the history was not a glamorous stage in the history of the press. While some papers such as Al Ahram experienced high quality reporting, it reflected the views of the government. At that time, a committee representing the national union was formed to run the nationalized press, editors had to abide by the new directives and guidelines of the national union and to promote the image of the Arab unity.

In 1964, a number of Marxist and socialist writers were given important editorial positions in the press to help the government sell the Arab socialism concept to the masses. Most journalists accepted the new nationalized press. They practiced self-censorship and stayed away from taboo issues because they feared the government or because the new system was more financially rewarding. Profit bonuses made it possible for many journalists to lead a life of luxury. .(Curry, 1982).

After the failure of nationalism in 1967, with the disastrous of the Arab defeat against Israel, president Sadat, who succeed Nasser in 1970, opened the economy and the political system to a certain extent. Strict press laws, such as imprisonment for publication offenses remained. Equally problematic was the fact that it was nearly impossible for private individuals to open a newspaper.(Gher,Amin, 2000).

Journalists began to experience freedom in Sadat's era, they could criticize but to a certain extent. Party press was less threatened and began to attack the government harshly.

When Mubarak became a president, the number of party press increased with

restrictive, legal and political constraints on parties, professional syndicates, NGOs and the press. The government kept its control over national press by appointing editors in chief.

Until now, it is extremely rare for an independent newspaper to be licensed in Egypt. In order to obtain a license from Egypt, the prime minister has to approve that himself, which is an extremely difficult thing. Ambiguity is a problem to these publications that can be banned for not abiding by the Egyptian social values. The cabinet could cancel a paper's license if the paper printed something aimed at corrupting morals, or affecting religion, causing terror, threatening national security or harming the public interest.(Middle East Times, 2000).

There are now more than 200 independent publications, most of them are licensed from outside of Egypt, usually in Cyprus. Many of the magazines are given the license from abroad and are published either in the free zone area or abroad in countries like Lebanon or Syria. (IJ Net, 2000).

State owned publications like al Ahram, al Akhbar and Al Gomhoureya are not censored, but their editors know where to stop. Publications owned by political parties, including Al Shaab, Al Wafd and Al Watan Al Arabi are not censored either but are subject to various forms of pressure including the imprisonment of their editors. Occasionally, an independent publication is allowed to register inside Egypt under the law of the shareholders company such as Al Osboa, and Al Nabaa. (Sandeen, Rod, 1998).

According to an interview with Hisham Kassem, publisher and editor of the weekly Cairo times that was published in Al Ahram Weekly last year, "making it close to impossible to obtain a license for a publication gives the government the right to close us down any time" He added that it is a bad feeling for someone who publishes a successful Egyptian publication and is not able to obtain its license from his country, Egypt.

It is very weird to some of the publishers these restrictions put on their publications despite the fact that the content of these publications is not political or scandalous, they deal with fashion, computers and other interests. The question remains why this great deal of censorship difficulty in obtaining an Egyptian license.

**Methodology**

The goal of this research paper is to find out how do we feel about censorship. Taking into consideration the viewpoints of editors from Egyptian based foreign licensed publications. As well as the opinion of public that are major consumers of news and the first to be affected by the censorship in Egypt.

In order to answer the main question of this paper, is censorship really needed in light of today's mass media? We conducted two personal interviews with editors in chief of two foreign licensed publications, Cairo Times and Community Times, asking them about their feelings toward censorship and is it needed in this era where

all the technology and news channels are available and nothing could be hidden from public.

Another survey is conducted with readers to view their opinions about censorship in Egypt, and if there are new ways to get the full truth other than newspapers and local TV channels.

Several hypotheses were in mind when we started working on this paper;

H1: foreign licensed publications distributed in Egypt are vigorously treated in terms of censorship.

It is that every publication before printing has to obtain the approval of the office of the censor of foreign publications, on each article.

H2: owners of these publications prefer to register abroad in order to skip from heavy taxation rules existed in Egypt, and that would made their businesses more profitable than the Egyptian based publications.

H3: publishers and editors feel dissatisfied with this censorship and call for lifting of this supervision.

H4: readers as well feel dissatisfied about this censorship and tend to obtain information from more liberal channels.

**Sample**

In this study two samples are under study. The first is the editors of the foreign licensed publications. Two personal interviews were executed. This interview is considered a qualitative research method.

The other sample was a purposive sample, we chose readers of newspapers and magazines above the age of 20 years and with high degrees. This sample was chosen with the knowledge that it is not representative of the whole population of the readers (Wimmer & Dominick, 2000).

The sample of the survey reached a total of 50 respondents, and we will see in the result section how do they respond to the phenomenon of censorship.

**Results**

Starting with the quantitative method of this paper, which is the personal interviews, we found out that the procedure of censorship nowadays has changed and become more lenient in terms of cutting out full pages or banning a full issue from distribution.

This has not been the case long ago. Starting from the late 1990s, the government realized that even if they continue to impose great rules on censorship, the newspapers can put their issues on the web and people can access that easily. It is not due to democracy in the country, it is because of the booming in the technology and communication (Kassem, 2002).

Early 1990s, any foreign licensed publication has to submit article by article to the office of censorship and had to agree on whatever they said. These days the

situation is better. Issues are sent to the censorship office after being printed in the free zone and usually they approve the whole issue.

We do our self-censorship, we know the rules and follow them, according to another foreign licensed magazine printed and based in Egypt who asked to stay anonymous. The same source said that they do not feel restricted from tackling certain issues in their publication. it is about the society, the events taking place in the country and the latest trends, we don't delve into the area of politics. The source added that our society needs censorship, because of the gap between people in terms of knowledge; people need to be directed and preached sometimes.

Another viewpoint exists in the case of Cairo Times newsmagazine. According to scholars, Cairo Times has demonstrated that "independent, high-quality reporting and critical analysis can be realized in Egypt" (Hussein & Gher, 2000). The publication sometimes has crossed the line drawn by censors.

No definite answer about the need of censorship in the society from the editor in chief of Cairo Times, he added that they know where to stop and they wont tackle issues related to religion, president, or the court case under judiciary (ElAmrani, 2002).

Regarding the quantitative part which is the survey, 60% of the sample are between the age of 21 and 25 years old whereas the groups of the ages between 26-30 and 36 to 40 represented 20% each. All of the candidates are holders of high college degrees.

- Regarding the gender of the sample, 68% are females and 32% are males.
- 98% of the sample mentions that they read the Al Ahram Daily newspaper whereas 18% reads daily newspapers on the net such as Bloomberg, business monthly, financial times, Al Ahram Weekly and others.
- 96% of the sample answers No to the question of whether they have any interest in knowing where the newspaper or the magazine they are reading are licensed from.
- 78% of the sample reads English publications licensed from abroad such as community times, Middle East Times, Cairo Times and Cleo whereas 80% reads Arabic publications licensed from abroad like Kol el Nas, Kalam el Nas, El Shark el Awsat, Al Alam el Yom and el Hayat.
- 17% of the sample thinks that the Egyptian licensed publications distributed in Egypt have enough freedom of expression and 30%of them thinks that foreign licensed publications practice this freedom.
- Regarding the issue of whether our society needs censorship:
  32% agrees that we need censorship since many of the journals use this freedom to generate greater sales
  3% answers sometimes, when they are related to taboo issues
  65% disagreed when they were asked whether we need censorship since we are living in a global village and everyone has the right to know the whole

truth in order for our society to progress.

- When asked about whether they feel satisfied reading the news in the papers, 59% of the sample's answers are yes while 41% feel that there are other sources of news such as TV, Internet and radio.
- When answering the question of whether they think that censorship of newspapers and magazines veils the full truth that they are seeking, 66% agrees while 34% disagreed.

**Discussion:**

In this paper, we had different hypotheses, regarding censorship of the foreign licensed press in Egypt. The first assumption was that the foreign licensed publications distributed in Egypt are vigorously treated in terms of censorship that every publication before being printed has to obtain the approval of the office of censor of foreign publications on each article. After conducting several surveys with readers of these publications, we found out that these publications perform their own censorship and that the office of censorship receives a copy of the issue after being published. This is a regular routine and changes are rarely made.

We found out that most of these publications are social and entertainment magazines and newspaper, which do not tackle taboo issues. They have their own code of ethics and avoid issues about the Copts, the armed forces, religions, as well as court cases that have not been issued.

Things are looking up for press freedom in Egypt but perhaps not for the best of reasons. Censorship is much more lenient these days, not because the government is committed any more to democratization, instead, the credit goes to the Internet and satellite TV.

The second hypothesis in this paper focuses on the economic aspect of the foreign license of publications which is that publishers of this kind of publications skip from heavy taxation rules existed in Egypt and that made their businesses more profitable than the Egyptian based publications. We came out with no answer to this hypothesis. Editors with whom we conducted interviews obscure any information regarding their circulation numbers and taxation systems.

The third hypothesis we put for this study was that publishers and editors feel dissatisfied with this censorship and call for lifting of the supervision. Results of the interviews that we conducted showed that the editors of these publications believed that the censorship system does not interfere with their content. They do not cross certain lines in tackling issues and that the office of censorship does not cause them obstacles in their printing process. This hypothesis was proved wrong, as the editors feel satisfied with the current censorship system.

The fourth hypothesis examines the way readers feel towards censorship and whether they seek more liberal channels for information and news. In order to obtain precise results, several questions were asked regarding the issue.

The results showed that the majority of readers complains about this type of censorship and looks for new more liberal channels on the Internet or satellite TV. Feel that censorship is veiling the full truth and that in order for the society to develop, people need to know more about the local as well as international issues. They also agreed that journalist have to have moral rules not to misuse the freedom given to their publications just to increase their circulations.

The results also showed that the majority of the sample are never interested in knowing where the publication they are reading is licensed from. Only 4% read where the publications are licensed fro m where as the rest do not.

We also found out that 98% of the sample said that they read Al Ahram Daily newspaper on daily bases, whereas 18% read news online in addition to Al Ahram daily.

Most of the readers of the foreign licensed publications were found to be females. We assumed that this is due to the fact that most of these publications deal with social, entertainment and maternity issues, which the males are not interested in.

**Conclusion**

The Egyptian newspaper market is changing. Even though the reprivatization of the domineering national papers is ruled out by government officials, a very partial privatization of the market is taking place through the introduction of a new private press. It is still rather small compared to the political party and the national press, but they still have the chance to distinguish themselves from the politically dependant papers by more balanced, objective, and therefore trustworthy reporting. The press market is in need of such specialized magazines that focus on certain segments of society such as women, kids and so on. The state owned publications do not meat this need creating a highly demanding market for the specialized versions of newspapers or magazines.

After conducting this research, we found out that there is no good reason for the Egyptian government for not giving this type of publications the licenses they need instead of getting them from Cypress and other countries. Nowadays, there are other Arab countries who had experience with this foreign licensed publications phenomena and are now locally giving licenses to their publications.

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# Arab National Press Systems as a Distinct Conceptual Type

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**Introduction:**

Arab media and communication system is increasingly challenged in the age of information and these challenges as well as the responses they have raised are too varied to be easily pinned down. The Arab traditional media system has by and large been established on a week political and economic base, low rates of literacy and the weak bases of civil society. It also operates under the concepts of centralization, mobilization, monopoly, control and other aspects of the authoritarian model. On the other hand, the digital age communication brings with it new challenges to the old Arab media and communication system. Changes of the global environment and the results brought about by globalization, communication technologies and direct satellite broadcasting may increasingly influence all Arab countries. It seems that these changes have begun to initiate some responses that may transform the rigid structures of the Arab media and communication system. As a result, some argue that these will result in the emergence of a democratic national communication system in the Arab world.

This argument is most influentially expressed by Ithiel de Sola Pool who holds that the new information and communication technologies are technologies of freedom and that regulations which inhibit their application are barriers to progress erected by existing holders of communication and information power and defended by them to sustain their monopoly of that power. The problem with the technological determinist argument is that it overlooks the fact that technological developments are themselves shaped by the prevailing structures of economic, political, and cultural power, and more importantly that they offer a range of potentials which will only be actualized by the prevailing structure (Garnham, 1991, p. 28).

In the Arab world, there is a dominant belief among Arab officials that the future measure of progress is the ability to acquire and use knowledge and that the development of human resources, creativity and communication technologies are the main factors determining the ability of the society to enter the age of information. The critical problem which characterizes the situation in the Arab region is mainly the apparent contradiction between this positive belief towards the concepts of the information society and the fact that most Arab political regimes historically, and presently tend to control mass media " print and electronic" with the justification that they face overwhelming external and internal problems requiring unity and a minimum of dissent in the public debate. However, the Arab world has witnessed the

introduction of new media especially direct broadcast satellites, the electronic journalism, the Internet, the computer technology, local computer networks and so on. These new media challenge the historical function of the traditional Arab media, while the old ones were devoted to produce standardized information and propaganda materials to publicize the ideologies of the political systems as well as the activities of the government public figures, the new challengers, as Wilson Dizard indicates "modify all of these conditions. Their products often do not come from a central source. Moreover, the new media provide specialized services for large numbers of relatively small audiences. Their most significant innovation is, however, the distribution of voice, video, and print products on a common electronic channel, often in two - way interactive formats that consumers have more control over what services they want, when they get them, and in what form (Amin, 2001 ).

**Purpose of the study**

The purpose of this study is twofold. The first is to provide an overview of the current features of the Arab the Arab press and communication system; the second is to construct a new model for the Arab press and communication system. The paper deals with the structural and professional features of the Arab press and communication system. This article aims at providing a classification of the Arab national media system.

**I. A brief historical review of media models**

**A. The four theories of press**

Fred S. Siebert, Theodore Peterson, and Wilbur Schramm combined the four theories of the press and divided the world media into four different groups or theories: authoritarian, libertarian, social responsibility, and soviet communist.

Schramm said that these four theories are derived from the simple dichotomy of the media, which is controlled by government (authoritarian and communist), and media independent of government (libertarian and social responsibility).

**1- Authoritarian theory:**

The authoritarian press concept developed in England in the 16th and 17th centuries, after the communication Revolution that followed Gutenberg's invention of printing with moveable type.

Before the Revolution the state and the church had a monopoly on knowledge. Thus, the revolution enhanced the first Mass Medium, which is the press to produce large quantities of books, pamphlets and newspaper, which aimed at challenging the authorities.

In countries where severe restriction was still there, governments were not able to stop the printing press from processing and it worked under strict government permission.

Other governments made use of the press by using it openly to maintain their power. Its power was in terms of preventing publications of information it does not want and forcing publication of information it does want.

**2- Libertarian Theory:**

The libertarian press theory evolved in the US and Britain as a reaction to the authoritarian press theory. The libertarian theory had two main ideas:

a. Certainly not a hereditary king or queen-had a monopoly on truth and should have a monopoly on information. Yet, truth, if a single truth ever existed, was discovered only through a clash of competing claims.
b. Citizens of a democracy, not the inner circle of aristocrats who had ruled in Europe's traditional royal courts, had the right to participate in political debate and ultimately to decide, which version of truth should be accepted. Thus, it can be drawn that for the authoritarian government, media is used as a tool either to maintain power or to annoy and deny any ability to threaten of challenge power. However, for the libertarian government, t he media is a crucial and an integral part of the competition for power. It plays the role of the watchdog for those in powerful political positions.

**3- Communist Theory:**

It is a twentieth century concept. The communist theory flows from the first communist revolution. Lenin's communist theory stated that the media has an active role in creating revolution. Lenin also said that the press is a scaffold or a skeleton that holds up a single party political system.

**4- Social Responsibility Theory:**

It is also a twentieth century and its responsibilities are:

1- Servicing the political system by providing information, discussion, and debate of public affairs.
2- Enlightening the public so as to make it capable of self-government.
3- Safeguarding the rights of the individual by serving as a watchdog against government.

**B. Revisions of the four theories of press**

After introducing the four theories of the press briefly, William A. Hatchten has done the most useful and informative updating to the Four theories of the Press in his book Global Communication in 1980. In his book, Hatchten has introduced the new five press concepts.

**C. Limits of previous theories**

These four theories have some drawbacks, in which the authors have classified

them into several points. Siebert et al four-model theories try prescribing than describing social phenomena by using empirical basis for inquiry. Also, the theories focused only on normative theories that lack explanatory power because they explain how things should be and they do not relate to how things are in the current status. Picard also criticized the four theories model 1985 saying that the problem focused only on the state-press relationship and the missing elements of economics, and it does not pay attention to the micro level interaction between organizations, journalists and the state. However, media operations, journalistic reporting and editorial decisions do not focus only on the economic rules and ignores the mature of the press under which professionalism operates by. The most important drawback of the four theories models is that they focus on the structural factors and they ignore and they ignore the professional factors. The structural factors are limited to the system of government with its economic, political and cultural system. Thus, in this model the structural constraints are imposed on the press and journalism field. For instance, they have at one scale democracy and at the other side authoritarianism. Democracy is defined as the political freedom for the media to criticize the policies of the state without imposing any constraints, censorship or government controls. On the other side, authoritarianism is defined as the system, which has the right to impose strict control over the state and deprive it from criticizing he state policies. The professional factors, which the four theories model miss is based on another rules. The Professional factors include individual journalistic values and the autonomy of individual journalists in the media institutions. Professionalization can be approached by two ways. First of all, is individual professionalization, which is an act of socialization? For example, a view of education and training for the work, which are special requirements for entering the occupation. It involves the whole profession and as a service ideal. Secondly, there is the collective professionalization. It imposes attributes, such as a code of conduct or ethics, degree of autonomy, claim of monopoly over certain types of work and the expression of a service ideal.

**II. A. Mass Media in The Middle East:**

Mass media in the Middle East have undergone many social changes since 1990. New technologies have spread, such as satellite television and the Internet, which have gone beyond the governmental and local frontiers and border. These global interactions of media and information have weakened the powerful role of the authoritarian government to great extent.

**B. Arab press systems:**

According to William Rugh, in 1979, he classified the Arab press in different countries into three main types: mobilized, loyalist, and diverse. The mobilized press is defined as the total subordinate of the media system to the political system.

This type is presented in the Libya, Syria, south Yemen and Sudan. The loyalist press is privately owned system, which is not even exposed to censorship, but it almost always supports the regimes, especially those regimes that can have control on their system and persecute journalists under the legal system. It is presented in Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and United Arab Emirates. The third type is the diverse press. In this type, the press is free, such as Morocco, Lebanon and Kuwait. Yet, Morocco and Kuwait have shown some loyalist features. The Egyptian press since the time of Sadat and Mubarak become diversified, such as Ruz Al- Yussuf magazine, which severely and critically criticize government's acts. Although it is diversified, journalists are persecuted and journals, which criticize the governments, are banned. In Jordan before 1993 and in Algeria around the early 1990s, the print media was diverse. For example, King Hussein in Jordan was afraid I of the criticism of the newspapers or the peace process that was done between Jordan and Israel. Also, the government was so anxious about the newspaper critique for the government's treatment to the Islamists. Iran is considered to have a contradictory press system. In 1997, president Mohammed Chatami, called for the end of censorship and encouraged the free flow and access of information. Thus, in 1998, newspapers freely criticized Iran's line in the Rushdie affair. However, in 1999, Chatami's conservative opponents around Ayatollah Khamenei started to roll back many of the liberalization efforts.

This takes us to another point, which is the media, ownership. Some states like Egypt were monopolizing the TV and radio media.

Yet, during the last two decades, Egypt, for example, started to let go its monopoly on TV and radio. This is due to three main factors. First of all, the introduction of western satellite program globally, has forced the Middle East countries to start a new policy, which is to be more professional. This is by encouraging the private capital to finance satellite TV network or film production. Secondly, is the external competition from the western countries. This competition gives hope to the Middle East countries to enlarge their program production and TV satellite production in order to attract larger audience not only in their country or region, but also in beyond their borders. This hope enforces competition between the Middle East countries themselves. For example, Saudi Arabia has built up a whole media empire for the Arab world with a large numbers of various satellite programs. The third reason is the pressure from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. This pressure increased the willingness for the Middle East countries to include the media sector in the privatization system. Thus, these are the three factors that helped the media in Egypt not to be governmentally owned and get out gradually of this bureaucratic system. Now the Saudi TV empire partly owns many media in other Arab countries and a large share of the Arab press published outside the Arab world countries, such as in London.

Now the world perceives the mass communication as a crucial development instrument and the core for socioeconomic change. Yet, the spot now is on the mass media in the third world countries and whether it is used as a developmental instrument or not. The important question is how does the Middle East and Arab countries express themselves through the media. Concerning the Middle East countries the media is used and indirectly controlled by the government to give pseudo facts and disguise the important political, economical and cultural facts that the government does not want to uncover for the public.

According to Kai Hafez, the media in the Middle East region lacks some important factors that enables it to compete and reach the Western developed media. One important factor for the development of the media is books, which are regarded as the gatekeepers of ideas. In the middle East region the production and the consumption of books is not yet impressive or astonishing. Moreover, the banning or book is wide spread in the Arab countries. For example, there was a book called *Muhammad,* written by the highly renowned French Orientalist Maxime Rodinson. This book was banned in Cairo and the American University in Cairo did not put it on its shelves after a columnist in Al-Abram Weekly newspaper, which said that this book insults Islam. Thus, this shows that the banning of book is not only done by the state intervention and monopoly, yet, other Liberal Education universities have done that too. Thus, state monopoly is not the only hinder for media development in the Arab countries.

Moreover, the Internet is considered to another development aspect. Most of the Arab countries use the Internet as a source of chatting or advertising for certain products. Although there is a large growth for the Internet cafes, yet this medium is only wide spread between the higher, well educated and who has fluent English language. It is not wide spread to the lower classes, like the satellite TV, which is wide spread among the lower classes as well as the rich ones.

Interpersonal communication is also quite important, such as conversations in the market, in the mosque, for the development. It is important especially in the Middle East countries, where there is large distinction between classes, which ranges from literate, metropolitan and illiterate.

Traditional communication sometimes plays the role of the watchdog of the society. This is because sometimes the state censor things form the new media, and yet the only medium to know the truth is the traditional communication, which is a quick mean for the distribution of the banned and censored information.

Thus, nowadays, the media in the Arab countries are facing some obstacles. Thus, the Arab countries should get out the idea of western invasion to the media and censorship information that it considered unethical or unuseful to the people. This is because traditional communication is a quicker medium of transferring this banned and censored information, whether it is cultural, political or social.

**C. Positive and Negative Aspects of Press in the Middle East**

With regard to the development of Arab mass media, a recent study of the Egyptian news media suggests many of the frustrations facing Egyptian media, which can more or less describe the general features of the Arab media system.

These frustrations include:

1- Historical, cultural, political and other factors have shaped a system that is- although ultimately the creature of government- ineffective in promoting stated government goals.
2- It fails to meet the informal needs of the public.
3- It is slow to respond to competitive pressures from within and without Egypt.
4- Symptomatic of the dysfunction among media workers is a general lack of professionalism, pervasiveness of corruption and favoritism, an attitude of mistrust toward outsiders, and widespread of passivity and acquiescence to government controls.
5- institutional practices such as bribery, unfair hiring and firing practices were identified as being at the heart of Egyptian media institutions and a major impediment to information flow (Napoli, 2001).

As for press in Arab countries, they are primarily absolute monopolies and usually function under direct government supervision. The press in most Arab states are owned, operated, and controlled by the governments. The main reasons for centralizing control are: the governments' desire to preserve national unity and to use the media as a political and propaganda tool and to keep these tools out of the hostile hands (Amin, 2001).

This tight and closed governments' policy on Arab media and communication system lies at the opposite position with the open policy of the western media systems, which requires active participation of peoples and independent and liberal media policy. The Arab closed media system is suffering from many problems, the most important of them is that it lacks its credibility and role in the Arab society in general and in politics in particular. In Hamada's research on "the role of mass media in decision making in the Arab world" he concluded that the absence of an actual role of the mass media in the process of political decision-making can be attributed to many factors such as:

1- the political pressures which influence the media organizations everywhere in the Arab world.
2- the low credibility of most Arab media to the extent that they lack influence on the Arab pubic opinion.
3- the government control on the content of the print as well as the broadcast media.
4- most Arab countries limit access to news and information especially those related to the important national issues in order to control the flow of information and mislead public opinion.

5- media practitioners do not receive equal treatment from Arab governments, those who regarded by the governments as unfriendly are penalized in most Arab countries.
6- licensing of publications and journalists, in addition to the restrictive laws are another factor which impede press freedom and limit the role of press in decision making.
7- the authoritarian, highly centralized Arab regimes hinder the contribution of both public opinion and mass media to policy and decision making. Sometimes, these regimes work against what they think is representative to public feelings as they consider the influence of those outside contributors a symbol of the weak political government (Hamada, 1993).

**III. Towards a new model of Press in the Arab World**

**A. Sructural factors:**

The main structural factor that will be taken into account is the system of the government with its economic, political, and cultural subsystems. Different political systems are labeled as capitalist or socialist, democratic or authoritarian. These generalized labels do not take into consideration economic structures tied closely to public policy and political arrangements of governments, nor democracy with its values of capitalism and profit orientation (Ostini, 2002).

In this model, the structural constraints imposed on the press and journalists are represented as one dimension: on one side of a continuum democracy and on the other side authoritarianism.

Democracy is the context of media as being political freedom for the media to freely criticize state policies and to operate largely without government controls in a free market place of ideas. Authoritarian is defined as a system that enforces strict obedience by the media to political authorities.

**B. Professional factors:**

The second dimension of the model represents professional factors such as individual journalistic values and the autonomy of individual journalists within media institutions.

Ostini (2002) specifies the professional individual values used in his model to be subsumed under the dimension of conservation-liberalism. Conservation is defined as journalists being averse to rapid change, the avoidance of extremes, and the support of societal quo. Journalists may sacrifice their autonomy and their professional values in favor of state policy, media stance, and the socialization process of their environment. Liberalism is defined as journalists supporting social change and reform, individualism, competition and free speech.

According to Ostini (2002) national press systems can be classified as democratic conservative, democratic liberal, authoritarian conservative or authoritarian liberal.

Democratic conservative media systems are those in which the political system is democratic but the professional values of the majority of journalists are conservative. In contrast, in a democratic liberal system dissent and free speech are values supported by both the political system and the individual journalists. Authoritarian conservative systems officially control press content and professional values within media organizations support such constraints. Authoritarian liberal systems are those in which official policies suppress dissent but individuals within the media organizations support social reform and display support in their practice of journalism.

## IV. Testing the model:

A case study was used to examine the new model in the context of the actual media coverage of the aftermath of Sept. 11. This event was selected because the media of several states system covered it. The Sept. 11 incidents provoked diplomatic rows, political and religious leaders and civil protests in different regions in the world. The Sept.11 and its consequents aggravated Arab and Islamic societies. The demonstrations, anger, historical, cultural and religious biases and frustrations tapped into issues of Arab nationalism, identity and militarism- issues that might be expected to be linked to individual; journalistic values. The sample consisted of media coverage from Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Algeria press coverage in the aftermath of September 11 in comparison to United States are explicated in the light of the new model.

According to Ostini (2002) previous models for the classification of national media systems are examined, little or no room is allowed for variation between countries that do not fall directly into western democratic or Soviet Communist models.

| Country | Four theories (1956) | Lowenstein (1971) | Astchull (1984) | Hatchten (1981) | Picard (1985) | Rugh (1987 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Egypt | Authoritarian | Government/ Social- Authoritarian | Communitarian | Authoritarian/ Developmental | Authoritarian | Mobil |
| Lebanon | Libertarian | Private/ multiparty/ government | Market | Western/ Developmental | Western | Diver |
| Iraq | Authoritarian | Government/ social Authoritarian | Communitarian | Authoritarian | Authoritarian | Mobil |
| Algeria | Authoritarian | Government/ social Authoritarian/ | Communitarian | Authoritarian | Authoritarian | Mobil |
| Saudi Arabia | Authoritarian | Government/ social Authoritarian | Communitarian | Authoritarian | Authoritarian | Loyal |

William Rugh (1987) tried to answer in his book *The Arab press* the difficult question how should we classify the Arab media system? What is the theory, or theories behind the Arab media?

In the Arab world, the system cannot be explained without specific reference to political and other conditions prevailing at the time in the country. Such factors as the existence of open political opposition parties, the strength, credibility, trustworthiness and legitimacy of the ruling party, the stability of the political system, the type of the regime (royalty, republic or emirates), the existence of free press, and the economic aspects are very important criteria to determine the type of Arab media system. The Arab media system stems from political, religious, economic and other aspects that prevail in the Arab countries. Four theories (1956), Hatchten (1981), Lowenstein (1971), Picard (1985) and Altschull (1984) classifications do not provide description of the national media systems in the Arab world. First in the authoritarian system, the media support and advance the policies of the government, which controls the media directly or indirectly through licensing, legal action, or subsidies. The regime allows the media some discussion of society but not of the people in power. Comment and criticism are carefully guided, and articulated goals of the community conform to the goals of the regime itself. There are authoritarian features in many of the Arab media systems, even in places where the press is not under government control. In the Arab world media transmit the official truth, the media by which this truth is authoritatively communicated to the masses (Rugh, 1987).

The western concept holds that the media must be completely free from government controls and provide readers and viewers with sufficient objective information and variety of opinion so the person can make up his mind. The media serves as a watchdog for the government and a free and open encounter of arguments, which help people to distinguish false from true. To be sure there are examples of journalistic responsibility in the Arab world. For example, Al- Hayat newspaper can be categorized as a liberal newspaper that provides its readers with unbiased credible information and it acts as a watchdog for the Arab governments. However the libertarian features are in the effects or the system rather than the underlying philosophy. The efforts to publish the truth have come under the ties from variety of sources: cultural, social and above all political.

Rugh (1987) assured that:

> Where the political temperature is high, the journalist usually considers objectivity and commitment to be the same thing, because both are identified with truth. However, there is a partisan voice in the Middle East region (p27).

After the introduction of private owned newspapers and television terrestrial and satellite channels, which cannot be contained within national boundaries. It

also provided audiences with an open encounter of ideas from which to choose.

In the communist concept the media are controlled and directed by the Communist party. The press was an integral part of the communist party. Media should serve the interests of and be controlled by the working class. Media should serve positive functions for society by mobilization, education and motivation. Anti- societal publications should be punished, banned and censored. News should be described as positive information that serves the communist party. One party press enjoyed monopoly on news. Unapproved foreign or other competing media programming may not be distributed at all in the country. In the Arab world, there are some restrictions on the importation of foreign print material. But these restrictions are by no means comprehensive. Semi- official newspapers promote the ideas and programs of the ruling party. During parliaments elections semi-official newspapers dedicate whole pages for the candidate to express their opinions and explain their programs and their plans. Thus while there are a few elements of communist thinking behind the controls on Arab media, the system as a whole cannot be placed in this category.

The developmental concept holds that all instruments in mass communication must be mobilized by the central government to aid nation's building. It assumes that the media should support authority not challenge it. The individual rights are somewhat irrelevant in comparison to major problems as poverty, disease and illiteracy. The concept implies that in international news each nation has a sovereign right to control both journalists and the flow of news back and forth across borders. This concept could fit the Arab media in the eighties but after the changes in media landscape and ownership and also after the introduction of satellite broadcasting and the Internet. This concept lost its meaning and applicability. The basic assumptions of the concept are closely related to the NWICO, which seems to be outdated and useless. This concept cannot serve in explaining the Arab media system anymore. However its worth noting that the role of media in forming civil society and nation building can be seen fulfilled in the Arab media. For instance, the Nile Sat carries specialized educational channels for school and university students in addition to a channel to eradicate illiteracy. This indicates that there are few elements of developmental thinking behind the mission and control of the Arab media, the system themselves cannot be put overall in this category.

Altschull (1984) and Tehranian (1999) provided description of the communitraian media systems. Communitarianism is a concept that avoids all perceived constructs of domination by focusing on pluralism of experience, language, culture and identity. Not setting the agenda for particular modes of discourse but recognizing that each comprises a thread of the fabric of societal existence strengthens the bonds of community and creates greater cohesion between otherwise fragmented enclaves of ethnicity and class. Majid Tehranian posits "the communitarian school of "another development" has called for the media to be employed instead as

instruments for endogenous rather than exogenous development by focusing on: (1) participatory modes of communication and development relying on both traditional and modern media; (2) horizontal rather than vertical communication channels; (3) appropriate technology rather than costly and complex high technology; (4) rural rather than urban biased programming; (5) preservation of indigenous cultural and national identity and pride (Tehranian 1999). The Arab media does not fulfill the second assumption of Tehranian that the media should be biased to the rural. Arab media does not consider the disadvantaged in its programs, the main programs that the media covered are related to the high socio economic status Arabs who. Arab media systems are trying to use the appropriate and convenient technology. The best example is the launching of the digital satellites: Nile Sat 101 and 102 and the building of Egyptian and Dubai media cities. However, still the Arab media systems need further development and provision of professional capable of utilizing these technologies. According to Abdel Rahman Hafez, Chairman of Egyptian Media Production City Company said, " we have the equipments, but still we have problems in providing qualified professionals capable of using the highly technical equipments."

**Method**

This study is based on descriptive qualitative analysis of Lebanon, Egypt, Algeria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia media coverage of the aftermath of Sept. 11.

Sample:

Media coverage in the Arab World was extensive due to the emotional nature of the event. The sample consisted of four Egyptian newspapers. A range of newspapers was chosen to account for both structural and individual dimensions of the model. These papers were Al- Ahram, a prestigious semi-official daily newspaper widely read in Egypt and the Arab world; Al- Wafd, an opposition daily newspaper; Al-Ousboue', an independent private weekly newspaper, and the Egyptian Gazette, semi-official English language daily newspaper. Lebanon sample consisted of two Lebanese newspapers. These papers were The Daily Star, Shi'ite English language daily newspaper and Al- Nahar independent Greek orthodox newspapers. Both newspapers are described by Rugh (1987 )as pro-west newspapers. Saudi Arabia's sample consisted of Al-Hayatt, Saudi owned private daily newspaper based in London; the Arab News English language newspaper. At the present the Iraqi sample consisted of Al-Ba'th daily political newspaper organ of Al-Bath Arab Socialist ruling party in Iraq. The Algerian sample consisted of El-Khbar independent daily newspaper and El Watan independent daily newspaper.

Analysis of the five states press coverage of the aftermath of Sept. 11 in comparison to US coverage was based on secondary data. The researcher looked at the Conservation Vs liberalism based on general attitude of articles selected

supporting their country and opposing other countries, whether favoring their own country and opposing the United States policies; articles themes sovereignty and moral obligation vs. social obligation and individual matter; who were considered main actors; Objectivity vs. biases; and professionalism of journalists.

**Results**

Attitude and theme are important components of the model because they illuminate professional factors. By using a model that takes account of individual professionalism in addition to structural factors, a clearer picture can be built up of the actual operation of the media systems. Using previous theories and concepts discussed earlier do not take into account many of the structural and professional factors that distinguish the Arab world.

**Attitude:**

Conservation as operationalized in the context of general reports of the Sept. 11 attacks followed by the war on Afghanistan was define as having attitude supporting their own countries and opposing western policies and in particular American foreign policy. Looking at the editorials exhibiting of negative attitudes towards the United States: Iraq and Algeria were the most conservative, with Egypt, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia somewhat less conservative, and no country was considered not at all conservative. However in general we can say that the Arab press is characterized by favoring their own countries and opposing other countries even within the Arab world.

**Articles Theme:**

Conservation was linked with ideas of sovereignty, historical claim and moral obligation. On this base all Arab countries, with the exception of Iraq, were equal in their Anti American feelings and there negative attitude towards the United States. In fact a tone of satisfaction and happiness that the US was under attack could be traced in the sample selected.

Liberalism was linked to ideas of modern and political claims, concepts of social obligation, and perception of the issue as being an individual matter. On this basis Lebanon media are ranked as partly liberal followed by Egypt and Algeria. Iraq cannot be considered liberal. if we consider newspapers owned by Saudi owned newspapers as Al-Hyatt and Al-shark Al-awsat we can consider them the example of the most liberal journalism in the Arab world. However we cannot consider them completely free.

**Main actors:**

Conservation is linked with ideas about the government being the main actor in social and political situations and liberalism is linked with ideas about social and

political groups as well as individuals being important actors.

The five Arab countries selected could be ranked as conservative. Most of the editorials and op-ed columns in the sample selected focused on the idea that the solutions for the current situation in the Middle East and the correction of the Arab image after Sept. 11 lies in the governments and their policies. Even the calls for boycott of American goods in response to the United States reactions towards Moslems and Arabs in the aftermath of Sept. 11 was devoting more importance to the governments rather than individuals inspite of the calls for social collaborate actions.

**Discussion**

Based on these results, extremes of conservation and liberalism on the part of journalists can be clearly identified. It is clear that the values of U.S. journalists as manifested in their nes coverage are liberal, where as the values of Arab journalists were conservative. Lebanese media are clearly less conservative than Egyptian, Saudi Arabian and Algerian media whereas they tend in the majority of categories to be much more conservative than U.S. media. Iraq represents the extreme the most conservative media system.

Using the model incorporating journalistic values and state systems, and the data gathered from the case study, the media systems of Egypt, Lebanon, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Iraq in comparison to the United States can be illustrated in the following Figure:




**Matrix:**

National media system x Individual journalistic value model

As it is illustrated the matrix above differentiate countries that share similar

structural factors but in which individual journalists operate under different levels of professionalism. The Egyptian and Algerian press systems are seen to be diverse conservative system; Iraq and Saudi Arabia are considered Authoritarian conservative system whereas Lebanon can be classified as Diverse Liberal system.

This model indicates that that the Arab countries cannot be classified in one category or one concept but it can be divided into:

**A. Diverse Conservative system**

The diverse system is characterized by the combining of some aspects of the democratic system and also some features of the authoritarian system. In which there is independent newspapers that report freely and other newspapers that reflect the government or ruling ideology and promotes the government programs. Conservative as illustrated above is represented in the journalists support for their country against other countries and their belief in sovereignty, historical claim, national security and moral obligation to modern claim, individual matter, social work and collaborate actions. They see the governments and political system as the main actors in social and political situations.

Arab countries that can be placed in this category Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Jordan, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman and Qatar.

**B. Diverse Liberal System**

The diverse system is characterized by the combining of some aspects of the democratic system and also some features of the authoritarian system. In which there is independent newspapers that report freely and other newspapers that reflect the government ideology and promotes the government programs. Liberal is explained earlier is represented to the journalists being neutral or pro-anti their country according to the event and the situation. The journalists in this category believe in the importance of social and political institutions in major political and social situations.

Arab countries that can be classified in this category are Lebanon, Morocco and Kuwait.

**C. Authoritarian Conservative System**

In the authoritarian system the regime allows the media some discussion of society but not of the people in power. Comment and criticism are carefully guided, and articulated goals of the community conform to the goals of the regime itself. There are authoritarian features in many of the Arab media systems, even in places where the press is not under government control. In the Arab world media transmit the official truth, the media by which this truth is authoritatively communicated to the masses. Conservative as illustrated above is represented in the journalists support for their country against other countries and their belief in sovereignty,

historical claim, national security and moral obligation to modern claim, individual matter, social work and collaborate actions. They see the governments and political system as the main actors in social and political situations.

Arab countries that can be placed in this category are Yemen, Iraq, Sudan, Mauritania, Jabot, Libya, Somalia, and Syria.

This contrasts strongly the four theories of press as if we use them to classify the Arab countries they would be all classified as only authoritarian systems without any differences and without taking into consideration structural and professional aspects.

In addition to providing greater level differentiation between media systems, this model provides a link between structural factors and professional practice lacking in the earlier models that reduced media coverage into single structural dimension.

**Conclusion:**

Theories of national press systems have largely remained theories, philosophical and normative assumptions. This new model moved beyond assumptions to description and empirical analysis. Newspapers remained the medium of focus because they have long been tied and connected to political power structure. The proposed model postulated that state systems operate at a political level above media systems and journalistic values that go beyond the coverage of specific issue.

This model was useful in classifying the Arab national media systems. It illustrated how distinct is the Arab system to the previous classifications. This study also illustrated that there are differences within the Arab countries in their media systems that made it impossible to classify all Arab countries in the same category.

The Arab world is unique, most of the Arab states have structural features that are in the middle between authoritarian and democratic systems. Also, it is impossible to focus on the structural factors without taking into consideration the individual journalistic values to provide an overview of Arab national media systems.

**Further Studies**

This study provided a preliminary classification of the Arab national media systems. However, the Arab world is now witnessing profound changes in the information age that will affect the operation, ownership and structure of media in the Arab world. This needs further investigation. For further studies it would be essential to apply the method and the model to different issues within a set of countries to see the differentiations across countries and the effects of the rapid political, social, technological changes on the classification and description of national systems.

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# Between Disney and Bakkar: What Egyptian Mothers Perceive As "Effects" of Animated Shows on Their Children?

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**Abstract**

*Which child does not watch animated shows? For long animated shows, or cartoons, have been the child's best past time. As a matter of fact, his peers could, at best describe a child who does not have a favorite cartoon character or who does not know the most recent animated shows on TV, as 'weird'. But these shows may not be as guilt-free as they appear. Behind the innocent jingles, social scientists and media specialists alike have put forward a lot of theories of the effects of these shows on children and subsequently their behavior forward.*

*Many studies have been conducted to discuss the effects of cartoons, especially the violent shows, on children's violent behavior. While, some may argue that toi assume that children will immediately act upon what they see is in fact assuming that they are a blank state, or assuming that television is the only socializing factor involved, contrary arguments are still going on.*

*This research does not aim to defend either side of the debate. However by speaking to Egyptian mothers, whose children are exposed to both Arabic cartoons such as "Bakkar" and international cartoons such as Walt Disney's "Tarzan" ("Aladdin", "Pocahontas"), this study aims to assess what their perceived effects of these shows are on their children.*

*Some of the questions posed to the mothers in the study are: Do the shows put forward a set of values, which, according to the mothers contradict traditional values or pose a "threat" to their children in any way? Do they feel that the shows affect their children's behavior? Do they discuss the contents of the shows with their children? What form of mediation takes place at home and how do the children receive it? What role does the father play? If the shows are psychologically damage or affect the children's mentality and perception of things, are there any alternatives? According to the mothers, what are these alternatives? Or what should they be? How did this changing media environment change the daily family values? What expectations do mothers have of the media? What values they hope will be transmitted to their children? According to the mothers, do schools have a specific role in educating their children about the harms of global media? Or is it left for*

*the home? Does the mother's background effect the decisions she makes or thoughts that she has?*

*Based on the analysis of intensive interviews with 10 Egyptian mothers, we will present recommendations for future research.*

**Introduction:**

"Oh I come from a land, from a faraway place
Where the caravan camels roam
Where they cut off your ear
If they don't like your face
It's barbaric, but hey, it's home
.
.
.
Hop a carpet and fly
To another Arabian night"

(Opening song to Disney's Aladdin, 1992)

Children and adults alike are exposed to television on a daily basis, thus it is assumed that it plays a vital role in their day-to-day communication as well as the shaping of attitudes, personalities and behavior. This is otherwise known as the socialization process.

In a survey in America, children aged two to 11 spend the average of 28 hours per week viewing TV. "The children of today have not learned any other way to pass time". (Out of control, 1).

In an article discussing how American media contribute to the negative health effects on children cited that: "young people view an estimated 10,000 violent acts each year... with children's programming being the most violent" (Article Documents Negative Impact...1). As for the Arab world, nearly fifty percent of the children's programs broadcast on Arabic channels is imported. (Abu Isbaa, 65).

Statistics as these and others have led to the growing concern of the negative effects of television on children. This is why researchers have relentlessly looked for these effects and attempted to evaluate them and to find ways to limit these effects.

Whether television has positive or negative effects on children depends on many variables. Such variables may include "gender, socioeconomic status, race, religion, age, hair color, or any thing else that may make one person different from another." (Television: A Positive or Negative Impact on Children, 1).

Many theories have been developed concerning the impact of media on children. One of these is Gerbner's Cultivation Theory, which argues that: "television has long term effects which are small, gradual, indirect but cumulative

and significant. Cultivation research looks at the mass media as a socializing agent and investigates whether television viewers come to believe the television of reality the more they watch it" (Chandler, Daniel, 1)

As mentioned previously, the issue of media effect on children has been given great attention by many scholars in the fields of psychology, sociology and mass communication. The reason behind this is the great affect that media in general and children programs and cartoons in particular have on the child's mentality, attitude and behavior.

Media, with its different vehicles, affects children at a very early age as they start watching television at the age of two. The viewing habits of every child are different from the other. However the majority of them, as the research's interviews indicated, watch television an average of two hours a day.

This means that children will be exposed to numerous messages everyday and in turn this plays an important role in shaping their personalities. "Children aren't dumb! In fact, they are fast learning, and even more intelligent and observant than we are." (Children aren't dumb, 1).

Programs such as cartoons, which are mainly watched by younger children, could have both negative and positive effects on children as they cover a wide variety of issues that can influence the children mentally, physically and even socially. It is well observed that most of the cartoons use "violence and inappropriate subject matter to entertain children. These images and stories can have a tremendous negative impact on children because the violence is rewarded without consequences, is glorified and idealized" (Kelly's portfolio, 1). A major concern about contemporary children's cartoons is that they contain high levels of violence as well as sexual content. Some researches have also shown that tobacco and alcohol use is also part of children's animated films. (Kosseim, 1).

On the other hand, there are cartoons that have little or no violence at all. These types of cartoons: "try to incorporate educational lessons that concern values and morals that are important for children to learn" (Kelly's portfolio, 1). Such cartoons have a positive effect on children and can work to enhance many good qualities in them.

There is a popular folklore concerning the relationship between television and children's play. Everybody seems to know somebody who knows somebody who read a story in the paper once about a child who jumped out of a window pretending to be Superman. Yet anybody who has spent any time observing young children playing together will know that boundary between fantasy and reality is of central significance for them. Children will consciously adopt particular roles, and often step outside the fantasy scenarios they have created to readjust or renegotiate these. While 'pretend play' may often permit children to try our forbidden roles and behaviors, children understand that it offers this license precisely because it is not real". (Buckingham, 1993 (217)).

One of the world's pioneers in the production of children's cartoons is the American-based Walt Disney Productions Company, which started in 1923 in "the rear of a small office occupied by Holly-Vermont Realty in Los Angeles". In this specific place Walt Disney and his brother started producing their first piece, which was a series of short animated films called the Alice Comedies. After 4 months they were able to expand the project and moved to a bigger place where the sign on the door read "Disney Bros. Studio". "During the next 14 years, many changes took place at the Disney studio: Mickey Mouse was born in 1928 followed by Pluto, Goofy, Donald Duck and the rest of the Disney gang" (www.disney.go.com).

In Egypt, the cartoon industry is modest and not advanced. A few attempts to create cartoons have not been successful due to it's lack of technological advancements. However, in the last three years, one cartoon has received unprecedented success; Bakkar.

Bakkar is a 15-minute Ramadan Cartoon produced by the Cairo Cartoon Company owned by Mona Abul Nasr, which also produced two other series (Kani & Mani and Sindbad) but they haven't been as successful as Bakkar.

Bakkar comes from Upper Egypt and speaks colloquial Egyptian Arabic "interspersed with some Nubian words". The show reflects the Egyptian environment as most of Bakkar's adventures take place in Pharaonic temples or the mud huts of small villages.

The director of the cartoon Abul Nasr explains a major asset of the introduction of Bakkar into the Egyptian market. She says: "this is the first time children can watch a wholly Egyptian cartoon on TV, as opposed to imported, dubbed products like Tom & Jerry or Donald Duck." (A token of respect, 1).

"In Egypt, side by side an observer can see remnants of the ancient world and the influx of new technology, western and eastern lifestyles coexisting in close proximity" (Strom, 4).

Due to the importance of such a topic, this preliminary research studies the effects of both local and international cartoons on children from the mothers' perspective. This topic was chosen because of the belief that children are a vulnerable sector of the society and that's why great care should be considered in whatever is introduced to them.

**Definition of The Problem under Study**

In this research, the mothers' interviewed spoke about their concerns regarding the positive and the negative effects of cartoons on their children. They were prompted to distinguish between the effects of international vs. local cartoons on their children and were also asked to recommend how the negative effects, if any, could be reduced.

Mothers were also asked to describe the nature of their guidance to their children.

There are three types of parental guidance:

1. Restrictive Guidance: this occurs when parents limit or restrict the child's viewing. Limiting the number of hours they watch and the times during which they are allowed to watch can do this. Another way to restrict TV use is to forbid the watching of particular programs or channels.
2. Evaluative guidance: which occurs when parents discuss what their children see on television by commenting on what actors in particular shows or movies do, by explaining that some things are not real, or by putting claims made in advertisements into a particular perspective.
3. Unfocused Guidance: a more general type of guidance in which parents simply sit with the child while it watches television, positively encouraging certain viewing behaviors or discuss what the child has seen or is about to see" (Van Den Bulck, 2).

**Hypotheses**

1. The more the mothers lived in a mediated media environment as children, the more they tried to apply it to their children.
2. The younger the children, the more they tend to live in the cartoon fantasy world.
3. The more the children watch cartoons, the less active they become.
4. The more children watch violent cartoons, the more they tend to act aggressively.

**Research Questions**

1. What major distinctions exist between international and local cartoons?
2. What are the advantages of cartoons for children?
3. What are the negative habits that children can learn from cartoons?
4. What is the effect of cartoons on the social life of children?
5. What is the role of mothers in explaining cartoon content to children?
6. What can media people do to improve the cartoon content for children?

**Literature Review**

In a study conducted in 1997 amidst 300 Egyptian children, the children expressed their fondness of cartoons, which had violent content. (Al Qileeni, 101).

Nearly 22.7 % of the children enjoyed the ninja turtles and 20 % enjoyed Tom & Jerry. More than half the sample said that they were not afraid of the violent scenes in the cartoons because they know that it was not real. The rest of the sample said that they were scared of scary faces, enormous sizes and violent scenes. Nine percent of the sample said they were not scared of bloody scenes. (Al Qileeni, 101).

More than half of the sample (59 %) said that they copied the violent scenes. This took place mostly at home and then at school and finally in clubs and parks. (Al Qileeni, 102-3).

The research indicated that the child's behavior is affected more than his psychology with violent scenes. It also said that the Egyptian television focuses on

broadcasting foreign cartoons from the United States and Japan, which has a high content of violent scenes. Meanwhile, the study also said that the violence was not used to support positive values but was used to support negative values such as violence just for the sake of it, victory for the villain and to take over other's rights.

The study suggested that the TV diversified it's import of the cartoons so that it doesn't simply focus on the American and Japanese cartoons. (Al Qileeni, 105).

It also said that it is important to utilize violence in cartoons to support positive values such as self-defense, defending others, facing oppression, and defending one's country. (Al Qileeni, 105).

In the year 2000, an Egyptian researcher, Mohammad Abdul Badee conducted a study on the effect of imported satellite channels on the values of the Egyptian family.

He said that the family was chosen because it is the first environment with which the child has direct contact and plays a vital role in the socialization of the child. (Al Shenawi, 176).

He said that while there are no official, accurate statistics on the distribution of satellite dishes in Egypt, marketing figures say that there are more than 100 thousand satellite dishes on Cairo rooftops and more than 35 thousand in Alexandria while the rest of the districts have a total of 35 thousand. (Al Shenawi, 180).

The researcher found out that the viewership of the foreign channels increased by 94.3 % and the most popular stations were ART, Saudi Arabia Satellite Channel, Lebanese Channels, Syrian Channel followed by the Cypriot Sigma channel. (Al Shenawi, 185).

He found out that the foreign channels led to the disintegration of the family represented in weak relations between parents and children and the lack of attachment to the family. (Al Shenawi, 185).

The negative effects of the channels on children, according to the study, was the spread of the western values, increasing the fright and anxiety, distracting the child for carrying out his hobbies and alienating him away from his family. In addition the channels also made the child surrounded by all methods of crime and made him more violent as well as it taught him the art of dancing and smoking. (Al Shenawi, 186).

However, the researchers said that the positive values included teaching the child how to enhance their intelligence, widen their horizon, adding vigor to their imagination, encouraging creativity, providing new information and giving them information on the happenings outside their environment. (Al Shenawi, 186).

In the United States in the year 2000, a study was done among 351 second through sixth graders to determine "the effectiveness of an active mediation strategy: encouraging children to focus on the feelings of the victim of violence in a cartoon." (Nathanson, 1).

It was found that "children who were asked to think about the victim's feelings found the cartoon to be less funny than children who did not receive the mediation." (Nathanson, 8).

The researcher found that "although some may argue that we should not worry about the effects of cartoons, especially on older children, cartoons often contain the most dangerous combination of elements for enhancing aggressiveness. Even if children know that the cartoon is not real, it seems that the combination of the attractive funny perpetrator with no reference to the consequences of violence for victims is sufficient for increasing aggressive inclinations in elementary school boys." (Nathanson, 9).

Parents could easily use this strategy, the researcher said, while they watched the shows with their children. "If children become accustomed to taking the victim's perspective, they may learn to use this technique themselves when they watch television alone." (Nathanson, 10).

In a study carried out in the UK in 1996 among mothers of children aged between three and 12 years, the standards mothers use to evaluate the quality of children's cartoons was investigated.

The mothers said they did not expect cartoons to provide role models for children. The researcher said that a reason might be that mothers see cartoons as a "fantastic program type that has little do with reality". (Nikken, 6) However, in this study, mother's expectations of cartoons were quite high.

The profile of standards found for cartoons partially overlaps those found for dramatic and educational children's programs. Where the standards considered important for cartoons differed from those considered important for other program types, the differences seem to be attributable to characteristic features of cartoons.

"Most cartoons depict incidents and activities, which are in reality impossible, so it is perhaps not surprising that mothers do not view credibility as an important feature of cartoons. In addition cartoons usually provide simple amusement, which may explain why mothers expect that cartoons should involve children to a lesser degree than other types of programs. Finally, cartoons are generally easy to follow, which could explain why mothers are less likely to be concerned bout their understandability." (Nikken, 6).

"Family communication and interaction have also been found to mitigate the effects of television on children. This mitigation can occur both directly, when parents actively mediate television for their children and indirectly, through communication environments. The family environment, wherein children learn to interpret and perceive their surroundings, affect how the make sense of television." (Krcmar, 3).

The family communication environment teaches the child how to approach the world. For example, a family where open communication is stressed and ideas are readily shared may convey to the child that his/her ideas are valuable and should normally be shared with others, even with those outside of the family. In turn, that child may perceive others' views as potentially valuable. A family where hierarchy is stressed and parents make most of the decisions may convey to the child that

authority figures makes rules which ultimately must be followed. The child may then value the interpretations and ideas of other authority figures." (Nikken, 3).

In a study conducted among children in grades K to 6 in the United States in 1998, the children were shown violent clips and were allowed to discuss it with the interviewer.

"Children who rated higher on family communication patterns dimension were more likely to see motivated violence as justified, whereas children who rated higher on the control dimension were likely to see punished violence as less justified, although this only approached significance." (Nikken, 8).

In a research studying mothers' active mediation in two cultural settings, the US and Japan, the researcher focused on preschoolers because of his belief that parental active mediation appears to have the most influence on younger children. "Research suggests that the earlier the parental mediation, the more likely children are to acquire an active frame of reference toward television viewing." (Komaya, 2).

The most common television-viewing partner for both American and Japanese children was the mother (51 % of American sample and 66 % of Japanese sample) and American children were more likely to view television programs alone. (Komaya, 5).

The results suggested that most American respondents had clear-cut views about television. American mothers tended to supervise the contents and amount of children's television viewing more than did the Japanese. Many of them also reportedly left their children alone to watch television, in concordance with the American value placed on independence. And as predicted, many American mothers reported active mediation, i.e., answering children's questions and discussing programs.

Such mediation tends to stimulate children's thinking and conversational abilities. In effect, American's active mediation of their children's television viewing supports American socialization goals such as early learning and verbal assertiveness.

"However, Japanese mothers in the sample had more positive and open views of television than did the Americans, and Japanese mothers and children reportedly watched more television than did the Americans. Japanese mothers regarded television as somewhat important for themselves and as having both entertainment and educational value for children. They hoped that television would enhance their children's affective development." (Komaya, 6).

**Methodology**

This preliminary research was conducted using the qualitative research technique: *Intensive Interviews* method.

According to Wimmer (2000), intensive interviews provide detailed background about the reasons respondents give specific answers. "Although they last for several hours and may even take more than one session, intensive interviews

provide great details and more accurate responses to sensitive questions. Moreover, they allow the interviewer to observe the respondents' non-verbal responses, which are difficult to observe in other research methods. Intensive interviews also allow interviewers to form questions based on each respondents' answer, which helps in gathering more information related to the scope of the research". (Wimmer, 122).

Wimmer also states that there are "several advantages to this form of research". He lists the wealth of detail it provides as well as the rapport between respondent and interviewer, which makes it easer to approach certain topics, which may be taboo in other approaches. (Wimmer, 122) Intensive interviews are also descriptive so the final result is a detailed description of the researched topic.

The *sample* was chosen upon availability. Other conditions were kept in mind such as accessibility to the Egyptian cartoon, Bakkar as well as Disney's cartoons (such as Lion King, Tarzan, Pocahontas, 101 Dalmatians, Aladdin, Mulan, Hercules, Snow White, Cinderella and Sleeping Beauty). Mother's chosen for the research had children whose ages ranged from 2 to 14 years old.

*Questions of the interviews* were carefully selected so as to yield relevant data that would be useful for the research. Most of the questions chosen were open-ended questions as they "give respondents freedom in answering questions and allow them to provide in-depth responses". (Wimmer, 163).

Moreover, "they give answers that researchers did not foresee in the construction of questionnaire and flexibility to ask further questions". However, they do have disadvantages, which include the amount of time needed to collect and analyze the answers. Another problem with open-ended questions is that subjects often provide irrelevant answers that have nothing to do with the original questions. (Wimmer, 164).

*Interview Setting:* Some of the interviews were held at the mothers' houses. This allowed them to be comfortable and to be with their children in an atmosphere that reminds them of the actual settings as they watched cartoons with their children. The rest were interviewed at different locations according to feasibility.

**Description of Chosen Clips**

After an in depth interview with the mothers designed to get feedback on their cartoons in general and Disney's cartoons in specific *See Appendix* The mothers were asked to watch a 13-minute clip: Tarzan (seven minutes) and Bakkar (six minutes).

They were asked to pause whenever there is anything they want to discuss with the interviewer especially when there is something that they feel is negative, positive or if there's a thought that they want to share about the clips.

When the mother did not pause, it was assumed that they did not understand the question. Further probing was needed for each clip. They were asked for example if they liked the clip, What are the values that are being taught here?, Do they think they have a positive/negative effect on the child?

**Tarzan's Clip:** In the chosen clip Tarzan was jumping between the trees in the

jungle and he hears bullets firing through the air. As he follows the sound he finds a group of human beings, whom he is not accustomed to see. The group includes a young girl (Jane) and her father (a science professor who is in the Jungle seeking to find guerrillas) as well as their bodyguard (Clayton). As Jane and her father express their excitement at finding a guerilla's nest, Clayton fires away at the sky causing deep distress to Jane. After that Clayton and Jane's father walk into the forest as Jane stalls behind distracted by a little monkey whom she starts to draw. The monkey then snatches the drawing from her hand and she starts to chase him. The baboons are disturbed by the commotion and start chasing Jane who is then saved by Tarzan (who has been watching the entire scene from a distance) in an action-packed two-minute scene. After the escape Tarzan and Jane are together on a tree and he starts to discover her intimately by touching her face, putting his palm against hers, hearing her heartbeats and making her hear his. After that, Jane tried to teach Tarzan to pronounce her name and after a few obstacles Tarzan was able to pronounce her name 'Jane'. The scene ends with Jane hearing Clayton's firing away at the sky and asks Tarzan to take her back to the camp.

**Bakkar's Clip:** Bakkar is at home and had just finished studying when Rashida, his goat, jumps in from the window and into his arms. They went out together to have a walk to the ancient Egyptian temples. When Rashida started playing with the artifacts, Bakkar tells her that these are valuable and that they are there to be enjoyed and protected, not be meddled with. Suddenly, they hear a noise coming from a Pharoanic tomb nearby. They decided to investigate and Bakkar slipped and fell into the tomb followed by Rashida. Inside the tomb they found three men stealing the treasures of the ancient Egyptians. Bakkar asked Rashida to call two of his friends to help him out. She immediately ran up the stairs, out of the tomb to call his friends. Meanwhile, Bakkar tried to scare the men. He took a case of a mummy and hid behind it. By pretending that the guardian of the tomb has come back to life, he threatened to curse the thieves if they did not put back the treasure. One of the thieves suspected something strange happening, so he went near the voice and discovered that it was Bakkar's and not the guardian of the tomb. Bakkar tried to escape and ran quickly to outside when the thieves started to follow him. He was able to get out and close the entrance of the tomb, trapping the thieves inside. Few minutes later, Bakkar, while sitting at the entrance's door allowing none of them to come out, saw his friends coming along with the police to save him and the treasure. At the end of the clip, the police arrested the thieves and Bakkar was happy for being able to report the theft with the aid of his goat and his friends and to save his country's treasure. He was warmly thanked by the police for doing a great job.

**Problems Faced During The Research:**

- Timing of the research (Ramadan): most mothers were not available which

affected our sampling.

- Mothers were busy with their children and exams.
- Mother's did not believe that the topic of the research was important, which led to not giving the interviewer in-depth answers.
- Two of the mothers did not have video sets at home: This was a problem for Bakkar's clip because it had to be explained to them. However, those mothers had Tarzan on their computer sets at home so the interviewer was able to show them the desired clip.
- Some of the questions were not clear. Especially the question that said: "Disney's cartoons do not teach my children sensitivity to different cultures": Because the question was asked in the negative form and led to confusion to both mother and the interviewer at the time of analyzing the data.
- One of the questions asked to the interviewees was a double-barreled (Wimmer, 165), which led to data analysis confusion. The question was: "Do they believe what they see? In other words, do they think cartoons are realistic?"
- The two interviewers of this research misunderstood one question. "Do you discuss what your children view on TV before or after? Or not at all" One interviewer asked it as it was, and the other asked half the sample whether they discuss what they see during or after.
- Some of the questions asked were not relevant to the purpose of the study but perhaps they helped to break the ice. Examples: Which school do they attend? What forms of media do you have at home?
- When mothers were asked similar questions in different parts of the interview they gave the interviewer contradicting answer, which meant that they either did not understand the question or they do not have a clear opinion about it.
- Two of the mothers were totally ignorant about Bakkar.
- The analysis of open-ended questions is difficult.

**Results and Discussion**

'Television shows such as cartoons have greatly influenced our lives to an unknown extent. The cartoon shows are very popular among children. Television can be a great avenue of influence in children. Television viewing in today is different from the past because there is greater technology, which allows for the availability of sources to everyone. Many television programs such as cartoon still contain violence for the young viewers because many people forget the effects and consequences of the violence observed by children.'

(Television as a medium of Education.... 1)

Many mothers in the survey reiterated the above comments as the results below indicate.

In the survey, 80 % of the mothers' had children aged from two to five years, 20 % had children aged from six to ten years and 30 per cent had children aged

between 11 and fourteen. When asked about the forms of media they had access to at home, all of the mothers said they had access to television, radio and newspapers. Ninety percent said they had access to satellite channels and computers. While 70 % of the mothers had access to Internet and only 60 % had video sets. The importance of knowing this information is knowing the forms of media which children have access to in their homes.

"Of particular importance for young children are parents, who may help select what media they see, listen to, or read. Parents also select the magazines and newspapers that enter the house, which thereby become accessible for their children". (Cortes, 24).

Half the mothers said that they had no limitations on their children's viewing habits. They allowed them to watch television as much as they wanted regardless of the day being a school day or a holiday/weekend. Twenty percent of the mothers restricted their children to two hours or less, another 20 % said that they had different arrangements for school days and the summer and 10 % of the mothers said that they only allow their children to watch TV during the weekends.

When asked whether or not their children had television sets in their bedrooms, 70 % of the mothers said they didn't allow that in order to supervise what their children see. Yet, 30 % of the mothers permitted their children to have TV sets in the bedrooms.

The problem with having television set in the child's room is " the solitary time spent using media.... Computer games, television shows.. etc are not a two-way human connections" ( Kelly, Katy, 1).

The accessibility to Internet did not affect the children's interest in watching cartoons. Ninety Percent of the mothers confirmed that their children are fond of cartoons with 50 % saying that their child was too young to be interested in the Internet and 30 % did not have access to the Internet. Meanwhile, 10 % only said that their child was not interested in cartoons anymore.

In terms of choosing what their children see, 40 % of the mothers said that they did not choose what their children see and another 40 % said that they did citing their desire to prevent their children from viewing violence (10 %), to choose cartoons with positive values (10 %) and to monitor what their children watch (10 %). Twenty per cent of the mothers said that they sometimes choose the TV programs for their children adding that their children were too young to understand the content of television programs.

"Parents not only influence what media their children consume. They also influence how children process, interpret and internalize the media they are consuming. In doing so parents participate alongside other societal curriculum individuals and organizations as both gatekeepers and media "spin doctors." (Cortes, 25).

The mothers were asked whether they forbade their children from watching

specific cartoons. Eighty percent of them said that they allow their children to watch all kinds of cartoons for two reasons. First, they do not think that they have negative impact on their children. Second, they want their children to watch everything while they are mediating instead of watching them behind their backs.

Meanwhile, 20% of the mothers banned specific cartoons that contain violence (10%), romantic themes (10%) such as Lion King 2, or anti religious themes (10%), such as Hercules, which depicted the hero as the son of god and a war between the various gods.

The father, surprisingly, plays a role, although not that prominent, in the selection of what their children watch. Forty percent of the mothers said that their husbands have a say, 10 % said that they don't and 50 % said that the father may sometimes have a say, depending on their availability at home which means that the mother play a greater role in such a matter.

"Guidance behavior of fathers and mothers may differ, particularly in traditional households. There is research suggesting that mothers and fathers differ in the ways in which they interact with their children. Mothers and fathers express their emotions differently towards their children. Generally mothers and fathers interact differently with their children"(Van Den Bulck, 3)

"Mothers, more likely to be at home during the day, can provide more accurate information about their child's use of television than their husbands. (Gantz, 532).

In terms of the specific cartoon interests of the children, 30 % of the mothers said their children liked to watch Disney's cartoons, another 30 % said that they "adored" Tom & Jerry and 30 % said their children loved to watch cartoons with animals. Ten per cent of the sample said that their children liked to watch cartoons, which have superheroes such as Pokemon, and Japanese cartoons. Thirty percent said that their children watched all kinds of cartoons without any specific preference.

The mothers' expressed different opinions regarding the international cartoons such as Disney's Tarzan, Pocahontas and Aladdin. Below are a few things they had to say:

"Innovative, Creative and attractive"

"Disney's cartoons knows how to attract children as well as adults, their characters are so nice and lively and their techniques are very good"

"Amusing and very advanced"

"You really like to live the story of the cartoon"

"I don't regard them as 100 per cent safe for my children"

"I don't think that children should be exposed to this type of cartoons that have a love story as part of its theme."

"I like the idea of having animals, which children like as well as famous Arabic actors in the dubbing. However, there's a lot of violence"

"It teaches them western values"

"I love cartoons"

"I don't like them all. I don't want my son to watch them all."
"More interesting, attractive, colorful, fast moving and you feel as thought the characters are speaking out at you from the screen. It's very well done."

"The success of the Disney fairy tale from 1937 to the present is not due to Disney's uncanny ability to retell nineteenth century fairy tales with originality and uniqueness, but due to his intuitive genius that made use of the latest technological developments in the cinema".( Buckingham, 1995,109)

Forty percent of the overall sample thought that these cartoons have a positive effect on their children. They said:

> "They teach them positive qualities such as to love their friends, to obey their parents and to defend themselves."
> "They teach them good things such as friendship, loyalty, types of animals and how to be creative."
> *"Children can learn to be loyal, cooperative, friendly and to respect all people."*

Despite the responses of the mothers during the viewing of the clip and their answers to other questions, only 20 % of them said that they felt that Disney's cartoons have a negative effect on their children as they believed that these cartoons are not teaching values and they are "only giving data and information". In another question, half of the mothers said that they don't regard cartoons as safe for their children. Some of the mother's comments with regards to the negative effects of these cartoons were:

> *"He can imitate the way the cat (Tom) drinks milk, he wants to be strong as Tarazan, and he can act things out. The pranks are negative. There are no values to be learnt."*
> "I've only shown him Lion King 2 once, then I didn't show it to him again. It's not fit for children, it's a love story, it's not a cartoon."
> "In the dubbed cartoons, they use colloquial language and sometimes it's pretty slang. They teach them how to swear."
> "It teaches violence and things that doesn't happen in our culture."

From the mothers' quotes we can see that some cartoons may not use violence but still affect the child negatively. These cartoons are of the type that contain inappropriate material for the children.

Meanwhile, 40% said that they view Disney's cartoons as having both positive and negative effects on their children. They said:

> *"You can use the positive things in the cartoon to convince your son and at the same time it could have a negative impact on the*

> *children because they're unrealistic and contain violence."*
> "It is de-stressing to watch them, but not too much of it. It makes you live in a different world. I know people whose son is extremely violent at school because he watches violent cartoons. There are no values, just entertainment."
> "Lion King teaches them courage. 101 Dalmatians teaches them how a mother and father love their child. The cartoon with the least values is Tarzan."
> "It improves their language. That's the only benefit of these shows. Especially the English versions."

Although the sample was chosen from Egyptian mothers, none of them said that their children preferred to watch local cartoons such as Bakkar and 10% said that their children were not even familiar with the local cartoons and another 10% said they wished their children watched Bakkar more often. However, 70 % said that their children liked to watch international cartoons such as Disney, Tom & Jerry and Japanese cartoons while 20 per cent said that their children didn't mind watching both cartoons.

The interviewer felt that it was necessary to have an overview of the kind of mediation the mothers' had as they were growing up in order to assess whether it influenced they way they brought up their children.

When asked about whether they had any form of mediation, surprisingly 60 % of the mothers said that they had no mediation at all, 20 % had low mediation and another 20 % had high forms of mediation with mother even saying that in her house she had to take permission to even switch on the TV set!

Eighty per cent of the mothers do not attempt to apply the same standards of mediation on which they were brought up to their own children. They cited different reason including the fact that their "children have access to different media" (20 %), "children are curious" (10 %), "we don't have the same ethics as before, as we're more open to western societies" (20 %). Meanwhile, 20 % of the overall sample said they would apply the same standards to their children.

The cartoons of the past were not just a way of entertaining the children, "they taught, they brought hope, they were something to cherish." The cartoons that had replaced them are full of violence and crudeness.

www.geocities.com/televisionsity/set/6257/plight.html,1).

"Without question, children today grow up in much more media-rich households than their parents' and importantly, with more uses for the television set. What do we know about what children watch on television? It's mostly adult fare. Children do not by any means watch only programs intended specifically for them"(Dennis, 30).

An interesting finding of the research was that 20 % of the mothers like to watch

cartoons themselves. According to Buckingham, (1995,111) "Disney's films were never intended solely for children but to captivate the 'child' in the viewers. If one can discern in the films an attitude toward children, it is that they to be swept away as objects by the delightful and erotic images."

Eighty percent said that they spend time watching cartoons with their children for a variety of reasons: to explain what they don't understand (10%), to stress positive values (10%), to undermine negative habits (10%), and 20% of them said that they even watch the cartoons before their children to judge whether it's suitable for them or not. While 20% of the sample do not spend any time watching cartoons with their children with one mother saying that she has no time.

The study included an important question to the mothers on whether they discussed what their children watched on TV. Only 10 % said that they didn't. However, 50 % of the mothers said that they discussed the cartoons during the viewing process. One mother said: "I am keen to sit and watch the cartoons with him and if I hear a word being said that I think is wrong I'd say: 'Tsk Tsk Tsk, see Mohammad what he just said! He shouldn't have said that right?' So that he understands that it's wrong and that it shouldn't just pass by without notice… Tarzan, for example, goes out into the jungle with hardly any clothes on! I have to explain to him that it's not right to go out into the street like that! You can't just sit there and be impressed by the show with him without guidance."

Thirty percent of the mothers discuss the content of cartoons with their children before and after they watched it, while 10 per cent discussed the content after and none of the mothers said that they deliberately discuss it before their children watched it.

In a study assessing parent expectations of Egyptian children, Strom said "that Egyptian mothers and fathers expressed discomfort whenever sons and daughters asked them questions to which they did not know the answers". (Strom, 3).

In addition the researchers said that mothers and fathers viewed themselves as a resource and revealed the perception of the child's role as a reamer. (Strom, 4).

The questions that children would ask their mothers may seem innocent or naïve to adults, however, they were genuine questions and the mothers were obliged in most cases to give convincing answers:

> "If there's something he doesn't understand"
> "He asks questions about romantic scenes. If he sees a man and woman together
> he asks questions"
> "Why did this happen?"
> "He asks about events occurring on the screen, even as he's watching"
> "Why don't animals talk to us, can we fly as superman, do animals sing"

> "Explain what happened to me, why did he do so, when he was young he asks questions such as can animals talk? Can human beings fly"
> "Is this real? Do animals have specific language"
> "How did Tom become so flat? How did he take the shape of the bottle? Why does Jerry hate Tom? Do animals cry?"

In response to a question on whether their child's social life is affected by many hours of watching TV 70 % of the mothers said Yes and 30 % didn't see any effect. Meanwhile 80 % felt that their children became less active when they watched TV for long hours.

A study by researches at the University of Buffalo and John Hopkins University on television and obesity among children concluded that " the incidence of obesity was highest among children who watched four or more hours of television a day and lowest among children watching an hour or less a day. (Article Documents Negative Impact...1).

Twenty five percent of those 80% said that cartoons make their "brain stop working". Twenty per cent of the mothers said that television did not affect the mental creativeness of their child.

"One problem with cartoons is that they do not challenge the children's minds. When a child watches television, the screen is doing all of the thinking for him, leaving nothing up to the child's imagination. As a result of this lack of simulation, only minimal brain activity occurs, thus depriving the child's development, cartoons are essentially useless." (Are Cartoons Affecting America?, 1).

As mothers are aware of this effect, they "ranked television last when asked to choose the activity they would prefer their child to do when they were too busy to play with their child. Playing with friends was chosen over television most often (90%) followed by helping mother (80%) and playing alone (72%)". (Gantz, 533).

Another 20 % of the mothers admitted that at a certain point of their lives, they used the television set as a temporary babysitter to distract their children.

"One of the primary functions of any babysitter is supervising the child. When a parent hires a babysitter, he /she expects that person to watch the child and make sure the child is safe. When a babysitter is present, parents do not expect to called on to intercede or supervise the child's actions. Obviously, television does not serve all the functions a human babysitter fulfills". (Gantz, 530).

"Television was babysitter whenever the parent actively encouraged the child to watch television or permitted the child to continue to watch without the parent, primarily because of benefits the parents would derive. This perspective suggests expanding typical gratifications typologies to include gratifications obtained by an individual due to another's (forced) exposure to the medium". (Gantz, 531).

Sixty per cent of the mothers said that their children believe what they see and

that they feel that cartoons are realistic. However, 30 % said that their children understand that cartoons are fiction and could not happen in our real life. Only 10 % of the sample whose children's age is between 11 and 14 said that the child now doesn't feel that the shows are real but they did believe that at a younger age.

Children did not only believe that cartoons are realistic but 60 % of the sample's children even imitated the characters, sometimes to their mother's shock.

Following are a few examples:

> "He imitates some of the characters' physical expressions"
> "Sometimes he likes to walk on his hands like Tarzan": 20%
> "He imitates how they sing"
> "When he watches violent cartoons, he acts them out on teddy bears"
> "Yes, the violence, but not in real life."
> "At a certain point of his life, when I'd put down the food for him to eat, he'd put his hands behind his back and he'd eat with his mouth of his plate."
> "He also jumps from couch to couch as Tarzan jumps from one tree to the other."
> "He likes to kiss me on my mouth even though I keep telling him it's wrong."

Children may imitate the use of alcohol and tobacco in animated films " as a nod of approval" (101 Dalmatians, Roger smoked a pipe) "children do remember such seemingly trivial features".( Tobacco and Alcohol Use in Children Animated Films ..1).

In his book the **Children Are Watching**, Carlos Cortés speaks about an experience he had with his two grandchildren Holly and Melissa.

"One day Melissa began whimpering because I had chastised her about something. Her consoling older sister turned to her and said, comfortingly, "That's okay. Hakuna Matata". A tune sung by Simba (Lion King) and his two pals to cheer themselves up, "Hakuna Matata" means "no worries." It worked for Melissa as well as for Simba, because she grinned broadly and stopped whimpering. The girls' superficial imitative behavior may not be as dramatic as purported media-generated copycat killings. Nonetheless, it suggests the way that media surreptitiously become a part of language and action." (Cortés, 11 ).

In another section he says:

"One evening, without warning, Holly asked Laurel and me to leave the room. She didn't want us in the room during that part of the movie- the scene where Pocahontas and John Smith first express affection towards each other." (Cortés, 15).

Children also acquire language from the cartoons they watch. Sixty per cent of the mothers said that they do use language, especially the singing and from the

Disney's cartoons dubbed in Arabic.

"Parents who were more involved in their child's television viewing had children whose language scores were higher". (Singer, 148).

"Adult co viewing is facilitative of vocabulary growth, because the adult can provide explicit definitions, explain potential confusions and include additional exemplars. However, the data available thus far suggest that, when the language of television is pitched at the level of the child who is viewing adult co viewing is not necessary for word acquisition to occur". (Singer, 149).

When the mothers' were asked whether their children feel scared of specific types of cartoons, 20% of them said that their children felt frightened of watching specific types of cartoons. Sixty percent of the mothers said that their children were not scared of any type of cartoons and 20 % did not notice any fright on their children while they were watching cartoons.

The sample was asked to respond on a Likert scale on a number of statements.

1. <u>Disney's cartoons teach my children violence</u>
   Agree (50 %), Neutral (10 %), Disagree (40 %)

Surveys on whether TV programs contain violence or not resulted in the following " about five violent acts are committed during 1 hour of prime time evening television programming and 20-25 violent acts occur each hour on Saturday morning: children's programs" (Children and Television, 1).

In another study by John D. Abel and Maureen E. Beninson to examine the perceptions of television program violence by children and mothers, the results were as follow: "children perceived programs to have more violence than did their mothers. However, there were no differences among male and female children's perceptions of the amount of violence in the programs. Also the study indicated that children were more regular viewers of the most violence shows than their mothers.

2. <u>Disney's cartoons teach my child about other cultures and societies</u>
   Strongly Agree (10 %), Agree (40 %), Disagree (50 %)
3. <u>Disney's cartoons teach my child new vocabulary</u>
   Strongly Agree (40 %), Agree (60 %)
4. <u>Disney's cartoons teach my children promiscuity</u>
   Strongly Agree (10%), Agree (30 %), Neutral (10%), Disagree (50%)
5. <u>Disney's cartoons do not teach my children sensitivity to different cultures</u>
   Agree (30 %), Neutral (10%), Disagree (50%), Strongly disagree (10%)

"Lippi- Green's claim that animated features teach children to ethnocentrically discriminate by portraying bad characters with foreign accents is examined in the context of recent and classic Disney films.... A specific example of a Disney character who portrays an accent obvious to the viewing public through the use of markers and stereotypes in Scar in the movie The Lion King... The choice of British accent to Scar is intended to highlight his snobbish mannerism and his feelings of intellectual superiority towards the rest of the plains animals and thus complies with

Gould's generalizations about British accents" (Wenke, Eric, 1,3,4).

6. Bakkar is more useful for my child
   Strongly Agree (20 %), Agree (40%), Neutral (10 %), Disagree (30 %)
7. Bakkar teaches my child positive aspects with regard to their culture
   Strongly Agree (10 %), Agree ( 80%), Neutral (10%)
8. I wish cartoons would be more sensitive to my child's growing needs
   Agree (80 %), Neutral (10 %), Disagree (10 %).
9. I wish cartoons would give them more useful information and focus less on violence
   Strongly Agree (20 %), Agree (50%), Disagree (30 %)

One mother said that she did not expect cartoons to provide her child with information, she said she wanted good entertainment and that she can do the job of giving him the information herself.

According to Dennis, "most of us don't think of television as a potential educational resource at all; we think of television the way its come to us over the years—entertainment, cheerfully complacent in its vulgarity and its bottom line objectives." (Dennis, 22).

He added that producers of commercial TV shows for children have always reiterated that "kids don't want to education with televisions" and that "no one can force a person to watch boring programming." It assumes that learning is and should be, the same things as schooling. It pretends that kids don't learn from entertainment. (Dennis, 26).

**Mother's Comments While Watching Tarazan's Clip:**

*Two mothers commented on the choice of the clip itself.*

She said: The clip does not reflect the whole idea behind the movie. It is just a very short part that does not say anything about Tarzan's life in the forest. This part does not teach anything but the movie does. It teaches children how to be loyal to their families and to their parents who raised them up.

I do not have much to say about this because it is a short part and does not reflect the real theme of the story, but it is nice.

*Others commented on the violence it included, such as Clayton 's firing in the air and the baboon chase.*

"Full of violence and does not teach any good values."

"This is unjustified violence."

*Some felt that the clip had no effect on their children.*

" I like the clip very much. It is very interesting and attractive. I do not see any positive or negative effects on my child.

*Some mentioned the scary effect.*

"I can not tell whether it could teach them something positive or negative but

the baboons running after her are somehow scary especially if they are very young."

"Scary for little kids (Monkey's chasing her).

*Some felt that the closeness of Tarzan and Jane was not a problem.*

"But when he touches her and feels her heart beats, I think this is ok because it is part of the theme. Children will understand this wrong. He is doing this out of curiosity, as he is not used to seeing human beings. He does not mean sex or anything wrong. It really attracts children regardless what it teaches."

"This is not appropriate, but it will not attract my son (because of his age) to watch it."

"They're too close to one another. But some children will not notice. It could be interpreted in different ways. If a child is brought up in a culture where he sees this a lot it will be normal. I don't think I'm not comfortable. My son I think will notice. It depends on the child's age."

However, others felt that it was quite problematic and paused while watching the clip.

"Too close. I wouldn't want my son to watch this. He'll ask questions about what's going on. But I don't think he'll ever think that it's normal though. I just don't like this because it brings his attention to something that I don't think in normal circumstances he would notice. It's difference between two animals than between two human beings."

"These shots are completely unnecessary. It teaches that it is normal to be like that between a boy and girl."

The mothers felt that the clip teaches that it is important to save a person who's in trouble.

"This could teach him that he must help others."

"The child learns that if there's someone in trouble he needs to help him."

Some mothers commented on the high quality of production.

"The production is very good."

Some mothers commented on the danger element of jumping from one tree to another.

"He learns here that it is not dangerous to jump from one tree to another."

"Tarazan jumping around amidst the trees with ropes. It's dangerous."

"My son jumps like that from couch to couch."

"This is very dangerous; he might attempt to do it using the curtains and to fly out of the window."

*In one scene Jane tricks a baby monkey by saying: look a banana! And then snatches a drawing from his hand. A few mothers did not see this positively.*

"I want him to give me something immediately not to trick me. This is something that he imitates."

"This teaches lying"

One mother also commented on the monkey using an umbrella to descend as

being dangerous, saying that children could imitate it.

"The monkey descending by holding an umbrella. I fear that he will imitate this thinking that it is safe to jump if you're holding an umbrella."

Tarzan's nudity also prompted one mother to comment.

"I keep telling him you don't walk like that in the street."

One mother felt that Tarzan's watching Jane and her group from a distance may teach the child to secretly spy. Another felt that there was actual informational content such as Clayton's remark on the fact that guerilla's are "ferocious animals".

**Mother's Comments While Watching Bakkar's Clip:**

Most of the mothers agreed that Bakkar teaches their children positive values.

"There are many values that can be taught from this clip such as: friendship, loving animals and be kind to them, protecting our history, being brave, fighting evil, being supportive to your friend. etc".

"Very simple and children can easily understand it. It teaches the children positive values such as: "we should try to protect our heritage", " friends should be cooperative", " Stealing is not correct", " one should be brave".

"I liked the clip because it delivers a certain message to the children which is we should protect our statues and that we should be brave when facing troubles."

"He learns that it is important to be active and not passive."

"This is a very good clip. It teaches the children many positive ethics. It teaches them how to be good citizens. Moreover, it teaches them that whenever they see anything wrong, they should not hide it and should immediately report to the responsible person."

"I like the fact that there was a problem and that it was solved in front of him so that he learns what to do in moments of trouble."

"This part gives information on the importance of monuments and that it is not just pieces of stones and that it has values. But Tarzan is more fun".

The child would get the information that he may not grasp if he reads it. Such as the nature of the artifacts and why people steal it."

Some drew the interviewers' attention to the difference in quality of the technical production between Bakkar and Disney:

"Little kids may like it but it is not as interesting as Disney's. The technique and the drawings are different from Disney. I think it is very slow and at some point it is boring. But it is more ethical and teaches more value than Disney's".

" If the local cartoons adopt these techniques (of the international cartoons), I think they would be more useful for the children."

"Bakkar's character is very successful but the plot itself is not sophisticated. Not fascinating. Lacks technical aspects"

"The simplistic sounds. It's very unsophisticated and is there in all Arab cartoons. Even the characters, they all look alike, the artist did not try to create new

looks, but simply modified one character to make it seem as though there are more than one."

A lot of the mothers emphasized the fact that Bakkar teaches children positive things about their culture and country:

"It teaches him how to love his country and that he must protect it from people who are trying to damage or steal from it".

"It teaches them how to love the country and protect the monuments."

Some mothers commented on the information quantity of the clip:

"Too informative and the child will not grasp all the information".

"In Tarzan the information is not condensed."

"It's very informative unlike Disney's production that depend on action and entertainment".

*One of the mothers believed that Bakkar's clip was unrealistic when he spoke to his goat and asked her to call his friends.*

" It would have been better to have a friend of his to help him."

**Conclusion and Recommendations**

In conclusion, this preliminary research was conducted to study the effects of cartoons on children, as their mothers' perceive them.

The research questions posed at the beginning of the study were adequately answered throughout the different sections of the research.

Meanwhile, the hypotheses were also proved or disproved accordingly:

The first hypothesis was: 'the more the mothers lived in a mediated media environment as children, the more they tried to apply it to their children.'

This was hypotheses was wrong. When their mothers were asked about the level of mediation they received from their parents as children, only 20% of the overall sample who said that they themselves experienced high level of mediation from their parents as children, also said that they apply the same standards of mediation on their children. There seems to be a mistrust among mothers about the current media environment which they regards as 'different' in terms of violent content from what they were exposed to as children, therefore mothers who felt that imposed stricter rules on television viewing in general and also on cartoons in specific.

According to the mothers' opinions, the majority of cartoons especially the international cartoons such as Disney, " use violence, rage, anger, revenge, and other awful emotions to deal with personal conflicts among characters" (Kelly's portfolio 3).

The second hypothesis stated that 'the younger the children, the more they tend to live in the cartoon fantasy world.' This was valid as thirty percent of the sample said that their children used to believe the content of cartoons was real when they were at a younger age. One mother decided to heavily mediate cartoons after her daughter became too involved with the cartoon characters and started to day dream intensively.

"She lived with the characters. the Jungle Book, Sleeping Beauty. Everything became related to the cartoons. Her reactions became slower and her school teachers noticed and advised me to put limits to the time which she spends watching cartoons. Till now, even though she's 14, Heba is still affected by the world of fantasies, but now it's that of novel characters."

The third hypothesis said that 'the more the children watch cartoons, the less active they become' This hypothesis was proven as 80% of the mothers felt that their children became less active when they watched cartoons for long hours.

The fourth hypothesis said that 'the more children watch violent cartoons, the more they tend to act aggressively'. The findings of the research did not support or negate this hypothesis. Future research on the topic should consider a method to measure the relation between watching violent cartoons and acting aggressively.

From the findings of the research, we can see that some of the cartoons, especially the international cartoons, are viewed by the mothers to have a negative effect on their children's personality and the way they perceive the world around them. Also, other academics have reiterated these concerns. For example, Abu Isbaa says: "Television floods the minds of toddlers with images at a time in which his mind should be learning how to create them inside it. (Abu Isbaa, 63).

Prominent U.K. media educationalist David Buckingham said that research has proven that too much television has had a negative effect on the child's academic achievement. (Buckingham, 1996, 64).

"When programs are planned and designed to teach, children can learn academic skills, information, and social values. Even when programs are not designed to teach, children learn from them, and sometimes what they learn is antisocial aggression or social stereotypes". (Macbeth, 39) " Heavy television viewing also can affect the quality of a child's social interaction" and the toy play of preschoolers (Van Evra, 89).

On the other hand, some of the mothers perceived cartoons as a method of teaching their children.

"There are positive effects for television including the increase of language learning, knowing other worlds with which he's not familiar, it sometimes serves as a role model for good conduct, it transfers social values, could be used as an educational tool when there are information that could be transferred to him.. In addition it helps in the political socialization of the child as well as the development of the aesthetic appreciation for the child." (Abu Isbaa, 64).

When mothers were asked how they can use cartoons to enhance their children development, they gave the following suggestions:

1. Cartoons should be 'meaningful'. For example many mothers said that they wish cartoons would teach their children good habits. "Honesty, Courage, Respect for Elders, Bearing Responsibility, Independence, these are all values I wish he'd learn," one mother said.

2. Another mentioned the importance of educational cartoons, even though one mother did say that she doesn't want cartoons to be informative and that she'd rather have them focus on safe entertainment.
3. Media people, one mother said, should try to present cartoons suitable to "specific ages especially the very early ages as some of the cartoons are really beyond the understanding of the child."
4. For the local cartoons, media people, as one mother suggested, "should work on their themes and techniques. They should try to make them more interesting and attractive to avoid children getting bored." There needs to be more attractive music and fun characters.
5. Cartoons should also keep in mind current issues and discuss problems that are up to date.
6. Arab and Islamic values should be transmitted through cartoons. Religious things should be taught to them in simple, attractive manners.
7. Media people need to conduct surveys among mothers in different income groups to find out the values they want their child to acquire and they should try to incorporate it in the cartoons.
8. "There should be more conferences, symposiums, there should be psychologists, sociologists, and pediatricians involved not just an idea for a director. There needs to be more research conducted and other people besides artists involved."
9. It's important to teach him fantasy but not to the extent of making them talk to animals, one mother said.
10. Mothers expressed concern at the slang language used in dubbed Disney cartoons.
11. "Local cartoons need to be provided with more funds in order to be able to compete with international cartoons"
12. Parents should place the television set in the family area to be able to supervise their children.
13. Television should avoid broadcasting western programs, which carry values that are alien to our culture, and programs with violence should also be eliminated. Meanwhile, children's programs should be placed in different timings than adult programs and the child should also not be allowed to freely choose programs or to use the video as he likes".(Abu Isbaa, 69).

**<u>The following are some guidelines for the parents:</u>**

1. They should watch at least one episode of the programs their children watch.
2. When they see violent scenes they should discuss what caused the character to act in a violent way. As one of the researches cited in the literature review said, parents should try to involve the child with the victim in order to reduce the amusement of watching violent cartoons.
3. Parents should ban any programs that they find too offensive.
4. Parents should teach their children how to critically watch television.

5. They should also limit the amount of time children spend watching television, and encourage children to spend their time on sports, hobbies or with friends.
6. Finally, parents should encourage children to watch programs that demonstrate helping, caring and cooperation" ( Brossette, Tonja, 1)

**Research Recommendations:**

1. Future researches should include other media products besides cartoons and should also examine parental mediation of other forms of media such as the internet and book reading. (Van Den Bulck,3).
2. Parents may provide answers which they feel is socially desirable, therefore this bias must be taken into consideration in determining whether the results should be generalized.
   A number of authors have remarked that there are often large discrepancies between the reports of children and parents regarding behaviors in the family. Significant discrepancies have also been found between parents' and children's accounts of media use. (Van Den Bulck, 3).
3. Because of this socially desirable bias, research should also focus on children and they should be asked to describe the form of mediation they go through. "Children's answers to survey questions are probably more reliable, because it is known that parents try to appear as "good" parents by giving socially desirable answers". (Buckingham, 132) "All too often, researchers study parents when they actually want to study children. While this is interesting when studying parent's opinions and parent's attitudes it offers little insight in what children think, feel and experience. Such an approach reflects a general tend to treat children as passive recipients of education and care". (Van Den Bulck, 8).
4. Future research should make distinctions between boys and girls and be more age specific.
5. Future research should consider other methodologies such as focus groups and in-depth interviews with at least a sample of 100 mothers from different economic backgrounds.

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# Egyptian Movies in the Global Age: Out of Touch or Out of Sight Case Study *

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**Abstract**

*If cinema is one of the media through which we imagine place, it must also be acknowledged that place is one of the templates with which we imagine cinema. Cinema, in other words, has commonly been analyzed as a medium of expression specific to a geographically situated culture. And within cinema's taxonomy, privilege has been granted to national cultures. As a medium of representation, cinema, specifically, offers us pictures of our physical and social world, showing us where we live, with whom we share community, and from whom we are different. Cinema offers us depictions of history, stories that explain to us how we got here and why our community is the way it is.*

*On the other hand, the term globalization refers to the increased mobility of people, capital, commodities, information, and images associated with the postindustrial stage of capitalism, the development of increasingly rapid and far-ranging communication and transportation technologies, and people's improved access to these technologies. Globalization has increased and facilitated intercultural contact across an array of social sites. Globalization nowadays imposes one type on everyone, but Hollywood is just one type of cinema and a single cinematic culture is dangerous for humanity as it may kill diversity, that is why Arab and non-Western worlds need to create a new cinema, which is deeply located in identity. We also aim to build bridges with other kinds of cinema of other cultures and ideologies.*

*This descriptive study aims to define the effects of globalization on the Egyptian cinema industry through how far does it affect the Egyptian Arab cinema. The study is divided into two parts. The first part will give an extensive look toward the effects of globalization on the cinema industry especially in Egypt as the Arab Hollywood, putting in consideration the effects of both the American (Hollywood) and Indian (Bollywood) cinema effects on the Arab world. While the second part will give an account of the Egyptian cinema industry within the last decade with a highlight over the role of both Cairo and Alexandria Film Festivals and the Egyptian Cinema Production City (Madeenet Alentag Alealamee). The study will also shed light on the interrelated problems of film culture and the film market in the Egyptian Cinema, as the Egyptian industry by virtue of its leading position, is part of a more general assessment of the problems suffered by other branches of culture, the root of which seems to be a doubt about the value of culture in general.* ■

* Abstract only is published here

## Global Education and Service-Learning (Role of Civil Society)

### Organizer: Dr. Salah Arafa, Department of Physics

In the education sector, the main concerns for human development are: the lack of clear policy guidelines on day care/pre-school education and non-formal education; the disparities in performance between the English-medium and Arabic-medium schools and between those Arabic-medium schools in towns/large village and those in small villages/remote areas; insufficient attention to the needs of special groups like disabled children, etc.; inadequate coverage in the syllabi of subjects like population, environment and pre-vocational issues; disparities in the enrolment and performance indicators among districts; and insufficient emphasis on vocational and technical education making these forms of education appear inferior to the mainstream academic schooling.

This special session was devoted to the role of NGOs in the education sector. A short presentation entitled "Global Education, Service-Learning, and Role of NGOs" was given by Professor Salah Arafa, followed by a presentation given by Mr. Sami Mohamed El-Tabbakh, head of NGOs division at the Ministry of Education. The opening lecture was given by Professor Ahmed El-Rashidi entitled " The Role of NGOs in enabling the Community Schools in the Globalization Era". There were few presentations by NGOs from the field (CEOSS, Salama Mousa, Basaisa, NCPD, and others) then questions and comments from the floor.

NGO leaders, development practitioners, researchers, teachers, funding agencies, media writers and intellectuals as well as representatives of all sectors attended this meeting. Arabic was the language of the meeting and simultaneous translation was available.

**The primary objectives of the meeting were:**

To facilitate networking and exchange of experience among those working in the field of human development; to highlight the important role of NGO's in human development; to present few success stories from the field. To highlight the sustainable long-standing commitment of AUC to community development exemplified in the Basaisa village integrated field project.

**The main questions for discussion were:**

Are we in need of Global Education? Service-Learning? Is our education system adequate for the 21st Century?

Are we ready for distant Education using ICT?

Will these new Technologies help the poor? help in illiteracy eradication?

Will Service-Learning be welcomed by local communities?

Can NGOs play more active roles in education and training?

With such a unique diversity of attendees and speakers, we hope to have shed light on the complex issue of human development and to have emphasized the importance of the role played by NGO's. ■